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THE

# QUARTERLY REVIEW.

No. 454.—JANUARY, 1918.

## Art. 1.—IMPERIAL UNITY: THE PRACTICAL CONDITIONS.

1. *Imperial Federation: the Problem of National Unity.* By Geo. R. Parkin. Macmillan, 1892.
2. *Imperial Unity and the Dominions.* By Arthur Berriedale Keith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916.
3. *The Problem of the Commonwealth.* Macmillan, 1916.
4. *The Privy Council and Problems of Closer Union of the Empire.* By Arthur P. Poley. In 'Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation,' Jan. 1917.
5. *The Organisation of the Empire: A suggestion.* By the Rt Hon. Herbert Samuel. In 'The Nineteenth Century and After.' March 1917.
6. *The War and the Empire.* By J. H. Morgan. In the 'Law Quarterly Review,' July 1917.
7. *Parliamentary Papers.* [1910, Cd 5273; 1911, Cd 5513, Cd 5741 (Imperial Conference of 1911); 1914, Cd 7347 (representation of the Dominions on the Imperial Defence Committee); 1917, Cd 8566 (Imperial War Conference).]

And other works.

### I. *The Empire and its Components.*

THE war has quickened men's thinking in many ways; it has caused us to recognise matters as urgent which had passed for being merely speculative; it has placed many standing questions of policy in a wholly new light. Among the problems of which this may be most truly said is that of devising some effective organic form to embody the unity of the British Empire. Here a

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beginning of action is already under our eyes. The Government of the mother country is in intimate contact with the Governments of the Dominions, and is in a better position than it has ever been before for ascertaining what the people of the Dominions really desire, to what extent their desires agree, and what measures intended to give effect to their claims will be most acceptable and practicable. Little now remains secret as to the knowledge the King's Ministers have acquired and the direction in which it has led their thoughts.

On May 4, 1917, it was announced that the Imperial War Cabinet, among other unanimous resolutions, recommended the calling of a special Imperial Conference immediately after the cessation of hostilities to consider the subject of constitutional relations within the Empire. On May 17 it was announced in Parliament that there would be an annual meeting of the Imperial Cabinet. Mr Lloyd George led up to this announcement by his statement, made at the Guildhall on April 27, in which he laid down the fundamental conditions as matters no longer of opinion, fixing the task of British statesmanship in the immediate future. In the past, he said, we treated that great commonwealth of nations, the British Empire, as a glorious abstraction (this must be taken, of course, as applying to the general attitude of the public in the mother country, and in that sense it is perfectly true); but now the choice must be made between immediate concentration and ultimate dissolution. The Dominions had established claims to a real partnership; henceforth effective consultation must be the only basis of future cooperation. Our Councils of Empire must be a reality; and (what is even more significant) the experiment of the Imperial War Cabinet must be incorporated in the fabric of the Empire. General Smuts's no less remarkable speech of May 15 may be taken as giving, in some measure, the answer of South Africa.

Mr Lloyd George (need it really be said?) means by an empire what Burke meant, 'the aggregate of many states under one common head; *whether this head be a monarch, or a presiding republic.*' There is no implication of a titular emperor, or of arbitrary government, or of any particular species of government, or of any rule or tendency of external policy. Thus India is,

as has been well said, an empire within an empire; and it is so because it is not only British India, but an aggregate of states, many of them important states. India was an empire not only before there was an imperial title, but before the Crown had assumed direct sovereignty; and the King's description as *Kaisar-i-Hind* is in truth only the recognition of the fact which existed a century ago and more. Some people dislike the word 'empire' because they imagine it to be anti-democratic, or capable of being misunderstood in an anti-democratic sense. For my part I am content to accept the true meaning as declared by Burke, a master of English defending American liberties.\* There is no other word that will do as well, for 'commonwealth' is ambiguous. Massachusetts, which for international purposes has no being at all, is officially and in fact a commonwealth. It is well to remember that the excellent word 'commonwealth' itself was in disfavour for a long time after the Restoration. The term 'imperial commonwealth' has now been used by the Imperial War Conference.

Turning from names to substance, we find before us the very problem that Burke formulated more than a century and a half ago—'to admit the people of our colonies into an interest in the constitution.'<sup>†</sup> True it is that our Dominions have long had their own constitutions, and that the government of all our possessions, whether enjoying more or less autonomy, has long been conducted under constitutional traditions. I do not except India, whose government, though not popular, is a system elaborately framed by Parliament, and is administered by public servants ultimately responsible to Parliament. Real exceptions, if such there be, have to be sought in mere naval and military stations; and the arm of the House of Commons will reach at need even to those. But the direction of the whole, as distinct from the governance of the parts, remains where the formal sovereignty is, namely, with the King in Parliament, the Parliament of Great Britain; and in this the Dominions have no definable share.

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\* Burke's definition occurs in the Speech on Conciliation with America (1775): 'Works,' ed. 1852, iii, 263.

<sup>†</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 266.

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This is notably the case as regards foreign policy, both in the conduct of relations with other Powers and in the decision of immediate urgent issues. Here is undoubtedly the main stress of our imperial problem. It may be that some kind of merely consultative machinery (more efficient, in any case, than the half-hearted methods of past Imperial Conferences) would suffice for the regulation of common interests within the Empire, such as trade, communications, and uniformity of commercial law; but this would leave the vital difficulty still outstanding. Peace and war would remain in the hands of counsellors answerable only to the British Parliament; and the Dominions might be committed by acts of the Home Government, in which they had no voice, to a war they deemed imprudent, to a peace they would resent as dishonourable, or to a course of policy leading to dangers invisible or unobserved in the latitude of Downing Street. To those who say (if any one still does) that the Dominions are content to leave things as they are, we must answer bluntly that they are not. The existence of a problem cannot be denied, though it is very possible to propose, and in good faith, solutions which would be rejected as making matters worse.

The empires of antiquity may perhaps teach us, in some measure, what to avoid; I do not think they have many lessons in construction to give us. Historians are familiar with the subjection of many tribes and kindreds, of different languages and manners, and spread over extensive territories, to a central government which has given them the blessing of peace among themselves even when it has not improved their ordinary conditions. The British Empire has further and novel attributes. The territories it embraces are not compact or continuous, but dispersed round the world; and their inhabitants exhibit not only the utmost variety of race, tongues, and customs, but many and diverse local political institutions. Under the Roman Empire provincial customs were left pretty much alone in non-political matters, but superior government and administration were of uniform type. No Roman official would have understood how a federal commonwealth, whose component states reserved a share, though a limited share, of all but independent sovereignty, could itself be a

member of a world-wide union. It would have seemed to him still more incredible that the shortest way from the imperial capital to that colony (a word he would understand, though not in its right modern significance without much explanation) should pass by an Asiatic member of this same strange union, offering to the student's consideration an infinite amount of social and racial complexities wholly different in kind from those of European states.

From the experience of modern federal systems in America, Switzerland, and our own Dominions of late years, we may learn more. But here, too, we must not be in haste to assume that the combination of homogeneous elements will always afford a guide in dealing with scattered and heterogeneous units. The relation between the Protestant and the Catholic cantons of Switzerland may be roughly likened to that of Ontario and Quebec; but we shall hardly find among citizens of the same state in Europe, and not easily in America, a difference corresponding to that of a French Canadian from a citizen of Aberdeen, or a Newfoundland fisherman from a Cape Dutch farmer.

## II. *Allegiance and Sovereignty.*

The reader is assumed to be aware of the political differences in kind between the units making up the British Empire—self-governing Dominions; Crown Colonies, some of them all but self-governing; India under a unique system, now recognised as a full partner; the Channel Islands, unique in another way; and finally (though not within our immediate scope) protectorates and other jurisdictions in foreign parts. It is not material to distinguish the various modes by which they have come under British sovereignty or protection.

If we are asked what all these diverse units really have in common, the only identical element we can assign is allegiance to the King of Great Britain. Even this cannot be taken, as the schoolmen say, univocally; for the inhabitants of British protectorates are the subjects of their own local rulers, not British subjects, and their allegiance is therefore indirect.

Allegiance to the British Crown has two distinct

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aspects. First, there is the symbolic and personal value of a common relation to an actual human being as the visible embodiment of sovereignty and of all the associations that ancient and continuous national tradition carries. This value is highest in India, where rich and varied symbolism plays, for the vast majority of the inhabitants, the part that is taken by political and other abstract terms in Western thought. But it would be foolish to underrate it anywhere. There is a standing witness to it in the fact that under most republican constitutions the president is expected to assume the function of impersonating the commonwealth on ceremonial occasions, and to be willing to take some trouble about it. Switzerland is the one considerable state known to do without a figure-head, the presidency being there merely the chairmanship of an executive board.

In the case of an imperial commonwealth including many states, autonomous and otherwise, it is of manifest importance that the living person who represents it in the public view should be detached from ties of domestic party. This condition is satisfied by the form of our constitutional monarchy, and it is hard to perceive in what other form it could be satisfied as well, or at all. Our monarchy has yet another advantage which must be reckoned among our felicitous historical accidents. This has been matured almost within living memory, and has been fully disclosed only since the publication of Queen Victoria's correspondence. Whatever acts of state are done in the sovereign's name are done in substance by Ministers answerable to the parliamentary majority by whose support they hold office, and in conformity with the general principles approved by that majority, but with a large discretion in details. The sovereign is bound to take his servants' advice, but is entitled to full information on the matter and the reasons of what is to be done. He is thus in possession of political knowledge and experience, especially in the higher politics of empire, which may well be called unique; and he is in a position to offer criticism and suggestion which may be of great value. We know that more than once Queen Victoria saved her Ministers from bad mistakes.

In short, the King has long ceased to govern, but he has become the standing confident of the governing

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Cabinet, a confident of assured discretion,\* whose advice must be listened to with respect but need not be followed. In the near future we shall want more than ever a well-informed *officier de liaison* between the Home Government and the Dominion Governments. After the Conference of 1907 the Colonial Office was supposed to have undertaken to provide something of the kind. If any attempt was sincerely made, the result has been insignificant; it is believed that a few officials were shuffled from one room to another and called the Dominions Department. The Dominions, I think, prefer the King to the Colonial Office; and there is no other choice in sight.

Next, allegiance to the Crown has a distinct political significance. It implies the right of British subjects in every part of the Empire to seek justice, in the last resort, from the King in Council, and redress of political grievances from the King in Parliament. In the self-governing Dominions, indeed, the Parliamentary control to which the citizen looks for all purposes of internal affairs is not at Westminster, but in his domestic parliament (federal, state or provincial, as the case may be) on which the Parliament of the United Kingdom has at some time devolved a general power of government. This devolution is in form revocable, but in substance it is well understood that revocation is out of the question, and amendment possible only when requested by the Dominion itself. However, if accident should disclose any omitted case, or in the extremely improbable event of a local majority attempting a violent departure from our common lines of legal and constitutional tradition, the unexhausted authority of the King and the Estates of the realm would still be available for the emergency.

Inasmuch as in all self-governing units of the Empire ministerial responsibility follows the English model by which Ministers hold office practically at the pleasure of the House of Commons, while the Home Government has to answer here in Parliament for those which are not

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\* It may be asked, What if the King had an indiscreet private secretary? So it may be asked, What if bankers and solicitors were indiscreet? Official and professional discretion are at the very root of sound public service, and cannot be machine-made. Fortunately our tradition in this respect is excellent.



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self-governing, it seems correct to say that every executive act done throughout the Empire is under the direction or subject to the control, though sometimes a remote control, of some servant of the Crown who is himself subject to Parliamentary control.

We now come to the preeminence of the British Parliament. In point of strict law the sovereignty of that body is universal and equal throughout the King's dominions, but in fact the constitutional understanding is that powers of government once devolved on an autonomous colony are, like the King's original power of judicature delegated to his judges, not resumable. The Parliament at Westminster, therefore, has in practice, so far as the self-governing Dominions are concerned, only a residual supremacy. But the residue is considerable. It covers all foreign relations, and some, though not all, of such matters affecting more than one state of the Empire as in the language of American publicists would be called inter-state.

Thus the British Parliament has the ultimate control, and down to 1916 the British Cabinet had the immediate control, of foreign policy and diplomacy, including peace and war, of imperial defence as accessory thereto, and of peaceful relations with foreign Powers, including commercial treaties and other international conventions. In the matter of commercial treaties the Dominions, notably Canada, have been entrusted in several cases with authority to negotiate them, but the treaty is always concluded in the King's name and with the authority of the British Ministry.\* If any standing regulation of the common policy in foreign affairs or inter-state relations is desired, and in fact agreed upon, it can take effect only by an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom; indeed there is no other form of procedure for amending the constitution of Canada or that of Australia.

Accordingly the foreign policy of the British Empire and every one of its units is the foreign policy of the King's Ministers here; and the substantive control of it is with the working majority of the British House of

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\* See Sir C. Hibbert Tupper, 'Treaty-making Powers of the Dominions,' 'Journ. Soc. Comp. Legisl.,' No. 37, Jan. 1917.



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Commons. It is needless to prove at this day, though a few years ago it may have been otherwise, that, when Great Britain is at war, the whole Empire is at war.\*

This, however, must not be supposed to mean that the Home Government can thereby claim, as of right, any assignable measure of active aid from the Dominions. In the event of a direct attack by the King's enemies on the territory of any Dominion, resistance would no doubt be the duty of all the King's subjects there; and the King's officers and Ministers in and for that Dominion would be in a position to exercise the extraordinary powers belonging to the Crown when there is a state of 'war within the realm' or rebellion, powers of which the precise extent has never been defined, and which it is now thought more prudent to confirm or enlarge by express legislation. But the power and the responsibility would still be with the local government; and it would be *their* business, not that of the Home Government, to take all necessary measures of local precaution and declare the duties of citizens in face of the enemy. Nor does it seem at all clear that any duty would arise, even in an extreme case—say a hostile expedition threatening Quebec—which could be practically enforced by any authority outside the Dominion concerned. For military purposes, in short, the relation of the Dominions to Great Britain is, in point of form, not much closer than that of an ordinary alliance.

The extent to which the Dominions can claim the mother country's assistance is no better defined. So far as the letter of the bond goes, Great Britain cannot require Australia or Canada to raise a single regiment; but it is equally true, and indeed it follows, that Canadians and Australians are entitled only in the most general way to rely on Great Britain for naval or military support beyond their own local resources. The King is bound to protect all his dominions; but he is not bound to comply with a particular demand for reinforcements; on the contrary, rash compliance with such a demand might well be a subject for the gravest censure of Ministers if it proved disastrous to the common interest of the Empire. The Imperial Defence Committee, it may be

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\* See 'The Problem of the Commonwealth,' pp. 89-93.

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observed, is not really an imperial institution. Like the National Gallery, it is a creature of the home Ministry kept alive by a modest grant from the House of Commons. There is no legal or constitutional guaranty of its permanence. Inasmuch as it consists of such persons as the Prime Minister chooses to summon, there has been no difficulty about admitting Dominion Ministers to it as full members; and that is no small item on the credit side.

Thus our arrangements for safeguarding our imperial commonwealth are really, so far as the actual constitution of the Empire goes, in as crude a condition as the provisions of our ancestors in the Middle Ages for keeping the King's peace. The sheriff might call out the power of the county, but neither the sheriff nor any other man could tell with certainty who would come. Aggrieved persons might call on the sheriff for aid, but the sheriff's power to help them was for the most part an unknown quantity, sometimes his will also. The result was that great men commanding their own retainers were dangerous neighbours to each other, and incidentally to peaceable folk who cared nothing for their quarrels, and often they were able to defy the King's justice for a considerable time. Such is the tale repeated with variations throughout English history from the tenth to the fifteenth century. The peace of nations is in much the same stage to this day.

What the states of the Empire have done in this war has been much better than our existing arrangements promised, and has certainly been an unpleasant surprise for the enemy; but it is not credible that either Great Britain or the Dominions should be willing to take a similar risk again. Another cause of war might be just, without appealing so manifestly to the sense of justice as the German invasion of Belgium. Another Government might make formal consultation with the Dominions a pretext for delay. We are faced with the necessity for putting emergencies touching the whole Empire into the hands of a truly imperial and authoritative executive.

So late as 1911, it is true, His Majesty's Government still clung to the notion, bred in the tepidly comfortable atmosphere of a peaceful Colonial Office—in some of whose corners it may linger even in time of war—that 'cooperation, spontaneous and unforced, for common interests and

purposes' would meet all reasonable requirements; in other words, that the system of conferences for discussion, forbidden to reach any conclusion, could not be improved upon. This official repugnance to effectual reform was founded on the assumptions that ministerial responsibility is indivisible; that one body of Ministers must be collectively answerable for the conduct of imperial policy; and that those Ministers must be the British Cabinet, and accordingly can be answerable only to the British House of Commons. We have now discovered that this supposed fundamental point of our Constitution was little better than an idol, whose cult was maintained for quite different reasons by publicists who wanted a neat theory and by party managers anxious to consolidate their discipline. In 1917 the War Cabinet already contained, as actual members and not as mere assessors, representative Ministers from the Dominions not dependent on the British Parliament for their tenure of office, but on their own parliaments. Such dependence is all that, in modern practice, ministerial responsibility signifies; and therefore those formerly magic words can no longer be treated as a sacrosanct and impassable barrier to political invention. For many years those of us who perceived the importance of the matter have been considering in what manner and form the Dominions could best be called to our councils; and now we see them, under the stress of war, summoned not only for counsel but to take a direct share of command. In view of this fact it becomes less important to consider how far ministerial responsibility of our own domestic pattern can be suitable for the government of a federation; but it is not a wholly unimportant fact that the institution is alike unknown to the oldest and the greatest of existing federal systems, those of Switzerland and of the United States.

It remains to see how the Imperial War Cabinet may be regularly continued in time of peace, and what alternative methods and forms the special Imperial Conference to be summoned after the war, or any fuller constituent convention to which it may lead, is likely to have before it. For the purpose of appreciating the magnitude of the step or rather leap that has now been taken, we must recall the former state of things in which the public were

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indifferent, Governments for the most part unwilling to move, and some very able students unable to see any clear way to organic change.

### III. *Constructive Methods.*

So long ago as 1892, before the conferences first known as Colonial and since 1907 as Imperial had taken any regular shape, Dr Parkin stated the problem and pointed out two ways of solution. One would be the deliberate framing of a constitution for the Empire, after the precedent of the Union of England and Scotland; the other would be 'a policy of gradual but steady adaptation of existing national machinery to the new work which must be done.' The obvious difficulty of the former method lies in providing adequate means for securing general agreement as to the kind of constitution we want. The less obvious risk of the latter is that the bearing of partial expedients on the fabric of Empire as a whole may not be fully perceived at the time. The method of gradual approach appeared, for many years, the only practicable one.

It is unnecessary to go back in detail to the short-lived promise of the original Imperial Federation League and the complete breakdown of its plans when they reached the point of asking for definite undertakings. During the last twenty years there have been proposals for the establishment of a Council or other body in the nature of a reinforced Imperial Conference, which would remain in being when it was not actually sitting, and would always be entitled to be heard by the King's British Ministers, though not to have any direct control over their decisions or any part in the final judgment thereon. The plan outlined by the 'Lyttelton Despatch'\* of April 1905 was of this kind. The Council was to be assisted by a standing Commission for confidential enquiry and report, whose work on civil matters of common interest would be analogous to that of the Imperial Defence Committee for naval and military purposes. But it was not to have any more formal constitution of its own than the previous Colonial conferences; in fact

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\* 1905, Cd 2785. This was published in Nov. 1905.

'it would merely be a continuation, under a more appropriate title, of the existing Colonial conferences which meet periodically for consultative purposes,' as the Secretary of State explained in reply to the not very intelligent answer of the Government of Newfoundland. Even this modest proposal was too much, at that time, for Canada, whose one active contribution to the proceedings of 1907 was the change of title from 'Colonial' to 'Imperial' Conference, as a compromise avoiding the dangerous name of Council.\*

It would be an entire mistake to regard the Lyttelton Dispatch as a timid experiment; its fault consisted in being rather too far in advance of what the Dominions were then ready to accept. In one or two quarters the plan was completely misunderstood. The Dominions were still haunted, in various degrees, by the spectre of a plot hatched in Downing Street to destroy their autonomy and extort contributions for the purposes of some imaginary British adventure. Certainly some of us hoped, and did not conceal our hope, that, if the Dominions did approve the establishment of an advisory Council, and if that Council were properly constituted and acted with proper discretion, its advice would in time acquire such weight that the following of it would become a custom. However, we are already beyond that stage. Ten years ago we were feeling about for a constitutional link between the Parliament at Westminster, with the Cabinet executing its will (or at any rate something consistent with its will), and the Parliaments of the Dominions. What we have to look for now is a permanent link between the Imperial War Cabinet, in which the Dominions are already represented, and all the Parliaments of the Empire. We have already seen that the continuation of the Imperial Cabinet after the war is assured.

The establishment of some kind of permanent central body with its own staff is a necessary element in any solution of the problem which is to be acceptable. It is not of itself a solution, though ten years ago it might have been the beginning of one; provision of improved means for conference and consultation gives no new

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\* For a fuller account see 'Q. R.,' vol. 206 (Jan., April, 1907).

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constitutional right. There is no doubt, however, that the existence of such a body, under whatever name, independent of the Colonial Office—a condition on which Australia and New Zealand are sure to insist—would, as a symbol of the new policy, signify much. It is compatible alike with grandiose and with relatively modest plans of imperial construction.

The plans hitherto suggested may be classed under two types. The more ambitious projectors want a federal parliament, created by a full-blown written constitution; the less ambitious think a council representing states rather than population might be sufficient. We may neglect minuter shades of difference for the present, and look in the first place to the general requirements that a scheme of either type ought to satisfy. The machinery must not be so cumbrous as to be useless on urgent occasions. Under cabinet government as we have it executive action can be very prompt; and this is one of the chief merits of our constitution. It would not do to lose or impair it for the sake of some theoretical point of symmetry. Again, any real constitutional change must derogate to some extent from the sovereignty of the component states, including the United Kingdom (which advocates of imperial reconstruction sometimes glide over or forget); but the derogation should be as little as will suffice for the purpose.

It needs no elaborate argument to show that some derogation there must be. A new common power to deal with the common affairs of a number of states can be made only by taking it out of the several powers of those states, for there is nothing else to make it of. Legally, of course, only the sovereignty of the home Parliament would be affected; it may well be desirable even to keep it formally alive, though dormant, in case of unforeseen accidents;\* but in practical politics the Dominions, as already explained, are rather in the position of allies who cannot renounce the alliance but are not bound to any defined active duties. In substance,

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\* Such as the need for repealing or amending old Acts of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, as to which no human skill could make sure of escaping oversight. It would be difficult to provide any new machinery for that purpose.



whatever may be the form preferred, the House of Commons at Westminster has to give up its existing sole and supreme control of foreign and imperial affairs. The Dominions on their part have to surrender some of their present absolute discretion as to concerted action in the future. Plainly the greater renunciation will be at Westminster, but the Dominions cannot acquire an effective and formally recognised share of control without undertaking any kind of obligation.

At the same time nobody likes parting with rights or privileges, and contention in such matters is apt to be far sharper than the actual value of the point in dispute seems to warrant. Therefore economy of means is desirable, and we should not conceive ourselves set down with a spacious blank sheet to write a statutory constitution upon. Many reforms in English law would have been better accomplished if the reformers had begun by asking themselves, not what kind of Act of Parliament they wanted, but how much they could do without an Act, and, if legislation there must be, how little would serve. There is at least one modern example of noble and learned persons having been parties, as legislators, to a supposed innovation which turned out to be a not wholly adequate formulation of principles already laid down by their lordships in their judicial capacity.

There is one feature in some projects that is represented by its advocates as necessary, but appears to me quite unnecessary and not a little dangerous; I mean the creation of an imperial financial authority with direct taxing power over the several states of the Empire. I have seen no evidence whatever that any Dominion is prepared to admit that particular kind of interference; indeed there is a good deal of evidence to the contrary. New Zealand has gone farthest among the Dominions in advocating closer union in general terms; but neither Mr Massey nor Sir Joseph Ward reject any encroachment on fiscal autonomy.\* Moreover, I shrewdly suspect that the Scot, the Irishman, and even the more patient Englishman would not be much readier than Canadians or Australians to welcome a new species of

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\* 1917, Cd 8566, pp. 43, 51, 58.

tax-collector. The plan of ear-marking some branch or branches of indirect taxation for appropriation to imperial purposes is more plausible; but it is not so simple as it looks.

On the other hand, the position of the executive departments of State must suffer a material change, and much the same change, whether the external and visible novelties of deliberation and decision be greater or less. When the foreign policy of Great Britain is directed by an authority formally representing the nations of our Commonwealth and not these islands alone, the Foreign Secretary can no longer be bound by the will of the British House of Commons alone or without qualification. Still less can he be answerable to that House for the acts of colleagues who are also under the direction of a truly imperial cabinet, their departments being wholly or mainly concerned with common affairs now separated from the merely domestic interests of Great Britain or any other component state. The same is true of every one of those colleagues; and the result is, in short, that the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, India and the Colonies (for the Crown Colonies will still have to be represented by a minister), the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War will cease to be merely British Ministers, and will not stand or fall with the Home Secretary or the President of the Local Government Board. It will not even be necessary that they should be members of the British Ministry or the British Parliament; but it may and probably will remain usual for some time.

This may not be a visible immediate consequence of the Imperial Cabinet acquiring a permanent footing. Our constitutional history is not a chain of logical deductions. But such a consequence is natural and, unless it should be swallowed up in some larger explicit construction, inevitable in the long run. Even taking the facts as they are, the Imperial War Cabinet is a joint committee of the British Government and the Dominion Governments; and each member of it has to answer to his own parliament and constituents and not to any other. Therefore the description of ministerial responsibility, as we find it in recent accepted expounders of constitutional law and usage, is not applicable; and it



would be idle to pretend that no substantial change has taken place.

For the rest, our present orthodox doctrine is quite modern; and close examination might show that even in our own time it has not always fitted the facts, at any rate so far as it assumes the normal existence of two and only two great parties, and the normal command of a majority in the House of Commons by one of them. For the last thirty years no one party has really had a commanding majority, save for a short time after the general election of 1906. The Unionist party is not a single party at all, but a coalition of the old Conservative party with a new body which has always maintained a distinct organisation. In like manner the Liberal party has only for a brief space had a majority independent of the Irish Nationalist members, not to speak of the Labour party. The filling of our great executive offices in strict obedience to parliamentary and partisan conventions, often to the great detriment of the public service, is likewise, I need hardly say, quite modern; nor can I perceive any reason for the disappearance of such a practice being regretted by any one but party managers and ambitious second-rate politicians.

Only one positive measure, and that not a legislative one, appears to be required to make the conversion of the War Cabinet into a truly Imperial Cabinet formally complete. It has been suggested by an acute critic, Mr Poley. The King's Council should be restored to its original unity and be one Privy Council for the Empire; and the existing local Privy Councils should come to an end or be continued only as committees of Council.\* Perhaps I should add that it is hardly possible to define with exactness the relative positions and respective functions of the War Cabinet, the War Committee of the Cabinet, and the Imperial War Cabinet. It may be possible to doubt whether the old overgrown Cabinet is

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\* It may be worth while to remind the reader that, except on the one occasion of a demise of the Crown, no meeting of members of the Privy Council is more than a committee without the sovereign's presence in person. By the way, the story published in Germany in November 1917 of a 'Crown Council' in Downing Street having discussed war with Germany in July 1913 is full of ludicrous formal blunders, besides being an impudent fiction in substance.

extinct or only suspended. But I believe the general tendency and effect of recent changes have been stated with tolerable correctness for the present purposes.

It has been suggested that the Imperial War Cabinet has no executive power. This is in a sense true, but equally true for the Cabinet throughout its history. Before the war the Cabinet was an informal parliamentary committee of the party in office, membership of the Privy Council being a qualification. It directed both executive and legislative policy, but had no secretary or other officer of its own, no minutes (taking notes, it is well known, was not allowed), and no means of issuing direct orders to any department of state. Whatever executive action 'the King's servants' decided upon was carried out by the head of the proper department, who either knew what had to be done as being himself in the Cabinet or was informed of it by a Cabinet Minister. Directions purporting in terms to come from the Cabinet would have had no legal or departmental validity whatever, and therefore were unknown. The Premier, as First Lord of the Treasury, could put the Treasury in motion; the Secretaries of State could take action in their own departments, and at need in any department presided over by a Secretary of State (in fact, not an uncommon procedure in matters of routine), and so forth. To say that the Imperial War Cabinet must have less authority than the domestic War Cabinet, or than any Cabinet, because it is not wholly responsible to any one Parliament, is to beg the whole question of constitutional development.

#### IV. *Parliament or Council?*

We now proceed to the alternative schemes for providing, in addition to the Imperial Cabinet or any modification of it, a continuous organ of deliberation and consultation in imperial matters. One type is that of a federal constitution, with new legislative and executive organs distinct from those of any component state. Another is that of a council or senate of moderate number, representative but not necessarily elected by popular vote, nor so ordered that the voting power of the states represented shall be in any strict proportion to

population; having some authority, but much less than a federal parliament must have if it is to be worked at all.

The more elaborate scheme of a full written constitution and a new federal government has found its chief literary support among a group of very able men whose experience was gained in the framing of the South African Union. In that case union of the four contiguous but politically separated colonies for the peaceful and adequate regulation of their commercial and administrative relations was urgent. Under the pressure of the circumstances, and strong exhortation from the Home Government, there was formed not a federation but a unitary state in which the former colonies are provinces with strictly limited autonomy, and, with no limit to the legislative power of the central parliament. As regards prompt and workmanlike procedure, the example is as good as can be, but there is very little resemblance in substance to the situation of the British Empire as a whole. The South African angle of vision hardly seems, with great respect, to be the best fitted for a comprehensive view. At all events, none of the Dominion Ministers or leading ex-Ministers appear to see the problem in that light. So far as they can speak for their respective Dominions, they will have nothing to say to a new federal legislature with compulsory authority over the Empire; and General Botha and General Smuts are as clearly of that mind as any one.

This type of construction, accordingly, does not seem to stand much chance of being adopted in our time. Nevertheless the forthcoming special Imperial Conference will have the problem of our greater commonwealth before it at large, and we do not know whether it will make definite recommendations or propose reference to some fuller convention to be set up for the purpose. So there may be no harm in noting a few points of criticism on the super-parliamentary scheme of imperial union, in which, I may frankly say, I have never believed.

I shall not dwell on the difficulties that would be found in settling the composition of a federal parliament for the Empire, whether a single assembly or two Houses, with due regard to the respective population and importance of the constituent states. Those difficulties would

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certainly be great; there would have to be, for example, some special device for representing India and the Crown Colonies; but we may assume that, if it were once decided in principle to adopt such a form of imperial government, the combined statesmanship of the United Kingdom and the Dominions would be capable of surmounting them. Nor need we be much troubled by the mechanical obstacles of distance, so greatly have they been and will be diminished. A more fundamental question remains: whether a federal parliament, being established, would really be so fitted to carry out the objects proposed as to be worth the pains of establishing it and the complexity of the new system.

The virtue of a representative assembly exercising sovereign power is that it represents the electors not as separate bodies but as a whole. Every member does in a special manner represent the constituents who actually elected him; and he is charged to attend to their particular interest, but only so far as compatible with the common weal. He is not a mere delegate but a member of a body whose will—that is, the will of its effective majority—stands for the prevalent will of the whole electorate; and his trust is not confined to the bounds within which he sought and obtained votes. The counsel taken in Parliament is manifold and includes widely differing opinions, but still it is common counsel about the common affairs of the realm. How far could this condition be realised in an elective assembly purporting to represent, not the inhabitants of a group of islands, but communities dispersed round the world? Could such an electorate really have a collective mind for any usual purpose, and could any one of the representatives have any sense of responsibility to such a heterogeneous multitude? What kind of common interest would there be, in any normal circumstances, between the electors of Wellington in Somerset and those of Wellington in New Zealand?

It seems that one of two results must be expected. Either a factitious uniformity for electioneering purposes must be obtained by the development of the party mechanism and the predominant influence of party managers on a scale hitherto unexampled, or the assembly will be and remain, in effect, no true parliament, but a convention of state delegates answerable

each of them only to those who sent him. The former alternative will surely not be accepted even by the most hardened party politician as fit for the government of the Empire as a whole. The latter may be contemplated without a shock to the political conscience; but, if state delegates are all we can get, why do we want so many of them, or such an elaborate machinery for appointing them?

Turning to the matter of a federal parliament's occupation, it may be doubted whether, having regard to the conditions that must be taken as fixed, it would be such as to justify the creation of so vast and complex an apparatus. Legislatures and all other organs of government exist, after all, not for themselves but for the business they have to do. What would be the business of a Pan-Britannic federal parliament? Not to tax the states of the Empire for imperial purposes; for it is clear that the Dominions are not minded to confer any such power; and the same may be said of tariffs and fiscal dispositions generally. Therefore one of the chief reasons for the existence of an elective assembly is necessarily wanting in this case.

Is legislation, then, to be its main function? It is quite true that in many commercial and other matters uniform laws throughout the Empire are desirable. But there is no reason to believe that this end cannot be attained by identical legislation in the component states; in fact, much has already been done in this way, notwithstanding the lack of any formal coordinating authority whatever, and has also been done under even greater difficulties in the United States. Not only the substance but the form of the law of negotiable instruments, to take a fairly old example, has been assimilated throughout our English-speaking jurisdictions.\*

In any case the framing of uniform laws in matters of commerce and the like is work for experts; and the only way in which a large elective assembly could get it done would be to delegate it to a select committee.

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\* British India stands outside because the Government of India began the process of codifying earlier. The discrepancy, such as it is, must be regretted, but the Anglo-Indian codes have been taken as models in several colonies and protectorates, and even a federal parliament of the Empire would hardly compel the Government of India to recast them.

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There is no reason to suppose that such a committee could not be appointed, if thought fit, by some simpler process than setting up a federal parliament, or that its recommendations, if addressed simultaneously to the several Governments of the Empire, would fail to receive attention. Any more general and ambitious legislative powers appear to be sufficiently ruled out by the exclusion of taxing power.

There remains the direction of foreign policy. Whatever it may be the passing fashion to say, that part of public business cannot be conducted, beyond laying down the most general principles, by debate in a large assembly; the execution would, under any possible constitutional scheme, remain with the successors of the Imperial War Cabinet, where it is already. Thus it would seem that a good many members of our super-Parliament, when we had brought it together, would find themselves without much Parliamentary occupation, and we might even have cause to remember Bagehot's warning: 'If you employ the best set of men to do nearly nothing, they will quarrel with each other about that nothing.' \*

It is not clear, moreover, that the best men would come; even within the Dominions there is some reluctance to seek federal in preference to state or provincial offices, and the attractions of a wholly untried imperial legislature do not seem likely to be more powerful. Again, in 1911 Sir Joseph Ward suggested 300 as the numbers of an imperial House of Representatives. If the men would come, can the Dominions at present spare so many of their best? It does not appear useful to pursue these doubts farther, but it must be remembered that they disclose only some aspects of a wider question: namely, whether our British Parliamentary procedure and its accompanying methods of party government and discipline, framed as they have been with almost exclusive regard to domestic politics, are really appropriate to the conduct of imperial affairs.

Another plan which has been put forward by several writers, and last year in a well-considered paper by Mr Herbert Samuel, is, as mentioned above, the formation of a council or senate of moderate numbers. Its functions,

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\* 'The English Constitution,' ed. 1878, p. 261.



less ambitious than those which would justify the existence of a federal parliament, would aim chiefly at keeping the executive of the Empire in touch with the legislatures, and through them the people of the Dominions. There is no exact precedent for such a body, nor any near analogy that I know of;\* but there is no precedent for the British Empire itself. In this way it would be possible to establish useful coordination and improve communication between the Governments of the Empire with the least amount of organic change. Far from superseding the periodical Imperial Conferences, a council of this kind would prepare their business and give it a continuity which hitherto has been imperfectly maintained.

Such a body would represent the states of the Empire neither in strict proportion to their population nor with entire disregard of it; for, although Rhode Island has two seats in the Senate of the United States and New York has no more, we could not at this day give Newfoundland exactly the same weight as Canada. There would be no great difficulty in providing for a periodical revision of the number of councillors allotted to each state, including in the case of Crown colonies the groups of minor colonies which it would be necessary to form. Election by the legislatures of the states, according to the method of proportional representation which is now sufficiently familiar, would seem the obvious course, but I see no grave reason why every component state should not settle the mode of election in its own way. For the singular case of India some special provision would be required; the difficulty would be less than that of representing India in a strictly Parliamentary assembly. The members would hold office for a fixed term, such as three or five years, with freedom of reelection; the alternative of a longer term and no reelection would make the council, to my mind, too much like a board of officials, the very last thing the Dominions are likely to want.

With regard to the business of a Council of the Empire, it would fall under several categories, with

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\* The Supreme Council of War established by the Western Allied Powers in November 1917 is in some respects analogous, and its working may be found instructive.

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functions and authorities appropriate to each. One thing such a Council might do, which fails to get adequately done at present, would be to work out questions of more than departmental scope as recommended to its consideration by the Imperial Cabinet or any of the Governments, or arising from the discussions of the Imperial Conference. This would be done without hurry, in an air free from partisan clamour, and with facilities for assistance from whatever special experience or technical knowledge could be found within the Empire; and the result might take the form either of a report or of definite proposals for uniform legislation in all or some of the states. There would also be standing committees, on trade and commerce for example, reporting periodically without waiting for specific instructions.

Further, the Council might well be entrusted with the elaboration and regulation of matters already laid down in principle by concurrent legislation, or by the assent of the Governments of the Empire to proposals formulated by the Imperial Cabinet. Such ordinances would be analogous to the Orders in Council and departmental orders made under statutory authority, by which a large and increasing part of our administration is carried on for peaceful as well as warlike purposes. The more important of these enactments might be subject to the dissent of any state if expressed within a limited time, in the same way as the provisional orders with which we are familiar are laid before Parliament and become operative if neither House objects. There could be no question of giving the Council any compulsory fiscal authority, but it might very well be charged by the Imperial Cabinet with the duty of preparing a scheme of proportionate contribution for common purposes to be submitted to the Governments of the Empire. The members of the Cabinet and the Council would know the minds of their constituent states well enough to make it likely that their proposals should be of a practicable kind. Nevertheless there might be occasional dissent; in which case our state would be no worse than it is now. The part of the Council would be confined to suggesting the objects to be provided for and the quotas to be contributed; the actual voting of the sums to be raised, and the mode of raising them, would remain with



each legislature. A scheme of this kind would not be an annual budget, though it would need revision at fairly short intervals. Anything beyond this in the way of uniform fiscal measures would have to be reserved for the Imperial Conference.

As the Council would do most of its work through committees, about one hundred seems a reasonable number for the whole; with fewer one could hardly be sure of finding all the special abilities required, while, if there were many more, there would be danger of the body as a whole becoming undistinguished and ineffectual. The fate of the Privy Council, which might and ought to have been the very body of men to supply the want, stands before us as a warning. It seems of no great importance whether membership of the Privy Council (being made one Privy Council of the whole Empire, as Mr Poley has proposed) should be a qualification for membership of the Council of the Empire or not.

The Imperial Cabinet would be in constant touch with the Council, and the members of the Cabinet would be entitled to attend the Council's meetings if not already members of it (for in a select and not very large body the process of 'finding a seat' is not to be recommended). It is not necessary for the present purpose to advance any conjecture on the normal formation of the Imperial Cabinet itself in the near future.

One alternative policy, which still has a few supporters, has not been here considered; I mean that of openly renouncing all ties between the United Kingdom and the Dominions except that of personal allegiance to the Crown, and treating their relations as those of independent allies. It is not easy to believe that the formalities of international diplomacy would be found less inconvenient than those of the Colonial Office, or to see how the one monarch of half-a-dozen sovereign states, exposed to receive conflicting advice from any two or three of his half-dozen cabinets, could discharge his duties to all of them at once. The best that can be said for such a position is that it would make an opportunity for a man of genius; but a monarchy that demanded genius of its king would not be constitutional. Our history furnishes no better analogies than the personal union with Hanover and the relations of Great

Britain and Ireland in the time of Grattan's Parliament, neither of them encouraging. But this doctrine appears too much outside practical politics to be worth fuller discussion.

Doubtless it will be objected to all constructive proposals that they are a departure from existing constitutional practice, and in particular from the system of party government and ministerial responsibility. I have tried to show that, whether we like it or not, the departure has begun already. The Tadpoles and Tapers may raise a hue and cry, but they will get little more comfort than Micah of Ephraim when he sought to recover his ephod and images and teraphim and priest, and was turned back with a short answer by the men of Dan, appointed with weapons of war, who had annexed them. I am free to confess that, if party government and party management are to be regarded as an inviolable ark of the covenant, it is extremely difficult to see how any working plan for the governance of the Empire as a whole can be framed. But the judgment of the people both here and overseas, I venture to think, will be that, if party government will not do for the British Empire, the British Empire will do without party government.

FREDERICK POLLOCK.

## Art. 2.—THE INDICTMENT AGAINST CHRISTIANITY.

No thinking man can deny that this war has grievously stained the reputation of Europe. Even if the verdict of history confirms the opinion that the conspiracy which threw the torch into the powder-magazine was laid by a few persons in one or two countries, and that the unparalleled outrages which have accompanied the conflict were ordered by a small coterie of brutal officers, we cannot forget that these crimes have been committed by the responsible representatives of a civilised European power, and that the nation which they represent has shown no qualms of conscience. That such a calamity, the permanent results of which include a holocaust of European wealth and credit, accumulated during a century of unprecedented industry and ingenuity, the loss of innumerable lives, and the destruction of all the old and honourable conventions which have hitherto regulated the intercourse of civilised nations with each other, in war as well as in peace, should have been possible, is justly felt to be a reproach to the whole continent, and especially to the nations which have taken the lead in its civilisation and culture. The ancient races of Asia, which have never admitted the moral superiority of the West, are keenly interested spectators of our suicidal frenzy. A Japanese is reported to have said, 'We have only to wait a little longer, till Europe has completed her *hara kiri*.' This is, indeed, what any intelligent observer must think about the present struggle. Just as the feudal barons of England destroyed each other and brought the feudal system to an end in the Wars of the Roses, so the great industrial nations are rending to pieces the whole fabric of modern industrialism, which can never be reconstructed. Mr Norman Angell was perfectly right in his argument that a European war would be ruinous to both sides. The material objects at stake, such as the control of the Turkish Empire and the African continent, are not worth more than an insignificant fraction of the war-bill. We are witnessing the suicide of a social order, and our descendants will marvel at our madness, as we marvel at the senseless wars of the past.

There has, it is plain, been something fundamentally wrong with European civilisation, and the disease appears to be a moral one. With this conviction it is natural that men should turn upon the official custodians of religion and morality, and ask them whether they have been unfaithful to their trust, or whether it is not rather proved that the faith which they profess is itself bankrupt and incapable of exerting any salutary influence upon human character and action. Christianity stands arraigned at the bar of public opinion. But it is not without significance that the indictment should now be urged with a vehemence which we do not find in the records of former convulsions. It was not generally felt to be a scandal to Christianity that England was at war for 69 years out of the 120 which preceded the battle of Waterloo. Either our generation expected more from Christianity, or it was far more shocked by the sudden outbreak of this fierce war than our ancestors were by the almost chronic condition of desultory campaigning to which they were accustomed. The latter is probably the true reason. The belief in progress, which at the beginning of the industrial revolution was an article of faith, had become a tacitly accepted presupposition of all serious thought; and even those who were dubious about the moral improvement of mankind in other directions seldom denied that we were more humane and peaceable than our forefathers. The disillusion has struck our self-complacency in its most vital spot. Nothing in our own experience had prepared us for the hideous savagery and vandalism of German warfare, the first accounts of which we received with blank amazement and incredulity. Then, when disbelief was no longer possible, there awoke within us a sense of fear for our homes and women and children—a feeling to which modern civilised man had long been a stranger. We had not supposed that the non-combatant population of any European country would ever again be exposed to the horrors of savage warfare. This, much more than the war itself, has made thousands feel that the house of civilisation is built upon the sand, and that Christianity has failed to subdue the most barbarous instincts of human nature. Christians cannot regret that the flagrant contradiction between the principles of their

creed and the scenes that have been enacted during the last three years is fully recognised. But the often repeated statement that 'Christianity has failed' needs more examination than it usually receives from those who utter it.

History acquaints us with two kinds of religion, which, though they are not entirely separate from each other, differ very widely in their effects upon conduct and morality. The *religio* which Lucretius hated, and from which he strangely hoped that the atomistic materialism of Epicurus had finally delivered mankind, has its roots in the sombre and confused superstitions of the savage. Fear, as Statius and Petronius tell us, created the gods of this religion. These deities are mysterious and capricious powers, who exact vengeance for the transgression of arbitrary laws which they have not revealed, and who must be propitiated by public sacrifice, lest some collective punishment fall on the tribe, blighting its crops and smiting its herds with murrain, or giving it over into the hand of its enemies. This religion makes very little attempt to correct the current standard of values. Its rewards are wealth and prosperity; its punishments are calamity in this world and perhaps torture in the next. It is not, however, incapable of moralisation. The wrath of heaven may visit not the innocent violation of some *tabu*, but cruelty and injustice. In the historical books of the Old Testament, though Uzzah is stricken dead for touching the ark, and the subjects of King David afflicted with pestilence because their ruler took a census of his people, Jehovah is above all things a righteous God, who punishes bloodshed, adultery, and social oppression. So in Greece the Furies pursue the homicide and the perjurer, till the name of his family is clean put out. Herodotus tells us how the family of Glaucus was extinguished because he consulted the oracle of Delphi about an act of embezzlement which he was meditating.

International law was protected by the same fear of divine vengeance. The murder of heralds must by all means be expiated. When the Romans repudiate their 'scrap of paper' with the Samnites, they deliver up to the enemy the officers who signed it, though (with characteristic 'slimness') not the army which the

mountaineers had captured and liberated under the agreement. To destroy the temples in an enemy's country was an act of wanton impiety; Herodotus cannot understand the religious intolerance which led the Persians to burn the shrines of Greek gods. Thus religion had a restraining influence in war throughout antiquity, and in the middle ages. The Pope, who was believed to hold the keys of future bliss and torment, was frequently, though by no means always, obeyed by the turbulent feudal lords, and often enforced the sanctity of a contract by the threat or the imposition of excommunication and interdict. In order to make these penalties more terrible, the torments of those who died under the displeasure of the Church were painted in the most vivid colours. But in the official and popular Christian eschatology, as in the terrestrial theodicy of the Old Testament, there is little or no moral idealism. The joys or pains of the future life are made to depend, in part at least, on the observance or violation of the moral law, but they are themselves of a kind which the natural man would desire or dread. They are an enhanced, because a deferred, retribution of the same kind which in more primitive religions promises earthly prosperity to the righteous, and earthly calamities to the wicked. Values, positive and negative, are taken nearly as they stand in the estimation of the average man.

But there is another religious tradition, which in Greece was almost separated from the official and national cults, and among the Hebrews was often in opposition to them. The Hebrew prophets certainly proclaimed that 'the history of the world is the judgment of the world,' and often assumed, too crudely as it seems to us, that national calamities are a proof of national transgression; but the whole course of development in prophecy was towards an autonomous morality based on a spiritual valuation of life. Its quarrel with sacerdotalism was mainly directed against the unethical *tabu*-morality of the priesthood; the revolt was grounded in a lofty moral idealism, which found expression in a half-symbolic vision of a coming state in which might and right should coincide. The apocalyptic prophecies of post-exilic Judaism, which were not based, like some political predictions of the



earlier prophets, on a statesmanlike view of the international situation, but on hopes of supernatural intervention, had their roots in visions of a new and better world-order. This aspiration, which had to disentangle itself by degrees from the patriotic dreams of a stubborn and unfortunate race, was projected into the near future, and was mixed with less worthy political ambitions which had a different origin. The prophet always foreshortens his revelation, and generally blends the city of God with a vision of his own country transfigured. We see him doing this even to-day, in his Utopian dreams of social reconstruction.

And so it has always been. We remember Condorcet, foretelling a reign of truth and peace just before he was compelled to flee from the storm of calumny to die in a damp cell at Bourg la Reine; and Kant hailing the approach of a peaceful international republic while Napoleon was preparing to drown Europe in blood. Apocalypticism is a compromise between the religion of rewards and punishments and the religion of spiritual deliverance. It calls a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old; but its discontent with the old is mainly the result of a moral and spiritual valuation of life. Greek philosophy has really much in common with Hebrew prophecy, though the Greek envisaged his ideal world as the eternal background of reality, and not under the form of history. In its maturest form, it is a transvaluation of all values in accordance with an absolute ideal standard—that of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. This idealism appears in a still more drastic form in the religions of Asia, which preach deliverance by demonetising at a stroke all the world's currency. Spiritual values are alone accepted; man wins peace and freedom by renouncing in advance all of which fortune may deprive him.

We are apt to assume, in deference to our theories of human progress, that the evolution of religion is normally from a lower to a higher type. It would, indeed, be absurd to question that the religion of a civilised people is usually more spiritual and more rational than that of barbarians. But, none the less, the history of religions is generally a history of decline.

In Judaism the prophets came before the Scribes and the Pharisees. Brahmanism and Buddhism were both degraded by superstitious and unethical rites. Christianity, which began as a republication of the purest prophetic teaching, has suffered the same fate. In each case, when the revelation has lost its freshness, and the enthusiasm which it evoked has begun to cool, a reversion to older thought, older habits and customs takes place; and sometimes it may be said that the old religion has really conquered the new. The *nomina* and not the *numina* have been changed.

Christianity, as taught by its Founder, is based on a transvaluation of values even more complete than that of Stoicism and the later Platonism, because, while it regards the objects of ordinary ambition as a positive hindrance to the higher life, it accepts and gives value to those pains of sympathy which Greek thought dreaded, as detracting from the calm enjoyment of the philosophic life. This acceptance of the world's suffering, from which every other spiritual religion and philosophy promise a way of escape, is perhaps the most distinctive feature of Christian ethics. In practice, it thus achieves a more complete conquest of evil than any other system; and by bringing sorrow and sympathy into the divine life, it not only presents the character and nature of the Deity in a new light, but opens out a new ideal of moral perfection. This is not the place for a discussion of the main characteristics of the Gospel of Christ, and they are familiar to us all. But, since we are now considering the charge of failure brought against Christianity in connexion with the present world-war, it seems necessary to emphasise two points which are not always remembered.

The first is that there is no evidence that the historical Christ ever intended to found a new institutional religion. He neither attempted to make a schism in the Jewish Church, nor to substitute a new system for it. He placed Himself deliberately in the prophetic line, only claiming to sum up the series in Himself. The whole manner of His life and teaching was prophetic. The differences which undoubtedly may be found between His style and that of the older prophets do not remove Him from the company in which He clearly wished to



stand. He treated the institutional religion of His people with the independence and indifference of the prophet and mystic; and the hierarchy, which, like other hierarchies, had a sure instinct in discerning a dangerous enemy, was not slow to declare war to the knife against Him. Such, He reminded His enemies, was the treatment which all the prophets had met with from the class to which those enemies belonged. This, then, is the first fact to remember. Institutional Christianity may be a legitimate and necessary historical development from the original Gospel, but it is something alien to the Gospel itself. The first disciples believed that they had the Master's authority for expecting the end of the existing world-order in their own lifetime. They believed that He had come forward with the cry of 'Hora novissima!' Whether they misunderstood Him or not, they clearly could not have held this opinion if they had received instructions for the constitution of a Church.

The second point on which it is necessary to insist is that Christ never expected, or taught His disciples to expect, that His teaching would meet with wide acceptance, or exercise political influence. 'The world'—organised human society—was the enemy and was to continue the enemy. His message, He foresaw, would be scorned and rejected by the majority; and those who preached it were to expect persecution. This warning is repeated so often in the Gospels that it would be superfluous to give quotations. He made it quite plain that the big battalions are never likely to be gathered before the narrow gate. He declared that only false prophets are well spoken of by the majority. When we consider the revolutionary character of the Christian idealism, its indifference to nearly all that passes for 'religion' with the vulgar, and its reversal of all current valuations, it is plain that it is never likely to be a popular creed. As surely as the presence of high spiritual instincts in the human mind guarantees its indestructibility, so surely the deeply-rooted prejudices which keep the majority on a lower level must prevent the Gospel of Christ from dominating mundane politics or social life.

Moreover, the actual extent of its influence cannot be estimated. The inwardness and individualism of its

teaching make its apparent effectiveness smaller than its real power, which works secretly and unobserved. The vices which Christ regarded with abhorrence are perversions of character—hypocrisy, hard-heartedness, and worldliness or secularity; and who can say what degree of success the Gospel has achieved in combating these? The method of Christianity is alien to all externalism and machinery; it does not lend itself to those accommodations and compromises without which nothing can be done in politics. As Harnack says, the Gospel is not one of social improvement, but of spiritual redemption. Its influence upon social and political life is indirect and obscure, operating through a subtle modification of current valuations, and curbing the competitive and acquisitive instincts, which nearly correspond with what Christ called 'Mammon,' and St Paul 'the flesh.' Christianity is a spiritual dynamic, which has very little to do with the mechanism of social life.

It is, therefore, certain that when we speak of Christianity as a factor in human life, we must not identify it with the opinions or actions of the multitudes who are nominally Christians. We must not even identify it, without qualification, with the types of character exhibited by those who try to frame their lives in accordance with its precepts. For these types are very largely determined by the ideals which belong to the stage through which the life of the race is passing; and these differ so widely in different ages and countries that the historian of religion might well despair if he was compelled to regard them all as typical manifestations of the same idea. There are times when the disciple of Christ seems to turn his back upon society; he is occupied solely with the relation of the individual soul to God. These are periods when the opportunities for social service are much restricted by a faulty structure of the body politic. Secular civilisation is so brutal, or so servile, that the religious life can only be led in seclusion from it. At another time the typical Christian seems to be the active and valiant soldier of a militant corporation. At another, again, he is a philanthropist, who devotes his life to the redress of some great wrong, such as slavery, or the promotion of a more righteous system of production and distribution. In all these types we

can trace the operation of the genius of Christianity, but they are partial manifestations of it, with much alien admixture. The spirit of the age, as well as the spirit of Christ, has moulded the various types of Christian piety.

If there has ever been a time when organised Christianity was a concrete embodiment of the pure principles of the Gospel, we must look for it in the era of the persecutions, when the Church had already gained coherence and discipline and a corporate self-consciousness, and was still preserved from the corrupting influence of secularity by the danger which attended the profession of an illicit creed. A vivid picture of the Christian communities at this period has been given by Dobschütz, whose learning and impartiality are unimpeachable. The Church at this time demanded from its followers an unreserved confession, even when this meant death. It was a brotherhood within which there was no privileged class. Men and women, the free and the slave, had an equal share in it. It abolished the fundamental Greek distinction of civilised and barbarian. It looked with contempt on none. Its great organisation was spread by purely voluntary means, till it gained a firm footing throughout the Empire and beyond it. To a large extent it was an association for mutual aid. Wherever any one was in need, help was at hand. The social advantages of belonging to such a guild were so great that the Church had to enforce labour on all who could work, as a condition of sharing in the benefits of membership. Social distinctions, such as those of rich and poor, master and slave, were not abolished, but they had lost their sting, because genuine affection, loyalty and sympathy neutralised these inequalities. Great importance was laid on truth, integrity in business, and sexual purity. A complete rupture with pagan standards of morality was insisted on from new members. The human body must be kept holy, as the temple of God. Revenge was forbidden, and injustice was endured with meekness and pardon. This is no imaginary picture. In that brief golden age of the Church, such were indeed the characteristics of the Christian society. In the opinion of Dobschütz the moral condition of the Church in the second century was much higher than among St Paul's

converts in the first. The paucity of references to sins of the flesh, and to fraud, is to be accounted for by the actual rarity of such offences. For a short time, then, the artificial selection effected by the persecutions kept the Church pure; and from the happy pictures which we can reconstruct of this period we can judge what a really Christian society would be like.

The history of institutional Catholicism must be approached from a different side. Troeltsch argues with much cogency that the Catholic Church must be regarded rather as the last creative achievement of classical antiquity than as the beginning of the Middle Ages. Its growth belongs mainly to the political history of Europe; and the strictly religious element in it is quite subordinate. There is, as Modernist critics have seen, a real break between the Palestinian Gospel and the elaborate mystery-religion, with its graded hierarchy, its Roman organisation, its Hellenistic speculative theology, which imposed its will upon the Empire in the fourth century. The Church, as Loisy says, determined to survive and to conquer, and adapted itself to the demands of the time. It has travelled far from the simple teaching of the earthly Christ; though we may, if we choose, hold that His spirit continued to direct the growing and changing institution which, as a matter of history, had its source in the Galilean ministry. In truth, however, the extremely efficient organisation of the Roman Church began in self-defence and was continued for conquest. It is one of the strongest of all human institutions, so that it was said before the war that it is one of the 'three invincibles,' the other two being the German Army and the Standard Oil Trust.

But our admiration for the subtle and tenacious power of this corporation must not blind us to its essentially political character. Its policy has been always directed to self-preservation and aggrandisement; it is an *imperium in imperio*, which has only checked fanatical nationalism by the competing influence of a still more fanatical partisanship. In the present war, the problem before the Pope's councillors was whether the friendship of the Central Powers or that of the Entente was best worth cultivating; and the unshaken loyalty of

Austria to the Church, together with a natural preference for German methods of governing as compared with democracy, turned the scale against us. In Ireland, in Canada and in Spain the Catholic priests have been formidable enemies of our cause. As for the other Churches, they have not the same power of arbitrating in national quarrels. The Russian Church has never been independent of the secular government; and the Anglican and Lutheran Churches can hardly be expected to be impartial when the vital interests of England or Germany are at stake. Lovers of peace have not much to hope for from organised religion. National Christianity, as Mr Bernard Shaw says, will only be possible when we have a nation of Christs.

The downfall of the medieval European system, though in truth it was a theory rather than a fact, has removed some of the restraints upon war. The determining principle of the medieval political theory was the conception of a 'lex Dei,' which included the 'lex Mosis,' the 'lex Christi,' and the 'lex ecclesiæ,' but which also, as 'lex naturæ,' comprised the law, science, and ethics of antiquity. These laws were super-national, and no nation dared explicitly to repudiate them. They formed the basis of a real system of international law, resting, like everything else in the Middle Ages, on supposed divine authority.

This theory, with its sanctions, was shattered at the Renaissance; and the Machiavellian doctrine of the absolute State, accepted by Bacon and put into practice by Frederick the Great, has prevailed ever since, though not without frequent protests. The rise of nationalities, each with an intense self-consciousness, has facilitated the adoption of a theory too grossly immoral to have found favour except in the peculiar circumstances of modern civilisation. The emergence of nationalities was often connected with a legitimate struggle for freedom; and at such times *esprit de corps* seems to be almost the sum of morality, the substitute for all other virtues. Loyalty is one of the most attractive of moral qualities, and it necessarily inhibits criticism of its own objects, which has the appearance of treason. But, unless the aims of the corporate body which claims our absolute allegiance are right and reasonable, loyalty may be, and

often has been, the parent of hideous crimes, and a social evil of the first magnitude. The perversion of *esprit de corps* does incalculable harm in every direction, destroying all sense of honour and justice, of chivalry and generosity, of sympathy and humanity. It involves a complete repudiation of Christianity, which breaks down all barriers by ignoring them, and insists on love and justice towards all mankind without distinction. The worship of the State has during the last half-century been sedulously and artificially fostered in Germany, until it has produced a kind of moral insanity. Even philosophical historians like Troeltsch seem unable to see the monstrosity of a political doctrine which has caused his country to be justly regarded as the enemy of the whole human race. Eucken, writing some years before the war, in a rather gingerly manner deprecates *Politismus* as a national danger; but he does not dare to grasp the nettle firmly. It is possible that this deification of the State in Germany may be in part due to an unsatisfied instinct of worship. In Roman Catholic countries, where there must be a divided allegiance, patriotism never, perhaps, assumes such sinister and fanatical forms.

But we shall not understand the attraction which this naked immoralism in international affairs exercises over the minds of many who are not otherwise ignoble, if we do not remember that the repudiation of the Christian ethical standard has been equally thorough in commercial competition. The German officer believes himself to have chosen a morally nobler profession than that of the business-man; he serves (he thinks) a larger cause, and he is content with much less personal reward. Socialist assailants of our industrial system, much as they dislike war, would probably agree with him. It is not necessary to condemn all competition. The desire to excel others is not reprehensible, when the rivalry is in rendering useful social service. But it cannot be denied that the present condition of industry is such that a heavy premium is offered to mere cupidity; that the fraternal social life which Christianity enjoins is often literally impossible, except at the cost of economic suicide; and that in a competitive system a business



man is, by the very force of circumstances, a warrior, though war is an enemy of love and destructive of Christian society. When the object of bargaining is to give as little and gain as much as possible, the Christian standard of values has been rejected as completely as it was by Machiavelli himself. The competition between two parties to a bargain is often a competition in un-serviceableness. Money is usually made by creating a local and temporary monopoly, which enables the vendor to squeeze the purchaser. In all such transactions one man's gain is another man's loss. This state of things, the evils of which are almost universally recognised and deplored, marks the end of the glorification of productive industry which was one result of the Reformation.

Hardly anything distinguishes modern from medieval ethics more sharply than the emphasis laid by Protestant morality on the duty of making and producing something tangible. Theoretically the Protestant may hold that 'doing ends in death,' and he may sing these words on Sunday; but his whole life on week days is occupied in strenuous 'doing.' We find in Calvinism and Quakerism the genuinely religious basis of the modern business life, which, however, has degenerated sadly, now that the largest fortunes are made by dealing in money rather than in commodities. In the books of Samuel Smiles, and in Clough's poem beginning 'Hope ever more and believe, O Man,' we find the Gospel of productive work preached with fervour. It is out of favour now in England; but in America we still see quaint attempts to make business a religion, as in the Middle Ages religion was a business. In these circles, it is productive activity as such to which value is attached, without much enquiry as to the utility of the product. The result has been an immense accumulation of the apparatus of life, without any corresponding elevation in moral standards. The mischiefs wrought by modern commercialism are largely the fruit of the purely irrational production which it encourages. There are, says Professor Santayana, Nibelungen who toil underground over a gold which they will never use, and in their obsession with production begrudge themselves all inclinations to recreation, to merriment, to fancy. Visible signs of such unreason appear in the relentless and hideous aspect which life



puts on ; for those instruments which emancipate themselves from their uses soon become hateful. 'A barbaric civilisation, built on blind impulse and ambition, should fear to awaken a deeper detestation than could ever be aroused by those more beautiful tyrannies, chivalrous or religious, against which past revolutions have been directed.' We cannot, indeed, be surprised that this ideal of productive work as a means of grace, precious for its own sake, has no attraction for the masses, and that independent thinkers like Edward Carpenter should write books on 'Civilisation, its Cause and Cure.'

This Puritan ideal is not so much unchristian as narrow and unintelligent ; but the money-making life has of late become more and more frankly predatory and anti-social. The great trusts, and the arts of the company-promoter, can hardly be said to perform any social service ; they exist to levy tribute on the public. We may say therefore that, though war between the leading nations of the world had become a strange idea and a far-off memory, we had by no means risen above the principles and practices of war in our internal life. The immunity from militarism hitherto enjoyed by Britain and the United States was a fortunate accident, not a proof of higher morality. Our fleet protected both ourselves and the Americans from the necessity of maintaining a conscript army ; but we had drifted into a condition in which civil war seemed not to be far off, and in which violence and lawlessness were increasing. By a strange inconsistency, many who on moral or religious grounds condemned wars between nations were found to condone or justify acts of war against the state, organised by discontented factions of its citizens. Revolutionary strikes, prepared long in advance by forced levies of money which were candidly called war-funds, had as their avowed aim the paralysis of the industries of the country and the reduction of the population to distress by withholding the necessities of life. These acts of civil war, and disgraceful outbreaks of criminal anarchism, were justified by persons who professed a conscientious objection to defending their homes and families against a foreign invader. This state of mind proves how little essential connexion there is between democracy and peace. It discloses a confusion of ideas even greater than

the antithesis between industrialism and militarism in the writings of Herbert Spencer. On this latter fallacy it is enough to quote the words of Admiral Mahan: 'As far as the advocacy of peace rests on material motives like economy and prosperity, it is the service of Mammon; and the bottom of the platform will drop out when Mammon thinks that war will pay better.' This is notoriously what has happened in Germany. A short war, with huge indemnities, seemed to German financiers a promising speculation. If such were the rotten foundations upon which anti-militarism in this country was based, the Churches cannot be blamed for giving the peace-movement a rather lukewarm support.

In Germany there was no internal anarchy, such as prevailed in England; there was also no illusion about the imminence of war. Our politicians ought to have read the signs of the times better; but they were too intent on feeling the pulse of the electorate at home to attend to disturbing and unwelcome symptoms abroad. The causes of the war are not difficult to determine. War has long been a national industry of Germany, and the idea of it evoked no moral repugnance. The military virtues were extolled; the military profession enjoyed an astonishing social prestige; the learned class proclaimed the biological necessity of international conflicts. The army believed itself to be invincible, and it had begun to control the policy of the country; where these two conditions exist, no diplomacy can avert war. Professionalism always has a selfish and anti-social element in its code, and the professionalism of the soldier is always prone to override the rights and disdain the scruples of civilians.

The dominant classes in Germany also found that their power was being undermined by the growing industrialisation. The steady increase in the social-democratic vote was a portent not to be disregarded. A letter from a German officer to a friend in Rumania, which found its way into the newspapers, tells a great deal of truth in a few words. 'You cannot conceive,' he wrote, 'what difficulty we had in persuading our Emperor that it was necessary to let loose this war. But it has been done; and I hope that for a long time to come we shall hear no more in Germany of pacifism, internationalism,

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democracy, and similar pestilent doctrines.' Sir Charles Waldstein, in his thoughtful book 'Aristodemocracy,' lays great stress on this. 'It appeared to me,' he says, 'ever since 1905, that in the immediate future it was all a question as to whether the labour-men, the practical pacifists, would arrive at the realisation of their power before the militarists had forced a war upon us, or whether the military powers would anticipate this result, and within the next few years force a war upon the world.' To the influence of the military was added the cupidity of the commercial and financial class. The law of diminishing returns was driving capital further and further afield; and large profits, it was hoped, might be made by the exploitation of backward countries and the reduction of their inhabitants to serfdom. To a predatory and parasitic class war seems only a logical extension of the principles upon which it habitually acts; and for this reason privileged orders seldom feel much moral compunction about a war-policy. Lastly, among the causes of the war must be reckoned one which has received far too little attention from social and political philosophers—the tenacious and half-unconscious memories of a race. Injustice comes home to roost, sometimes after an astonishingly long interval. The disaffection of Catholic Ireland would be quite unintelligible without the massacres of the 16th century and the unjust trade-legislation of the 17th and 18th. The bitterness of the working-class in England has its roots in the earlier period of the industrial revolution (about 1760-1832), when the labourer, with his wife and children, was treated as the 'cannon-fodder' of industry. Similarly, the seeds of Prussian brutality and aggressiveness were sown at Jena and in the raiding of Prussia for recruits before the Moscow expedition. If such were the causes of the great world-war, how little can be hoped from courts of international arbitration!

These considerations have, perhaps, made it clear that the main causes of international conflicts are what the Epistle of St James declares them to be—'the lusts that war in your members,' the pugnacious and acquisitive instincts which pervade our social life in times of peace, and not least in those nations which pride themselves on

having advanced beyond the militant stage. There are some who accept this state of things as natural and necessary, and who blame Christianity for carrying on a futile campaign against human nature. This is a very different indictment from that which condemns Christianity for tolerating a preventible evil; and it is, in our opinion, even less justified. The argument that, because war has always existed, it must always continue to exist, is justly ridiculed by Mr Norman Angell. 'It is commonly asserted that old habits of thought can never be shaken; that, as men have been, so they will be. That, of course, is why we now eat our enemies, enslave their children, examine witnesses with the thumbscrew, and burn those who do not attend the same church.'

The long history of war as a racial habit explains why a ruinous and insane anachronism shows such tenacity; for the conditions which established the habit among primitive tribes demonstrably no longer exist. It is probably true, as William James says, that 'militarist writers without exception regard war as a biological or sociological necessity'; lawyers might say the same about litigation. But 'laws of nature' are not efficient causes, and it is open to any one to prove that they are not laws, if he can break them with impunity. It would be the height of pessimistic fatalism to hold that men must always go on doing that which they hate, and which brings them to misery and ruin. Man is not bound for ever by habits contracted during his racial nonage; his moral, rational, and spiritual instincts are as natural as his physical appetites; and against them, as St Paul says, 'there is no law.' Huxley's *Romanes* Lecture gave an unfortunate support to the mischievous notion that the 'cosmic process' is the enemy of morality. The truth seems to be that Nature presents to us not a categorical imperative, but a choice. Do we prefer to pay our way in the world, or to be parasites? War, with very few exceptions, is a mode of parasitism. Its object is to exploit the labour of other nations, to make them pay tribute, or to plunder them openly, as the Germans have plundered the cities of Belgium. War is a parasitic industry; and Christianity forbids parasitism. Nature has her own penalties for the lower animals which make this choice, and they strike with equal

severity 'the peoples that delight in war.' The bellicose nations have nearly all perished.

There remains, however, a class of wars which escapes this condemnation; and about them difficult moral problems may be raised. We can hardly deny to a growing and civilised nation the right to expand at the expense of barbarous hunters and nomads. No one would suggest that the Americans ought to give back their country to the Indians, or that Australia should be abandoned to the aborigines. But were the Anglo-Saxons justified in expropriating the Britons, and the Spaniards the Aztecs? There is room for differences of opinion in these cases; and a very serious problem may arise in the future, as to whether the European races are morally justified in using armed force to restrict Asiatic competition. As a general principle, we must condemn the expropriation of any nation which is in effective occupation of the soil. The popular estimate of superior and inferior races is thoroughly unchristian and unscientific, as is the prejudice against a dark skin. The opinion that a nation which is increasing in population has a right to expel the inhabitants of another country to make room for its own emigrants is surely untenable. If it justifies war at all, it sanctions a war of extermination, which would attain its objects most completely by massacring girls and young women. The pressure of population is a real cause of war; but the moral is, not that war is right, but that a nation must cut its coat according to its cloth, and limit its numbers.

Unless we justify wars of extermination, war has no biological sanction, and Christianity is not flying in the face of nature by condemning it. On the contrary, by condemning every form of parasitism, it indicates the true path of evolution. It is equally right in rejecting the purely economic valuation of human goods. The 'economic man' does not exist in nature; he is a fictitious creature who is responsible for a great deal of social injustice. Some modern economists, like Mr Hobson, would substitute for the old monetary standards of production and distribution an attempt to estimate the 'human costs' of labour. Creative work involving ingenuity and artistic qualities is not 'costly' at all, unless the hours of labour, or the nervous strain, exceed the

powers of the worker. More monotonous work is not costly to the worker if the day's labour is fairly short, or if some variety can be introduced. The human cost is greatly increased if the worker thinks that his labour is useless, or that it will only benefit those who do not deserve the enjoyment of its fruits. Work which only produces frivolous luxuries is and ought to be unwelcome to the producer, even if he is well paid. It must also be emphasised that worry and anxiety take the heart out of a man more than anything else. Security of employment greatly reduces the 'human cost' of labour. These considerations are comparatively new in political economy. They change it from a highly abstract science into a study of the conditions of human welfare as affected by social organisation. The change is a victory for the ideas of Ruskin and Morris, though not necessarily for the practical remedies for social maladjustments which they propounded. It brings political economy into close relations with ethics and religion, and should induce economists to consider carefully the contribution which Christianity makes to the solution of the whole problem. For Christianity has its remedy to propose, and it is a solution of the problem of war, not less than of industrial evils.

Christianity gives the world a new and characteristic standard of values. It diminishes greatly the values which can accrue from competition, and enhances immeasurably the non-competitive values. 'A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth.' 'Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?' 'The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.' Passages like these are found in every part of the New Testament. This Christian idealism has a direct bearing on the doctrine of 'human costs.' Work is irksome, not only when it is excessive or ill-paid, but when the worker is lazy, selfish, envious and discontented. There is one thing which can make almost any work welcome. If it is done from love or unselfish affection, the human cost is almost *nil*, because it is not counted or consciously felt. This is no exaggeration when it is applied to the devoted labour of the mother and the nurse, or to that of the evangelist conscious of



a divine vocation. But in all useful work the keen desire to render social service, or to do God's will, diminishes to an incalculable extent the 'human cost' of labour. This principle introduces a deep cleavage between the Christian remedy and that of political socialism, which fosters discontent and indignation as a lever for social amelioration. Men are made unhappy in order that they may be urged to claim a larger share of the world's wealth. Christianity considers that, measured by human costs, the remedy is worse than the disease. The adoption of a truer standard of value would tear up the lust of accumulation by the roots, and would thus effect a real cure. It would also stop the grudging and deliberately bad work which at present seriously diminishes the national wealth.

The Christian cure is the only real cure. It is the fashion to assume that militarism and cupidity are vices of the privileged classes, and that democracies may be trusted neither to plunder the minority at home nor to seek foreign adventures by unjust wars. There is not the slightest reason to accept either of these views. Political power is always abused; an unrepresented class is always plundered. Nor are democracies pacific, except by accident. At present they do not wish to see the capital which they regard as their prospective prey dissipated in war; and for this reason their influence in our time will probably be on the side of peace. But, as soon as the competition of cheap Asiatic labour becomes acute, we may expect to see the democracies bellicose and the employing class pacific. This is not guess-work; we already see how the democracies of California and Australia behave towards immigrants from Asia. Readers of Anatole France will remember his description of the economic wars decreed by the Senate of the great republic, at the end of 'L'Ile des Pingouins.' It would, indeed, be difficult to prove that the expansion of the United States has differed much, in methods and morals, from that of the European monarchies; and the methods of trade-unions are the methods of pitiless belligerency. Democracy and socialism are broken reeds for the lover of peace to lean upon.

In conclusion, our answer to the indictment against



Christianity is that institutional religion does not represent the Gospel of Christ, but the opinions of a mass of nominal Christians. It cannot be expected to do much more than look after its own interests and reflect the moral ideas of its supporters. The real Gospel, if it were accepted, would pull up by the roots not only militarism but its analogue in civil life, the desire to exploit other people for private gain. But it is not accepted. We have seen that the Founder of Christianity had no illusions as to the reception which His message of redemption would meet with. The 'Prince of this World' is not Christ, but the Devil. Nevertheless, He did speak of the 'whole lump' being gradually leavened, and we shall not exceed the limits of a reasonable and justifiable optimism if we hope that the accumulated experience of humanity, and perhaps a real though very slow modification for the better of human nature itself, may at last eliminate the wickedest and most insane of our maleficent institutions. The human race has probably hundreds of thousands of years to live, whereas our so-called civilisation cannot be traced back for more than a few thousand years. The time when 'nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more,' will probably come at last, though no one can predict what the conditions will be which will make such a change possible.

The signs are not very favourable at present for internationalism. The great nations, bankrupt and honeycombed with social unrest, will be obliged after the war to organise themselves as units, with governments strong enough to put down revolutions, and directed by men of the highest mercantile ability, whose main function will be to increase productiveness and stop waste. We may even see Germany mobilised as one gigantic trust for capturing markets and regulating prices. A combination so formidable would compel other nations, and our own certainly among the number, to adopt a similar organisation. This would, of course, mean a complete victory for bureaucratic state-socialism, and the defeat of democracy and trade-union syndicalism. Such a change, which few would welcome, will occur if no other form of state is able to survive; and this is what we may live to see. But there is no finality

about any experiments in government. A period of internationalism may follow the intense nationalism which historical critics foresee for the twentieth century. Or perhaps the international labour-organisations may be too strong for the centralising forces. It is just possible that Labour, by a concerted movement during the violent reaction against militarism which will probably follow the war, will forbid any further military or naval preparations to be made.

Whatever forms reconstruction may take, Christianity will have its part to play in making the new Europe. It will be able to point to the terrible vindication of its doctrines in the misery and ruin which have overtaken a world which has rejected its valuations and scorned its precepts. It is not Christianity which has been judged and condemned at the bar of civilisation; it is civilisation which has destroyed itself because it has honoured Christ with its lips, while its heart has been far from Him. But a spiritual religion can win a victory only within its own sphere. It can promise no Deuteronomic catalogue of blessings and cursings to those who obey or disobey its principles. Social happiness and peace would certainly follow a whole-hearted acceptance of Christian principles; but they would not certainly bring wealth or empire. 'Philosophy,' said Hegel, 'will bake no man's bread'; and it is only in a spiritual sense that the meek-spirited can expect to possess the earth. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to suppose that a Christian nation would be unable to hold its own in the struggle for existence. A nation in which every citizen endeavoured to pay his way and to help his neighbour would be in no danger of servitude or extinction. The mills of God grind slowly, but the future does not belong to lawless violence. In the long run, the wisdom that is from above will be justified in her children.

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Art. 3.—THE TURKISH PEASANTRY OF ANATOLIA.

1. *Researches in Asia Minor*. By W. J. Hamilton. Murray, 1842.
  2. *Turkish Stories and Parables* (the concluding part of 'Frederick the Great on Kingcraft'). By J. W. Whittall. Longmans, 1901.
  3. *A Wandering Scholar in the Levant*. By D. G. Hogarth. Murray, 1895.
- And other works.

THERE is an aspect of the Turkish situation which deserves to be carefully considered by those who are interested in the future relations between Great Britain and Turkey—What will be the condition of the Moslem peasant population after the war? It is unlikely that Britain will be able, or even willing, to wash her hands of Turkey permanently or completely. The country will remain on the hands of the Allied powers. Not merely must the scanty remnants of the Christian and the Jewish populations be cared for and helped to recover their position and their economic ability; an equally pressing and even a bigger matter will be to set the Moslem population of Anatolia and Syria on their feet. They are not in an economic point of view self-sufficient. They cannot recreate their position, poor as it was before the war. It is useless to give them money (which some people regard as a cure for every ill); to give money to those who cannot use it wisely only makes their situation worse. Morally, intellectually and financially, those Moslem peasants will be found incapable of making the effort which is needed to restore prosperity or even any ordinary comfort to their villages and their families.

Apart from a few exceptional cases, the agricultural tradition has for a long time been not improving but deteriorating over great part of Anatolia (to which my knowledge, and therefore the scope of the present article, are restricted); Anatolia, however, contains the strength and the backbone of the Turkish state. Further, I have in mind the central mass of Anatolia, where Moslems constitute almost the entire population, setting aside those districts where Greeks on the one side and Armenians on the other furnish (or at least formerly

furnished) an influential part, numerically as well as morally, of the inhabitants. Money wisely given, and not merely distributed at random, may help the Greeks and Armenians; even the staving-off of starvation will do them permanent good, for they are energetic, and they have some knowledge; but the Moslem peasants need guidance more than money. After the war they will have deteriorated still further in respect of economic capacity. It requires knowledge to carry on agriculture and make it successful even after the simple fashion of Western Asia. The whole basis upon which the economic existence of the peasantry rested will be found to have been broken up during the war and the sufferings which it has entailed on the peasantry. People who are accustomed to a stable social order (as in Great Britain) are for the most part hardly conscious of the vast amount of practical wisdom which has been applied in building the foundations on which civilised life rests. Even in the much more simple and humble life of the Moslem peasantry there was involved an amount of practical knowledge and cooperation which will not be recognised until the want of it is felt. The reasons which have led to this long-continued economic deterioration form the subject of the present article; and the need of drawing attention to this subject was strongly impressed upon me in conversation with an extremely well-informed American consul, who had just returned from Turkey and who has had long experience of the country.

It has been natural that the attention of the Allied Christian peoples should have been almost wholly directed in the last year or two to the condition and the sufferings of the Christian peoples who are still left under the domination of the Turks, and it is an unpopular thing at the present time to speak about the needs of the Turkish people; but the Turkish problem is one that cannot be avoided in the near future. It is impossible to obliterate from the attention of the world a large population in a country that was once wealthy and productive, and might be so again, a country which was more than once the cradle of a young civilisation and the central point in the movement of history. A large mass of suffering and undirected or misdirected people anywhere constitutes a general evil for modern civilisation.

Turkey, if left to the unaided ignorance of government after the old system, will be a running sore, weakening the entire body of the civilised world. Something must be done in the early future; and to do it well requires thought in the present. Action without knowledge is the evil; and the knowledge must be collected and arranged in a useful form now in order to be available at the earliest moment, when the application of it is needed.

I am well aware how little claim I have to speak on the subject. It lies out of the line of my proper studies, but the general facts of the situation have been deeply impressed upon me in casual experience during thirty-five years of wandering in the country. It is, however, difficult to find trustworthy and detailed information about the growth of the evils that afflict the ordinary peasantry in Asiatic Turkey; and this difficulty prevents one from being able to speak with full knowledge. The facts are not recorded in any collected and useful form. Many persons of long experience in Turkey, whom I have consulted, have emphatically confirmed the views here stated about the Moslem agricultural population, but all declare that no documentary evidence bearing on the subject is known to them.

Every traveller and almost every European resident in Turkey has acquired a strong liking for the Anatolian peasant. Many who hate the Turkish rule will readily confess their love for the villager, their gratitude for his hospitality and kindness, their admiration for his simplicity and courage. It is to me a duty to make some practical return for the hospitality of many villages and individuals; but, to do any good, knowledge of the facts and the causes is needed; and where are we to look for knowledge? The histories are mainly filled with the great events, battles and treaties, assassinations and massacres, the fate of sultans and viziers; but I have looked in vain for any study of the facts regarding the fate of the cultivators of the soil and the keepers of the sheep and goats. I do not fancy that I am able to illuminate the subject, but at least I can write a plea on behalf of the common people, the humble, hard-working peasantry, whose lot even at the best would

appear intolerable in Great Britain; for it would be regarded as an outrage on society if the idlest and least deserving workman in our country were permitted to spend a week in circumstances such as the mass of the ordinary Moslem population of Asiatic Turkey experience throughout their whole life. I write on their behalf, and attempt to bespeak for them some consideration in the coming settlement of Western Asia. They have never attracted the attention or weighed for a moment in the consideration of diplomatists and ambassadors. These are interested mainly or solely in sultans and ministers and the wealthier classes. They never come in contact with the peasantry; they seem to be hardly aware of their existence; they are concerned with supporting the established system of government and the ruling dynasty.

The self-righting power of the East, which has effected the salvation of Asia in former time by sweeping away every effete dynasty after it has ceased to possess vigour enough to thrive, has been interfered with by European diplomatists and ambassadors, who seek for some recognised authority to deal with. Diplomatic attention is inevitably and necessarily directed towards the continuous web of wiles and guile and stratagem and conspiracies and intrigues which make up the life of an Oriental government; and the ambassadors accredited to it usually find it so difficult to get hold of the truth under the false appearances which float on the surface of affairs that they gladly acquiesce in the one continuing fact amid the flux and change, namely, the permanence of the dynasty. Enemies and friends of Turkey alike among the diplomatists—if there are any real friends of Turkey where all are in duty bound to forward the interests of their own countries—agree in supporting the established ruler. A change of dynasty in Asia is always accompanied with disorder, battle and bloodshed; and in the trouble some innocent outsiders frequently suffer. Diplomatists are confined to the walls of the embassy for a time, and look out only at some personal risk. It is all very unpleasant and disturbing, and therefore they avoid it. They rarely consider the fact that the happiness and the very life of the humbler population may depend on the success of a revolution



when a dynasty has become effete; and the best of them recognise, after long years of service in Constantinople, that their interest in the people as human beings and their powers of discovering and viewing sanely the needs of the people have become atrophied. In truth, if they had the impertinence to attempt to direct the attention of their own Foreign Offices to such considerations, they would be censured as meddling with affairs outside of their own province, and would be recalled to their proper sphere of duty or requested to leave the Service. To discover what is going on from day to day in Constantinople is very difficult; and the man whose business it is to find out must attend to that alone.

The state of the Turkish peasants has deteriorated steadily during the last century. The Moslems of Anatolia, who once probably numbered more than ten millions, were in a much better economic condition before Mahmud II (1808-1839) began to reorganise the Turkish Empire. He found the Empire, a loosely knit Oriental despotism, far advanced on the usual Asiatic path to dissolution, as the weakening fibre of successive monarchs was proving unfit to hold the dominions together, and no other bond of unification existed but the will and strong hand of the Sultan. The soldiers had become the arbiters of Turkish destiny. The provinces were drifting towards home rule (or independence, as it was called). There was no proper bureaucratic system, and administration depended largely on the personality of the chief minister (Grand Vizier). Mahmud set himself, as Shelley makes him say, 'to stem the torrent of descending time.' He massacred the Janissaries and broke the overgrown military power; he attempted to modernise Turkish administration by introducing European ways and a better articulated official system, which might be able to carry out more efficiently the will of the central authority; he fought hard to prevent Greece from achieving independence, and to hold Egypt in obedience; but he missed success in every enterprise, because the tide of history was strong and the moral quality of Turkey weak. Both he and his weaker successors, who continued the same policy, failed to make the natural Turk into a capable or trustworthy official. The Turks



illustrate the reason for the failure in a story which Sir William Whittall relates,\* and which I quote in order to exemplify the fashion whereby in Turkish society all explanations of political and social phenomena tend to take the form of anecdote. In story and fable the Anatolian popular mind has always expressed itself.

'In the reign of Sultan Selim a dispute arose between Russia and Turkey; and a certain Emin Effendi, reputed very clever, was chosen by the Sultan as his special envoy to settle the difficulty. He went to Petersburg, and was received there with great distinction by the Russians. Prince Orloff, the Foreign Minister, gave a banquet in his honour, and at its finish informed his guest that a Tatar had just arrived from Odessa bringing despatches, some of which were for His Excellency, and which he would have much pleasure in delivering to him with his own hands. The Prince summoned one of his aides-de-camp and instructed him: "Go to the Foreign Office, and in my private cabinet, in the left-hand drawer of my desk, of which this is the key, you will find a bundle of despatches, which bring me forthwith." After the aide-de-camp had saluted, Prince Orloff, looking at his watch and turning to Emin Effendi, said, "To show Your Excellency what regularity we are accustomed to in Europe, my aide-de-camp is now going down the staircase of my palace; he is now in the street; he has reached the Foreign Office; he is in my cabinet; he is now opening my drawer; he is now down the stairs, crossing the street, coming up my stairs; he is now at the door;" and just as he said this the aide-de-camp knocked at the door and presented the despatches. Emin Effendi was struck by this, and said to himself, "Why can't we Turks be as good as the *giaours*? Now, there is my *kehaya* (attendant), Hassan Aga. Why shouldn't I teach him to do as well?" And he at once set to work to teach him the punctual execution of orders. Meanwhile Emin Effendi's mission was satisfactorily concluded, and he was made Foreign Minister at Constantinople.

'Prince Orloff, having got into disgrace, was shipped off

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\* I refer to the 'Turkish Stories and Reminiscences' printed at the end of his book 'Frederick the Great on Kingcraft' translated from the original manuscript in the possession of his family (Longmans, 1901). The authenticity of the '*Matinées*' is contested by the Germans, though the principles stated in them are strikingly illustrated in modern time, and the manuscript has a proved existence of more than a century: at any rate the value and interest of the Turkish stories is incontestable.

as Ambassador to Constantinople, so that the former host became now the guest. Emin Effendi, grateful for the attentions received from the Prince, gave a grand banquet in his honour, and after the banquet he thus addressed him: "Prince! His Imperial Majesty, my august master, has deigned to confer on you a snuff-box in brilliants. I shall have the honour of presenting it to you with my own hands"; and, clapping his hands, he called out, "Hassan Aga!" His attendant at once presented himself, "Buyuroum, I await your orders." Emin Effendi instructed him, "Go to the Foreign Office, into my cabinet, open the right-hand drawer of my desk with this key. In it you will find a red velvet box, which bring to me at once; and mind you, Hassan Aga, you are on your trial. Don't forget my year's drudgery in giving you lessons." "On my head be it," says Hassan Aga, and disappears. Emin Effendi then smilingly turns to the Prince, after taking his watch out, and says, "And to show you, Prince, that we, too, in this country have habits of regularity, my attendant is now going down the stairs, up the street, into the Foreign Office and my cabinet; he is now opening my drawer, taking the case out, returning, etc., and now he is at the door;" and he calls out "Hassan Aga!" and Hassan Aga jauntily steps in, which makes the Minister say to him, "Well done, my faithful son; you have learned my lessons." But suddenly he perceived that the velvet case was not in Hassan Aga's hand, and asked impatiently, "And where is the case?" Hassan Aga, as if it were a matter of course, replied, "Effendim, I couldn't find my papoutches (outer shoes)"—the fact being that he had not gone out at all, but was looking for his papoutches all the time.'

Mahmud, quite in the spirit of Emin Effendi, attempted to create a bureaucracy after the European fashion; and a certain small degree of success was attained very slowly during a century. Gradually there was created, mainly through the help of European teachers and sometimes of renegade Europeans, a poor imitation of the European system of control from a governing centre, which was imposed by slow stages on Asia Minor in place of the old system. The result was bad for the peasantry. Before the time of Mahmud and for decades afterwards, there were many powerful territorial families, known for the most part as the Dere-Beys ('Lords of the Valley'), who exercised real government over the Anatolian people. Their sway was generally easy, kind and slack. They

protected their own people from the exactions of the central government at Constantinople. The power of the Sultans in Anatolia was ineffective and narrowly circumscribed. Under this system there was no economic progress and no mercantile development; things went on in the old fashion year after year, and century after century; but the peasantry were on the whole happy, because they were contented and free, generally speaking, from any serious oppression.

With regard to the simple ways of Anatolian trade I give one example. An English friend, an experienced and successful business man in the inner part of Turkey, used to relate what he had heard during a visit to Trebizond more than sixty years ago. Down to a time not many years before he was there, and within the experience of many of his business associates, the custom had been that goods for sale in Central Asia were entrusted to native traders, who went in charge of caravans of camels laden with merchandise. A trading journey lasted from a year to eighteen months. On their return these native traders entered Trebizond early in the morning, having bivouacked for the last time some little distance outside the city. As they passed along the street they deposited at the door of each merchant for whom they had done business a bag containing the money which was due to him; and, when the merchant in Trebizond arose, he found the money waiting on his doorstep. Everybody was satisfied; there were no contracts, no accounts, and a reasonable profit. Most remarkable of all, there was never any theft of money from the doors, until Maltese immigrants began to settle in Trebizond, and introduced European 'civilisation.' Such a method of doing business is inconsistent with the highly developed Western business system and Western 'civilisation'; but it was not oppressive to the people. There were no large fortunes; there was no opportunity for making a great fortune; it was impossible for one man to force into his service the minds and the work of a large number of people, and so to create a big organisation out of which he might make big profits. There was a very large number of small men doing business on a small scale, all making a decent living and all reasonably happy in a humble fashion.

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Now contrast that picture with what was the case in the year 1878, when a Consul-General for Anatolia, appointed to inaugurate the British Protectorate of Asia Minor, reached Sivas after a rapid progress through Central Anatolia. I have the story from the Consul's own lips, as he related it to me at Sivas in 1881 and referred to it more than once afterwards. There was in Sivas an extremely wealthy Armenian who controlled, and indeed possessed as his own business, the entire carrying trade with Central Asia. Every load which was taken from the harbours of the Black Sea up towards the East, and every parcel of goods which was brought back, was carried by his pack animals and managed by his men. He was a man of no education, but simply of great natural unregulated ability, and possessed of the skill to make use of other men. It was doubtful whether he could write; it was certain that there were no accounts kept of his business except in his own head; he knew everything personally, he managed everything personally, he remembered everything, and could tell at any moment where any one of his vast numbers of employees was, what he was doing, and when he ought to return. It happened that the entire Christian population of Sivas and of most of the great province of which Sivas is the capital, including the great man, went forth to welcome the Consul, who was charged with the duty of improving the administration of Turkey and thereby alleviating the lot of the poor Christians. There was quite a marvellous concourse of a whole nation. The Consul was taken as a guest to the house of this Armenian, until he had hired his own official residence and furnished it for his convenience. The great man promptly seized the opportunity of selling to the Consul an inferior carpet at an exorbitant price. It was his habit, which had become nature with him, to sell at the highest price that he could get in every situation and in every bargain. To Turkish Pasha or to British Consul he would behave alike; but, when he met a Turkish Pasha, he had to deal with a man who knew something about the true values of native articles, whereas, when he dealt with an English Consul, a soldier new to the country, he was dealing with a man who was not acquainted with values and who was misled by the apparent enthusiasm with

which his advent had been welcomed; and not even in the peculiar circumstances of this case did it occur to the wealthy man that it would be patriotic to behave with simple honesty. It was his nature to make money, and he was too old to change. To such Orientals the profit of one piastre exercises almost as strong attraction as the profit of 1000% ; and they will haggle over a bargain of the smallest kind with the same pertinacity that they apply to the largest trading ventures.

In these two anecdotes the difference between the situation in 1800 and in 1878 is evident. The big man was replacing the many small men. The one point that interests us is whether or not the peasants benefited by the change. It may be true that the big man was able to do a greater amount of business, and work the carrying trade to a larger extent and at a cheaper rate than the many small men; but was the mass of the people happier than before?

I am far from holding up to admiration, as if it were perfect, the administration of the 'Lords of the Valley.' It involved some serious evils; it was too much dependent on the character of the individual; it was infected with the vice of the feudal system. Moreover, it was undoubtedly weakening the Turkish state (though that need not be regarded as an evil for the world as a whole), for the power of the Sultans was steadily diminishing as the power of the great territorial families increased; but, here again, what we want to find out is the comparative happiness of the mass of the people. It would have done no harm, but probably only good, both to the Anatolian peasants and to the world in general, if the Osmanli Sultans had gone the way of their predecessors the Seljuk Sultans of Rum, and had gradually perished as the parts of their 'ramshackle Empire' broke off and became practically independent. Resident landlords belonging to old-established families, being in continual contact with their own people, can never be so harsh to the peasant population as the administrative agents of a distant Government, especially when these come and go in such rapid change as was the case under Abd-ul-Hamid's administration.

The chiefs of the Turkmen Asheret (tribes) were at least as independent as the Dere-Beys, and they were in

a more advantageous position. They were massed always in considerable numbers, some in the mountains, and some roving over the great plains, and thus they were removed from the power of the central government and its agents. The same was the case with the chiefs of the Kurdish tribes, even of those Western Kurds on this side of the Halys in the great plains that lie between Konia and Angora. The Turkmens and Kurds, therefore, were not so easily reduced to obedience; but the Dere-Bey's had their seats for the most part in or close to the great cities, and were more exposed to the reviving power of the Sultans' organisation. I have been a guest of the most exposed of the Turkmen chiefs in the hill country immediately south of Eski-Sheher (the great railway centre of the country), and learned something of the long struggle which they were maintaining against the exactions and impositions of the Government, and of the gradual wearing-down of their strength by the centralised administration. The nomad chiefs, as a rule, could protect their people to a considerable degree. They could not, however, educate them, nor would they, even if they could, have tried to transform the nomad into the agriculturist. They could not give the knowledge and skill which is required in successful cultivation of the soil.

Gradually the old territorial families were eliminated, sometimes by war, sometimes in other ways. To take one example: the great family of Kara-Osman-Oglu, 'Son of Black Osman,' had its principal seat at Manisa (Magnesia), eight hours north of Smyrna. The head of the family said with pride that he was able to ride from Smyrna to Baghdad and sleep in his own house every night, so widely extended was their immense property. I do not imply that this was literally true, for Turks in conversation are apt to take a very grandiose view of their circumstances and scale of expenditure, and further they are unqualified by nature and untrained by education to cultivate exactness in estimate or in arithmetical statement; but at least there was a broad basis of fact on which such a proud assertion rested. Most of the Dere-Bey's property passed into the hands of the Sultans; and Abd-ul-Hamid was particularly skilful and successful in getting possession of estates all over the country on



an enormous scale. A friend of my own, much younger than myself, had seen the last Kara-Osman-Oglu residing in poverty at Pergamos. My friend's grandfather, whom also I knew well, told me that in his youth he had visited the head of the family at his home in Magnesia, and had witnessed the hospitality, the generosity and the kindness, with which the Bey exercised his great influence. As he said to my old friend, he had only three things which he did not share with his friends or his guests—his own horse, his own gun, and his own wife. There was something about that old system which makes one long to have seen it. The best analogy to-day is found in the old Irish landlord system as it is pictured in the novels of Samuel Lover; and the best way to comprehend the spirit of that old system is to study the works of Lover. I have always been struck with a certain resemblance between the Irish character and the Anatolian character; and this resemblance is in the kindest and most human qualities of both. The Turks, indeed, are absolutely devoid of the wit and the brilliance and the quick intellect of the typical Irishman, but there is a certain quality of spirit and humour and quaintness and kindness, also (it must be said) of carelessness, untidiness and thriftlessness, which is common to both. I speak, of course, of the Irishman who has not been corrupted by politics, and who remains his natural self, free from any need to court the favour of the populace and to 'go one better than' his rival.

This characteristic of the Turks has not escaped the attention of Sir William Whittall, to whose pages every one that appreciates Turkey will return over and over again in order to find illustrations of the deep-lying character of the Turkish, or rather of the Anatolian, people. As he remarks, the stories that are told of old Nasr-ed-din Hodja, the typical Anatolian peasant of the mediæval period under Moslem education,

'embody the humour of the confusion of ideas—the humour of nonsense, as some would call it. In fact, it is the humour which is conspicuous in the Irish race. Why the quick-witted Irish and the slow and sedate Turks should have the same kind of sense of the humorous is a profound mystery which I cannot understand. Possibly the Turkish kind is of a coarser,



heavier, and more grotesque nature than the Irish, but they certainly are both of the same type. Thus an Irishman picks up a sovereign one day, which turns out to be a light one, only worth 17s. 6d., and he refuses to pick up another the next day, because, forsooth, he lost 2s. 6d. by its sister the day before. Under the same confusion of ideas, Nasr-ed-din Hodja, because, through his donkey's straying, he lost his pelisse which he had thrown on the pack-saddle, takes off this pack-saddle from the animal's back to punish him, and, carrying it home on his own back, threatens never to replace it on the ass's back till the pelisse is found. In the same way, too, having quarrelled with the villagers, whose cowherd he had become, he threatens them with terrible vengeance. Upon which one of them asks him, "What will you do, O Hodja? Will you let our cows stray, and become the food of wolves?" "Worse than that," replies the Hodja. "Will you set fire to our village?" asks the villager again. "Much worse than that," he replies. "Well, what will you do? Tell us," says the villager. "I'll tell you," replies the Hodja; "I'll work for you for a whole year, and when the time comes for you to pay me my wages, I'll throw the money into your faces and go away" (pp. 203-4).

The Hodja may fairly be regarded as a representative of the Anatolian peasantry; to understand him is to understand them.

Nasr-ed-din is not a creation or growth of the pure Turks; he is the Turkish survival of the ancient *Æsop*. Both *Æsop* and the Hodja were Phrygians. *Æsop* belonged to Kutaya, the ancient Kotiaion; Nasr-ed-din belonged to Ak-sheher, the ancient Philomelion; those cities lie on or near the great road which leads from Constantinople and Bithynia to the south-east. The wisdom and humour of Phrygia in its ancient and in its mediæval form are connected with these two names. Each represents a certain phase or stage in the development or degeneration of society in Anatolia. *Æsop* marks the period when the collective self-protecting and self-directing instinct of the people, which previously had found expression through the goddess and her religious institutions, was seeking some more direct way of utterance, and was gradually learning a kind of rude half-literary expression, no longer in the guise of divine teaching through the prophets of the sanctuary, but as the native utterance of an individual mind. Nasr-ed-din

Hodja marks an epoch in degeneration. The society of the Christian Empire had long been accustomed to express itself in literary forms, not indeed reaching a high level in the later centuries, but still declaring through the mouth of individuals the thought of the community. The Turkish conquest had changed that; and such literature as was produced under the Seljuk Sultans was exotic and Persian in type rather than Anatolian. Thus the Moslemised peasantry of Phrygia were again placed on a stage similar to that on which Æsop had lived. The Hodja gave expression to the native thoughts, which now had ceased to be capable of real literary expression and again took the form of story and fable. He lived when Tamerlane overthrew the Seljuks and reigned at Konia, and his grave is shown at Ak-Sheher. Whether he or Æsop was a real figure, or both were creations of the popular imagination (like many of the Moslem 'heroes' whose graves are shown in many parts of Anatolia), forms no part of our subject. They are types of the Anatolian peasant.

The native character of Nasr-ed-din suggests a fact which is too often forgotten, or rather which is unknown to or unregarded by the world in general, though every person who has travelled much in Asiatic Turkey is well aware of it. The Anatolian Turks are not merely Turks; they are in large degree and with certain exceptions the ancient population of the country. They are Phrygians or Isaurians or Cappadocians and so on, in a more real sense than they are Turks. This, of course, does not apply to the many nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes, such as Turkmen, Avshahr, Yuruk, etc., nor does it apply to the modern immigrant or refugee peoples—the Mohadjir element, as it is called—but it is eminently the case with the settled people of the towns and villages generally, who are pointedly distinguished in native appreciation from the nomads. Nasr-ed-din is a sort of impersonation of the rough, homely-witted, good-humoured peasant of the Phrygian hills and the great central plains, who has remained the same throughout the ages. The Anatolian is the 'fellah,' almost the beast of burden, whom we see carrying on his back a pack-saddle, supporting an enormous load of merchandise along the streets of Smyrna, in the service of a European merchant. The

Anatolians of the Phrygian hills and plain are the typical part of the whole population; and we remember that the word 'Phrygian' was practically equivalent to 'slave' in the estimation of the quicker-witted Greeks and Romans; the Phrygians were the 'fellahin,' the hewers of wood and drawers of water, the unskilled workmen, whom Nature intended (as Aristotle said) to be slaves of the higher race. Yet the Phryges were the 'Free Men,' the European conquerors of the land, and are still excellent soldiers under good officers.

Regarded as expressions of the character of the Anatolian peasant, the stories about the Hodja, which always arise out of some situation in social life, derive their point from their humorous and yet apparently ignorant or stupid way of describing the situation from an unexpected point of view; but there is a certain irony always under the surface, and to miss this irony is to miss everything. There is a translation by Muellendorff of some of the stories about Nasr-ed-din Hodja, published at the small price of threepence in the Universal Library of Reclam at Leipzig, but nothing can be more disappointing than the German version of the Turkish stories. Dr Muellendorff seems always to miss the point in his translation. I eagerly seized on the book when it was first shown to me, having been familiar in the past with many stories which passed from mouth to mouth regarding the adventures of the mediæval Phrygian, stories which always were apposite to the situation that suggested them, and full of quaint humour; but the pages of the learned German translator contain only disappointment. Something seems to have dropped out in practically every story, and the little thing that is omitted destroys the effect. Sir William Whittall has only a few stories of the Hodja, but they make the Turk and his ideal in Nasr-ed-din intelligible to the world.

The description of one of the best Turkish peasants with whom I have come in contact, may be quoted from my 'Impressions of Turkey' (published in 1897):

'Akhmet, a Koniali (from a village eleven hours west of Konia), who was one of our men in 1886, had served seven years as a soldier, had risen to the rank of sergeant, had gone through the earlier stages of the Russian war and the siege of Plevna; he had been taken prisoner when Plevna

was captured (one of 140 men who survived out of a regiment 700 strong), and had been released at the end of the war. During his seven years of service, he had received one dollar as pay. He was an excellent specimen of a village Turk; absolutely trustworthy, strong, slow, steady, modest, quiet, perfectly well-behaved, and perfectly useless in all the departments of work where any skill or readiness was required. When we came to a village, Akhmet, instead of putting on some show and making an impression of importance, would take the humblest inhabitant aside and enquire in a whisper where he could procure milk, a fowl, etc. He never knew what to do or to say beyond his ordinary round of duties; he could never learn to distinguish between a stone without letters and a "written stone"; he never could understand why we looked at such things, and, much as he tried, never could feel the faintest interest in them (even though he knew *bakshish* rewarded every discovery).

Yet, if I ever should be in a really dangerous situation, it would be the rather stupid but absolutely honest Koniali, and not any one of the much abler servants whom I have often had, that I should wish beside me—if I could not have both. There lies the reason why I always have such affection for the Turkish villagers. A nation, to be self-sufficient, must contain more than people like the Koniali, but those who have known the need of such people will never undervalue them.

Such is the Anatolian peasant in his natural condition, with the good and the bad. Our object is to see what his fate has been under the reformed and centralised Oriental administration which, with the support and under the teaching of Europe, enabled the Osmanli Sultans to recover their power. They could learn a little from the methods of European organisation, and thereby they were gradually enabled to destroy or degrade the territorial aristocracy of Anatolia; but from Europe the Sultans learned little or nothing except the misuse of the methods of civilisation. There was always some European power which found it advantageous to its own individual interests to help the Turkish Government in Constantinople. Many people cherished a genuine though, as events have shown, mistaken belief that the Government could be regenerated and revived, and that

it might apply the resources of civilisation to good instead of to evil; they thought after the fashion of a wise man and religious teacher in Smyrna, according to the story told by Sir William Whittall.

'During the Crimean War, the first telegraph was established in Turkey. This wonderful invention created the greatest astonishment amongst the Turks; and great and bitter were the discussions as to whether it was a good or a bad thing for humanity. To solve the question, it was at last decided to have a full debate by the Ulema of the Province of Smyrna, who were at the time presided over by a very wise old mollah. The meeting was held, and fierce was the contention. Half the Ulema opined that the telegraph was a good thing, because it quickened communications; the other half asserted that it could not be good, seeing that it was an invention of the devil. There seemed to be no way of arriving at a conclusion, when it was perceived that their chief, the old mollah, had not yet expressed an opinion. Both parties, therefore, eagerly pressed him for his view on the subject, and agreed to abide by his decision. The old mollah replied, "My children, the telegraph is a good thing." "What," said the conservatives, indignantly, "do you mean that it is not a work of the devil's?" "Oh yes," replied the old man, "assuredly it is a work of his; but why are you so dull of understanding, my children? Can't you see that if the devil is occupied going up and down the wires with each message sent, he will have less time to trouble us mortals on the earth below?" And all the Ulema acknowledged the wisdom of their chief.'

Deterioration, both moral and economic, has accompanied the reorganisation carried out by Mahmud and his successors. It is not that the theory of the relations which ought to exist between the various sections of the population was seriously wrong in the Turkish system; in some respects it was very good; the evil lay entirely in the administration. In practice it was a vast organisation of bribery. It was not merely the case that there were corrupt officials, and that some took bribes. It was that all took bribes as their main or only source of income, and that this was done almost openly on a well-recognised tariff. Every one knew the system. Every official was in office to get money, and not to do work. Every official knew that all the world was aware that he

systematically took bribes. There was no false shame about it. Every one, with the rarest exceptions, bought his appointment, and had to recoup himself during his term of office. He could not do so from his salary, which was miserably small and generally was not paid. Nobody seriously blamed any official for taking bribes, because all knew that they themselves in the same circumstances would act exactly in the same way. Moreover the Turk was not naturally a good official. He rarely had any desire to carry out the law, or much knowledge of what the law provided, or any wish to learn what were its provisions. He was in office for a short time, because officials changed very rapidly; and he had not merely to repay himself for the cost of getting his office, but also to prepare to bribe higher officials in order to get a new appointment. The centre of power in Constantinople was most corrupt of all and most thoroughly opposed to change, because the officials there made good business out of the existing system and knew that, if the system were changed, they would have to go.

The cost of everything had to be squeezed out of the peasantry. There was no rational or uniform system of taxation. The wealthier classes found it much cheaper not to pay the taxes but to bribe the officials; and it was the poor, who were unable to bribe, that suffered most. I have seen with almost uncontrollable indignation the treatment which an official bestowed on some wretched peasant clad in rags who was brought before him by policemen, though I never witnessed the sequel after the peasant was led away. I heard of it. These peasantry of central Anatolia were almost all Mohammedans; and formerly they suffered more than the Christians in the towns, because the Christians were usually more successful, better traders, possessed of more money and therefore better able to give bribes. In the Armenian country, further east, the peasants were in large proportion Armenian Christians.

Abd-ul-Hamid certainly had the wish, and tried in his own way, to recreate and improve the position of the Moslem peasantry, but his methods were entirely wrong and only made things worse in the long run, because they were based on the old Turkish system of massacring sections of the Christians, in the hope that the



Moslems, being thus set free from the competition of the Christians, would succeed in occupying their place and their comparative prosperity. For a year or two some sections of the Moslems were certainly placed in a more favourable position, but their intellectual and moral capacity for maintaining that position was steadily weakened by being accustomed to false and violent ways of life. Abd-ul-Hamid himself was the supreme head of the system of bribery; and I was told by excellent authorities that a percentage of all bribes received by members of the Imperial household went to the Sultan himself in regular course. Everybody knew what everybody else was getting, and the Sultan knew what all were getting, and so the vicious circle was completed. Reform in such a case was impossible. The evil had to be radically rooted out. While all of us are now well informed about the misdeeds of the Young Turks who expelled the Sultan, and who themselves (it must be confessed) are after all mere Turks—I use the word in its political sense—it stands to their credit that they did eliminate and almost exterminate the old gang, and that for a year or two the practical facts of administration in Anatolia were made far better and more honest than they had been; for officials were paid, from the highest to the lowest, and thus the mainspring of economic need, which had made bribery a universal necessity, was done away with. This my friends and I know from personal observation.

Such are the general circumstances which produced a steady deterioration in the economic life of the peasant population. They became poorer and poorer, alike financially and morally and even intellectually. The strongest counterbalancing influence was that of their religion and of 'the Book'; but still the Koran is not pitched on a sufficiently high standard to keep the soul of the people vigorous. 'Reform is quite possible in Turkey, but not under Turkish rule.' So the present writer said in a book published in 1897, where he quoted also the opinion of that excellent traveller, Hamilton, that 'the Turks are incapable of that high moral energy and perseverance in the path of duty, which are essential to the accomplishment of any moral or political regeneration.'

My conclusion is that Turkey must be taken in tutelage by the Western powers, and that everything will depend upon the personal character and the knowledge of the men into whose hands the task of regenerating Turkey will be put. Foremost among those who are fit to be entrusted with this duty are certain American missionaries in the country—not by any means all of them, for I have known one who said to me with fervour that he had never been inside a Turkish mosque. Such as he may be eliminated at once, but many missionaries whom I have known are well fitted to be guides, as in their life they are ensamples, of economic management and moral vigour, and of living on a high standard. It is, however, not the purpose of this paper to do more than point out the urgent need for the application of knowledge and study and preparation for this revivification of Western Asia. The knowledge is wanting, the facts have never been collected, and it is of the first importance that they should be collected and tabulated now, before the need for applying the knowledge presses upon us. To benefit a class like the Anatolian peasant it is necessary to have regard in the first place to his present condition, education and circumstances, and in the second place to the historical process which has brought him to the situation which he now occupies. A cure which would be useful to one class of peasantry having certain racial characteristics would be useless and perhaps even harmful to peasants of a different type. The Anatolian peasant is obedient, contented and easily governed in a way that is almost unique in the case of a race possessing such a courageous and in some ways trustworthy basis of nature.

No amount of knowledge, however, and no collecting and tabulating of facts or statistics will be of any avail without the will and the skill to use them in practice. Our diplomatists in Turkey have usually been strenuously opposed to doing anything to aid the people except in the way of sending armies and doctors and nurses, the last two elements almost entirely through private initiative and at private expense, but cordially supported on most occasions by the Embassy. To improve the economic situation of the people lay wholly outside the

interest and wish of diplomacy. In this respect all that has been done by Britain has been done by private persons and trading enterprise, in spite of the systematic neglect and sometimes the contempt and opposition of the official world. General von der Goltz, in July 1908, said to an intimate friend of his and mine that the deal by which a British railway was handed over to Germany about 1888 could never have been carried through without the energetic support of the British Ambassador. The words used shortly afterwards by my good friend the Manager of the Ottoman Railway to the same ambassador are significant: 'All that I ask of you, Sir, is that you let me alone, and do not use your influence against me.'

Another friend, somewhere about 1900-1905, wanted to instal electric light in his large engineering works. Desiring to place the order in his own country, he consulted our Consul. The reply was that this was quite impossible, as the Turkish Government would never consent: 'The Sultan is determined that no dynamo shall be admitted into the country.' Yet by treaty and right there was no reason why such goods should be refused admittance. My friend went to the German Consul to see what he could do. The reply came on the instant. The installation would be made; terms, price according to published rates plus customs payable to Government; payment, when the work was completed and in satisfactory working order; sole condition, that the order must be placed with a German firm. The success of this first installation in Turkey led to the placing of many similar orders with the same firm; but it needed all the influence and resolution of the able German Ambassador to force the first order through the Custom House. The idea that British influence should be used to make Turkey admit goods according to agreement in spite of the Sultan's feelings would have been too absurd at that time.

I fully admit that there can fairly be put forward an argument in defence of this reluctance, namely, that it tended to keep British embassies free from the charge of favouring private interests. Such charges have been made not rarely in respect of other embassies and consulates within my experience; and I could quote, if space

allowed, quaint examples, some of which became public and notorious, while others did not; but it was rarely possible to make such a charge against any British representative, because it was notorious that private mercantile enterprise received no favour and was generally treated with the scantiest respect in any British office. On the whole, however, results have proved, without any argument being needed here, that this aversion was unfortunate. No person (except perhaps a few old officials) entertains any doubt about that; and there is hardly anyone who has not long ago determined that change is necessary.

The story of the British administration of Cyprus will stand out in history as a memorial of incapacity. Cyprus was occupied in 1878 in order to be a basis from which the Protectorate of Asiatic Turkey could be exercised. It lies off the south coast of Asia Minor and the west coast of northern Syria. Taken for this military purpose, and governed thirty-seven years, the island proved to be absolutely useless when war with Turkey broke out in 1915. It has not played any part, and could not serve any purpose, in the war. Why? It had never been developed industrially, or commercially, or as a naval or military station. British officialism went and stayed and for long did practically nothing, though in recent time the Department of Public Works has been actively and usefully employing resources too limited. Now look at another picture. One of our ablest statesmen, who was at Berlin in 1878, bartered Heligoland to Germany about ten years later. That barren tiny stretch of sand and rock, which was rapidly being washed away by the sea, was transformed into a great fortress, which has been the crown of German sea-defences. If Britain had spent on harbours in Cyprus and their needed defences, or on developing agriculture and trade, one-fifth of the money that Germany spent on Heligoland, it might have been of incalculable service in this war.

Moreover, Cyprus is a large island, and was once rich and fertile; but, like all the Mediterranean lands, it depends for its productivity on the energy and labour and skill of the population. Under Turkish rule it had deteriorated seriously. In 1878 it needed roads, railways, bridges, harbours, and all the many devices for conducting trade

and communication, as well as improved agriculture, which depends on the supply of water to the soil. It has mineral wealth, and gave its name to the copper with which formerly it supplied the world. Its trees are valuable, and its general agricultural possibilities are great. It might be made once more a garden of the Mediterranean. The complaints which were made, about 1878, that it was too unhealthy for the troops, arose out of the action of a military authority who placed the camp low down in the most malarious part. In reality Cyprus is well fitted to serve as a sanatorium. The one purpose which, so far as I know, it has served during the war is to receive and recuperate wounded or sick soldiers; and its one small railway has been extended a few miles to facilitate the transport of the sick. If, in the future, we continue to do so little for the improvement and restoration to prosperity of an island like this, it will furnish a conclusive proof that we are unfit to be entrusted with the charge of the neglected parts of the Levant. Even in Egypt, where we have improved so greatly the economic condition, the question will be asked whether this would have been possible had it not been, in the first place, for the absolute necessity that our stay in Egypt must be justified, lest the Empire should break in twain; and in the second place for the fortunate chance that two great men, Lord Cromer and Lord Kitchener, were put in authority there. The short interval between them was a period of disintegration and shame.

I do not hesitate to say that with all their cruelty, and all the hatred which they inspired among the Turkish people after some experience of their ways and character, the Germans in Anatolia, during the few years in which they influenced the country, did more to develop it and to improve its economic condition than the British Government has done during the entire time that it has influenced, often with almost complete predominance, the state of the Turkish Empire, because it either neglected or obstructed the efforts of private British enterprise to make use of and improve the country. It must in honesty be said for the Germans that they have constructed railways on a vast scale, engaged in irrigation works of a quite grandiose and impressive character,

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and undertaken other labours which promise to be of permanent benefit to the country. Nominally these are, like the British, matters of private initiative, but they are all more or less directly and expressly enterprises of the Deutsche Bank; and every one knows well that they are merely Government enterprises under the guise of private undertakings. They are great, beneficent, and well-planned; they are really works on which any government and any nation might plume itself, owing to their useful and, from a superficial point of view, international character. The great irrigation scheme which is already watering the plain of Konia from large lakes on the opposite side of the mountains a hundred miles away, was nominally done by private contract to the order of the Turkish Government. I happened to say to one of the practical directors of the work, 'You cannot possibly trust to the hands of the Turks the supervision of constructions like this. In two years the water would stop running and all the work would be wasted.' He acknowledged that it was so, but said that proper securities were taken that supervision would remain in the hands of the constructors for a sufficiently long term of years. The obvious intention was that, before that term of years was near an end, the entire control of the country should be in the hands of the German Government. No honest man can refrain from speaking a word of praise in reference to works like these.

W. M. RAMSAY.



## Art. 4.—FROM WATERLOO TO THE MARNE.

*Gli ultimi cento anni di Storia Universale, 1815-1915.* By Pietro Orsi. Vol. i (1815-1870), 1915; vol. ii (1871-1915), 1917. Rome: Società Tipografica-Editrice Nazionale.

TWENTY years ago, when young men still lived at Cambridge in quiet cloisters, reading books old and new and discoursing on them one with another—as their forefathers had done for unnumbered generations of brief college life, scarcely disturbed by the Civil Wars and not at all by the Napoleonic brawl beyond the seas—into that haven of perennial English felicity which in these years of universal exile so many now remember longingly from foreign lands, into that pleasant nursery of gentlemen, there came twenty years ago a traveller from the unknown Continent of Europe, bearded like an antique sage, full of strange knowledge and, as it seemed to us, still stranger combinations of opposing systems of thought. He was Lord Acton, the new Professor of History. When he spoke it was with brief emphasis and a conviction more impressive than argument, words that sank into the mind to dwell, coming to the surface to challenge consideration often after many years. And so to-day, while, under circumstances fantastically strange, I read Pietro Orsi's new History of the World since Waterloo, I find the key to many things in memories of a talk with Lord Acton long ago. He had been telling me that the Middle Ages were dull, and that history began to be interesting with Luther; on my asking why he thought so, the reason given by the great Roman Catholic Liberal was that in Luther's movement we had the first true revolution, a revolution being defined as a political change carried out as the consequence of an idea. With the Reformation the struggle for power which is called politics ceased to be a selfish struggle between persons and institutions representing themselves alone, and became a struggle of persons and parties representing ideas; and only amid the clash of rival ideas is liberty born, liberty without which, to Acton as to Shelley, 'truth' itself were 'a sacred lie.'

This definition of things by Lord Acton comes back to me to-day, suggesting the reason why the first of

Pietro Orsi's two volumes, that which covers the events of 1815-1870, an age of 'revolution' for 'ideas,' is enthralling; while the second volume (1871-1915), through no fault of the author, holds us less, because the tale of struggling material interests is a weariness to the reader's soul. Pietro Orsi, so true a Venetian, so good an Italian, yet withal so acute and impartial an historian, is well aware that his second volume is less interesting; and on its first page he tells us why:

'The marvellous successes of the German arms and policy had set the power and prestige of Germany on a pinnacle, so that the new Empire became the centre of the political life of Europe and also, as it were, the glass of fashion for all institutions. The character of the German Empire powerfully influenced the general direction of history. In the intoxication of the victories of 1870 it was thought that the great results attained were due exclusively to material force. People forgot that force had triumphed because it had put itself at the service of a cause that corresponded to the ideas of the age and answered exactly to the historical development of Germany and its moral preparation. Military force alone was now exalted.'

And again at the end of the chapter recording, without a comment, the miserable story of the deliberate preservation of Turkish misrule by Disraeli's ill-calculating materialism, miscalled in our annals 'peace with honour,' Orsi suddenly lets his feelings break out in the following words:

'One would say that in these years above all, whether in the field of international politics, or in the internal politics of particular States, great ideals had yielded place to the conception of immediate profits. The current of material interest prevails absolutely in human affairs. Now disappeared from the scene of the world Giuseppe Garibaldi, the great champion of the highest idealism.'

Pietro Orsi dedicates his second volume, published this year, to the memory of his son Gustavo, killed last summer in the Trentino, one of the many chosen youths of the free countries of Europe who have sacrificed their own lives and their parents' joy in life, ungrudged, to bring in the new age of liberty and moral force, and move at last the mountainous weight of materialism and

military force that, emanating mainly from Berlin, has for nearly half a century impeded all 'revolution' in Lord Acton's sense, lying heavily on the soul of Europe, of Italy, and at times of England herself.

The two volumes together can be praised for the qualities needed in a general history of this kind—acuteness of generalisation, accuracy, sanity, fairness, and sense of proportion. The book is a credit to Italian history, and another example of the balanced and liberal qualities of the modern Italian mind, the antithesis of prostituted German learning. Such a book is much to be recommended in England, where the national ignorance of the history of Europe in the 19th century proved one of the chief causes of our diplomatic and military disasters in the early part of the present war.

With a few exceptions, our statesmen and journalists, immersed in home problems as their normal study, and giving what leisure they have to the colonial and trans-oceanic world which is Britain's peculiar heritage, have no time to spare for their neighbours across the narrow seas; nor have they been helped by any instruction received in youth, brought up as they are at school and college in that insular ignorance of recent Continental history which is one of the hall-marks of English education. On the day war broke out hardly one educated Englishman in fifty, whether soldier or civilian, knew whether or not the Magyars were Slavs, what race inhabited Rumania or what had happened in Serbia besides a regicide. A few months ago a highly intelligent and cultivated Englishman, engaged in semi-political work in foreign parts, asked me if anything particular had happened in Europe in 1848. The officers of a Continental army are, so far as my experience goes, better versed in Continental history than the officers of our citizen army, whether professional or emergency soldiers. The reason is not that the class whence Continental officers are drawn is better educated or cleverer, but that the recent history of their own country, its very existence in the case of Italy and Germany, is so closely interwoven with the history of Europe in general that the events of the French Revolution, of 1848, of 1860-1870 are familiar and important to them as no historical events seem to the inhabitants of our old-established island fortress—

England a world by herself. But, now that perforce we are a European power once more, one of 'a tide of races Rolled to meet a common fate,' we must study European history or we shall once again have reason to rue our ignorance.

It is impossible for us to have a sound foreign policy as regards any part of the world unless the country in question, its history and character, are known and understood by the political public in Great Britain. The mistakes of our policy in the 19th and 20th centuries have come much more often from ignorance than from ill will; and our successes have always been the result of good will guided by knowledge. Our greatest diplomatic success in the 19th century was our treatment of the Italian question in 1860, when, without a war, we assured the Making of Italy, and so won her 'traditional friendship,' which has already lasted two generations, and forms one of the bases of the present Alliance. This cardinal success of British policy, by which the whole world has benefited no less than ourselves, was the result of knowledge. Our policy in 1860 would certainly have gone astray—for there were many pitfalls—if the Italian question in the light of Italian history had not been familiar to the political public in the England of that day, and more particularly to the Ministers Russell and Gladstone, who lived largely among Italian men and books. Add to this that they were advised from Turin by Hudson, who knew more about Italy than any other Englishman; and we see why Russell acted with such consummate skill in the Italian question, in an era when so many other questions—America and Turkey, for instance—were being sadly bungled by statesmen whose ideas of America were drawn from 'Martin Chuzzlewit,' and their ideas of Turkey from nothing but an ignorant fear of Russia.

The history of our diplomacy in the Balkans, both in the 19th century, when we saved the Turk, and in the 20th century, after we had abandoned him to his deserts, is the antithesis of the Italian affair, for it is one long story of the penalties that attend on national ignorance. And now that, as a result of the present war, all nations must be drawn closer together to work out their common fate for good or evil, knowledge of other countries and

of their history will be more necessary than ever before. The facts and generalisations contained in such a book as Orsi's ought to be familiar to every educated Englishman. The interests and the safety of our land, and indeed the interests and safety of the whole world, require that modern history should be extensively and intelligently taught in the schools and colleges of Britain, whether she be regarded as the responsible head of the greatest of all Empires, or as a leading partner in the League of Nations.

In 1815 the cause of freedom on this side the Atlantic seemed finally lost. England and France were half free, but Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Russia were all subjected to absolute power in its worst form. Two good things only had been secured by the fall of Napoleon: that the peace of the world was safe for a generation, and that France and England were certain ere long to resume their rank as Liberal Powers. But even when, after 1830, France and England were both once more influences on the side of freedom, they were too weak to liberate the rest of Europe. Strong as they were in moral prestige and propagandist influence, they were weaker as military powers than the despotisms of Central and Eastern Europe. The campaigns of Beresina, of Leipzig and of Waterloo, necessary as they were for the world's peace, had redistributed power on the Continent in a manner fatal to freedom. Prussia was firmly established on the Rhine; Austria was in Italy; Russia held the greater part of Poland, all the more securely because the rest of it belonged to Austria and Prussia. History after Waterloo has been dominated by an iron law—often overlooked but always in the end proof against the aspirations of the century—namely, by the fact that Prussia, Russia and Austria were militarily stronger than England and France. It is true that the three military despotisms did not always stand together, but they did so on the vital question of Poland, and in the decisive year 1849. Furthermore England and France never acted together for liberty, except when in 1854, in the name of liberty as against Russia, they ignorantly fought to save the worse tyranny of the Turk.

The two Liberal Powers did indeed shortly afterwards

help in the liberation of Italy—an event which brought into being a third Liberal Power, as we witness to such good purpose to-day. But even in liberating Italy they were too jealous to act together, England taking up the active championship of Cavour only when France had begun to oppose him. Italy was freed because she was supported first by France and then by England; because Russia and Prussia deserted Austria for reasons unconnected with the merits of the Italian question; and because of the combined wisdom and energy of the Italian people themselves, who were worthy of their four heaven-sent leaders—no country ever had in the hour of her need four such men as the prophet, the king, the warrior and the statesman of Italy.

If Germany in 1848 or afterwards had desired union through liberty as much as Italy desired it, or if she had had but one Liberal leader of genius, she could have been united on a basis of freedom and the world would have been spared the present war. Her task was far easier than Italy's, for she had not the Austrian armies occupying her territory. But Germany was mainly anti-Liberal at heart, and wholly so in energy. The Parliament of Frankfurt lacked the spirit of Pym, of Franklin, of Mirabeau. Her men of genius and her instincts for action were all dedicated to the powers of darkness; and so she was united, not in 1848 on the basis of freedom, but in 1866 and 1870 on the basis of military absolutism.

While Germany was failing to obtain freedom and unity in 1848-9, Russia aided Francis Joseph to re-establish military despotism in his dominions. This was rendered possible by the refusal of the Magyars under Kossuth to treat the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary as anything except subject peoples. Kossuth in exile successfully passed himself off to American and English sympathisers as a great Liberal; but it may be doubted whether any man since Robespierre did so much injury to the Liberal cause. He it was who deflected the Magyar national ideal from the true Liberalism of the earlier movement to the jingoism and racial absolutism of the present-day Magyar oligarchy. He stands as one of the prime architects of the present war.

The failure of 1848 to overturn despotism in Austria and Germany has never been made good, for Austria and



Germany are geographically the heart of Europe, their bulk lying athwart the intercourse of the surrounding states, and radiating influence on all sides. With the increase of the power and wealth of these two Kaiserdoms in the last fifty years, the dominant force in Europe has become military despotism. Worse than this, after 1870 it became an active ideal. In 1849 it triumphed, but as a mere negation, connected with no principles more vital or modern than the tradition of the Dead Hand which Metternich had transmitted from the chancelleries of the Ancien Régime. But after 1870, with the genius and prestige of Bismarck, military despotism became an active principle, which, under the title of *realpolitik*, rivalled and supplanted English and French ideals of liberty in the world of thought itself.

This is the reason why the Europe that has grown up since 1870, in spite of all its flashy modern cleverness, has reached its final inevitable goal in the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of the present war. It believed in materialism and was too clever to believe in liberty, and has got its deserts. But that supreme evil is, with pain and travail, bringing its own supreme remedy. If it is true that, in spite of the great incident of the Italian revolution, our Europe was in 1914 still the Europe of 1815 and of 1849, and had latterly under German teaching become proud of its slavery to force, it is equally true that during the last year, 1917, the entry of American democracy into European or world politics suddenly turned the tables on the whole ancient order of ideas in Europe. And, whatever evils the present anarchy in Russia is bringing on the world, the fact that the great Slav Empire has at last ceased to be a despotism has so far redressed the balance in favour of liberty. It is the reasonable aspiration of all persons of good will that this righting of the balance of power in the direction of liberty and democracy will lead to a peace between free peoples more stable than the peace between despotisms which the Holy Alliance brought as its one contribution to human welfare. If the peoples will study one another, and not be content to remain divided by ignorance of each other's history, character and aspirations, Mr Wilson's visions may yet be realised under the impetus of reaction against the present war and the ideas that

brought it on. But no League of Nations can be based upon mutual ignorance.

It is only since August 1914 that we have fully realised what a tragedy our French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars really were. That our greatest military hero, a man worthy of all the praises that have been lavished on his character and on his genius, a man rightly beloved by us as the symbol of the best English qualities, as Marlborough was never loved—that Wellington should as the outcome of his life's work have established the black forces of clerical and military despotism in Europe as the necessary price of saving us from the tyranny of Napoleon, is a national and a world-wide tragedy. All the forces, ideas and parties of clericalism and of social and political reaction that were our allies in every country against Napoleon are our enemies in every country to-day. In every Continental state, belligerent or neutral, there is, distinct from the pacifist socialists, a reactionary pro-German party, which answers in traditions and ideals to the anti-French party of a hundred years ago. We then set up that party to rule Europe, and have been engaged, from Canning's time onwards, in a series of attempts to pull it down, of which the present war is by far the greatest, the most purposeful and the most promising. That England should have been forced to undergo a generation of political reaction at home when the social and economic problems of the industrial revolution were coming fresh upon her, that she should have caused her people the terrible economic sufferings of the Twenty Years' War in order to reduce the power of the French Revolution, and set up Austria, Russia and Prussia as the arbiters of Europe, is a tragedy so terrible that, even if it was as necessary to go to war in 1793 as Pitt thought, it was also as disastrous as Fox believed.

Now that England sings the 'Marseillaise' as readily as the 'Star-Spangled Banner,' it is time that we took as impartial a view of the tragedy of 1793 as we have long taken of the tragedy of 1776. It is time that English historians saw that Fox and Wordsworth were just as patriotic when they regarded the war against the French Republic with horror as they were when a dozen years later they led the country, the one with his

sonnets and the other with his Premiership, in withstanding Napoleon's attempt at universal dominion. Waterloo was a necessity, but it was a bitter necessity. It gave a necessary peace to the world, and remains our eternal glory, but it is tinged with eternal sadness. For it transferred political supremacy in Europe from France to the Eastern powers of darkness. France had proved herself impossible as the mistress of Europe; but her successors in hegemony have had more than all the defects of the victors of Marengo and Austerlitz, and none of their incomparable merits.

From 1815 to 1870 force lay, in the last resort, with the party of despotism, as was proved in 1849. But the intellectual and moral initiative was still with the party of freedom. The age was, therefore, an age of 'revolution' in Lord Acton's sense of the word, of struggles for power, not between material interests, but between parties representing ideas. France had not lost her intellectual leadership at Waterloo as she afterwards lost it at Sedan. Her ideas, old and new, circulated in Europe as current coin. Throughout the middle half of the century foreign poets could still sing of her:

'We look for her that sunlike stood  
Upon the forehead of our day,  
An orb of nations, radiating food  
For body and for mind away.'

England meanwhile used the prestige won for her by Nelson and Wellington to push the ideas of Canning and Russell. Before 1870 the belief in liberty and progress as things ultimately inevitable was axiomatic; the ethical outlook on history and politics was everywhere assumed by serious thinkers, few of whom were on the side of the existing régime. Therefore, even after the disillusionment of 1849, hope survived. The catastrophe of freedom seemed a mere postponement. In such an atmosphere the wounded cause revived, to make in 1860 its Italian conquest.

Italy was freed because freedom was the intellectual current of the age and the native bent of the Italian people. Also because Napoleon III—that 'cut-purse of the Empire and the rule'—although he depended for his stolen throne on clerical and conservative support, was

himself a 'revolutionary' of the tradition of Marengo and Austerlitz, and went as far as his clerical supporters would allow him, and much further than they liked, in lending French arms to free Italy. When France had finished helping Italy, England came in, and after England, strange to say, Prussia herself. For Prussia also was at this time among the prophets. She was heading a 'revolution' of her own, not indeed a revolt for freedom, but a movement to realise the idea of German unity. Prussia assisted Italy in 1866 and 1870, not because Bismarck sympathised with Italy, but because he needed her. It is remarkable that, although Prussian victories opened the Italian path to Venice and to Rome, no German has claimed and no Italian has rendered gratitude on this count, because Germany was so notoriously out of sympathy with the ideas of the Italian *Risorgimento*. In the debates between Giolittians and 'Interventionists' about the present war, the argument of gratitude to Prussia for the help of 1866 and 1870 has never been put forward. But gratitude to France, and still more to England, has always weighed strongly in the Italian mind.

✓ The years 1859-1870 saw three great revolutions accomplished—the union of Italy on a basis of freedom: the union of Germany on a basis of military despotism: the abolition of slavery in the United States. These years are the most fruitful in history between the era of Napoleon and the revolutionary convulsions of the present war. But since 1870 the atmosphere of world politics has changed. Bismarck, having got what he wanted, ceased to be a revolutionary, and the hour of enfranchisement passed by. The problems of liberation which were not solved before 1871 remained unsolved in 1914. The new age saw, indeed, an enormous increase of material prosperity, great educational progress, and a turbid intellectual activity of every kind, but it succeeded in solving no problem of the first order, at least not on the Continent of Europe. Whereas in eleven years Italian unity, German unity and American abolition were settled for ever, the next forty-six years failed to bring a solution of any of the five great problems still outstanding: Russian liberty, German liberty, the Polish question, the Turkish and Balkan question, and the race

questions of Austria-Hungary. And to these problems, which it has failed to solve, the wretched policy of the last fifty years has added the problem of armaments, a species of universal ruin and slavery which it was left for our clever modern brains to invent. Because all these problems were incapable of solution in the post-Bismarckian atmosphere of Europe, the present war became inevitable. This complete political failure during a period of astonishing material and educational progress, this ultra-conservatism in an era of rapid economic change, can be explained mainly by the dominion of Prussia in the world of force, and also to no small degree in the world of ideas.

England, less affected than other countries by the Bismarckian gospel, had shaken herself free of it before the final challenge came. The period since 1870 has been in the British Empire a period of advance towards democracy, the changing attitude of the Conservative party towards popular institutions being characteristically one of the chief methods of progress in England. The vast extension of the area and responsibilities of the Empire during the same period has not been found inconsistent with the growth of freedom in its various members. Wide imperial responsibilities all over the globe often necessitate the use of force; and there was, therefore, a tendency at one time for British 'Imperialism' to be connected with Bismarckian principles in the minds both of critics and supporters. But the extremely democratic character of the English-speaking communities overseas more than counterbalanced this danger, which soon passed away. In its final form the Empire has emerged a Liberal Empire, and now spans the terraqueous globe as the great network of freedom. When the European war surprised us, it found us materially unready, but spiritually prepared; we were not sunk in the materialistic and slavish doctrines of Central and Eastern Europe. We stood in the breach for freedom and righteousness against *realpolitik*, and in spite of many disasters, including that of last October, it is permissible to believe that we have not stood in vain.

But England was for some time and in some degree affected by the Prussian disease. In the days of Palmerston British foreign policy, though often ignorant

and blundering, had not lacked an element of knight-errantry that at least had the merit of making us unpopular with despots and ranged us on the side of freedom. But, when Disraeli assumed power in 1874, an unenlightened self-interest became for awhile our only guide. If it is true that Disraeli first introduced a self-conscious Imperialism, he unfortunately introduced it in connexion with the worst act of materialistic *realpolitik* of which we have been guilty in modern times, the protection of the Turk in his tyranny over Christian races. In 1876, before Russia took the matter into her own hands, Disraeli encouraged the Turk to resist the just pressure of the concert of Europe. He thus rendered the Russo-Turkish war inevitable. After it had run its course, he again interfered to tear up the Treaty of San Stefano, which would have settled the Balkan question, and rendered the liquidation of Asiatic Turkey only a matter of time. England put back half the Balkans under the Turk after Russia had freed them. At the same time we allowed Austria-Hungary to occupy the Slav territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If Austria and Germany rule in the Slav Balkans to-day, if they threaten Egypt and India through Turkey, and if Turkey herself is a military power defying England, France and Russia to prevent her from massacring her Christians in Asia, we are only reaping what we ourselves let Disraeli sow. That was England's contribution to the crimes that brought on the present war. In 1915 we lost 100,000 men in a vain attempt to undo what we did in 1878. Now that we have repented by offering up the life-blood of our best and bravest in the Dardanelles, do not let us any longer, in mockery of these dead, write solenin approval in our history books of the proceedings that saved the Turkish Empire.

Disraeli's action had not the many excuses that can be urged for the Crimean war. That war we waged as a war for freedom—to some extent mistakenly, but to some extent, as it chanced, effectually. The Tsar Nicholas was the acknowledged head of the European reaction of 1849; and the blow he received before Sebastopol helped in the end to free the Russian serfs and the Italian patriots. But the Tsar Alexander, whom Disraeli thwarted twenty years later, was a semi-Liberal; and the check



that we inflicted on his liberating policy in the Balkans was one of the causes of the long and terrible reaction in Russian politics for which his murder gave the signal.

Both before and after 1870 it was a fatal error of our Foreign Office to suppose that the 'balance of power' required us to thwart Russia on every occasion, even when she was liberating peoples and setting up independent states. When Bright said that the 'balance of power' was a 'fetish' he was wrong in theory, for till we have a League of Nations we must have a balance of power; in Napoleon's time and again in 1914 it was necessary to fight for the balance of power or fall slaves to one nation. But, at the time he spoke, Bright was uttering a practical truth of great value, for the use made first by Palmerston and afterwards by Disraeli of the catch-word 'balance of power' in order to justify constant hostility either to France or to Russia was, in effect, to set up a 'fetish.' The 'balance of power' then existed, if only they could have let it alone. Indeed, in so far as it required readjustment, the danger lay, as we now see, in exactly the opposite direction—in the latent power of Germany, Austria and Turkey.

In 1880 there was a reaction against Disraeli's Prussian style of Imperialism, which never reappeared in England under the same form. But the reaction came too late to upset the Turk; and Gladstone's mismanagement soon brought on a counter-reaction against idealism. In the sphere of foreign politics this reaction did no harm, for Lord Salisbury after 1885 was one of the wisest and best Foreign Ministers England ever had. But in the realm of thought Bismarckian theories combined with a misreading of Darwin to spread distrust of liberty and cynical contempt for idealism of all sorts. It was unfortunate that, when the Germans had had something real to teach us, we had turned a deaf ear to Matthew Arnold's vindications of their 'sweetness and light'; and, when at last, in an age too late, we took the advice of 'Friendship's Garland' and in the *fin de siècle* turned to Germany, we heard only the harsh barrack voices of Bismarck and Treitschke, and revered them as the successors of Goethe.

The extravagant worship of German methods of thought and scholarship was injurious in many spheres, and in none more so than in history. English history

may in the middle 19th century have been too literary, too liberal, too ethical. But at least it presented a serious study as attractive reading to a people usually too much inclined to frivolity in what they read; it popularised the history of our own and other countries; it taught Englishmen, out of the lives of their forefathers, the ideal of ordered freedom on which our patriotism is based; and it instilled a habit of bringing ethical judgments to bear on public actions. It had been a form of national education for which those who abolished it provided no substitute. In the last decade of the 19th century German influence was supreme among our historical scholars; and under its influence they pronounced the divorce of history from literature. Thereby they cut off history from the people and confined it to students. Furthermore the reactionary and non-moral attitude of the German professoriate towards events in the past was for awhile regarded as peculiarly 'historical.' Young Englishmen were warned off their own country's classics and told to look to Treitschke for an example of what an historian should be. It is not likely that this influence will survive the war; and indeed long before the war the worst crudities of the Germanising movement in English history had become unpopular. Unfortunately the connexion of history and literature, once it is broken, is not easily reestablished.

The undue worship of German methods affected many other branches of thought, and threatened to deflect the Anglo-Saxon genius into a materialistic pedantry quite unnatural to its free and varied idealism. From the universities of the United States advanced students went in great numbers to Germany to complete their education. It is to the credit of the heads and hearts of American academicians that, although they had been brought up so largely in Germany, the moment Belgium was invaded they led their fellow-citizens in the moral revolt against Prussianism. The next generation of American students will not study in Germany. It lies with Oxford and Cambridge to make the regulations that will attract them to England, and so help to rebuild the intellectual and moral unity of the English-speaking world.

The premature deaths of Lincoln and Cavour were misfortunes not to Italy and America alone, and were

felt in the world of thought no less than in the world of politics. Their names soon became as a tale that is told, nor perhaps until the present war did the world fully understand the greatness of the two countries which they had rebuilt on such wise and noble foundations. Bismarck survived them to dominate the new age and to captivate the thought and imagination of men, even in the land of Cavour. Gladstone, indeed, survived, but mainly to fail, and by his failure yet further to set off the gross fame of *realpolitik*.

For these and many other reasons the Bismarckian influence was at its height in England as well as on the Continent in the last years of the 19th century. Then came the Boer war, the inevitable outcome of twenty years of blundering on the part of successive British Cabinets, and of short-sighted astuteness on the part of Paul Kruger. Because of the prevalence of Bismarckian ideas at that moment in England, we entered on the war in a spirit very different from the magnanimous idealism with which the nation sprang to arms in 1914. The outcome has been thus epitomised by General Smuts, who seems the best interpreter of the soul of our Empire: \*

'The world required this shock to wake it up. England herself was slipping from the track. Under Disraeli she thought that she must be a military nation bent upon Imperialism. She went in for it, and the trial came finally in South Africa. The British victory over the Boers was a great test. A cheap and easy victory would have strengthened what were then the strong Imperial tendencies of England and the British. But that tremendously exhausting struggle, maintained by one of the world's smallest peoples, taught the British that the Boers were fighting, in some measure, for Britain's own traditional ideals. That meant that, when the British won the military victory, so great a change was found to have been brought about in their *morale* that not only the two small Republics, but that which needed to be conquered in Great Britain, all three had met defeat. The Boer war forced anew upon the British people the realisation of those fine ideals for which at bottom they invariably feel sympathy.'

After the Boer war Prussian ideals faded out of

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\* 'Observer,' July 1, 1917. Report of interview.

England's conception of her Empire, partly for the reason given by General Smuts, partly because we became immersed in our own social problems, where Bismarck was clearly no guide. If we failed to solve the Irish question, our faults were party spirit and lack of great statesmen to control its various excesses, not any national hardening of the heart. When the great war fell upon us, we were an improvident but a generous people.

But on the Continent there was no such reaction against Bismarckism. The curse of 1815, renewed in 1849 and 1870, lay irremovable. After Italy's liberation, no people still enslaved could hope for freedom. The military despotisms of Central and Eastern Europe still outweighed the Liberal states of the West, in power as they had done since Waterloo, and in influence as they had done since Sedan. The only hope for the world lay in a quarrel between the great despotisms, the separation of Russia from Austria and Prussia. The *Dreikaiserbund* was, therefore, above all things to be dreaded. If Russia remained in the orbit of Central Europe, if the Russian people were cut off from Western ideas and became entirely Germanised, political liberty would be confined to the shores of the Atlantic. To keep alive the one hope for ultimate change and liberation—a hope 'too like despair' indeed—first France, then England, then Italy allied themselves to Russian Tsardom. The belief was sound that Berlin was at the bottom of the mischief in Europe, particularly in Petrograd; and the side chosen by the three Liberal Powers was therefore the right one. But until the Russian Revolution of last year came to justify it, there had been great disadvantages in this desperate policy dictated by desperate conditions. By her entente with the Tsardom Great Britain was compelled to subserve the tyrannous methods of the old Russian system in Persia, and was kept officially mute on the abominations of the reaction in Russia after 1906. This was the culminating point of the triumph of materialism in world politics, that Britain, at the most democratic moment of her own internal politics, should appear indifferent to the extinction of liberty in Russia. Such was the inevitable logic of the enormous preponderance in military strength of Russia, Germany and Austria. We were still the slaves of 1815.

Meanwhile the Turkish revolution had been turned by German influence into the triumph of a system more potent for evil than the fallen régime of Abdul Hamid. And such was the bad spirit of the age that the first Balkan War, with all its hopes and generousities, was quickly swallowed up in the second. The opportunity for imposing on the Balkan States a just settlement of their affairs was neglected by the Great Powers, and was used by Germany and Austria as a means of preparing the stage for the coming Universal War, which was to satisfy their own selfish ambitions. The moral condition of Europe and the distribution of material power were so hopeless that any effective remedy must have been violent.

The remedy has been violent enough. It all but killed the patient in 1914, and the cure is not yet accomplished. But, if the first clear impulse of the Russian revolution seems to be losing itself among the rocks and shallows of anarchy, the entry of the more staid American democracy into full participation in our troubles goes far to guarantee the promise of the future. We find ourselves once more living in an age of 'revolution' in Lord Acton's sense of the word. The sense of human impotence that has lain heavy on men during the last half-century has at length been rolled away. Free will, men's moral choice in national and international affairs, has returned to earth. History becomes once more interesting, heroic, a struggle not of interests but of ideals.

It cannot reasonably be hoped that the age of revolution on which we are now embarked will be any more easy or pleasant to live in than similar ages of the past. The memorable epochs of history have not, when they were taking place, been agreeable to historians and other quiet people. Gibbon's frenzied annoyance with the French Revolution, for interrupting his peaceful contemplation of the revolutions of the past, will be felt again by many of us in the lean, active years that are now at hand. The end of the war will not be the end of the turmoil. For even if, as we may begin to hope, another such catastrophe can be averted by a League of Peace, Europe will at best have to face not only the labour troubles, which are the natural heritage of our

time, but unnecessary and artificially created racial and political troubles, the result of so many millions having been kept in undue subjection in Central and Eastern Europe when they were ripe for freedom long ago. When they emerge to the light of liberty, two generations too late, they will not be reasonable, in Austria and Germany, any more than in Russia. It is impossible to postpone emancipation unnaturally long and then expect the same easy results when liberation is offered late as would have been attained if it had been offered in time. Even England has to-day one reason bitterly to rue that truth.

But, if we are entering upon a terrible and dangerous epoch, properly ushered in by the most destructive war in history, the bold adventure is better than the continuance of the rule of military despotism in half the civilised countries of the world, and the prevalence of Bismarckian ideas in all international relations. If, as Macaulay said about the break-up of the Roman Empire, it was worth while to have a thousand years of barbarism to save Europe from the fate of China, it is worth a hundred years of revolution to save Europe from the fate of Prussia. If the state of things that has lasted since 1870 had continued, Europe would have acquiesced in military despotism as its final form of government.

In these circumstances the British and American peoples, long nurtured in liberty and devoted to peace, will be the chief hope of mankind. President Wilson and our own statesmen understand our full common responsibility, the utter impossibility of further isolation, and the sure vengeance that will follow continued egoistic action among the nations constituting the Commonwealth of the World.

G. M. TREVELYAN.

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## Art. 5.—CHARLES PÉGUY.

1. *Œuvres Complètes de Charles Péguy*. Tomes I et II. Paris : Nouvelle Revue Française, 1917.
2. *Jeanne d'Arc*. Émile-Paul. Paris, 1897.
3. *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*. Paris, 1900-1914.\*
4. *Notre Patrie (Cahier, 1905)*. Nouvelle Revue Française, 1915.
5. *Œuvres choisies, 1900-1910*. Paris : Grasset, 1911.
6. *Morceaux choisis des œuvres poétiques de Charles Péguy, 1912-1913*. Paris : Ollendorff, 1914.
7. *Avec Charles Péguy, de la Lorraine à la Marne*. Par Victor Boudon. Paris : Hachette, 1916.
8. *Charles Péguy*. Par Paul Seippel. Paris : Payot, 1916.

To a chosen few men it is given to work out perfect lives. They may have known little happiness and much sorrow; they may have been long absent from felicity, and yet their lives, which we are forced to judge by some more ultimate standard of their own, are perfect. The deep congruity of their achievement, the indissoluble harmony of their life and their work, the unfaltering rhythm of their mortal progress, the unmistakable sense that they are inscribing themselves as with a sculptor's chisel upon the perdurable rock—such are the qualities which invest them with the significance of an artistic whole. Although we may have thought that something yet remained to be done, when they die, suddenly striding into the darkness as travellers along a familiar road, we also suddenly understand how their lives have been perpetually complete.

So calmly and magnificently, 'his wages taken and the long day done,' did Charles Péguy stride the ultimate stage along a great road when he died for France on Sept. 5, 1914. It is not that his death was braver or more heroic than the innumerable brave and heroic deaths of this war. It is different from those, perhaps, only in that it contained a greater measure of conscious and deliberate sacrifice, and of certainty that the sacrifice

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\* The whole of Péguy's work appeared in these *Cahiers*, which he published himself.

would not be unavailing. The glory of the others is great and cannot be diminished; they also died for their country. But there is a sense in which it is given only to a chosen few, 'a band of brothers,' to die for their country. They alone have brought the unconscious idealism of their countrymen to consciousness; they alone know exactly for what high end they have faced death. They give up their lives for that which is eternal in their country, with open eyes, for the vision and the dream which is the reality. In this profounder sense they alone die for their country who are spiritually prepared.

Péguy's life was a long and unremitting spiritual preparation for his death. His work as a writer was essentially the slow and laborious tempering of an instinctive patriotism, the untiring effort to apprehend France 'sub specie æternitatis,' and to be sure in consciousness, as he was by instinct, that there was that in France for which all that he had and was might be justly sacrificed. And more than this. He strove and fought to make his country true to her high calling. At every stage in his own discovery of France, France must subdue herself to the ideal purposes which he disclosed in her. In *cahier* after *cahier*, with the hammer-beat of the strong prose which, in his hand, slowly forges the expression into a final fidelity to the real, he strove to fashion France and himself after their common truth. Thus it is that his death becomes incorporated with his life in one complete achievement. It is seen at last to be as truly his own work as the clear ringing prophecy of the poem in his last *cahier* :

'Heureux qui sont morts dans les grandes batailles.  
Couchés dessus le sol à la face de Dieu. . .'

For he who died at the moment of agony when the spring of France, bent by the barbarian onrush almost beyond endurance, trembled between snapping and victorious recoil, had laboured his life long to make that recoil certain. As he charged at the head of his men up the height of Nantouillet, he was riding the crest of a wave of his own creation. More truly, he was himself the crest of the wave. Péguy, the *pion* as his men called him (in this also, as though prophetically, recognised as

the educator of eternal France), said no memorable words in that final hour, but only 'Tirez toujours.' To the last, M. Boudon's story tells us, he was wholly *l'homme du métier*; and even at the moment when he died, the hope of victory had become a certainty in the heart of France.

For other men who laboured to live the life of art and whose lives have been cut off in this war, our grief is abiding. It may be that their aspirations were transmuted under the alchemy of hours of destiny; but we who can judge them only for what they seemed to be, remember only that their aspirations, which we knew, were denied fulfilment. When we contemplate the death of Charles Péguy we are fortified by an abiding sense of consummation. The single movement of a life devoted to an ideal passes proudly into the poise of completion.

Charles Péguy was born on Jan. 7, 1873, at Orléans. On both sides he descended from an old peasant stock; his father's family had been *vignerons* of the Val de Loire; his mother's, woodmen of the Bourbonnais. His father died early, and his mother made a livelihood by renting out and repairing the straw-seated chairs in the cathedral of Orléans. In this peasant-workman childhood his spirit was formed. The spirit of the cathedral, and the instinctive knowledge that to work and to pray were one, accompanied him all his life. For him the divorce between art and work was never made. In the cathedral of which he was the child they were one; it was the expression of the ideal aspiration of humanity, but it was also the solid work of many men. True masons, men who worked with their hands honestly and were glad, who were good workmen before all things—such, Péguy knew as a child, were the builders of cathedrals and such the builders of the world. Before he left his home to receive another and a new education as a *boursier* in the great Ecole Normale of Paris, he was formed. His soul was not wax to be shaped by the fingers of his masters; it was a touchstone to try their teaching. He was already a workman. We see him in vision as a boy already with a little hammer in his hand, such as one hears ringing on the wheels of a railway train when it comes after a long journey to a halt. So, with his hammer, the young

Péguy tapped each doctrine put before him with an absorbed intention. The ring of soundness and the discord of the flaw were his standards; and he applied them with a steady seriousness. 'J'ai toujours tout pris au sérieux,' he was to write of his school-days afterwards. 'Ça m'a mené loin.' It led him far and by lonely ways.

He embraced, as he thought, the Socialism of the day; he abandoned, as he thought, the religion of his childhood. In truth, he did neither. His Socialism took the phrases which were meant to be whittled away by a 'parliamentary' interpretation, as a literal, humane and reasonable creed, whose vital strength lay in the infinite love which a man should feel for his neighbour. It was for him not a political programme, but a religion; and, though it took him some years to understand this wholly, his new religion was identical with his old. It has been said that Péguy became a convert to the Catholic faith. Péguy was never converted; he was always a believer. The Socialist City was for him a city in which men did honourable work, loving their labour, secure from misery, and loving no less their fellow workmen, for the honourable work which they also did. Thus it was inevitable that in the 'practical' world he should be excommunicated both from above and below. The empty rhetoric of the theorists, the incessant equivocation of the grandiose and empty phrase, the unfair hostility to honest effort, drove him to abandon the career marked out for him by the Ecole Normale. He entered into Socialist politics only to be alienated by the cupidity of its demagogues and the blasphemy of its methods. Nothing less than the word 'blasphemy' could convey the indignant horror with which the doctrine and the practice of *sabotage* inspired him. It was to him incredible that this should have sprung from the workmen themselves. It was a bourgeois method, and its adoption was a bourgeois victory.

'Nous avons connu un honneur du travail exactement le même que celui qui au moyen âge régissait la main et le cœur. C'était le même conservé intact en dessous. Nous avons connu ce soin poussé jusqu'à la perfection, égal dans l'ensemble, égal dans le plus infime détail. Nous avons connu cette piété de *l'ouvrage bien faite* poussée, maintenue jusqu'à ses plus extrêmes exigences. J'ai vu toute mon enfance

rempailler des chaises exactement du même esprit et du même cœur, et de la même main, que ce même peuple avait taillé ses cathédrales.

'Que reste-t-il aujourd'hui de tout cela? Comment a-t-on fait, du peuple le plus laborieux de la terre, et peut-être du seul peuple laborieux de la terre, du seul peuple peut-être qui aimait le travail pour le travail, et pour l'honneur, et pour travailler, ce peuple de saboteurs? comment a-t-on pu en faire ce peuple qui sur un chantier met tout son étude à ne pas en fiche le coup? Ce sera dans l'histoire une des plus grandes victoires et sans doute la seule, de la démagogie bourgeoise intellectuelle. Mais il faut avouer qu'elle compte, cette victoire.'

On leaving the Ecole Normale Péguy married the daughter of a Socialist, who brought to him as dowry some 1600*l*. For the first and the last time in his life he had a moderately large sum of money at his disposal. With the consent and at the desire of his wife and her family he spent it in establishing a Socialist publishing bookshop in Paris. The venture failed. Péguy had to learn bitterly that professed Socialists treat a commercial rival just as a professed bourgeois does, and that they are as inexorable as the capitalists towards the man who seeks to advance the cause of humanity by other ways than they themselves prescribe. The Socialist politicians boycotted his bookshop; the Socialist press smothered his publications in a conspiracy of silence. To these his early play, 'Jeanne d'Arc' (1897), glorifying a national heroine and a canonised saint, was proof positive of heresy both to atheism and the Internationale. He sold, he tells us, but one single copy of it; no doubt he would not, under any circumstances, have sold many copies, for it was a book of 752 pages, published under name of Pierre Baudouin (a pseudonym which he was subsequently to use in brilliant dialogues with himself in the earlier 'Cahiers de la Quinzaine'), and weighing about three pounds. He sought, however, not commercial success, but the assurance of sympathy and the honesty of a candid judge. Both these were denied him. His virtual outlawry served only to confirm him in his resolution to persevere in the way he had chosen.

At the outset of his career Péguy had been plunged into the Affaire Dreyfus. Herein he came into a contact

with his contemporaries, with his country, with himself, which was decisive. He tested and was tested, and he emerged from the conflict a lonelier, but a proven man. The rest of his life and work was the inevitable development of the ideas, the convictions and the personality which he then essentially formed. The attitude which he adopted in the contest gives the figure of the man. For him the vital question at issue was not whether Dreyfus was or was not innocent (though indeed he believed in his innocence), and far less whether it was or was not in the interest of France that the verdict of the Military Courts should be maintained. It was whether or not, if Dreyfus was innocent, France would have the courage of what he implicitly believed to be her destiny, to be the champion of justice in the world; whether his country would have the greatness to humiliate herself before her own ideal; whether, in a word, France was ready to lose the whole world to gain her own soul. But, when the Dreyfusards had won the day, he saw that their victory contained for France no less of peril than defeat. Out of the majority that had triumphed over what Péguy felt to be the lie in the soul of the French army, there was evolved a political majority that would cast down the army itself. Out of the just opposition to clericalism there grew a fanatical hatred of the Catholic faith. The noble impulse of justice was denatured to its opposite. Under the old banner of truth, *sabotage* marched to the defeat not of what was evil in France but of what was eternal in her. He turned upon Jaurès, whom he had valiantly helped in the heat of the struggle; Hervé's plan of military *sabotage*, the anti-Catholic policy of M. Combes, were in his sight crimes against France. 'Il m'a fallu (he said) remonter tous les courants de basse demagogie politicienne qui sortaient de partout pour corrompre le dreyfusisme, pour *profiter* de l'affaire Dreyfus.'

He had learned a bitter lesson, which was henceforward to become one of the chief themes of his writing—the irreconcilable opposition between *la mystique* and *la politique*, that is to say, the corruption of the ideal in the practical life. Now he saw that the ideals of the great Revolution had been corrupted, that the mystical virtue of the Republic itself had been used



to hallow the indescribable rogueries of servile politicians. But, though he saw these things and fought against them hardily, of him, no less than of the great Roman, it is true that he never despaired of the Republic. He would have no dealings with the radical politicians; he demanded true republicans; he would have no dealings with the Clericals, he demanded true Christians.

'On nous parle toujours de la dégradation républicaine. Quand on voit ce que la politique cléricale a fait de la mystique chrétienne, comment s'étonner de ce que la politique radicale a fait de la mystique républicaine? Quand on voit ce que les clercs ont fait généralement des saints, comment s'étonner de ce que nos parlementaires ont fait des héros? Quand on voit ce que les réactionnaires ont fait de la sainteté, comment s'étonner de ce que les révolutionnaires ont fait de l'héroïsme?'

He would exchange false for true, not one false for another. Therefore he had enemies in every camp.

An outlaw has no force in politics, where success belongs to him who can control the existing mechanism to his purposes; and it would be untrue to say that Péguy and the 'Cahiers de la Quinzaine' (which he founded in 1900 and in which his whole effort centred until his death) were ever a political force in France. Péguy himself was not deceived. In 1910, when he had passed through a crisis of disillusionment, and had reached security, at the beginning of the year in which his literary achievement reached its individual perfection, he confessed in 'Notre Jeunesse' the outward failure of his generation, condemned after so long a struggle to earn its bread in poverty.

'Mais dans cette misère même, et à cause de cette misère même, nous voulons avoir été grands, nous voulons avoir été très grands. Justement parceque nous n'aurons jamais une inscription historique. Si nous avions, comme tant d'autres, une inscription historique . . . assez mesurée à notre effort, à notre intention, à ce que nous fûmes en réalité, alors nous saurions payer le prix, alors nous aurions mauvaise grâce à insister sur la considération qui nous est due.'

'Nous voulons avoir été très grands.' Péguy, his life long, was not afraid to insist upon the grandeur of the

cause for which he fought, and of those who fought for it. He had been, he knew, the embodiment of what was eternal in the mighty political struggle which shaped him. The Dreyfus affair was no mere event in time, but an elemental upheaval of ideal forces. In it France strove against the falsity of her material limitations. Though her champions were obscure in history and the march of events had, it seemed, trampled them underfoot, they were not wholly beaten. They could not be. Another generation would arise.

‘Quand nous disons aux vieux républicains : Faites attention, après nous il n’y a personne, ils haussent les épaules. Ils croient qu’il y en aura toujours. Et quand nous disons aux jeunes gens : Faites attention, ne parlez point si légèrement de la République, elle n’a pas toujours été un amas de politiciens, elle a derrière elle une mystique, elle a en elle une mystique, elle a derrière elle tout un passé de gloire, tout un passé d’honneur, et ce qui est peut-être plus important encore, plus près de l’essence, tout un passé de race, d’héroïsme, peut-être de sainteté—quand nous disons cela aux jeunes gens, ils nous méprisent doucement et déjà nous traiteraient de vieilles barbes.

‘Ils nous prendraient pour des maniaques.

‘Je répète que je ne dis point que c’est pour toujours. Les raisons les plus profondes, les indices les plus graves nous font croire au contraire, nous forcent à penser que la génération suivante, la génération qui vient après celle qui vient immédiatement après nous, et qui bientôt sera la génération de nos enfants, va être enfin une génération mystique. Cette race a trop de sang dans les veines pour demeurer l’espace de plus d’une génération dans les cendres et dans les moisissures de la critique. Elle est trop vivante pour ne pas réintégrer, au bout d’une génération, dans l’organique. Tout fait croire que les deux mystiques vont refleurir à la fois, la républicaine et la chrétienne.’

‘Réintégrer dans l’organique.’ It will be recognised for a conception taken from the philosophy of M. Bergson, or rather as an adaptation of that philosophy to the conduct of life. Not that Péguy in any way derived from M. Bergson, but in the new philosophy he recognised immediately an exact description of his own evolution and the forces at work within him. It

described (not explained) the evil with which he wrestled. The opposition which it posited between the organic movement of life and the mechanical framework of intellectualism in which men sought, in vain, to contain it, was no other than the opposition which Péguy detected between *la mystique* and *la politique*. Péguy had done, exactly, that which M. Bergson demanded of those who would 'understand' life. He had lived organically. With a lift of the eyebrow the metaphysicians assure us that M. Bergson's philosophy is no philosophy at all. Indeed it may not be. But it does take count of the profoundest movements of the soul. It allows for and reveres them, and if in so doing it forfeits its right to be called philosophy, that is because it will not confound a method (though it be the only method) of attaining truth with the truth itself.

And here is the very essence of Péguy's thought, the source of his inward conflicts, the occasion of his outward struggles. He attacked the Sorbonne for making this confusion of kinds. The Sorbonne made, he said, of an intellectual method a compulsory creed; the machinery of the State was employed to impose this tyranny upon the people. He attacked the politicians who, he said, had erected a method of assuring the common weal into the common weal itself. The impulse was lost in the machinery of its own creation, the truth in the detail of its own explication, the faith in the Church, patriotism in militarism. Only at moments of destiny could the living reality burst through the fetters, and then only to be lost again. The Dreyfus affair was such a moment; and to the truth which was then revealed, though it was quickly covered again with false phrase and its driving force diverted to unnatural ends, a little band remained faithful. Two-thirds of the subscribers to his 'Cahiers,' he was to confess in 1910, were even then those who had supported him in the Affair. Another moment was the crisis of 1905, when M. Delcassé was forced by Germany to retire, and the sudden knowledge that they were French, that an elect nation had been humiliated, penetrated the hearts of the people. Péguy then gave the sense of this sudden humiliation and sudden awakening an immortal expression in 'Notre Patrie.' To keep the flame of this instinctive knowledge alive, to maintain

it at its brightest, was the office of the 'Cahiers de la Quinzaine.'

'L'interêt, la question, l'essentiel est que dans chaque ordre, dans chaque système, la mystique ne soit point dévorée par la politique à laquelle elle a donné naissance.'

The metaphor has a universal validity in the realm of the spirit. The artist must fight against the temptation of his own success, the politician against obedience to any other obligations than those which his own inward honesty imposes, the Christian against the degeneration of the communion of saints into an institution. The necessity of retaining this fine truth of soul, inculcated in others and in himself obeyed, is the fundamental and organic principle of Péguy's work. Every ramification of his work develops directly from this central source. Therefore some have said that Péguy had no æsthetic judgment, that he bowed in all things to the voice of a moral preoccupation. It is the cause of a great disappointment that M. André Suarès (who was one of Péguy's collaborators in the 'Cahiers') in his introduction to the volume which contains the finest of Péguy's work, 'Notre Jeunesse' and 'Victor-Marie, Comte Hugo,' should have perpetuated this superficial judgment. To repeat it is to confess to a deep misunderstanding of Péguy's essential greatness, which was that he divined the ultimate identity of morality and art, the indistinguishable community of all spiritual genius. The artist and the saint were to him of one kind; and, more than this, the honest workman with his hands was also of one kind with them, partaking of their sweetness, their beauty and their magnificence. It is the joy of this recognition which suffuses the words he wrote of a generation that had passed away:

'Travailler était leur joie même, et la racine profonde de leur être. Et la raison de leur être. Il y avait un honneur incroyable du travail, le plus beau de tous les honneurs, le plus chrétien, le seul peut-être qui se tient debout. C'est par exemple pour cela que je dis qu'un libre-penseur de ce temps-là était plus chrétien qu'un dévot de nos jours. Parcequ'un dévot de nos jours est forcément un bourgeois. Et aujourd'hui tout le monde est bourgeois.'

Nothing could be more profound or more human than

this creed of work. To have contemplated the saint, the artist, the peasant and the craftsman as workmen is to have made the mystical and overwhelming conception of the community of saints a reality; it is also, in intention at least, to have annihilated modern society, to have seen, in the city of men, the vision of the city of God.

Visions, says the man of practice, are visionary. They do not work. They are all very well, but they are only dreams, and those who indulge in them are only dreamers. But is it only a dream that men should seek the truth of their own impulse and obey it, that they should guard themselves from the contagion of the lie in the soul, that they should make their work a true and integral part of themselves? These dreamers are the doers. Art and sainthood are only a more perfect work.

‘Car les politiques se rattrapent, croient se rattraper, en disant qu’au moins ils sont pratiques et que nous ne le sommes pas. Ici même ils se trompent. Et ils trompent. Nous ne leur accorderons pas même cela. Ce sont les mystiques qui sont même pratiques et ce sont les politiques qui ne le sont pas. C’est nous qui sommes pratiques, *qui faisons quelque chose*; et c’est eux qui ne le sont pas, *qui ne font rien*. C’est nous qui amassons et c’est eux qui pillent. C’est nous, qui bâtissons, c’est nous qui fondons, et c’est eux qui démolissent. C’est nous qui nourissons et c’est eux qui parasitent. C’est nous qui faisons les œuvres et les hommes, les peuples et les races. Et c’est eux qui ruinent.’

Only that is created which is born of the unflinching and incessant adjustment of the act to the intention. The obedience is to be paid to the soul, not to the exigencies of the external world. Shift this allegiance from the one side to the other, and you have, not an organic creation but a mechanical assemblage without the breath of life in it, which will dissolve in a day. To learn how to give this exact and uncompromising allegiance, to discover to what to give it, and so devotedly to fulfil the *mystique* of his own life, to reach the impersonal bedrock of personality and to build upon it congruously—this was Péguy’s destiny. By his conformity to this universal plan, he proved himself a poet of humanity. He followed out the roots of his being to their final contact with the native earth, and, subduing

himself to France, earned the right to demand that France should subdue herself to him, not as to Charles Péguy the man, but to Péguy the representative of ideal France. His prophetic beginnings were justified. The instinct that had moved him to commence author, as we say, by constructing a drama of 750 pages upon Jeanne d'Arc, was refined and strengthened to a conscious artistic purpose. He apprehended all the magnificence of his chosen symbol; he knew that he was marked out to be its interpreter. He had in his long struggles with the unworthiness of his age discovered the true significance of his peasant stock: he was a peasant still.

‘Moi, vous le savez bien. Les tenaces aïeux, paysans, vigneron, les vieux hommes de Vennécý et de Saint-Jean-de-Braye, et de Chécý et de Bou et de Mardié, les patients aïeux qui sur les arbres et les buissons de la forêt d'Orléans et sur les sables de la Loire conquièrent tant d'arpents de bonne vigne, n'ont pas été longs, les vieux, ils n'ont pas tardé; ils n'en ont pas eu pour longtemps à reconquérir sur le monde bourgeois, sur la société bourgeoise, leur petit-fils indigne, buveur d'eau, en bouteilles. Les ancêtres au pied pertinent, les hommes nouveaux comme les ceps, enroulés comme les vrilles de la vigne, fins comme les sarments et qui comme les sarments sont retournés en cendre. Et les femmes au battoir, les gros paquets de linge bien gonflés roulant dans les brouettes, les femmes qui lavaient la lessive à la rivière. Ma grand'mère qui gardait les vaches, qui ne savait pas lire et écrire, ou, comme on dit à l'école primaire, qui ne savait ni lire ni écrire, à qui je dois tout, à qui je dois, de qui je tiens tout ce que je suis; Halévy, votre grand'mère ne gardait pas les vaches; et elle savait lire et écrire; je n'ajoute pas *et compter*. Ma grand'mère aussi savait compter. Elle comptait comme on compte au marché, elle comptait *de tête, par cœur*. . . . J'ai beau faire; j'ai eu beau me défendre. En moi, autour de moi, dessus moi, sans me demander mon avis tout conspire, au-dessus de moi, tout concourt à faire de moi un paysan non point du Danube, ce qui serait de la littérature encore, mais simplement de la vallée de la Loire, un bûcheron d'un forêt qui n'est pas même l'immortelle forêt de Gastine, puisque c'était le périssable forêt d'Orléans, un vigneron des côtes et des sables de Loire. . . .’

What had he to do with the elegances of the Sorbonne? he asked. For him they could at most be a



whetstone to sharpen the edge of his own consciousness, which was no rapier blade, but a weapon of old France, a tool of peace no less than a weapon of war. Peremptory voices had spoken to him from the depths of his own being, telling him that he must suffer himself wholly to become the peasant that he was. He above all men should obey the voice.

'Je serais un grand sot de ne pas me laisser faire, de ne pas me laisser redevenir, reconquérir paysan. Plus que tout autre je serais un grand sot. Plus que jamais en ce moment même je serais un grand sot. Cette année même il m'a été donné en plein ce que je demandais, en vain, depuis dix ans et plus, ce qui m'avait été donné une fois, une première fois. Il m'a été donné de commencer, de mettre tout ce qu'un homme peut mettre de son être à représenter les quatorze ou quinze mystères, le mystère unique de la vie et de la vocation et de la sainteté et du martyre de la plus grande sainte, je crois, qu'il y ait jamais eu . . . Je me priverais moi-même, je m'enlèverais mon principal, mon seul atout, temporel. Pensez, mon cher Halévy, n'est-il pas effrayant de penser que son père et sa mère, son oncle Durand Lassois, ses trois frères, sa grande sœur, ses amies, Mengette, Hauviette, *Madame Gervaise* étaient des gens comme nous en avons tant connus étant petits, comme nous eussions été nous-mêmes, comme nous allions être nous-mêmes (or si nous pouvions tranquillement le redevenir!), étaient exactement, étaient identiquement des gens comme tous ceux où nous avons vécu étant petits. Et que toute cette grande histoire est sortie de là.'

In the three 'Mystères de Jeanne d'Arc' (1910-12) which Péguy lived to write we have, therefore, but a fragment of his plan; yet so compelling is the sense of the organic unity in Péguy's life and work that the fragment leaves us with the satisfaction of fulfilment. It is not merely a patriotic figure of speech to say that the twelve mysteries which Péguy did not live to write with a pen upon paper were inscribed by him eternally in his death. That is no more than the exact truth, and to those who find it a hard and incomprehensible saying a full understanding of Péguy is denied. He has been named 'The Chaplain of the Republic'; but that, after all, is only a timid approximation to the truth. He was the saint of the Republic, and there has been no other.

He was shaped of the substance and according to the design of the Maid whom he glorified.

Because this essay purports to give no more than an indication of the inward rhythm of Péguy's achievement, I am spared the ungrateful task of summarising the three books of his 'Jeanne d'Arc.' If they were of another kind than the rest of his work, the omission would be inconceivable; but they are of the same kind. 'Jeanne d'Arc' is, as it were, a natural and inevitable growth of the vital principle which I have endeavoured to define. It is not even Péguy's poetry as opposed to Péguy's prose. There is no firm dividing line between even literary kinds in his work. It is one throughout. The hammer-beat of the short sentences, with which each successive theme is finally exhausted, the strong nervous language with its peasant tang, the astonishing simplicity and fearlessness of his approach to holy things, the sense of his assurance that he is a citizen of no mean city, of the republic of men and God—these qualities of his 'Jeanne d'Arc' are common to all his work; and its unity is manifested beyond doubt in the strange and convincing propriety with which he makes those mediæval French women, and not least the Maid herself, speak his own language. There is the evidence of his conviction that he was one with them, their spokesman to the modern world, and not their spokesman only.

'C'est embêtant, dit Dieu. Quand il n'y aura plus ces Français. Il y a des choses que je fais, il n'y aura plus personne pour les comprendre.

Peuple, les peuples de la terre te disent léger,

Parceque tu es un peuple prompt.

Les peuples pharisiens te disent léger,

Parceque tu es un peuple vite.

Tu es arrivé avant que les autres soient partis.

Mais moi je t'ai pesé, dit Dieu, et je ne t'ai point trouvé léger.

O Peuple inventeur de la cathédrale, je ne t'ai point trouvé léger en foi.

O Peuple inventeur de la croisade, je ne t'ai point trouvé léger en charité.

Quant à l'espérance, il vaut mieux ne pas en parler; il n'y en a que pour eux.'

Here is again that ring of prophecy which lifts Péguy into another realm than that of his contemporaries. Here is the mighty murmur of France itself, the strange tremendous sound that breaks suddenly upon our ears at vast distances in French literature, that gathered strength and terror in the caves and holes of the earth under the *ancien régime*, finding a spiritual embodiment in the drama of Corneille, breaking in one sudden unforgettable paragraph through the austere repressions of La Bruyère, thenceforward lost in literature but rushing, like a mighty wind, forth to the Crusade of the Revolution—a reality hidden from the eyes of the French themselves. It is an elemental force, rebellious to all discipline but its own.

And this strong wind blows incessantly through the work of Péguy's *annus mirabilis*, 1910. In that year besides the first 'Mystère' and 'Notre Jeunesse' he published also 'Victor Marie, Comte Hugo,' which is the complete inscription of the man. From it is taken the passage, already quoted (p. 102), wherein he discovers himself a peasant. It is stern and witty, sublime and supple, mordant and full of charity, moving in obedience to a profound and personal rhythm. Nothing in French literature or in Péguy's own work is comparable to this.

All his strength gathered into one effort. He had always, he wrote in the superb description of the activity of writing which 'Victor-Marie' contains, been impelled not to revise his old writings, but 'to correct one work in another.' 'Victor-Marie, Comte Hugo' is the re-creation, the final correction of all his works. In it he achieves the purpose which he proclaims, and 'follows the very outline of the reality.' But the reality he follows is his own soul in all its aspirations, instincts, impulses, and achievements; and the language which he shapes upon it is that which he learned from his grandmother, and forged into an instrument of so great strength and precision. 'Il faut pourtant bien que je déclare que nous, les gars de la Loire, c'est nous qui parlons le fin langage français.'

The theme of this wonderful *cahier*, like that of all great works of literature, changes with the level of apprehension. At one it is Hugo himself, at another friendship, at yet another—and this the highest and most

near the heart—it is contained in the words: 'Un mot n'est pas le même dans un écrivain et dans un autre. L'un se l'arrache du ventre. L'autre le tire de la poche de son pardessus.'

Take some of the words in 'Victor Marie, Comte Hugo' which are not the same, some of the words that are 'torn out of his body.' There is, first, the word 'friendship.' That is the musical theme, given out. He calls to his friend Halévy that he should be mindful of what they have been, and eternally are, each to the other; what each has given and received back again. Péguy has given himself. There is the word, 'Péguy.' And he tears this word out of himself—the peasant of Beauce, the worker, the fighter, *l'homme du métier*, the man whose work is his life. There is the word 'work.' This too he has given, in a supreme act of friendship, wherein the creator wrestles with his soul in the presence of his friend, admits him to his holiest. They have striven together to conquer the thought which is the act of art. How they grappled with that mighty one, Hugo, and wrestled with him for his secret until the dawn rose over the bridges of Paris! There is the word, 'Victor-Marie, Comte Hugo.' That pagan angel, 'ce génie pourvu de talents,' the creator of 'Booz Endormi'—him they mastered and knew together. From him, together, they climbed to the supreme trial, to wrestle with Corneille and Racine. There is the word, 'Corneille.' There is the word, 'Racine.' And Corneille is all France, the eternal France. He is the spirit that moves in grace, nay, that *groues* in grace. 'Corneille n'opère jamais que dans le royaume de salut; Racine n'opère jamais que dans le royaume de perdition.'

Here, if anywhere, was a word 'arraché du ventre.' This was not the idle thesis of the schools, the comparison between the two French poets, which every pupil imbibes from a glib professor. This was knowledge won by right of conquest, the peace of spiritual apprehension which the soul wins by force of its own arms. But it is only a strange answer to a familiar question, may be said by those who do not understand that the enduring criticism is that wherein a man seeks an answer to his own questions from the great ones before him, and dares to measure his humanity with

theirs. On whose side was he, Péguy asked? was he with Corneille or was he with Racine? who was on his own side—Corneille or Racine? Nothing less than the destiny of himself, more, nothing less than the destiny of France, hung on that question for Péguy. His answer stands:

‘Quoiqu’ils en disent, quoiqu’ils en pensent même peut-être, les Français sont généralement Cornéliens. . . . Les blessures que nous recevons, nous les recevons dans Racine; les êtres que nous sommes, nous les sommes dans Corneille.’

But that is not criticism. Indeed it is not, now that the word has sunk to little meaning with much use. It is creation, the straining of the soul outwards away from limitation to communion with the great souls of the past. Beside it a lesser criticism is an impertinence; for the condition of its achievement was that Péguy should have been, if only for the brief moment while he strove to hold this thought, the equal of Corneille.

The enduring impression of Péguy’s work, to one who follows it from its beginnings, is that of a steady and vital progress to a culmination of greatness, to a greatness intensely human. There is in Péguy no remoteness. He grows like a strong tree from the ground. We are, if we will be, his comrades; he does not hide himself from us because he cannot, because he is not ashamed, and because he knows that he is a visible example. We are at home in his homeliness, for he had the spirit which gathers up common occupations into itself and creates them art. The mechanism of life, by the alchemy of a candour so deep, becomes organic once more.

It would have been well if we had enlarged the picture to include his actual manual work on the ‘Cahiers,’ done down to the last detail as he sat with the country mud on his boots and his umbrella at his side, earlier almost than the dawn, in the little *rez de chaussée* in the Rue de la Sorbonne. It would be good to tell how he loved the craft of printing, and how the giving of the *bon à tirer* was as integral to his work as his language or his imagination; how he talked slowly to his friends and how he was loved by them; how he fought poverty and outward failure; how he sacrificed all to the ‘Cahiers’;

how his collaborators reached fame throughout the world before him; how, as he tells of himself in the 'Comptendu de Mandat' (1901),

'Il travaille avec les typographes à l'atelier pour faire de belles pages, de belles couvertures; il corrige les épreuves, s'abrutit les yeux. Comme libraire il fait des paquets, colle des timbres, dresse des listes, établit des fiches, aligne des commandes, empile des volumes. Il travaille de ses mains.'

These things, his peasant gait, his beard, his *pince-nez*, would make definite the picture of the actual man, and they would have their fitness, for there was never a man who more exactly lived his work than Charles Péguy. But, for the same reason, they are implicit in his spiritual design.

That was fulfilled by his death. It has been told how in 1909, immediately before his *annus mirabilis* began, he passed through a crisis of disillusionment. His was a beaten generation, he wrote, in 'A nos amis, à nos abonnés.' There were defeats that were glorious, disasters that bore the honourable name of the vanquished down to posterity. But he and his comrades were the victims of obscure defeat.

'Nous avons été très grands dans la réalité, mais nous ne l'avons été que dans la réalité. C'est comme rien. Nous ne l'avons pas été dans l'enregistrement, dans l'appareil d'enregistrement, dans l'histoire. Et quand nous le disons nous parlons comme des imbéciles. Nous avons l'air d'être des imbéciles. Et nous le sommes; puisque nous faisons figure d'imbéciles. Qu'importe que nous ayons été grands *en réalité*? L'histoire ne s'occupe pas des réalités. Elle n'a que faire de la réalité.'

Then he glorified the names of the past—'O drapeaux du passé, si beaux dans les histoires'—the warriors and the battles, the victories and the defeats, the victories in defeat. He saw himself and his generation called to the bar of history, and this final challenge rang in his ears. 'Alors de quoi parlez-vous? Apportez-moi donc seulement vos morts. Voyons, comptons-les.'

It has been the tragic, yet the beautiful destiny of Péguy's generation that it should bring forward its dead in hecatombs that History herself cannot number. Of

these Péguy is the chief and the exemplar. He died joyously, as one to whom a great gift had been given; he sanctified the sacrifice of his fallen comrades, for he, more than all others, knew the banner under which they fought and the blood which ran in their veins.

In the months immediately before his death, in the long poem which formed his last *cahier*, 'Eve,' appeared a poem of solemn prophecy, a psalm of quiet and assured victory before the coming sacrifice. 'Blessed are they who die for their carnal city, for they are the body of the city of God.'

Heureux ceux qui sont morts pour la terre charnelle,  
Mais pourvu que ce fût dans une juste guerre;  
Heureux ceux qui sont morts pour quatre coins de terre,  
Heureux ceux qui sont morts d'une mort solennelle.

Heureux ceux qui sont morts dans les grandes batailles,  
Couchés dessus le sol à la face de Dieu;  
Heureux ceux qui sont morts sur un dernier haut lieu  
Parmi tout l'appareil des grandes funérailles.

Heureux ceux qui sont morts pour des cités charnelles,  
Car elles sont le corps de la cité de Dieu;  
Heureux ceux qui sont morts pour leur âtre et leur feu  
Et les pauvres honneurs des maisons paternelles.

Heureux ceux qui sont morts, car ils sont retournés  
Dans la première argile et la première terre;  
Heureux ceux qui sont morts dans une juste guerre;  
Heureux les épis mûrs et les blés moissonnés!

Thus at the last Charles Péguy proclaimed the truth for which he had laboured all his life, namely, that his earthly city was by intention created after the pattern of the heavenly, and its true citizens (who alone are the citizens of the heavenly also) are bound to live and privileged to die in order that it may be made loyal to its high ideal.

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY.



## Art. 6.—EFFICIENCY.

1. *Shop Management.* By F. Winslow Taylor. Harpers, 1911.
2. *The Principles of Scientific Management.* By F. Winslow Taylor. Harpers, 1911.
3. *Work, Wages and Profits.* By H. L. Gantt. New York: Engineering Magazine Co., 1913.
4. *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency.* By Hugo Münsterberg. Constable, 1913.
5. *Scientific Management.* By Clarence B. Thompson. Milford, 1914.

IN taking their way westward, European habits and fashions follow what has been said to be the course of Empire. All the flotsam and jetsam of European life—Russian dancing, German scholarship, Hungarian musical comedy, Parisian fashions and English literature—are borne on the tide and spread over the American continent. The American manufacturer is ever alert for the latest European inventions; the American scientist, whether he work in the laboratory or in the operating-room, is in touch with the literature of his speciality coming every month from abroad; and American scholars, reformers and preachers are alive to the latest discoveries in scholarship, the newest movements in social reform, and the most modern trend in religious ideas.

All this is as it should be; but what puzzles one is that the tide rarely sets the other way. It is only with the greatest difficulty and after many years that American books, customs, movements, reputations, arts, take root either in England or on the Continent. A few notable exceptions blind us to the truth of this fact. These exceptions are so pronounced, so American, that they create an impression of Europe's becoming Americanised quite rapidly enough; for, though perhaps excellent in themselves, they often are incidentally suggestive of those things in American life and ways that are distinctly alien to the European mind. The cinema has become an almost exclusively American enterprise; ninety-one per cent. of the films shown in the British Isles come from overseas. But this is an exception. Again, Americans,

after forty years of insistence, have brought certain comforts, such as central heating, into European hotels, but how long and painful the process has been! And such reforms end at the hotels; the average English or French country-house, to say nothing of more modest dwellings, is still cold and uncomfortable in winter, at least for certain portions of the day and certain portions of the house.

This sluggishness of adoption is due to several reasons. It is due partly, as we have indicated, to a distinct liking for one's own way and a distrust of the ways of others; it is due partly to climatic conditions, which are so influential in forming the character of a race, and which in Northern Europe leave men deliberate and incurious, in Southern Europe emotional and easy-going; but it is also due very largely to the fact, merely psychological one might think, yet very real, that any idea coming to Europe from America must fight its way against a strong current that always sets the other way. Naturally, the European, from his superior historical position and his sense of what Europe has recently achieved in thought, art and invention, finds this removal from American influences quite a natural if not beneficial detachment. Better fifty years of Europe than, if not a cycle, at least several hundred years of America.

And yet, while admitting the reasons for this imperviousness, while granting that it carries with it a certain protection against whatever is excessive in Western civilisation, one may doubt whether the balance does not represent a loss rather than a gain; the unprejudiced mind, conversant with both civilisations, may feel strongly that Europe would be a better Europe if she permitted herself more easily and quickly to be permeated by Western ideals and achievement. An entirely different social order exists there, an amazing activity in all departments of life; and it could not but give a wider and therefore a truer horizon to our own outlook upon life if Europeans were at least aware of this order and activity, even if these were found not quite fit to appropriate in their entirety. Again and again, on this side of the Atlantic, we are told that certain changes in the body politic and social are quite impossible, when the other side of the Atlantic has

proved them quite possible years ago. Conditions differ, but, in general, society advances much more slowly than it might, simply because we are so ignorant of the advances made elsewhere. Content to say that human nature cannot be changed or that the British public would not put up with such and such a reform, it hangs back, rather proud of its conservatism. As a matter of fact, human nature is far more adaptable than we allow, and soon accommodates itself to new conditions, forgetting the old. And, essentially, in our reforms, it is not human nature that we wish to change; rather we are striving to effect certain benefits to society as a whole, let human nature remain or change as it will.

The two forces in America that in recent years have done most to put the American house in order and of which next to nothing is known in Europe are Efficiency and Prohibition, both of which undoubtedly interfere with individual freedom, but have come into play in the States without any of that wholesale injustice with which we are always ready to brand any reform. Prohibition has disappointed its opponents, both in the facility with which it has been introduced and established, and in the number and magnitude of the blessings it has conferred. Totally unsuspected benefits have developed, including commercial benefits which have won over the most unbelieving adversaries.

But the question of prohibition is too controversial a matter to be discussed here and now. The subject to which I wish to call attention is the other movement, also widespread in the States—that of 'Efficiency,' or 'Scientific Management,' as it was termed by its founder. I prefer the simpler term 'Efficiency,' since I wish to treat of this force in its general, philosophic aspect, rather than in its application to industrial management. I speak of Efficiency as a force, since its discovery was precisely like the discovery of some hitherto unsuspected force in nature, in that it completely revolutionised old ways of doing things and opened up new fields of achievement. Efficiency was not unknown—it is, indeed, as old as the hills; but only toward the end of the last century, and in America, was it discovered that it could be applied scientifically to all walks of life, and particularly to the output of labour and the management of business. Some

scoffed, and continue to scoff, at its (to them) exaggerated claims, pointing out that every big business must have studied Efficiency in its own particular line—it was, in fact, the very air that big businesses breathed. But the unprejudiced observer will, I think, confess that Efficiency or Scientific Management, as it has been preached and practised the last score of years in America, is a great and new idea in the world.

It developed in this way. In 1878 a young American, Frederick Winslow Taylor, whose training had been that of a pattern-maker and machinist, entered the machine-shop of a steel company at Midvale, Pennsylvania. He quickly rose from the position of a day-labourer to a clerkship; next he became a machinist running one of the lathes; then, after several months, as he turned out more work than other machinists on similar lathes, he was made 'gang-boss' over all the lathes. After about three years, during which time he had been promoted to be foreman of the machine-shop, it was found that the output of the machines had been materially increased, in many cases doubled. What was the secret of this increased output Taylor had scarcely told himself, much less the world, although he had his wild surmises, as do all those who make a real discovery. To obtain this result he had changed the movements of men and machines, and had adopted many new devices for speeding-up, probably to a greater degree than is usual where any increase of production takes place without increase of labour or plant; but as yet he had hit upon no new laws of maximum results, he had not converted his ideas into a science. He was confident, however, that scientific laws existed and could be translated into formulæ that would, with determinable modifications, be applicable for all work.

Taylor was now joined by others, as enthusiastic and convinced as himself; and in the years that followed, chiefly in the steel-works of Western Pennsylvania, countless experiments were carried out, countless data tabulated, as to the maximum amount of heavy labour that could reasonably be expected of a first-class man in a day—that is, how many foot-pounds of work a man best suited to a particular job could do. The number of

foot-pounds varied considerably with the different kinds of heavy labour that were under inspection; in fact, it was soon discovered that there is no direct relation between the horse-power which a man exerts and the tiring effect of the work upon the man. On some kinds of work the man would be tired out when doing only one-eighth of a horse-power, while in others he would feel no greater fatigue after having done half a horse-power. After three long series of experiments, Taylor and his colleagues, by plotting the curves of their data, discovered the central law of heavy-labour maximum, namely, that to obtain the maximum output of a heavy labourer before he is tired out, he must be under load only for a percentage of the day. This percentage varies inversely with the strain caused by each given pull and push on the man's arms; the greater the strain, the smaller the percentage of the day that he should work, if the maximum result is to be obtained from his labour. Thus, when pig-iron is being handled, a first-class workman can be under load only 43 per cent. of the day when each pig weighs 92 pounds, but 58 per cent. of the day when each pig weighs 46 pounds.

Taylor got his data by timing men at work with a stop-watch. He experimented with them, noting which men did the most work, and why; seeing whether these men could do more work if they omitted certain movements or rested periodically; and timing the movements and output of these first-class men, so as to know just when these periods of rest should come and how long they should last. In the case of loading pig-iron on to a freight-car, Taylor's data pointed to the conclusion that a man suited to the job ought to be able to load between 47 and 48 tons per day, when the pigs weighed 92 pounds each. As one of the managers at the Bethlehem Steel Company, he then undertook to see whether his experimental data would hold good in practice and on a large scale. The pig-iron gang at these works at this time consisted of seventy-five men, who were lifting pig-iron from a ground-pile, walking up an inclined plank and dropping it into a car at the rate of  $12\frac{1}{2}$  long tons a day. Taylor's first step was to single out one of these men, a Dutchman called Schmidt, of the ox-type of man, and on this first day and all day long Schmidt was told

by the man who stood over him with a watch: 'Now pick up a pig and walk'; 'Now sit down and rest,' and at half-past five in the afternoon Schmidt had loaded  $47\frac{1}{2}$  tons of pig-iron on to the car. It was then merely a question of picking out other men of the Schmidt type. Only eight were found in this particular gang, but enough of the ox-type were found either in the yard or outside; and more suitable work was found for the sixty-seven men who were not the right men in the right place when loading pig-iron. By the end of the third year in which Taylor's methods had been applied at the Bethlehem Steel Company, the number of yard-labourers was reduced from between 600 and 400 to about 140 (of whom only two were drinking men), while the average number of tons handled was increased from 16 to 59 per man per day, the average daily wage raised from \$1.15 to \$1.88, and the average cost of handling a long ton lowered from  $7\frac{1}{2}$  cents to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  cents. In this reduced cost are included the office and tool-room expenses as required by the new system of management, and all the wages of labour-superintendents, foremen, clerks, time-study men, and others.

There is the whole story. It all points one way; there is no other side to it. The men were better paid, happier and soberer, and they worked fewer hours; the Company increased the quantity and quality of its output at a reduced cost per unit, and experienced no labour troubles. In fact, wherever the Taylor system has been applied, there have been no strikes or labour troubles; and the system has been applied to every form of industry and office management during a period of thirty-five years.

The illustration given above tells the whole story as regards increasing the production of man, but the science of efficiency has been applied with equally remarkable results to the production of machines. In one case, the gain in time made through running metal-cutting machines according to scientific principles ranged from two and a half times the speed in the lowest instance to nine times the speed in the highest. The new theory, however, meets perhaps with its greatest triumphs in those trades and occupations where the saving comes not alone from the observance of the laws of fatigue,

nor alone from the speeding-up of the machines or contrivances involved, but thirdly and perhaps chiefly, from the imposition of system and order, and the proper relation of the workman to his tools. One of Taylor's followers, Mr Frank B. Gilbreth, experimented with bricklaying, a trade thousands of years old, but one in which there has been little or no improvement in the implements or materials used or in the method of their employment. Mr Gilbreth, having made an intense study and analysis of each movement of the bricklayer, eliminated, one after another, all unnecessary movements, and substituted fast for slow movements. He studied the best height for the mortar-box and the brick-pile, and then designed an adjustable scaffold, with a table on it, upon which all of the materials were placed, so as to keep the bricks, the mortar, the man, and the wall in their proper relative positions. By this means the bricklayer is saved the exertion of stooping down to the level of his feet for each brick and each trowelful of mortar and then straightening up again. Under Mr Gilbreth's system there is no need for the bricklayer to turn the brick over, or end to end, to examine it before laying, since the sorting is done by cheap labour on the ground, and the bricks, all good ones, have their best edge uppermost in the hod, which has its proper position on the adjustable scaffold. The mortar is mixed to such a consistency that there is no need for tapping the brick after it is in place. By these simple means the art of laying a brick was reduced from eighteen movements to five, and the capacity of skilful workmen raised from 120 bricks per man per hour to 350, attended, of course, by a very considerable increase in pay.

Another classic instance of this general type of increased efficiency was in the inspection of bicycle ball-bearings, in which, by eliminating the girls unsuited to the work, by resting the girls for ten minutes every hour and a half, and by other changes, thirty-five girls came to do the work formerly done by one hundred and twenty. The accuracy at the higher speed was two-thirds greater than at the lower speed; the girls' wages were increased by from 80 to 100 per cent.; and, in addition to the four periods of recreation during the day,



their hours of labour were shortened from ten and a half to eight and a half hours.

It is instinctive to every man, and perhaps particularly to Englishmen, to look askance at innovations. They have a constitutional dislike of being jerked out of their ancient ways, and they protect themselves by advancing a host of objections. Thus Taylor's ideas met with a cold reception in this country. One argument advanced was that, after all, they did not make a new man of the labourer and did not solve our social and industrial problems. No one can read the history of the movement without seeing that, among other benefits, this is precisely what it does tend to achieve. Taylor's great hope from his new type of management was that it would largely eliminate the wage question as a source of dispute. 'What constitutes a fair day's work will be a question for scientific investigation, instead of a subject to be bargained and haggled over. Soldiering will cease to exist because the object for soldiering will no longer exist.' 'The close intimate cooperation, the constant personal contact between the two sides, will tend to diminish friction and discontent. It is difficult for two people whose interests are the same, and who work side by side in accomplishing the same object, all day long, to keep up a quarrel.'

Moreover, scientific management tends to solve our social problems, because it takes care of the individual. It is far from being merely a trick for dealing with men *en masse* for the sake of increased output. It does not lend itself to 'driving,' to pushing-through a piece of work at high speed regardless of the workman. As we have indicated, it not only finds out what work the individual can best perform, but it keeps the individual fit and happy in that work. With women-workers each is made to feel that she is the object of especial care and interest on the part of the management, and that, if anything goes wrong with her, she can always have a helper and teacher in the management to lean upon. One of the regulations is that all young women are to be given two consecutive days of rest (with pay) each month, to be taken whenever they choose. Still further, outside of the factory, all large undertakings in America now have Welfare Centres for their employees, with

cost-price restaurants, club-rooms and recreation-grounds. Hartford, in Connecticut, practically guarantees all its skilled labourers continuous employment; the manufacturers, through their own labour bureau, notify one another a week in advance whom they are to lay off and whom they wish to take on.

There are no statistics to show the extent of the Taylor movement and what its total result has been. That result cannot be measured by figures, since efficiency is a spiritual force. Moreover, not all the manifestations of the new spirit owe their birth directly or indirectly to Taylor. It is a wide-spread, national movement. Although there is still much misgovernment and political corruption in the cities, efficiency is the great cry, in all parts of the land and in all departments of life. It may become nauseating where it is used merely to vaunt material wealth and the growth of 'big business,' but it is a welcome slogan if it means, as it should mean, that through efficiency the material things of life are to be made less material, are to consume less of our time and patience, are to sink to their proper place. The average wage of the members of the Typographical Union of New York City, including the periods when they are out of work, is over a pound a day of eight hours, whereas the average wage of compositors in London has been less than eight shillings a day of nine hours or over. According to the last report on comparative prices of H.M. Board of Trade, the cost of living in America is only 50 per cent. more than here.

The time has gone by when a nation can afford to neglect any proved reform, whatever its origin. England is forced to change and improve, whether she will or no, if she is to compete with other nations and bear the burden imposed by the war. The day of rule-of-thumb methods and dry-rot conditions must come to an end. Trade overleaps all prejudices and former hatreds, and follows where most money is made; and most money is made where there is the greatest efficiency.

Already the efficiency, i.e. the output, of the Canadian workman is appreciably higher than that of the English or Scottish workman; and the difference is bound to increase, ruinously for these Islands, unless there is a general awakening. Strips of moulding that cost 9d.

each delivered from Germany before the war, still cost four shillings and sixpence made in England after three years of war. Those strips, and a host of other things, will climb any tariff wall that can be set up after the war, unless England is better organised. The sole protection, the sole preparedness, consists in a highly trained and intelligently educated democracy. Every English man, woman and child must come to realise what efficiency means, and must insist with himself and all those with whom he comes in contact that it shall be attained. There is no walk in life, even as there is no action of our daily existence, where efficiency, both a general sense of it and its constant application, would not help to make both our own and the nation's task lighter and nobler. The man reading a story aloud to the cigar-rollers in a Cuban factory, the feat of washing the clothes of fifty thousand workers on the Panama canal over a period of seven years with scarcely the loss of a handkerchief, the stopping of trains 'at the crack' as is done in New York subways, the taking of order-tickets for Paris omnibuses in order to avoid disgraceful scrambling, the feeding of 25,000 people from one bread-depôt without crowding, as has been done for nearly three years in Belgium—these are instances of what can be done when some one man has a sense of causes and consequences.

One might think that a reform of this nature could be left to fight its own way, as a commercial reform, if the savings are as great as represented. It *has* made its way, and that rapidly, in the States; but the estranging sea lies between us, and here the cause of efficiency or scientific management needs preaching from the house-tops if it is to win attention. Taylor's books are more and more in demand, but as yet no school has been founded, as in America, to train efficiency superintendents, and, neither the Government nor the Borough Councils have shown any anxiety to put the new idea into practice. The recently issued report (March 1917) of the special committee on munitions-output emphasises the need of Government action, showing how much might be saved if only the commonest laws of fatigue were observed. One factory, continually experimenting on its own initiative, has found its output distinctly larger

when its operatives work five and a half days a week than when they work six or seven days a week.

But we cannot wait for the manufacturers to adopt the better ways, and so gradually indoctrinate the people. It is for Government first of all to set the example; the public corporations should follow; lastly, the methods should be taught in the schools. There is nothing, from the opening of our mail in the morning to arranging for fresh air at night, in which a little extra care and thought will not avail. If we have not given it extra thought and care, we may be employing eight typists in our office when, if we listen to Taylor, five would do more and better work, and be better off themselves, while the other three would be really contributing something of sweetness and light to the general hive, where now they are no better than drones. 'Why labour at the dull mechanic oar,' why pile up burdens unnecessarily for ourselves and our children, when, almost by the turning of a hand and a little will, conditions can be made so much better? Let us talk less of the impossibility of changing human nature, let us study less the frequently meaningless will of the people, let us worry less about labour troubles and the relations between employer and employee. Let us, instead, aim at that greater all-round efficiency, by which alone wages can be safely increased and our labour problems solved. To the old virtues of industry and thrift, we need to add the new ones of scientific efficiency and daring change. We need a new spirit that forms and reforms, that leads and is not pushed; a new conscience, that will not let us rest until conditions are far better than they are. Incompetence, slackness, ignorant neglect, are the cause of half our woes. Let us be informed, let us be determined, and we shall not fail. The world is strong, very strong, but man is stronger.

ROBINSON SMITH.

## Art. 7.—THE NEW REALISM. ✓

1. *Philosophical Essays*. By Bertrand Russell. Longmans, 1910.
2. *The Problems of Philosophy*. By the same (Home Univ. Library). Williams and Norgate, [1912].
3. *Our Knowledge of the External World* (Lowell Lectures). London. By the same. New York: Open Court Publ. Co., 1914.
4. *The New Realism*. By E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding. New York: Macmillan, 1912.
5. *The Distinction between Mind and its Objects*. By Bernard Bosanquet. Manchester Univ. Press, 1913.
6. *Neo-realistic Theories of Mind or Consciousness*. By R. F. A. Hoernle. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Reid, 1914.
7. *The Working Faith of the Social Reformer and other Essays*. By Henry Jones. Macmillan, 1910.
8. *A Defence of Idealism: some Questions and Conclusions*. By May Sinclair. Macmillan, 1917.

THE interest of the educated public in the disputes of the philosophers is apt to be slender. But a very simple line of reflections will enable any one who wants to understand it to bring the most important recent departure in philosophy tolerably well into focus. The new method is called Realism. It includes at least three main groups in its following—the 'new realists' of America, the Manchester school in this country, and the still more important though somewhat undefined group who follow Mr G. E. Moore and Mr Bertrand Russell. While we cannot as yet speak confidently of its history—every separate modification of the theory seems to have had its own private history—we can yet see upon the movement as a whole the hall-mark of a genuine departure. It is impossible that so many different versions of the same general way of looking at things should have sprung into being all about the same time, in such widely different quarters, without a genuine reason. And the reason, speaking in quite general terms, is easy to signalise. It is not that the various advocates of the theory have all been to a common master to learn their new way of thinking. It is rather that they have been

breathing a common atmosphere and have been driven, largely independently of each other, to seek in various directions the intellectual nourishment which that atmosphere has seemed unable to supply. To bring their movement into focus we only need to apprehend what it is in the general intellectual environment of them and us which is inviting people in the direction they have taken.

The incentive to Realism, the invitation which the present state of thought apparently extends to us all to become realists, is not difficult to state in outline. It is a species of spiritual exhaustion—a recurrent phenomenon in the history of thought.

The arena in which philosophies fight out their battles is always limited; and the scene witnessed in it is always a diversified one. Only rarely is any one philosophy to be found in full possession and without a rival. But at different periods there are predominating influences; and for a considerable time now there have been such. A spirit of Idealism has been abroad among thinkers. It is an Idealism of classical ancestry which 'twenty years ago,' as Mr Russell says, 'held almost unquestioned sway in all Anglo-Saxon universities.'\* Even Mr Russell will allow that this Idealism is still a strong, although now, in his view, a decaying force. Now, this powerful influence has been exerted in the direction of fostering an ancient habit, which Mr Russell notes and deprecates in his 'Problems of Philosophy,' of ignoring the limits of philosophical knowledge, and unweariedly aspiring to a knowledge that is not really possible. He would have philosophy confine itself to humbler tasks.

'Most philosophers—or, at any rate, very many—profess to be able to prove, by *a priori* metaphysical reasoning, such things as the fundamental dogmas of religion, the essential rationality of the universe, the illusoriness of matter, the unreality of all evil, and so on. There can be no doubt that the hope of finding reason to believe such theses as these has been the chief inspiration of many lifelong students of philosophy. This hope, I believe, is vain. It would seem that knowledge concerning the universe as a whole is not to be obtained by metaphysics, and that the proposed proofs that,

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\* 'Our Knowledge of the External World,' p. 4.



in virtue of the laws of logic, such and such things *must* exist and such and such others cannot, are not capable of surviving a critical scrutiny.\*

We may here perceive, in crude outline, the motive to Realism. By an inevitable circumstance of his being, man's problems are furnished by his desires. The fact generates in him a tendency to try to let his desires provide also the solutions; and it ends in an exhausting effort to believe what he wishes to believe. There is a strong sense that such effort has been too long protracted. It is the ruin of philosophy, and not of philosophy only but of much that we value more. This, at any rate, is the verdict of the most eminent and eloquent of the English realists. That our whole human dignity requires us to cease clinging to sheer impossibilities born of religious hopes and aspirations, is the central thesis of Mr Russell's unique little essay 'The free man's worship.' Man has from time immemorial placed a God of some sort behind the natural order of things. Scientific investigation has not justified him. The universe, so far as investigation can show us, follows no 'divine plan.' Rather is it the very negation of such a thing, a mere game, ultra-Mephistophelian in its meaninglessness.

† That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noon-day brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system; and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.†

How, asks the author, are we to preserve our aspirations untarnished in such a world of sheer brute force? Not, he answers, by falling down and worshipping it,

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\* 'The Problems of Philosophy,' pp. 220-221.

† 'Philosophical Essays,' pp. 60-61.



and then trying, like Carlyle and Nietzsche, to persuade ourselves that this inhuman remnant is all we wanted for a divinity; but rather by ceasing to try to believe in a God any longer, saying roundly that there is none at all, none except that great creature of the imagination who should have reigned over the earth but is not there. This devotion to a great non-existent, to the God who never was, is not and never will be—this alone is the free man's worship.

'If Power is bad, as it seems to be, let us reject it from our hearts. In this lies Man's true freedom: in determination to worship only the God created by our own love of the good, to respect only the heaven which inspires the insight of our own best moments. In action, in desire, we must submit perpetually to the tyranny of outside forces; but in thought, in aspiration, we are free, free from our fellow-men, free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, free even, while we live, from the tyranny of death.'\*

Read in this light, the phenomenon of Realism is simply a renewed sense of the need of fact. If man will be man, let him cease to allow his futile desires to prescribe what reality shall be. There is no salvation for us except in acknowledging fact, in being realists. And when one asks where one is to go to find the 'real,' the answer is not far to seek. We are to go to the report which the sciences have given us of the world we are in. The method of science is conceived as that of practically accepting as fact what is given to us as such, and in taking as proved what has been mathematically demonstrated. By taking whatever that method yields for our knowledge, and what our imagination supplies for our ideals, we must stand equipped before the world. Realists in general, although mostly without raising these ultimate aspects of the question at all, are endeavouring to supply the 'knowledge' side of this balance-sheet. They are endeavouring to evolve some statement of what knowledge regarding the problems of philosophy can be had on these terms. To put it shortly—taking the given as the factual, and the logical as the true, they are trying what that common-sense plan will enable them to make of the world.

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\* 'Philosophical Essays,' pp. 63-64.

Such is the incentive in the air, and such is the realist response. The effort of the will to believe has proved exhausting and it must be ended.

But we have not yet penetrated to the heart of the matter. We are told to go back to the methods which have yielded the magnificent results of science, to go back to its way of handling data and making inferences. But philosophy had got thus far before. Now, Mr Bosanquet, whose word in such a matter is surely authoritative, and who is certainly the last authority to say so easily, says that twentieth-century realism 'may fairly be described as a new situation in the philosophical world.\* We must endeavour, if we would understand it clearly, to grasp what is new about it; and this enterprise, we must admit at once, will make rather harder going for us than the above general outline.

The most general features of the movement which we have been tracing are not new. The 'common-sense' ground just described had already been found untenable by philosophy. It was this discovery, partly, which gave rise to the idealism of the present time in England. Idealism found common-sense philosophy in possession, found it wanting, and for it substituted itself. What we are witnessing now is the Idealism which supplanted common sense, itself on its trial. And to get at the root of its weakness, we have to ask wherein it found common sense weak. For, undoubtedly, by a recuperated and rearmed common sense it is now being attacked.

Viewing the matter in the broadest possible way, but using terms in a perfectly justifiable sense, the answer to the question, 'Where did Idealism find common sense wanting?' can be put, in a formal fashion, very shortly. It was characteristic of common sense, then as now, to rely on given facts and consistent logic. Putting it quite bluntly, then, the discovery which Idealism made was that those facts and that logic really lead you to God.† It acknowledged, of course, with the very next breath, that man is utterly incapable of seeing every step of the way thither. He does not see the way, except in the

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\* 'The Distinction between Mind and its Objects,' p. 5.

† Common sense, of course, could find its way there too; but not by its facts and its logic,

anticipatory vision of faith. But Idealism became convinced that thither the way must in the end lead; and that, not by courtesy only, but of its own necessity. Can we see at all how Idealism came to this view? How does such a conviction arise? We must be able to answer this question if we are to get Realism in its true perspective.

In the first place, God, if he is at all, is all that we can conceive of ourselves becoming. He is simply our imperfection perfected; that is to say, our incomplete knowledge completed and our unrealised ideals realised. He is, wholly and eternally, all that we are partially and fitfully. Now, the 'given' facts betray such a Being for these reasons. In the first place, once we see them as they really are, they are found to be very imperfectly described as merely 'given.' The whole array of them, far from being a mere agglomeration of dead externalities, are a strenuous energising. If we ask, further, what they are the energising of? the answer is: not any foreign force or anything which we can only know from the outside. On the contrary, they are found to be the energising—towards its own perfection—of the one thing which we know from within. They are the energising of that which wells up in us as our own being when we are in any degree intelligent and good. Such are the 'facts' on which common sense would rely. The 'Logic,' on the other hand, once we get at what *it* really is, turns out to be simply the direction of that energising. It is the directed impetus of that whose energy we read as facts; it is its impetus towards its goal, its thrust towards its own completeness.

Idealists differ amongst themselves, but some such line of considerations is found to lie at the root of all their positions, once we insert ourselves properly into them. Such, to take a prominent example, is the positive side of the teaching of Mr F. H. Bradley in his extraordinarily misunderstood work 'Appearance and Reality.' He would quarrel, no doubt, as to whether the all-perfect is rightly to be called God; but that there *is* an all-perfect, that you have not reached to the ultimate reality until you have made your way thither, and again, that thither you logically must endeavour to make your way—such is the central teaching of his book. That nothing

is ultimately real except a perfected individual experience is the thesis; and the reason assigned for it is that nothing less is ultimately logical. Thus, given facts and consistent logic, taken together, once the idealist has got to the bottom of them, seem to him to be nothing else than the energising of a spiritual universe towards the perfection of its individual experience.

It is not easy in an untechnical way to come still closer to the idealist position than this; to explain how 'facts' could ever come to *seem* such an energising, or 'logic' the direction of such energy. But some attempt must be made; for until we have actually reached the idealistic position it is impossible to see where exactly the New Realism has joined issue. There are various possible approaches to the matter; let us consider the idealist conception of the nature of truth.

The question 'What is the truth?' would plainly never arise if error did not continually get about. And common sense has always tended to answer the question by saying simply that we have got the truth when what we have in our minds corresponds with the facts outside—repeats them, mirrors them, or in some way runs parallel to them. But so simple a view does not survive scrutiny. Idealistic criticism points out that our knowledge cannot correspond with anything except other knowledge. 'Corresponding with the facts' means corresponding with true knowledge. The result we get is plainly empty. Common sense has no theory. It cannot tell you what the truth is. It can only say 'truth is truth.' Yet it must know; for it rejects some things as false. And thus we are still left with the question: What is it really doing when it decides that something is false, and that something else is the truth? What standard is it actually going by? What kind of thing does, in point of fact, manage to vindicate itself to common sense as true?

Idealism begins its answer in the way just pointed out—by recognising that there is no use in looking for 'correspondence.' Knowledge is part of experience; and there is nothing *not* experience for experience to correspond with. And the idealist goes on to find the nature of truth by asking quite a different sort of question. Not, 'Does knowledge correspond with this, that or the

other?' but, 'Is it internally coherent? Is it consistent with itself?' For it is always what gives coherence to our knowledge that justifies itself as true. To grasp things in their order is to grasp things as they are. The ideal of truth is to get the whole world into order, not physical facts only, but all others—æsthetic, economic, political, religious and moral. And once we have thus got a completed experience into a perfect order, we have reality. However imperfect and confused, therefore, our experience may be, even that confused, imperfect experience is reality, in so far as there is the completeness of coherent order in it. There is no point in taking this wholly or partially completed experience as 'our ideas,' and proceeding to ask 'whether reality corresponds.' Such experience is not merely 'ours'; and there is no such reality as could be opposed to it if it were. Reality itself is such a perfect experience; and in our having the same, we are entering into it.

This, then—our being consciously in a reality which is coherent and complete consciousness (and which we *are* in, whether we be conscious of it or not)—this is to be the truth, or 'have the truth in us'; and it is what common sense is really making for when it is 'seeing to it' that its 'knowledge corresponds with the facts.' Really, it is seeing to it that one part of its experience is coherent with the rest. On this construction of things the ultimately real and true is the conservation of all value, the sum of all perfection. The false, the illusory, the erroneous, the evil, is that within the whole, which energises against its principle; and it takes its place, once the whole is seen in its power, as a discord within the higher harmony.

Such in very rough outline is the position which Idealism had already evolved as against the philosophy of uncritical common sense. It had not quarrelled with the resolve to abide by facts and logic. But it had perceived a virtue in the facts and logic which common sense itself had not suspected, and out of which the most important results could come. Now, what is new in Realism is the attack which it makes upon this entire attitude, *in limine*—rightly judging that the important thing about the whole construction is its first steps.

*Why* is there nothing not experience, for experience to correspond to? And why, even if there be nothing but experience, should it be a 'complete' experience?

These are the two cardinal questions which the New Realism has been instrumental in raising. They are the result of its renewal of the old demand for given facts and consistent logic. They are connected questions. An answer to both is involved in an answer to either. And an answer to both is to be found in all that the best representatives of the school have to teach. But in different cases the emphasis has fallen out differently. The first of the two questions figures prominently in the writings of Prof. Perry in America, and of Mr G. E. Moore in this country; while the latter has been most searchingly dealt with by Mr Bertrand Russell. We shall take up the two points in order. But first we must notice some symptoms of how the way has been prepared for the whole movement.

In considering what the realists are urging in connexion with these questions, it is important to notice from the outset that it is something the need for which has not been unknown to idealists themselves. In the case of at least one eminent representative of the view, Prof. Sir Henry Jones, we find not only an exceedingly clear consciousness of the general necessity out of which these questions have arisen—the necessity, namely, that philosophy should do more justice than it has lately been doing to the unideal that is in the world—but we find even the actual development of what has come to be the standing realist argument with respect to the first of the two points which we are now bringing under discussion. As regards the general position, the following passage is typical of what Sir H. Jones has long been urging:

'Philosophy, it seems to me, is crying aloud for a more objective expression of the truth. Having proved that the real world is ideal, it must prove that the ideal world is real; that space is real, and time is real, and matter is real, and that the self-exclusive relations of natural objects hold, just because they are all manifestations of spirit. For rational life also has its double movement. Spirit also scatters, as well as gathers. It surpasses natural life in the intensity of its oneness, for it is all in every part: it is itself the essence of all its elements. But it surpasses it, too, in the variety of



its content, in the depth of the differences it comprises, in the independent significance with which it endows them. Rational beings, just in the degree to which their spiritual nature is realised, possess a private intensity of distinct individuality, an impermeable internality of intellectual life, an undivided exclusiveness of moral responsibility, a repellent force against, and an uncompromising antagonism to, all mere "otherness," of which natural objects are not capable. And yet, in virtue of this, they are under an intrinsic necessity of mutual interpenetration, of binding their very essence in a single universal life, to whose oneness a natural organism offers but the faintest parallel.

'Until this double movement is recognised, Idealism will only misinterpret spirit; and its ruling hypothesis, being itself misunderstood, will explain nothing. . . . And spirit or self-consciousness is misunderstood, so long as its out-going, self-differentiating, self-negating movement is practically ignored as it is at the present time.'\*

Here is the very breath of the spirit out of which the new realistic movement has sprung. And not only can we find in the same writer's pages the general sense that Idealism is courting a realistic reaction and needs itself to institute one, but we can find the very argument whereby some of the leaders of the reaction have sought to 'refute' idealism or to show that its case is unproven. The argument is developed here quite independently, through the study of Mr Bradley's 'Appearance and Reality.' Sir Henry Jones, himself an idealist, regards Mr Bradley's work as an example, and even as the culminating example, of that tendency towards an abstract and narrowed form of Idealism which he discerns to be in progress and which he feels to be dangerous. He detects the tendency already in Mr Bradley's adoption of the phrase 'the real is experience,' and his substitution of this for the older expression, 'the real is thought' or 'the real is spirit.' Reality is to him something more radically self-differentiating than the Bradleian 'experience' or 'sentience.' And in testing the position, in criticising the proof which Mr Bradley brings forward in defence of the statement that the real is experience, he develops, as against what he conceives to be an

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\* 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer,' pp. 78-79.



illegitimately narrowed statement of Idealism, the very argument which the realists have urged against Idealism as a whole. A glance will show us this.

Mr Bradley's proof that the real is experience consists, Sir H. Jones finds,

'in challenging us to produce or point out anything besides feelings, thoughts, or volitions, or whatever else constitutes psychical phenomena. "Find any piece of existence, take up anything that any one could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience. Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed."'

Sir H. Jones' criticism of this 'proof' might almost be taken as it stands, as the answer of the realists to the first of what we have called their two cardinal questions. The point at issue is the existence of anything that is *not* experience. Mr Bradley's answer is an argument from our ignorance. We are and must for ever be utterly ignorant of anything which is not. And the reply offered to Mr Bradley is that his conclusion does not follow. If we are quite ignorant of what is beyond experience, then we do not know that there is nothing there. And we have no right to build a philosophy on the assumption that there is nothing.

Sir H. Jones puts his case in two ways. First, he says that Mr Bradley, in asking us to deny, if we can, that everything is sentient experience, is only asking us to deny a tautology. Now, a tautology tells us nothing, even though we cannot deny it.

'For Mr Bradley requires us to "find," "take up," "assert," that is, to possess as experience, what, at the same time, must not be experience. It is impossible to do so; but that tells us nothing as to the nature of experience. A dualist might quite well acknowledge that he can "find," "take up," "assert," "speak of" nothing but experience, and still try to maintain that experience consists of utterly disparate elements. That we cannot go beyond experience, that "we can conceive only the experienced," does not prove that experience consists of mere unity, nor of mere difference, nor does it throw any light whatsoever upon its constitution.'

\* 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer,' p. 72.

† Ibid., p. 73.

Secondly, he points out that if the statement, 'everything is experience,' or 'everything is "perception and feeling,"' is not to be a tautology; if it is to have a meaning; if, that is to say, there is to be a genuine whole containing both what is 'perception and feeling' and what is not; then Mr Bradley offers no proof of the position. At the most he shows that when the 'perception and feeling' is taken away, the whole disappears. This does not prove that 'perception and feeling' were the whole, but only that they were essential to it, that the whole could not carry on without them. It is a point of Mr Bradley's own, says Sir H. Jones, when he is arguing against hedonism.

'Neither does the fact that "nothing remains when all perception and feeling are removed" prove that nothing exists except perception and feeling. It is an old fallacy, exposed by Mr Bradley himself, to conclude that, because the removal of one element in a whole destroys the whole, therefore that one element is the whole. Pleasure may be an essential element of the good, but there may be other essential elements in it as well, the removal of any one of which would destroy it.'\*

Here we find, in a manner, the way prepared for Realism. In these contentions we have the sum and substance of what is urged by Mr Moore and Prof. Perry on the subject of the former of its two fundamental questions—the question how it can be shown that there is nothing *not* consciousness or mind, and that the ultra-mental, the ultra-experiential is an enigma. To Prof. Perry all Idealism is Berkeleian in that its cardinal principle lies in the argument to which Berkeley in the last resort appeals, viz. that one cannot conceive things to exist apart from consciousness, because to conceive is *eo ipso* to bring within consciousness.† The situation is that 'no thinker to whom one may appeal is able to mention a thing that is not an idea, for the obvious and simple reason that in mentioning it he makes it an idea.'‡

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\* 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer,' p. 73.

† See, e.g., an article on 'The Cardinal Principle of Idealism,' in 'Mind,' N.S., No. 75.

‡ 'Mind,' N.S., No. 75, p. 334.

This situation proves, Prof. Perry says, that every mentioned thing is an idea, but in doing so proves nothing; because the statement is virtually a redundant proposition to the effect that every mentioned thing is mentioned, or that 'every idea, object of knowledge or experience is an idea, object of knowledge or experience.' And a redundant proposition is no proposition at all. It tells us nothing about the constitution of things.

Mr Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism' \* turns ultimately on the same point. It consists in proving that the Berkeleian principle, *esse is percipi*, is false in all the senses which have ever been attached to it. The proof consists in showing that this principle ignores the distinction between cognising, apprehending or experiencing on the one hand, and what is cognised, apprehended or experienced on the other. In face of this distinction it can only be true if it makes itself a tautology. *Esse is percipi*, only for those who first make up their minds to mean by *esse* just *percipi*. The result of all these lines of argument is the same, namely, that what has been appealed to by Idealism to prove the all-inclusiveness of 'experience' is a tautology; and that, since a tautology cannot prove anything, it cannot prove either that there is something outside of experience or that there is not.

The brilliant newcomer who has just entered the lists with 'A Defence of Idealism' appears to have reckoned it part of her task to meet the realist's question, Why should there be nothing not experience? with a direct answer. And in so far as it is an answer, to show that all we know is within our experience, she does it with great skill. She gets a fulcrum for her lever in what is still regarded as mental; for not everything has been extruded from the self by the New Realists, or at least not by all of them; and she shows how inevitably the mental, if the Realist allows it at all, expands till it spreads over the limits within which he has tried to confine it. Her argument on this point, though not much more than a reiteration of the position which realists have found to be weak, is worth looking at, were it only for its extraordinary freshness of statement.

For the old realists, primary qualities were objective,

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\* 'Mind,' N.S., No. 48.

secondary qualities subjective. The new school makes both of these alike objective, but still reserves a region of 'tertiary' qualities for the subjective side of the account. It is upon these that Miss Sinclair fastens.

'If we ask whether, within the Self's narrow border, there remains anything at all that is the work of consciousness, we are told: Yes, besides the primary and secondary qualities of matter there are certain tertiary qualities that cannot be planted out with them. Such are the æsthetic feelings and values, the moral feelings and values; delight, charm, and their opposites, all that Mr Alexander calls the "richness of the mind," and all that is creative in the objects of creative art. These are purely subjective. They have no home anywhere but in the Self that feels them. It is interesting to see that Mr Alexander includes among them beauty and goodness, which to Mr G. E. Moore and Mr Bertrand Russell are essentially objective realities, universals; and that Mr Ralph Perry . . . also admits that "higher complexes, such as history, society, life, or reflective thought, are dependent on consciousness"; but whether he would get any backing here from his brother realists is open to doubt.'\*

But Miss Sinclair has a gift for exposing such a device as this:

'Starting with the tertiary qualities and working outwards from a subjective centre, we pass through a reaction zone of tertiary qualities merging into secondary, in a gradation of shades so subtle as to defy the arbitrary division that realism has set up. The æsthetic feelings, wonder, admiration and awe, the passions and emotions, love, desire, fear, pleasure and displeasure, and disgust, are not qualities that Realism would dream of planting out in the objects that excite them; and it requires some stretch of imagination on Idealism's part to realise sound and colour, hardness and heaviness, as sense data rather than as sensations. And it requires a bigger stretch still to plant out tastes and odours in the particles of matter that excite them.

'But what about heat and cold? Supposing the idealist agrees that it is the fire that is hot and the air that is cold, and not the idealist, then, when by imperceptible gradations the fire grows hotter and hotter, and the air colder and colder, and pain is his reaction to the higher intensities of the

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\* 'A Defence of Idealism,' pp. 206-7.

stimulus, is he to plant out the pain into the fire and the air? I suppose the realist will say he need plant it out no farther than his own body; but even that is too far for the intimately subjective thing that pain seems to be. Besides, you have now left it unsettled whether the heat is in the fire or in his body. If the new realist says that, obviously, it is in both, then how about the pain? How are you to distinguish as secondary and tertiary between the heat that is outside consciousness, and independent of it, and the pain which is in consciousness? . . .

'And you can take *all* the secondary qualities and increase their intensity with the same result. Intense light and sound, taste and odour, will bring about violent reactions, your objective secondary sensations merging into subjective tertiary agony. What is more, your sensation of primary qualities will behave in the same way.\* . . .'

But is there not something in the protest of the late James Hutcheson Stirling in his notes on Berkeley (in his translation of Schwegeler's 'History of Philosophy'), in regard to this matter of what is in consciousness and what is out of it? "Out is in," says Berkeley. "Whether out or in," replies Hegel, "is not the question."

The very fact that this part of the realistic argument is to be found in precisely the realistic shape in the pages of a writer so sympathetic to idealism as Sir Henry Jones suggests the possibility that the Berkeleian principle which it subjects to criticism—the principle that everything must be experience or that everything must be mental—may not be so cardinal to Idealism as it is often taken to be. We shall probably find this suggestion confirmed as we proceed. But we cannot discuss the point except as bound up with another and still more fundamental one. For, as a matter of fact, until we have dealt with the second of the two questions which we pointed out (p. 129) as being at the root of realistic doctrine, we have not dealt with the most damaging attitude towards Idealism which the realist can take up. Realism, so far as we have yet represented it, has only made a negative point. It has not shown that there is something without the pale of experience. It has only shown that the contrary has not been established. It is

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\* 'A Defence of Idealism,' pp. 248-249.

always *possible*, it says, that there should be a 'beyond-experience.' But, so far as we have yet represented the matter, no one has thought of questioning the fact that at least all with which man has to do falls within the sphere of experience. What may be without is, at least, nothing at all to him. And perhaps the idealist can afford to neglect a mere abstract possibility which can never be shown to be real. The realist, however, couples with this position a new version of what is within experience; in this lies his answer to the second question suggested above.

That question was: Must all that falls within the sphere of experience complete itself, in the end, into a perfected individual experience, or into anything that deserves to be so called? Must all that of which we can have experience sum itself up finally into anything which we could recognise as the perfection of the individual experience we have? Realism sees no necessity that it should. This position is involved in that of Mr Moore and Prof. Perry. But it has been most explicitly emphasised by Mr Bertrand Russell. It is the net result, so far as Idealism is concerned, of his doctrine of 'external relations.' This is the doctrine which ends by confining philosophy to 'analysis' and preventing its attaining to anything in the nature of 'knowledge of the universe as a whole.' Few controversies—even in philosophy—could well seem more abstruse than the one which has been waged around this theme. Yet the essentials of it are, perhaps, susceptible of untechnical statement, and may even be all the clearer for being so stated. And, as it concerns the ultimate stronghold of the neo-realistic views, it is worth a little effort to comprehend.

From his volume of Lowell Lectures, the most recent general statement of his views which Mr Russell has given, one can readily gather that, for him, the central thing in philosophy is Logic, and the central thing in Logic is the doctrine of relations. Logic is central for him, for he heads one of his main chapters, 'Logic as the essence of philosophy.' And clearly, even when one has recognised the central position of Logic, he still regards it as a capital blunder if one should go wrong in one's view of relations. For this is what Idealism has done; and



Idealism, from a realist point of view, is naturally the capital error.

In the sketch of Logic given in the chapter alluded to, Mr Russell reveals that in his thinking he works with three fundamental categories. There are, that is, three categories into one or more of which everything must fall. They are 'things,' 'qualities' and 'relations.' There is nothing necessarily abstruse about any of them. All three can be exemplified within the limits of the simplest statement. If I say, 'In this ring of mine there is set a blue stone,' the stone is a thing, blue is a quality which it has, and its relation to the ring is that it is in the ring. Of course, when you begin to detail the contents of any of these great categories, when you begin to enumerate the different sorts of things or different sorts of qualities, difficulty of comprehension begins. Some of the 'things' recognised are said not to exist, for example; and there are other subtleties. But we can disregard these. There are, in any case, only things, their qualities, and the relations in which they stand. Everything in heaven and earth is comprised under these three.\*

Now, the fundamental error of Idealism, an error derived from the old formal Logic, lies in not seeing the difference between relating a thing and qualifying it—between saying about a thing that it has this or that quality, and merely saying about it that it stands in this or that relation to something else. Idealism has treated a thing's relations as if they were qualities of the thing. They are not so. When you alter the stone's colour you make the stone different. But when you only alter its relation to the ring—put it outside, say—you don't alter *it*. Idealism, in fact, does not believe in relations. It has reduced relations to mere qualities. In common with formal Logic, it supposes that, ultimately, there can be no such entities as relations between things.†

This will make strange reading to any one acquainted with such an idealist as T. H. Green, who is so persistently accused not only of having recognised the reality of relations, but of having practically recognised the reality

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\* Mr Russell does not emphasise all this. But it is to be gathered from what he says: see 'Our Knowledge of the External World,' p. 51.

† See, e.g., 'Problems of Philosophy,' p. 148.



of nothing else. But the point is that Green and all idealists treat relations in a way in which Mr Russell could only understand qualities being treated. Remembering this, we can treat Mr Russell's representation as quite sound in the sense in which he means it. 'True,' we could imagine him retorting to a disciple of Green, 'Green makes everything nominally relations, but his "relations" are just qualities; he treats them as only qualities can be treated; and that is why his reduction of everything to "relations" is so cardinal an error.' And the question for any one seeking to estimate Realism, the question for us here, is: What is the error? More explicitly: What does the idealist get out of qualities, which he couldn't get if he recognised that he had not only qualities to deal with, but relations too?

What does the idealist get out of those mere qualities which he misnames relations? The question is radical, and the answer to it opens up the fundamental rift between the classical Idealism and the new anti-idealistic trend. The answer is that, though the idealist could get nothing out of his 'qualities' were he equipped only with the realist's Logic, yet, equipped with Logic as he himself conceives it, he can and does get, not only something but much—no less, in the end, than the Absolute itself, that perfection of an individual experience of which we have spoken, and which is his point of union with the religious consciousness.

We must remember, of course, that they are qualities only in the language of the realist. The idealist's own word for them is 'relations'; for they are logical, as he conceives Logic. That is the whole secret. The characteristics of a thing, call them relations or qualities or what you will, are for him a unity, and the bond of cohesion among them is logical in its nature. There reigns a logical necessity among them. Given some of them, the remainder must be there. Now, as Mr Russell is fond of urging, since everything is related to everything else, the idealist, in making a thing's relations into its constitutive qualities, has packed into each thing (for a mind which could penetrate far enough into it) the whole character of the universe. Hence, there must be, on the idealist's logic, the whole of *it*, if there is any.

This is perfectly true to the idealistic position. There must be the whole of things if there is so much as 'something.' And it seems clear that there is something.

What the idealist has to show, then, as a reply to realistic criticism is fairly easy to see. He has to show that the 'whole' referred to, the whole which must be if anything be, really is a whole. Putting it otherwise, having found from the universe's fragments that there must be the whole, the idealist must endeavour to answer the question, the whole of what? The whole of space? the whole of time? the whole of matter? *on what possible grounds, the whole of a completely endowed and perfectly moralised individual being, all-knowing and all-good?*

And the lesson of the '*esse is percipi*' controversy would seem to be that the idealist's answer to the question, hitherto, has tended to be too easy. Its strength has lain too much in the challenge 'find,' 'take up,' 'assert,' etc., cited from Mr Bradley (p. 131). It seems that, whatever the value of this 'short way' may have been or may still be, Idealism cannot now rely, if it ever could rely, on it alone. And the line along which it must move, strictly analogous, as might easily be demonstrated, to the line along which it has already moved in its past history, is being curiously prescribed to it further by Realism itself. A strong case might be made for the view that Realism has as its distinctive function, this—that it is directing Idealism back into the 'objective' channel from which it had, especially in America, conspicuously departed. With a glance at this we may conclude.

It is a curious and recurring note in Mr Russell's writings that the question of the existence of the 'self' is a difficult one:

'The question whether we are also acquainted with our bare selves,' he says in the course of his discussion of 'Knowledge by acquaintance,' in his 'Problems of Philosophy,' 'as opposed to particular thoughts and feelings, is a very difficult one upon which it would be rash to speak positively. When we try to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon some particular thought or feeling, and not upon the "I" which has the thought or feeling. Nevertheless there are some reasons for thinking that we are acquainted with the "I,"

though the acquaintance is hard to disentangle from other things.\*

And in the later volume† he is forced to take account of 'the extreme difficulty of defining self' in developing his argument regarding our knowledge of the external world. In Mr Moore's writings the self, in course of being opposed to its object-matter, disappears into something quite transparent and empty—'diaphanous' is his adjective for it. In the work of Prof. Alexander, the founder and leader of the Manchester school, it is confined, at least primarily, to the rôles of activity and feeling. Such a crowding of difficulties around a single point among the various realist schools is due, of course, to the fundamental impulse from which the whole way of thinking begins, the impulse to extrude as much as possible out of the 'ideal' or 'mental' sphere into the real, to 'plant everything out,' in Miss Sinclair's piquant phrase. The great difference between the new Realism and the old, as Mr Bosanquet points out, is that the new realists have enriched reality with so many of the spoils of what the older, more materialistic Realism freely treated as 'fabrications of the mind' only.‡ But among the American realists we find the Gordian knot of the self beginning to be frankly cut. This fact, as is insisted on by Mr Hoernlé, is connected with one of the late Prof. William James's 'Essays in Radical Empiricism,' in which he deals with the question, 'Does consciousness exist?' and answers it in the negative. James in this paper goes to the extreme of identifying all experience with the objective content experienced, leaving, as it were, nothing for the other side. Experience is made, he shows, 'of *that*, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, of brownness, of heaviness, of what not. . . . Experience is only a collective name for all these sensible natures.' Now, in the American Realism we find evidence that this is to be adopted as a point of view. Mind is a selection out of the total mass of being. A selection of what makes up the totality of the real comes momentarily together into conscious focus; and

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\* 'Problems of Philosophy,' p. 78.

† 'Our Knowledge of the External World,' pp. 73 ff.

‡ 'The Distinction between the Mind and its Objects,' pp. 7 ff.

so you have a mind or self. The self is not what looks at objects. When you look for what looks, you cannot find it. The self is just they.

Realism seems here to be renouncing the self altogether and flinging itself into the arms of reality. Something of this nature Idealism must do. Something of this nature, strange as the assertion may seem, it began by doing. It has to learn that the question whether *esse* is *percipi*, or whether reality is experience, is not the whole issue. Nor does the issue depend on whether there are only qualities, or only relations, or both qualities and relations. It goes further back. It depends on what is legitimately to be made of something prior to all these views and held, independently of them, by all disputants. Whatever our view of any of these questions may be, it is at least certain and allowed by everybody that we have all, in being born, arrived in the presence of a *primâ facie* plurality of some sort. Idealism, it would seem, must commit itself to that, and set about to deal with things in all their crude and unredeemed heterogeneity; it must see whether or not there be a Logic in them of the idealistic sort, that is to say a *nisus* towards a whole; and see whether that Logic—that *nisus* or movement or fundamental drift of things—can be traced in time; try whether it can be found written out there, in the evolution of nature and in the course of history.

As to the lines along which such a concrete vindication of the postulates of man's higher life may possibly be carried out, this is perhaps hardly the place to speculate. But one point at least is much in need of being made. That strain which Idealism puts upon faith, to which we made reference at the beginning, is nothing against its truth. There are two matters of importance here. First, it is a mistake to regard Idealism as a theory of the matter of the universe only; it is a theory of its constitution and articulate construction. It is not interested in saying what the world has been made out of, except in so far as that prescribes what it must have been made into. It has no interest, for example, in proving that everything in the universe is psychical; which is probably the utmost that the Berkeleyian argument proves, if it proves even that. Not that the world is ideas, is the thesis of idealism, but that, in some

legitimate sense of the term, it is good. The other point is this. To gather the general structure of things into one focus is a task whose result, if it be successful, will most likely demand great effort to assimilate. There is nothing in the mere fact that it is hard to take in, to prove any doctrine untrue. It depends on the kind of difficulty. Hard, in the wide and just sense, all truth, like all goodness, must ever be. The only suspicious sort of difficulty is that which accompanies the determined effort to evade the strain of the full-orbed truth—the intellectual analogue to the ‘hardness’ which is ascribed to ‘the way of transgressors.’

The universe is big, after all. To keep the truth of it in view is to keep the truth of everything in view. This must entail a specific kind of strain—that which presses in equalised fashion over our whole nature, the strain of that summoning of our whole being together which a high act of courage entails. If Idealism be the truth, we must be prepared to find that there come periodically recurring times, in the slow march of civilisation and thought, when this strain is too much, and, when the truth temporarily ceases to convince. It is only in such pauses of scepticism, under the conditions of finitude in which we have to do our thinking, that our vision is enriched. We may be passing through one of these pauses—suffering an inundation of the crass and crude real, to put it metaphorically—in more regions than that of thought. But even so, it is well to keep awake, to rise a little above the flood at times, and send a glance across the vast of sheer disconnected fact and casual or unbeautiful achievement, to where we can catch a passing glimpse of the whole, towards which we have no right to doubt that our temporary movement is still ultimately tending.

J. W. SCOTT.

## Art. 8.—THE BRITISH TRADE CORPORATION. ✓

A GREAT deal of water has passed under the bridge since the article on English and German banking, which appeared in our number of October 1916, was published. The subject has been frequently canvassed in our principal financial papers, and it is already in some degree better understood. Gradually we are learning that the system which has been so generally called the German system is not an exclusively German system at all, but was really the original banking system in Europe and practised particularly in Italy. The name of 'Lombard Street,' which has adhered so long to the street in the City which is especially devoted to the business of banking, reminds us of this. It was practically impossible that the business should have been otherwise than in the hands of foreigners during times when the whole commercial system of this country was so little developed, and yet the rudiments of banking had begun. That business implies the employment of the resources which the banker holds in loans made principally to merchants and traders but also to manufacturers. In early days these traders had but little capital of their own to employ, and hence, more than most people, required loans of a fixed character.

In England banking was crippled for many years by being confined to firms not exceeding six partners. We need not go into the reasons which caused this limitation, nor into those which restricted the issue of bank notes, which are a natural feature of the business, and formed, in early times, a very large part of it. People were willing to take the notes of a banker in the discharge of a debt when they would not have taken the 'promise to pay' of any other person. In those days cheques were almost unknown, and business of all kinds was mainly carried on by notes. Gradually this method was altered. Down to the latter half of the 18th century, the Bank of Dundee, practically the only bank whose early history has yet been published, held for years no deposits, but had a large note circulation. It had existed nearly thirty years before deposits appeared in its accounts. This was a very usual state of matters for many years in early

English banking. In the next stage, and down to a date still within the lifetime of some business men and most of their fathers, the capitals employed by the greater number of our banks, and their businesses generally, were comparatively small and numerous. This arose from the fact that the business was practically supported by the local standing of the partners themselves. Our banking system was based on the principle that it was not the business of a bank to provide 'capital' for any concern, however prosperous. Loans for a short period, with a promise, which could be depended on, that the advance would be punctually paid off at the date fixed, became the rule, and rightly, considering the small amount of the capital compared with the liabilities. We are now brought to feel that a different system is required by the exigencies of our trade and industry, and we do not doubt that it will be provided.

The British Trade Corporation has commenced operations after a protracted and somewhat uneasy period of incubation. The connexion with the Government remains in its structure. This we regret for several reasons; First, because we believe that such help was not needed, and that private enterprise could provide all the funds that are required with greater freedom as to the employment of their money; and secondly, because the connexion with the Government is not unlikely to hinder the success of the enterprise, which we should greatly regret. This will certainly be the case if the connexion causes the doings of the company to be criticised, as has already been the case during a somewhat bitter debate in the House of Commons. We regret it, further, because it is clear that more than one institution of this class will be required to provide for the needs of the widely extended business which this country will have to carry on when peace returns, and which will demand considerable financial support. Business is now developing into far larger concerns than has hitherto been the case; and even the most powerful firms will have to strengthen themselves by developing into large limited companies to enable them to meet the requirements of present times.

While the Trade Corporation will, we trust, give a great impetus to our home trade, it has other duties as



well. It should powerfully assist British enterprise overseas. Help is badly wanted in this direction.

'To take one instance from recent history. When the Victoria Falls power scheme, now probably the largest electrical power company in the world, was initiated a few years ago, attempts were made to finance the undertaking in London. They failed in the face of German competition. The close cooperation between the Deutsche Bank and the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft enabled the Germans to obtain this valuable contract by undertaking at the same time the finance. The electrical companies in England were not backed by any great financial interests.' \*

The fact that this occurred gives a very strong hint to our own electrical power companies and similar industrial concerns, that, where they have to compete with foreign enterprise, and also in some cases where the business proposed is to be carried on in this country, they must prepare not only what we may call the design of the immediate enterprise that lies before them, but take measures for its immediate execution, without having to hunt up assistance from outside. There would have been, no doubt, resources enough, and much more than enough, at home to do all that was wanted in the case mentioned above, but they were not immediately ready. Some have held that the German trading world has been led into a too hasty expansion by the great power which it has obtained through their modern methods, but, whether this is the case or not, we believe that there is actually no fear of British trade over-expanding in the same manner.

There are several directions in which such an institution as the British Trade Corporation might find useful employment within the United Kingdom at the present time. There is, for instance, the whole question of dealing with the canals of this country. These very important trade-routes have been allowed to be stifled through the greater expansion which the railways have received, and through the unfortunate arrangement by which railways were permitted to buy up the adjacent canals. There is

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\* From a privately printed paper, by a very competent authority.

no doubt that in some, perhaps in many, cases cheaper means of transport and of supplying raw materials to manufactories, combined with better arrangements for the housing of those who are employed there, can be obtained through the employment of water-ways.

Carriage by sea has recently been much hampered through fear of enemy submarines, a fear which has caused the cost of moving coal from the mine to the concerns where it was needed to approach, and in some instances, we learn, even to exceed, the cost of the mining operations by which the mineral was extracted. Though we trust that this obstacle to carriage by sea will shortly disappear, water-carriage by means of canals will always be very useful, if it can only be better arranged; and, when we say better arranged, we mean better than it has ever been before. When the canal system of the country has been brought into such order that one class of canal-boats can travel to all parts of the island, just as the carriages of one railway can travel on any of the railways of the kingdom, we shall know what our canal system is worth, and wonder that it was never put into order before. As is well known, it has become useless through many and sometimes small hindrances which, generally speaking, no very large outlay will be needed to overcome. Yet, when this work has to be commenced and also while it is continued, many of the companies concerned—most of them comparatively unimportant institutions whose shareholders will probably be poor—may find it difficult to arrange for the supply of the credit which they will require. These advances, at least in many cases, would not be loans which our banks as at present constituted would desire to make, even if they could properly do so, but they would be well within the scope of the British Trade Corporation.

We may mention also another branch of industry in which a credit institution might be of great service. A large and increasing part of our manufactures and trade is now carried on by limited companies. Some of these are comparatively small, though in the aggregate their operations mount up to large figures. The stocks and shares of the larger companies are readily saleable on the London Stock Exchange, but it is different with the smaller companies. These often have to issue their

ordinary shares in the first instance in their own neighbourhood; and they have subsequently to obtain in the same way the funds that they need for the renewal and the enlargement of their works, when the gradual growth of their business compels an increase in their capital. The dealing in, or the issue of, these securities, which are often perfectly substantial, is often almost, if not quite, impracticable. Not unfrequently they are held by the relations and friends of those who started the original business. When any of these securities have to be sold, as is frequently necessary owing to the death of a holder, or when the need arises to transfer the capital so invested to some other employment, it is generally a very troublesome and lengthy operation to find a purchaser. It is difficult, if not impossible, to deal with these securities on the London Stock Exchange. In the larger towns and more active business neighbourhoods, where local stock exchanges exist, it is, as we understand, more easy to obtain purchasers, but in many districts, where the population is thinner and less wealthy, there is, as we have said, in a general way, a very great difficulty in disposing of them. It is true that there are no less than twenty Stock Exchanges in England, Scotland and Ireland, including Birmingham, Dublin, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester, and at most of these places there are also local clearings; but, even so, a very large part of the country enjoys no facilities for the disposal of local investments.

This state of things is very disadvantageous to these local industries, which, though they may not be very important in themselves, are of great service to their own neighbourhoods by supplying occupation to persons who would otherwise have to migrate to some distant centre, and by keeping business alive in some otherwise stagnant district. Old inhabitants in country towns sometimes can surprise those who come to visit them with the long list they can give of industries formerly carried on there, but now extinct.

In the first place, those who wish to establish a new industry or to revive a stagnant one find it difficult to obtain the ready money they want, and are put to considerable inconvenience. Hence the local business withers, and the concerns themselves, which have already

issued the securities and yet require more capital for the purposes of extension of their operations, are hindered in obtaining this by the fact that securities, such as Bonds or Preference Stock, which they have already issued are at a discount, and consequently there is no encouragement to issue more. These securities are at a discount not through any inferiority of their own, but through the inability of those who possess them to find the right market for their disposal. This is exactly a case in which the Trade Corporation could fill the gap, by simply holding the security, the value of which they would be able to appreciate, till the natural turn in the tide comes, and there is again a local demand.

Having thus given a rough sketch of some of the ways in which such an institution may be of service, a few words may be usefully employed in describing what has already been done towards the establishment of the new British Trade Corporation. A capital of 10,000,000*l.* has been authorised, of which 2,000,000*l.* has already been issued. A strong Board has been formed, the Governor being Lord Faringdon, to whose energy and judicious direction the enterprise owes much. Many of his fellow-directors are men well known in the City. We may mention, among others, Mr W. H. N. Goschen, a Director of the National Provincial Bank of England and a partner in Fröhling and Goschen; the Right Hon. F. Huth Jackson, who is also a director of the Bank of England; Sir James Hope Simpson, General Manager of the Bank of Liverpool; and Mr Harold Snagge of E. Boustead and Co., East India Merchants, who is also a director of Barclays' Bank. Besides those we have mentioned, there are also men who are associated with our business life in other ways, as Sir Algernon F. Firth, President of the Association of Chambers of Commerce; Mr F. Dudley Docker, President of the Federation of British Industries; and Sir William B. Peat, late President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants. The General Manager is Mr A. G. M. Dickson, formerly a Sub-Governor of the National Bank of Egypt, a very powerful bank with a capital and reserve of more than 4,000,000*l.*, and large deposits. It possesses the exclusive right to issue notes payable at sight to bearer in Egypt, and has an

actual issue at present of over 22,000,000*l*. The London Manager is Mr Percy C. West, who was Sub-Manager in London of the Banco de Chile. Mr West has had great experience of the ways of the London money market, and also of similar business in South America. We have gone into this detail of names and particulars as it indicates the manner in which first-rate men, employed in very varied occupations, have been chosen. In the published statement it is declared that the Corporation will specially devote its energies to the development of the trade of the British Empire in every part of the world. It will

'provide financial facilities, the currency of which may extend over a longer period than is covered by the usual advances made by Bankers; and it will be prepared to assist in opening up new channels for enterprise, where it is demonstrated that financial aid can be afforded without undue commercial risks. . . . The Corporation proposes to appoint representatives in the chief cities of the world, who will be domiciled with the Banks holding the Corporation's agency; and various arrangements for such agency have been provisionally negotiated. Where similar arrangements are not practicable, it is intended to open branch establishments in important centres abroad.'

Proper arrangements have been made in the deed of settlement 'for maintaining British control of the Corporation.'

It will be seen that a very good beginning is thus made for the development of the trade and industry of the Empire throughout the world; and arrangements are being made for an adequate organisation of our great industries with each other and with similar trades in different directions. The representatives who are to be appointed in the chief cities of the world should be of great service to British manufacturing and industrial interests, and they should effect an extension of business. Besides this we learn that the 'Corporation will establish Information Bureaux to collect reliable data upon openings for foreign trade, new contracts, State and other loans and issue proposals, and generally upon all matters relating to foreign trade and the status of merchants and traders.' This outline of the arrangements for

carrying on the business appears to be very complete, and gives good promise of success.

It may seem a truism, but it is well to note what care will have to be taken by the British Trade Corporation in making the advances which they will be invited to make. They will have to see that the borrowers are solvent and honest people, and that the advances requested are justifiable. The German banks, some of them at all events, have had severe and unpleasant experience of what trusting unsuccessful undertakings means.

The recent arrangements of the Government to organise a larger number of qualified persons than has been the case hitherto to enquire into the best methods for improving our trade abroad may be an assistance to the undertaking. Although it has not been expressly said that the persons to be appointed as Trade Commissioners in various parts of the Empire by the Civil Service Commissioners will be connected with the British Trade Corporation, yet, we cannot doubt that their efforts and their work will be of great service to that institution as well as to the business men of the country generally.

For several years past there have been official representatives of the Board of Trade resident in the four principal self-governing Dominions. These trade-commissioners, four in number, were appointed in 1907 by Mr Lloyd George as President of the Board of Trade. The valuable results of their work in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa have been commented on in the various Reports made by the Dominions Royal Commission. So much advantage has accrued from their work, that it was suggested that similar officials should be sent to all parts of the Empire without delay. It is understood that steps have been taken to appoint twelve more Trade Commissioners at once. The most important qualifications for these appointments are stated to be a good knowledge of import and export trade, and commercial experience at home and abroad. A knowledge of foreign languages will also be essential; and we are glad to understand that some of our Public Schools are beginning to be aware of this. Our trade abroad has certainly suffered in some degree from the war, and, apart from this, there is plenty of room for expansion.



In this work the British Trade Corporation should be of great service. It is advisable also to consider some of the deficiencies in our existing methods of doing business, which prevent our financial strength from assisting the general business as much as it should do. In the first place we should desire to associate the British investor more closely with British industry than has been the case. It is curious that foreign industry receives in some directions more support from us than does British industry. It has been said, and we believe it has been true, that in many cases where an English investor holds some 15,000*l.* or 20,000*l.* in commercial securities, a very large proportion of these securities will be in the bonds of concerns which represent industries carried on in foreign countries, and that, while there will be some in securities of companies and corporations in the Dominions, only a small proportion will be in British industries. This is not merely a question of the return made to the holder from his investment. Frequently the foreign investments are not more remunerative to the British holder than are British investments. The large investments recently made in our War Loans have doubtless made a great difference in this, while the sale of the foreign securities has been of great service to the country by providing capital abroad where it was needed.

But we hope that, when better days come, the habit of assisting foreign rather than British industries will not revive. It is an unfortunate thing that in the majority, if not in the whole, of the drapers' shops in our large cities, including London, it is a matter of indifference to the shopkeeper from what source, whether foreign or English, his commodities come. The price and the expectation of sale at a profit are all that he considers. Foreign countries protect their industries; but this raises too large and controversial a question to be discussed here and now. Yet, before we leave the subject, we may point out that the requirements of our laws governing the manner in which our principal industries are carried on, in the way of air-space allotted to each worker and similar arrangements for their comfort, with health and accident insurance, cause an expense to our manufacturers of fully 20 per cent. on



the labour-cost of production, from which foreign competitors are free. We are thankful that our operatives are thus assisted, but is it fair to our manufacturers that they should have to meet these charges when their competitors are exempt because they live in another country?

While we should develop our connexion with foreign business, we should not forget that our own country requires equally assiduous care. With regard to business abroad, we are glad to see that some of our banks have established foreign branches. These branches are generally, we might almost say universally, confined to Europe. There is room for similar industry further afield. For example, we may mention the Commercial Bank of Spanish South America, an English bank with an office in the City, which is but little known to the general public. It is not a deposit bank in the ordinary sense of the term. It advances money to planters and industrial firms guaranteed by mortgages on the borrowers' properties. The bank markets the crops and other products of the customers, and acts as agent for the purchase of manufactured and other goods in Great Britain and elsewhere. In this way it has created a considerable British trade with the smaller South American countries. This has been very useful to our commerce, and we hope to see the example followed.

No very distinct arrangement has yet been mentioned as to the method by which the funds which will be required by the British Trade Corporation for carrying out its operations are to be raised. Care must be taken that it does not compete unduly with the existing banks of the country, which depend almost entirely on their deposits for their power of usefulness. In this respect, might not the system followed by the Credit Societies of France be employed here? Their resources are, to a large extent, procured by the issue of Premium Bonds. This method has not at present been favoured in this country. The system may be sketched out as the issue of a large number of small bonds, for 10*l.*, or 20*l.*, bearing a low rate of interest. At fixed periods a considerable number of these bonds are drawn for payment. Of the number paid off, a very small number, perhaps only two or four of a total of, we will say, 50,000 or 60,000, are paid off at a very high premium, say 1000*l.*

each; a large number receive a smaller premium; and the remainder are paid off at par. Such a system is likely to attract the working classes, to whom the offer of a moderate rate of interest does not appear to offer a sufficient inducement to put by against 'a rainy season.' At all events, no one who invests his money in this manner ought to lose anything.

Nor must we forget the need of greater enterprise among our own industrial concerns. We are apt, for instance, to think that in a textile industry, when we have obtained the newest and best looms and other machinery, and also the best raw material, we have done all that is necessary, not only for safety but for progress. This is far from being the case. In all industries there should be a department for research work; that is to say, for discovering new methods of applying existing materials and new developments generally. Work like this is very expensive, and requires the employment of great scientific ability and of considerable business aptitude. We are thankful to know that further developments are being made in these directions. Such research work frequently exceeds the power of any individual concern, yet it is essential to success. While the separate concerns cannot venture on the outlay which may be necessary, it is no less essential that the outlay should be made. This is another branch of enterprise which a well-developed industrial Trade Bank institution should bear in mind. In doing this it may assist in carrying out the work of the Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.

We have ventured on these remarks in order to give hints as to some of the work which has to be carried out unless this country is to drop behind in the race for success. A century ago, and even more recently, such work was not needed. Our trade institutions were competent for the task which they had to perform. We are now passing into a different stage of both mental and business activity; and it lies with us either to meet and overcome the difficulties which confront us, or else to be surpassed by other nations. We cannot doubt what course this country will take.

R. H. INGLIS PALGRAVE.

✓ Art. 9.—COMMERCIAL AERONAUTICS.

IF, after the war, any appreciable volume of land and sea traffic is to be transferred to the air, it will only be so transferred, in the majority of cases, if the speed of air travel, compared with that of land or sea, is very materially greater. Small savings of time will certainly not prove sufficient to bring about that revolution in ideas which will be necessary before the express transport of the world is diverted from the earth to the air. For a commercial air service, therefore, speed will, if dividends are to be earned, prove all-important.

High-speed vehicles on land have two forms of friction with which to contend, those of earth and air; but in flying the friction of a contact with the earth is eliminated, while the resistance of the air is lessened by a system of stream-lining or tapering the hull and external parts of a machine. It is also a fact that an aircraft may be driven at very high speeds with greater safety than is possible on land. When land vehicles are driven very rapidly there is the risk that they may overturn, or that a wheel or axle may break. A flying machine, however, moving as it does in, and not on, the medium it is navigating, runs no risk, as may a train, of reaching a speed so high that oscillations throw it from its track. It has, indeed, no track. An increase in speed, with well-built aircraft, implies in fact greater safety rather than a greater risk. It enables the machine, for instance, to make headway against a wind, and to resist the impact of abnormal gusts. What has to be remembered, however, is that there is a limit to the speed at which it is safe for a machine to move across the ground before ascending, and an even more definite limit to the speed at which, in alighting after a flight, it can make its contact with the ground. With existing methods of construction, for example, should an aeroplane be built to attain a maximum speed while in flight of 200 or 250 miles an hour, it would require to move across an aerodrome at a high and under some conditions dangerous speed before the pressure on its wings would lift it into the air; while in alighting it would have to glide down so rapidly that it might sustain damage through the force of its impact with the ground. A very large aerodrome

would also be required on which to manœuvre such a machine.

A ship, once it has been launched, remains in its element, but an aeroplane, gaining support only so long as it is in forward motion, and being unable to continue perpetually in flight, has to return to earth at the end of each of its journeys. Aeroplanes must be designed, therefore, so that they will navigate two elements. They must move across the ground on wheels before ascending; they must fly rapidly when, once aloft, they are in their real element; and they must be so constructed that they will alight again on the ground, without damage, even when moving at a comparatively high speed.

Aeroplanes are now in use which fly at appreciably more than 100 miles an hour, but aviators of considerable skill are needed to handle these. Such pilots, by dexterity in checking the speed of their machines before alighting, can make their contact with the ground at 30 or 40 miles an hour; whereas an aviator of less skill or experience, if put in charge of such machines, might find he had to alight at 60 miles an hour or more, a speed likely to prove dangerous on any but a specially-prepared ground of large size.

The difficulty for the designer is that, with existing systems of construction, an aeroplane has an unvarying wing area, and this must be sufficient to enable a craft to alight at a reasonably slow speed, as well as to fly fast. So far, it is true, this difficulty has not become acute; in other words, machines have not yet attained such speeds as prevent skilled pilots from bringing them to the ground in safety. In aeronautics, however, constructional progress is very rapid; and, when a craft can be fitted with engines which develop thousands of horsepower instead of hundreds, it should be possible to increase very materially the maximum speeds at present attained. A great deal of experiment, scientific and practical, will, of course, be required for structural improvements, and for lessening the resistance a craft offers to its own passage through the air. This will take time, and cost money, but if aeroplanes can be built so as to alight fairly slowly, as well as to fly very fast, there seems no reason why speeds should not be attained of 200 to 250 miles an hour, and ultimately, perhaps, of

300 miles an hour, though at such great speeds the factor of air resistance becomes extremely important.

Very high rates of travel by air will scarcely be possible unless a machine can be given a wider variation in speed than is feasible to-day; and, to obtain such a variation, two methods at present suggest themselves. One, which has been experimented with already, is to mount the sustaining surfaces in such a way that a pilot, by a movement of a wheel or lever, can rock the planes to a certain limited extent, and present them to the air at either a steep or a fine angle. When an aviator has climbed to a sufficient altitude, and is flying fast, he adjusts his planes so that they are at a fine angle to the air—exercising, indeed, only just sufficient lift to preserve horizontal flight, and offering at the same time a minimum of drift, or head resistance. Then, when the time comes to descend, the pilot operates the rocking mechanism again, and inclines his planes at a steep angle to the air. The effect of this is twofold; in the first place the planes, being at a steep angle, exercise a greater lift, and support the machine in consequence at the slower speed necessary for alighting; and, in the second place, they act as an air brake, and check forward motion in the same way that a bird, when it wishes to alight on some spot it sees below, swings its wings at an angle in order to reduce speed.

The advantage of this system is that it can be adapted to existing methods of construction, and that planes which are built of nothing more substantial than wood, covered with fabric, can be so connected to the hull of a machine that they will rock in the way required, without imperilling their factor of safety.

But when speeds are sought, as they must be, which will render air-borne transit very considerably faster, even under adverse weather conditions, than that of land or sea, it is scarcely likely that the method described, effective though it may prove to a limited extent, will provide variations which are sufficiently wide. Machines which bear heavy loads, as they will when mails and passengers are carried by air, and are expected at the same time to fly extremely fast, will need a considerable wing-area if, while moving across the ground at a reasonable speed, they are to gain a sufficient 'lift' to

take them into the air; and in alighting, when the safety and comfort of passengers have to be considered, the speed must be sufficiently low—necessitating again large wing-areas—to ensure a smooth and easy contact with the ground.

Ships reef their sails in a rising wind, and an aeroplane, as it drives ahead with gathering speed, increasing thereby the air pressure on its surfaces, will require to be able to curtail or reef them while actually in flight; and it must also be able, as is the ship, to shake out these reefs again when occasion demands, and resume its full surface. Here, as a matter of fact, if it can be realised, is the ideal—that, at whatever speed an aeroplane may be travelling, it shall expose only just enough surface to maintain it in horizontal flight. One needs only to watch a bird, as it contracts its wings when gliding fast, to realise what this power would give an aeroplane. It would mean more, indeed, to the aeroplane than does the gear-box to a motor-car. Slow alighting speeds could be combined with very high flying speeds; and it might even be possible to satisfy the wish of the aviator who said he desired to ascend from his own garden, instead of from an aerodrome, and to descend again safely on an ordinary lawn.

To build an aeroplane with wing-surfaces which can be contracted or expanded while the machine is actually in flight is, as may be imagined, easier said than done. It appears, indeed, impossible of achievement, so long as wood is the chief material in construction, to evolve any system which, while operating successfully, will provide at the same time an adequate strength. But as soon as aeroplanes cease to become obsolete so rapidly, with types changing almost from day to day, it should be possible on a commercial scale to replace wood by metal; and then, with a high-grade steel, produced in the form of hollow tubes, one may hope by experiment to evolve a wing which will telescope inwards on itself, and provide as required a surface either large or small.

Technical problems arise, naturally. In the outer sections of a telescopic wing it would not be practicable, for instance, in view of this telescopic action, to use either interplane struts or bracing wires. Therefore the strength of these outer wing-sections would have to



be sufficient—and there is little doubt it could be made so—to withstand unsupported the strains imposed by a rapid movement through the air. With a high-grade steel, such as would be used in the construction of the hollow spars, very great strength should be obtained with a comparatively light weight. Already in wood construction it is possible, thanks mainly to experience, to give planes such an inherent strength that the use of struts and wires is very considerably reduced, which means, of course, a lessening in head resistance; and with variable-surface wings of the future the fact must be borne in mind that, when they are moving through the air at very high speeds, and are receiving their heaviest pressure, they will have been reefed to such an extent that they are exposing only a small amount of surface. This will of course lessen the strains to which they are subjected, and also the resistance which they offer to their own movement through the air, while the steel main-spars, as they telescope one within another, will gain automatically a greater strength.

It is possible, already, to form a mental picture of the passenger aircraft of the future—a machine which is amphibious, alighting either on land or water; navigating, indeed, three elements—earth, sea, and air. It will be driven, perhaps, by petrol turbines, delivering many thousands of horse-power; and its air-screws will have blades which can be varied in the pitch or angle which they present to the air, so that they may adapt themselves automatically while in motion to any speed, high or low.

The air-screw, it may be explained, has blades so designed, and placed at such an angle, that they will deal most efficiently with the air when moving forward through it at some specific speed—this speed being the maximum at which the craft to which the propeller is fitted has been designed to fly. When an aircraft is moving at a speed considerably lower than this maximum, its air-screw or screws tend to churn up the air and slip, instead of dealing with the air-stream smoothly. Apart, however, from the fact that the weight of a variable-pitch mechanism has to be reckoned with seriously, the difference between the high speed and the



low speed of an aeroplane is not yet sufficiently marked to render really imperative any variable-pitch system. But in the future, when machines will need to ascend rapidly and alight slowly, and to fly also at extremely high maximum speeds, the variable-pitch air-screw will, in the absence of some better device, become practically indispensable.

The hull of the large passenger aircraft, resembling in some respects that of a ship, will represent in its shape the latest that science can teach as to lessening the air resistance which is encountered when at very high speeds. It will be smooth-surfaced and tapering, with the dome of its conning-tower projecting only a short distance above the level of the hull. When on the water the machine will ride like a ship, and will be sufficiently strong constructionally to withstand heavy seas. It will be fitted also with an alighting mechanism, which will draw up and disappear within the hull when the machine is in flight or resting on the surface of the water, but will be lowered into position when it is necessary to descend on land. The ability of such a craft to alight either on land or water will on occasion give it a considerable advantage, apart from any question of speed, in the transport of passengers and mails. A trans-Atlantic machine, for instance, carrying passengers from New York to London, instead of having to put in at Liverpool or Southampton (as would a ship) and transfer its passengers and luggage to a train—causing thereby delay as well as inconvenience—will fly straight on overland to an air-station just on the outskirts of London, from which the passengers will be carried into the city in a few minutes by means of high-speed tubes.

The machines of the future will not be biplanes or triplanes, but craft employing a large number of sustaining surfaces, superposed in such a way that they interfere with each other as little as possible. The ideal is for a plane to work in a perfectly undisturbed air stream. If, therefore, surfaces are fitted directly one above another, and close together, as was the case with early experimental triplanes, the air-flow is disturbed as it passes between them, and a loss in lift and efficiency is the result. But any such loss can be minimised by setting the planes some distance apart, and also by what

is known as 'staggering'—that is to say, by placing one plane out a little way in front of, or behind, another.

The advantage of using a number of fairly small surfaces, instead, say, of one or two large ones, is that the span of the planes, or their width from one wing-tip to the other, is kept within a reasonable limit. With machines having an extremely wide span, such as would be necessary, say, with biplanes carrying a very heavy load, the difficulty is to give these wide-spread wings sufficient strength, and to prevent them at the same time from becoming too heavy.

Another advantage to be obtained by using a number of planes, each narrow in chord, is that, when a considerable amount of sustaining area has to be used, as in weight-carrying machines, its lifting power is likely to be greater, when disposed in this way, than would be the case were only one or two large surfaces employed. The reason for this is that most of the sustaining power of a plane is obtained near its entering or forward edge; therefore, if an attempt should be made, in endeavouring to avoid a wide span, to use planes which have a deep chord, it may be found that their rear sections are inefficient.

With large machines, employing a number of surfaces which are telescopic, and also of a moderate span, it should be possible, when on the water, to draw these surfaces inwards till they are almost hidden within the hull; and this would permit a machine, whenever necessary, to ride out a rough sea without any risk of damage to the planes through the rolling of the machine bringing them in contact with the tops of the waves.

In ascending, either from land or sea, the machine of the future will speed up her engines, and at the same time extend her wings till the moment comes when she has enough surface exposed, for the pace at which she is moving, to lift her into the air. After this she will climb, using a large amount of surface to ensure a rapid ascent; then, having gained altitude, she will cease to ascend and will begin to move horizontally, using the full power of her motors, and gradually reducing her sustaining surface till just enough is left to maintain her at any chosen height. The faster she travels, under the thrust of her turbines and air-screws, the less sustaining area

she will require, until at length, moving through the air at an immense speed, she will have attained almost the momentum of a projectile, and will have reefed her wings till she is exposing only a very small amount of surface.

The passengers in the saloon of such a perfected aircraft will experience neither vibration nor oscillation. Practically no sound will reach them from the smoothly-running engines in the fore-car. They should hear nothing, indeed, beyond the sound of the wind as it rushes past the hull. At great heights and at immense speeds, seeing often nothing either below or around them but banks of cloud, they will be borne across continents and oceans with a comfort unattainable by travel on land or sea. Distance, as we view it now, will cease to exist as a barrier for inter-communication. Men of affairs of the future, with world-wide interests to superintend, may find eventually that they can cross the Atlantic by air in twelve or fifteen hours; being enabled, thereby, to transact business one day say in New York and the next in London.

CLAUDE GRAHAME-WHITE.  
HARRY HARPER.

# Art. 10—PUBLIC KITCHENS.

A FEW weeks ago a question was asked in Parliament as to what steps were being taken to ensure the provision, in populous centres, of kitchens formed and conducted under public authority for the sale at cost price of cooked food prepared in large quantities. In reply, it was announced that the Food Controller was calling the attention of Food Economy Committees to the great importance of such kitchens from the point of view of food and fuel economy; and the hope was expressed that this appeal, together with some degree of financial assistance where necessary, would effect a considerable increase in the number of public kitchens, of which 161 were already at work in various parts of the country. We may therefore assume that public kitchens are to become, under the active encouragement of the Ministry of Food, a salient feature of the national war economy; and the time is opportune for considering the principles that should govern their working and the conditions which limit their success. There are plenty of data on which to base a study of the subject. The kitchens referred to as already in operation in this country have been independently started, for the most part, by local authorities or groups, to serve particularly obvious and urgent local needs; and, as each has carried out its own scheme in its own way, a comparative survey brings out the factors that make for success or failure. Again, the Ministry of Food has for some months past had under direct control and close supervision a kitchen established to serve one of the most populous areas of South London; and much valuable experience has been gained therefrom.

There are, moreover, useful lessons to be learned from the experiences of other countries with regard to the public provision of cooked food at moderate prices; and we need have no diffidence in profiting, so far as may be, from those of Germany and Austria. Germany's food situation was, even two years ago, so difficult that the establishment of public kitchens on an extensive scale was deemed a necessity, and by this time last year there were in operation in Germany 2200 public kitchens, supplying 2,500,000 portions of cooked food daily; which

means that more than ten per cent. of the urban population of the German Empire were obtaining one meal a day from public kitchens. The organisation of this vast service has been carried out, as might be expected, with painstaking thoroughness; and, though there is much in the German methods to avoid, there is also much from which to derive instruction.

Let it be emphasised at once that the public kitchens now in question bear no relationship to the charity soup-kitchens of the shameful past. Their object is not the relief of a class but the advantage of the community. The purpose in view is national economy and national well-being, the first to be secured by the elimination of waste, and the second by the provision of appetising and nutritious cooked meals at non-profit prices for all, without distinction of class or income, who may find it convenient or agreeable to buy food ready-cooked. It is essential, if these objects are to be attained on an extensive scale, that the use of the kitchens should not be regarded as in any way discreditable—that to patronise a municipal kitchen should be as ordinary a matter as, let us say, to travel on a municipal tram.

The case for the establishment of central kitchens at this particular juncture rests upon the economies to be effected in food, fuel, and services, and upon the provision they will make for all and sundry to obtain easily a satisfying cooked meal. That individual cooking, unless performed with knowledge, skill and care, results in the waste or misuse of food, requires no proof; and it will not be disputed that there are a great many homes at the present time in which the preparation of the principal meal of the day cannot be otherwise than wastefully done. Even were culinary skill an especial attribute of the British housewife, many wives and mothers are nowadays out on war and other work, and have neither time nor energy for proper cooking when they reach home; while the buying-in necessary to the preparation of a good round meal is becoming an ever more tedious and vexatious business. Hence the makeshift meal consisting largely of bread—the one form of ready-cooked food which can at present be everywhere conveniently bought, and, as it happens, the food in regard to which economies are especially desirable. Moreover, good cooking requires

proper appliances; and the lack of such appliances is responsible, more than anything else, for the deplorable cooking which, in so many homes of the poorer classes, restricts the *menu* to a narrow circle of generally expensive and wasteful foods.

Nor would the advantages of a ready recourse to the public kitchen stop here. The gas or coal required for the preparation of a thousand meals in a central kitchen is a mere fraction of what would be consumed in preparing the same meals in a thousand homes. Add to these considerations the means which an extensive system of public kitchens would afford of introducing to the public unfamiliar articles of food which may be temporarily plentiful, but which the average housewife could never be induced to buy (for in the matter of food we are nationally the slaves of habit); add further the facilities for the equitable distribution of food which, in the event of a real scarcity of foodstuffs, a network of public kitchens would afford; and the case for the public kitchens is stated. X

It may reasonably be asked why, if the central kitchen is going to prove such a boon and a saving, the demand has not already created a sufficient supply, and why the starting of kitchens cannot even now be left to private enterprise. The answer lies in the distinction between a commercially profitable demand and a question of national advantage. In a time like the present, undertakings calculated to result in the saving of food, fuel and service cannot be left to the hazards of private enterprise, conditioned by the expectation of private gain. A kitchen which would not pay in the commercial sense might pay handsomely from the national standpoint. Until the standard of life in the more populous centres has been raised to a point at which the demand for ready-cooked meals of satisfactory quality becomes effective, the private cookshop is likely to concentrate, as at present, on a few popular but frequently wasteful and comparatively expensive foods, and to scorn economy without affording a satisfactory standard of nutriment. At the present time there is undoubtedly a demand for nutritious and economical ready-cooked meals which the existing cookshops do not gratify.

† Yet, while the demand that has arisen shows that custom awaits the public kitchen in many districts, that factor must not be overrated. The public kitchens, if they are to succeed, must set themselves to attract customers by all the arts and devices that make for success in a commercial concern. They must, for example, be opened in the right neighbourhood, in attractive premises located in prominent positions; hole-and-corner kitchens in side streets will not be redeemed from failure by virtue of their public status. They will have to offer such value for money as to compete effectively with the privately cooked meal. They will have to study the tastes and prejudices of their patrons, introducing unfamiliar dishes gradually. And, over and above all that, they will have to make the most of their particular and exclusive advantages as public institutions, forming part of a great public system and enjoying the support of the central food authorities. If they are to make good, they will need every advantage to be gained from centralised buying at wholesale prices; they will need every help in the shape of information, instruction, and advice that can be given; and they will need all such 'goodwill' as may attach to their public character.

× In considering the needs of any locality, and the best means of providing for them, it should be borne in mind that public kitchens may be organised in two ways: as self-contained units, or as component parts of a linked system, consisting of a central cooking kitchen serving a surrounding network of selling stations to which the cooked food is sent by van or motor. This arrangement, where it can be carried out, offers certain advantages. It reduces the capital expenditure on appliances, it simplifies the purchase of materials, it puts the technical part of the work under one roof where it can be supervised by a highly qualified superintendent; it lends itself to the pooling of fluctuating local demands; and it allows of a number of selling stations being opened larger than would be economical were every kitchen a self-contained unit. This latter point is of importance in that a kitchen cannot expect to command for long the patronage of persons outside its immediate neighbourhood. On the debit side of the centralised arrangement must be set the cost of transport, also the risk of

*begin*



the food cooling down during the journey and having to be re-heated at the selling station, which would not only lessen the saving of central cooking but would impair the attractiveness and quality of the food.

A still more important objection is the very grave doubt whether people would readily patronise local selling stations, where they could see nothing of the conditions under which the food is cooked. The public kitchen will have a great deal of initial ignorance and suspicion to live down; and it will do this more easily if the food can be bought at the kitchen where it is actually prepared. To put it bluntly, food sold at a mere selling station would run the risk of being described as 'yesterday's leavings warmed up.' It is doubtful, moreover, whether a kitchen rightly planted in a populous locality would not find its full capacity tested by the immediate local demand: The question is one to be settled on its merits for each separate area, but it is important that it should be considered by each Food Economy Committee before steps are taken to open kitchens in the district; for, if the central kitchen with its network of selling stations should be deemed the most suitable system, the complete scheme ought to be planned in advance; and, if local conditions are not carefully studied, the network of outlying selling stations might prove a costly failure.

The choice between the self-contained kitchen and the central-kitchen system is in great measure determined by the kind of food it is proposed to provide. With very few exceptions the German kitchens keep strictly to a *menu* of broth, stew, or soup; and this lends itself particularly well to the arrangement of the central kitchen with its network of selling stations. It simplifies the whole process of preparing, cooking, transporting, serving and apportioning the food. At the central kitchens little other equipment is required than mincing or chopping machines and boilers. For transportation any large cans or vessels can be used, and suitable ones can easily be obtained. At the distributing centres nothing more is required than a dipper; the serving is done in the least possible time, and there is a minimum of grumbling about inequality of portions. Add to these considerations the fact that the food needs no reheating

at home, being still hot when it reaches the table; that there is no loss of weight or nutriment, such as takes place in oven cooking; that all kinds of food-stuffs, whether in large or small quantities, can be put into the boilers; and that with broth meals tea or coffee can be more easily omitted, and the advantages of a soup *menu* are seen to be very great.

An exception to this rule is provided by the case of Frankfort, where a particularly varied bill of fare is provided. Almost alone among German towns, no diminution in the number of portions served was experienced at Frankfort during the hot months of last summer; and the kitchens have achieved an exceptional measure of popularity and success. It is particularly pointed out in regard to Frankfort that, because of the appetising dishes served, the transition from home cooking to the buying of food ready-cooked is made easier than in other centres.

It is certain that people in this country would not take kindly to an all-soup *menu* at the public kitchen. Not only is a prolonged course of broth, soup, or stew, even when varied constantly as to ingredients and eaten only once a day, apt to pall on people accustomed to a less liquid diet, but there is a distinct charity flavour about soup which is not easily dispelled; and the mere fact that everything can be put into the boiler and come out effectually disguised raises unfounded but perhaps not unnatural suspicions. Hence, practically all the public kitchens now at work in Great Britain have laid themselves out to offer a wide variety of dishes, including roast meats or meat rissoles, sausages, vegetables, dumplings and puddings, with, of course, soup as a regular or frequent item.

This involves much more trouble and a more costly equipment, but it has been justified by results. It has not precluded the kitchen superintendent from influencing, by judicious recommendations and hints as to values, the preferences of customers in favour of particular dishes. Thus the demand for roast meat—roasting being an especially extravagant method of cooking in time of dearth—has in many cases been diverted to rissoles or croquettes, in which there is no waste and a little meat can be made to go a long way, without any dictation or

interference with the customer's free choice. Again, plentiful foods against which inexplicable prejudices exist among particular classes (the herring is a notable example) can be gradually brought into favour; and in the same way soup or stew, which after all makes the very best of meals in time of food difficulties, can be popularised to almost any extent. The demand for soups and stews—for anything, in fact, which can be carried in a basin—will be found to be very large; but, if that demand is to be encouraged, it is indispensable that there should be a free choice. Again, the popular taste for fried fish can easily be converted into a taste for boiled fish dishes of all kinds (which the poorer housewife has neither time nor appliances to prepare), if there is no attempt at dictation. The one essential is that the kitchen should be prepared at the outset to supply the dishes to which the people are accustomed. The 'cut from the joint' and the meat pudding must be on the *menu*. As favour is obtained and confidence gained, less usual dishes can be gradually added and will find favour.

It may be remarked incidentally that, where a kitchen is established near a large elementary school, a separate department providing cheap and satisfying meals for children will be a desirable adjunct. It is only the very necessitous who are fed by the schools; and the majority bring with them a few coppers to buy the midday meal or return home to such provision as can be left by a mother who has gone out to work.

Although it is not intended that the kitchens shall make a profit, the Food Controller has made it clear that they should, so far as possible, be self-supporting. The sums necessary for establishing the kitchens will be advanced by the local authorities, sanction having been given by the Local Government Board to expenditure for such purpose out of the rates. It is expected that, with proper management, the takings of the kitchens will be sufficient not only to cover the food bills and the wages sheet and to meet establishment and fixed charges, but also to provide a margin for reserve and for the repayment of the cost of equipment, so that the moneys advanced by the local authorities will be recoverable out

of the working of the kitchens. If so, they will indeed justify themselves; but the inverse proposition—that, if a kitchen should not pay its way, it will have failed to justify itself—is not necessarily true; and it should not be enjoined that no kitchen is to be opened unless there is good reason to believe that it will pay its way. Apparently the Food Controller accepts this view; and it is understood that, in order to encourage the establishment of kitchens, authority will be obtained from the Treasury to make substantial grants towards the equipment of public kitchens in approved areas.

As already suggested, the economy in food and fuel and the release of services expected to result from the establishment of kitchens might make a commercial loss consistent with a national gain. The objection that the kitchens, if subsidised, would not be 'free from the taint of charity,' and that 'false pride' would keep people from patronising them, can hardly carry much force, considering that the food supply is already being subsidised in various ways. Indeed, the question of charity does not arise, unless the use of the kitchens is to be made conditional on proof of poverty, which is not for a moment contemplated. The relation between takings and expenses is an important factor in determining whether a public kitchen should be started or continued; but it is only a factor, not a final criterion.

It is of interest to note that in Germany all idea of making the kitchens pay their way in a commercial sense has been set aside. The initial cost of establishing public kitchens has usually been borne outright by the municipality, which has made a grant for the purpose. Thus the Berlin Town Council voted 100,000*l.* for the establishment of the Berlin municipal kitchens; and at Düsseldorf the installation of the central kitchens with their annexes cost the local authority 20,000*l.* The municipalities have also, for the most part, heavily subsidised the kitchens. The figures for Düsseldorf may be quoted. The meals sold at the thirty-two distributing centres numbered last winter about 26,000 daily. The installation of the central kitchens with their annexes cost 19,000*l.* The working expenses in the first seven months of their existence were 12,000*l.* The ordinary price of one meal, consisting of nine-tenths of a litre, was 3½*d.*

The total cost of providing such a portion was 4½d., of which 4d. represented the cost of food and ½d. working expenses. The net loss was therefore 1½d. per portion, or 162l. 10s. per day. ✕

A serious objection to the subsidising of public kitchens out of public funds arises out of the fact that the kitchen will come into competition with existing catering establishments. This consideration could hardly be allowed to stand in the way of assistance being given to enable kitchens to be started and run to meet a real public need, but it points to the desirability of taking account beforehand of existing private concerns and providing for some sort of equitable and serviceable coordination between them and the new establishments. It will also be necessary to avoid overlapping or conflict with existing communal kitchens started by voluntary groups, and with canteens attached to industrial establishments and any arrangements that may be in force for the feeding of school children. A good deal of friction and waste will be avoided if, in framing their schemes, local committees will take stock of all catering facilities in the area, consult the proprietors or principals, and agree with them upon a plan whereby all the establishments in the neighbourhood can, as the need arises, be linked up into a comprehensive system.

✕ The responsibility for making a survey of the district to be served, planning the system to be adopted, determining the policy to be followed, securing the right premises, and providing the proper equipment, must rest upon the Food Economy Committees in each area, acting in consultation with the central Public Kitchens department. It will also devolve upon the Food Economy Committee to superintend the running of the kitchens, make provision for the purchasing of supplies, and control the finances. Much will depend upon the ability with which these duties are carried out; but, when all is done, still more will depend upon the person placed in charge of the kitchen and the staff under her. It may be hoped that no committee will fall under the delusion that any well-meaning person can run a public kitchen. It is not true, as experience has amply testified. The successful conduct of a public kitchen demands not only those qualities which make for success in any sphere of

activity, but also a considerable degree of special skill and training. The calculation of quantities, costs, and food values, which is a part of daily routine, calls of itself for rather more than ordinary ability and knowledge. The watching of the markets for the ebb and flow of supplies and the rise and fall of prices, the composition of the *menu* so as to make full use of the more plentiful foods and at the same time to please customers and provide well-balanced meals, the ordering of the cooking and serving, all require that breadth of judgment and degree of resource which comes only from a specialised training.) The number of women possessing these qualifications is unhappily not large, but the domestic science colleges and cookery schools throughout the country are doing a great deal to supply the deficiency, while the kitchens already at work can be and are being used for the training under expert superintendents of women who will become superintendents in turn.

It is particularly necessary that superintendents shall possess, in addition to expert knowledge of cookery and food values, a knowledge of local conditions and requirements, and the virtues of tact and discretion. Any appearance of patronage or dictation will destroy the popularity of the kitchen; and ignorance of local conditions will destroy half its value. The experience and advice of Care Committee workers, and any others well acquainted with the people and their circumstances, should be obtained to the fullest possible extent; and there should be no attempt to institute a uniform system or *menu* for all localities.

It ought not to be necessary to insist that superintendents, cooks, and helpers should be paid workers, receiving salaries befitting their qualifications, abilities, and services; but many people still harbour the curious belief that any undertaking which can claim to be for the common good can and ought to be run by unpaid or ill-paid workers. That idea has spelt the doom of many a promising communal enterprise, and, if it is to creep into the organisation of public kitchens, will lead to failure. Unless an adequate remuneration is offered, the right type of woman will not be obtainable for the more responsible posts, and the supply of such trained women will be cut off at its source. Even as regards the subordinate



positions the practically universal experience of the war period is that voluntary helpers are 'more bother than they are worth.' They do not 'stick it out,' they do not readily submit to discipline, they are often irregular in attendance, and they are apt to give an impression of condescension and patronage. This is the general experience. There are, of course, splendid exceptions, but a movement of national scope cannot be run on a hope that exceptions will prove the rule. Where in particular cases it is deemed desirable to use voluntary help, it is suggested that such help should be under corporate discipline, such as that afforded by the 'Women's Army Auxiliary Corps.'

Hitherto the great majority of kitchens have opened only for certain hours in the day, usually confining themselves to the provision of the midday meal. In due course some kitchen may find that there is a demand for evening meals, and even for breakfast portions, sufficient to justify their opening at other hours. Very few of those most likely to patronise the public kitchens make a heavy meal in the evening, but there might be a demand at a very early hour—say five or six in the morning—for cold lunches which the workman could take with him to his place of employment. The demand, however, is likely to be modified by the establishment of kitchens in factory districts, or of canteens at the works; and, as a general rule, the midday opening will suffice. It is a matter for judgment and experiment in each case, as is also the question whether the kitchens should open on Sundays. The usual experience is that, while some people buy on the Saturday enough for the Sunday meal, many more prefer to have the Sunday dinner cooked at home, the effect of which is seen in a lessened demand on the Monday, when the residue of the Sunday meal is eaten. The practice of the German and Austrian municipal kitchens is very varied in this respect. The commonest practice appears to be to serve only one meal per day, generally the midday meal; but there are exceptions to the rule. At Vienna the kitchens open at 5.30 and 6 o'clock in the morning to serve breakfasts of coffee and flour soup, and again at noon to serve the midday broth. At one time they were again opened for



the evening meal, but this was subsequently discontinued because of the shortage of supplies. An evening meal service was started at Frankfort in May last and is well patronised, some 2000 participants being served daily.

It may be useful to note the attitude of the German public towards the public kitchens that have been established for its benefit. The usual experience has been that people have begun by holding aloof from the public kitchens, partly from sheer inertia, but also from a desire to see who patronised the kitchens and how they fared. Hesitation on the latter score was speedily overcome by experience of the good value offered by the kitchens and the convenience of ready-cooked meals, but the breaking-down of 'false pride' has been a slower matter. A commentator on the Berlin system in October 1916, when the kitchens had been in operation for three months, states that the institution was still not so popular as was expected. The 'stigma of charity' still attached to the public meals; and many people thought it beneath their dignity to take advantage of them. Although they experienced great difficulties in obtaining provisions and often had to stand for a long time in the queues outside shops, many would starve rather than go for public meals. An enquiry made in August 1916 into the feeling in sixty-four industrial districts showed that, except in cases of real destitution, public kitchens were unpopular among the majority of people. This feeling has, however, since then worn down. As the winter came on, all sentimental objections were swept away by the sheer difficulty of obtaining food at the shops; and the people's kitchens are now patronised regularly by people of all classes. In Munich, an enquiry was held on a particular day in November into the class of persons who used the kitchens and paid for their meals. Of 1100 persons, 20 were independent owners of businesses, 31 members of the liberal professions, 65 State and municipal officials, 40 persons without any occupation, 63 soldiers, and 632 working men and women. *X and*

Unless the food situation in this country becomes very much worse than it is at the present time, it is not to be expected that the patronage of public kitchens will reach anything like German dimensions. All the records go to show that the number of participants falls or rises

according as the food situation temporarily improves or worsens. Experience shows that the majority do not use the kitchens from unconstrained preference, but rather resort to them under the pressure of circumstances, from lack of means or from difficulty of obtaining food or of cooking it in the ordinary way at home. It is possible, however, that continued use of the kitchens under pressure of circumstances will in time weaken the force of custom and create a 'ready-cooked' habit in its place; and it is noticeable that, even when, in the spring, food has been comparatively abundant for a month or two, the kitchens have continued to supply a large, though reduced, number of meals.

The difficulty of attracting patronage to the public kitchen will be very largely overcome if proper means are taken to explain the system to those expected to make use of it. A simple leaflet, written by someone acquainted with the people as well as the system, should be printed and widely distributed. This leaflet should call attention to one or two salient and easily comprehensible advantages of the kitchens, such as the saving in time and in gas or fuel. It should make it perfectly clear that the kitchen is not a charity establishment, and that it simply gives value for money. At the same time it should be made equally clear that it is not intended to put money into the pocket of the State or anyone else. Such a leaflet, aided by the personal influence of individuals locally known and trusted, will bring in many of the more level-headed and intelligent at the start; and their experience, if satisfactory, will convert the rest.

The sole argument of any moment advanced against the principle of the public kitchen is that it is a 'communistic experiment' which must tend to break-up family life. The answer is, firstly, that the question is practical, not theoretical, concerned with conditions, not tendencies; secondly, that the private home has already been affected by the withdrawal of its menfolk for military service and its womenfolk for industrial employment; and thirdly, that the system as worked affects no part of the home except the oven, for the meals issued will not be consumed at the kitchens (the provision of dining facilities is not contemplated), but will be carried away and eaten wherever the meal would otherwise

have been consumed, at the place of employment, or at school. X

In considering the whole question, it will be well to keep in mind not only the present but the future. On the one hand there is the possibility that the food situation may become worse, and that large numbers of dwellers in the great towns may find the difficulties of securing food so great as to be in real danger of semi-starvation. Such a contingency may be too remote to require immediate consideration, but there can be no doubt that the establishment of a well-planned system of public kitchens would provide, perhaps, the best of all insurances against its occurrence. On the other hand, there is the certainty that the value of the system would not disappear with the war. It cannot be too often repeated that the two greatest difficulties in the way of good cooking and economical household expenditure are want of time and want of appliances. The harassed mother of many children, possessing few utensils and perhaps out at work for the greater part of the day, is driven perforce to the food which is easiest to procure and prepare, independent of economy or nutriment value. The ultimate remedy, no doubt, is a general raising of the standard of life, but in the meantime the public kitchen, supplying a varied, palatable and sustaining diet at a low price, would do much to make money go further and to avert the dangers of malnutrition, especially for women and children. The exceptional pressure of the present time affords a unique opportunity of introducing and popularising such establishments; and, if the opportunity is firmly seized and wisely handled, it will become the means of conferring a permanent benefit as well as of meeting an immediate crisis.

JOHN HILTON.

## Art. 11.—ITALY AND THE SOUTHERN SLAVS.

1. *L'Italia d'oltre confine*. By V. Gayda. Turin: Bocca, 1914.
2. *La Dalmazia*. By G. Prezzolini. Florence: Libreria della Voce, 1915.
3. *Italiani e Slavi nel problema Adriatico*. By C. Maranelli and G. Salvemini. Florence: Libreria della Voce, 1918.
4. *La Dalmazia; sua italianità, suo valore per la libertà dell' Italia nell' Adriatico*. By G. Dainelli and others. Genoa: Formiggini, 1915.
5. *Trieste e la sua fisiologia economica*. By M. Alberti. Rome: Associazione fra le Società italiane pei azioni, 1916.
6. *The Reconstruction of South-Eastern Europe*. By V. R. Savic. Chapman & Hall, 1914.
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*The Question of the Southern Slavs.*

THE crux of the Austrian problem—and of that of Europe—lies in the Venetia Giulia (region of Gorizia, Trieste, Istria), Slovenia (Carniola, Styria, Carinthia), Croatia-Slavonia, and Bohemia. Austria might lose Galicia, Transylvania, Bosnia, Dalmatia and the Trentino without ceasing to be a Great Power. She would be an Austria reduced to thirty-five million inhabitants (about as many as Italy contains), in which the Germans and Magyars would establish their predominance over the Czechs, Slovenes, Croatians and Italians, who would be reduced to a definite minority. She would be an Austria more than ever bound to Germany by the clear German-Magyar majority, by the remembrance of their common

defeat, and by their common desire for restitution. And the greatest weight of this German-Austrian-Magyar system would press on the South, on Italy and on the Adriatic.

On the other hand, if Slovenia, Croatia and the Julian Veneto were taken from Austria-Hungary, and Slovenia and Croatia were free to unite with Serbia, while the Julian Veneto went to Italy, the Austrian Empire would be over and done with for ever. The Austrian Archduchy and the Kingdom of Hungary, the last remnants of the old Empire, would become inland States, like Switzerland or Bohemia. The union between Hungary and Austria would tend to grow looser if the neighbouring states should facilitate the trend of Hungarian commerce towards the Black Sea, the *Ægean* and the Adriatic, and allow her the same favourable conditions of transit that Switzerland has received from Italy and France. An independent Bohemia would become possible, thanks to treaties and railway conventions, which would not only assure free transit to the whole of the Slovenian back-country for the port of Trieste, but would place the railway between Trieste and Bohemia in the hands of a joint administration in which the political and economic interests of an independent Bohemia would be consolidated, against every German attempt, with those of Trieste and Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia, the masters of the back-country between Trieste and Austria.

From the point of view of Italy's advantage, the new Slav State, with its north-west corner projecting between the Italian territory of the Julian Veneto and the Archduchy of Austria, would become a permanent obstacle to every fresh German attempt to reach the Adriatic. The Germans would not be able to conquer Trieste against Italy without at the same time cutting off Slovenia from the Slavs of the South. The new State would be, in short, a natural ally of Italy against Germany.

Furthermore, Italians ought never to forget that the Roman question—no matter how much less acute it is now than it was some years ago—has always been bound up with the ecclesiastical state policy of Austria. Austria-Hungary is now the only State in Europe in which the Catholic hierarchy takes part in public administration and preserves many of the attributes of mediæval

sovereignty. For the Hapsburg dynasty and for the bureaucracy which depends upon it, the Roman Catholic religion is a normal instrument not only of internal administration, but also of international politics. Thus, to incite the Croatian Clericals to hostility against the Croatian Liberals and against the Orthodox Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, and the Slovenian and Croatian clergy against the Italians of the Adriatic, has been, during the whole of the past half-century, a regular function of the State, in which clergy and police, judiciary, school and army have joined hands. The present war against Serbia, Russia and Italy is, for a great part of the lower clergy and the Austro-Hungarian peasants, a religious Crusade against schismatics and infidels, rather than a war of German-Magyar Imperialism. At present, Austrian clericalism relies especially upon the rural population of Slovenia and Croatia. Taking away these countries from the Austrian administration and combining them with Serbia, an Orthodox country, would mean creating, to the east of Italy, in place of a compactly Catholic Austria, a State owning a mixed religion (Catholic in the north and Orthodox in the south), in which the influence of the Catholic clergy would be politically paralysed by that of the Orthodox clergy, until such time as the progress of civilisation has attenuated the power of both. The dismemberment of Austria-Hungary to the advantage of the schismatic Rumania and Serbia, and of liberal Italy and Bohemia, would be the greatest possible disaster to political Catholicism that has happened since the formation of a United Italy and the separation of Church and State in France.

This condition of things, explaining as it does the Russophobia and the Germanophile attitude of the Vatican, should have shown clearly to Italians—at least to those Italians who feel the national necessity of combating everywhere the political power of the Vatican—the way to be followed in the present crisis: namely, to draw close to the Czechs and Rumanians and to the Slavs of the south in the fight for the dismemberment of Austria, that is to say, the fight for the creation of an independent Bohemia, of a Great Rumania, and of a Great Serbia.

For what concerns the allies of Italy, the foundation



of a Serbo-Sloveno-Croatian unity is an absolute necessity, especially for England. As Lord Cromer, the great organiser of Modern Egypt, has explained, the Slav State of the south, like Belgium, is one of those Key-States whose existence is vital for the maintenance of the equilibrium of power in Europe ('Times,' Sept. 28, 1916). Only when German access to the Ægean Sea is intercepted by a 'block' of some 12,000,000 Slavs, allied to Rumania and Italy, will England be sure of the eastern Mediterranean. England would defend the Isthmus of Suez, thenceforward, against Germany, by means of the new Slav State, on the line of the Drave. And in this respect Italy stands in the same position as England, because the line of the Drave blocks the road which Germany would take towards the Adriatic. The formation of a Serbo-Sloveno-Croatian State would, in and by itself, represent the failure of the whole Oriental policy of Austria and Germany. On the other hand, to keep Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia disunited is to leave open a way for the renewal of the eastern ambitions of Austria and Germany. Consequently, Austrian policy, from the Congress of Berlin onward, has been wholly directed towards the political, economic, and moral disintegration of the Southern Slavs, in order to remove every barrier towards the East that might stand in the way of German penetration.

The new State will touch Italy on the Adriatic; and now is the time to ask what would be the most convenient and reasonable frontier line to draw between these two powers; that is to say, the line which, while respecting the legitimate claims of both nations, would create friendly relations between the neighbouring inhabitants, and make possible that Italo-Slav alliance which the new Europe will so much need to defend the southern routes against every new attempt at German conquest.

The problem is by no means easy to settle. There does not exist in the eastern Adriatic region any clear national division between the parts inhabited by Italians and those inhabited by Slavs, for the two nations are almost everywhere mixed up together. The physical confines that might be satisfactory, from a military point of view, to both States, do not everywhere coincide with the line that, from the exclusively ethnical point of view,



would be the fairest; while the local hatred between the Italians and Slavs, perfidiously fomented in the last half-century by the Austrian Government, makes all reasonable discussion well-nigh impossible.

*The Problem of the Julian Veneto.*

In the Upper Adriatic, the lands in dispute between Italians and Serbians are: (a) the territory called by the Austrian Government the Küstelband and by the Italians the Julian Veneto (Venezia Giulia), that is to say, Gorizia, Trieste and Istria; (b) the territory of Fiume.

According to the Austrian census of 1910, the Gorizian region is inhabited by 154,000 Slovenes and 90,000 Italians.\* The district of Gradisca, to the south-west, is compactly Italian both in the towns and in the country; the north-eastern districts of Sesana, Tolmino, and Gorizia—except the town of Gorizia—are compactly Slav. But a political division which should coincide with this racial division would not be possible. The Slovenes live in the north, to the right of the Isonzo and on the nearer side of the old Austro-Italian frontier, in the province of Udine, while Italians dwell to the southward on the left bank of the Isonzo, and along the shore.

The political indivisibility of the racial zones is clearly revealed by a study of the topographical, economic and administrative centre of the whole region—Gorizia. This town, with a population of about thirty thousand, was inhabited in 1910, according to the Austrian census, by 50·57 per cent. of Italians, 36·84 per cent. of Slovenes, and 11·05 per cent. of Germans. Inasmuch as the Germans, being almost all Government functionaries, in active service or pensioned, would emigrate to more congenial surroundings if the Austrian régime disappeared, we can eliminate this element from our consideration. As to the proportions between Italians and Slovenes, they are probably rather more favourable to the Italians than the official statistics tend to make out. In Austria, in the regions contested by different races, the arithmetic of census-taking always favours the nationality which enjoys the favour of the presiding authorities.

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\* Census of 1900: 140,000 Slovenes, 81,000 Italians.

In this case, the nationality protected by the Austrian Government (which took the census-making out of the hands of the Italian communal administration) was that of the Slovenes. Hence we are safe in assuming the Italians to be something more than 50 per cent. of the population and the Slovenes something less than 36 per cent. If we blindly accept the Austrian statistics, we shall be forced to believe that the Slovenes in Gorizia had almost doubled their numbers between 1900 and 1910, although the decennial increase of the Slovene population has generally during that period been only from 4 to 5 per cent.\* Even allowing for the fact that in a town like Gorizia, attracting to itself the population of a vicinity preponderatingly Slav, the Slav population would naturally increase more rapidly than its rivals, it is evident that an increase of 85 per cent. in ten years is impossible. It would not be far from the truth to calculate that in the town of Gorizia two-thirds of the population are Italian, and one-third Slovenian.†

This being so, if the town of Gorizia, on the left bank of the Isonzo, were incorporated in Italy, as it would have a right to be by the composition of its ethnical majority, this would leave the Slovenian nuclei to the north, scattered in the mountainous zones of Carnia and the Carso, without any economic and administrative centre: if, on the other hand, it were incorporated in the new Slav State, the south-east plateau zone would lose its centre, and a large city with a majority of Italian inhabitants would be incorporated in a Slav State.

In Trieste and the adjacent territory, according to the 1910 census, when the governing authority was favourable to the Slovenes, the 229,900 inhabitants are divided into 119,000 Italians (that is to say, 62.31 per cent.), and 59,000 Slavs (29.81 per cent.). On the other hand, according to the census made by the Italian municipal authorities, 74.67 per cent. were Italians and 19.44 Slavs.‡ Even if we accept the official figures, we are bound in good faith to conclude from this census,

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\* Chevrin, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

† The census of 1900 gave Gorizia 16,112 Italians and 4754 Slovenians.

‡ The census of 1900, made by the municipal authorities, gave 116,000 Italians and 24,000 Slovenes.

which gives for Trieste 38,000 foreigners, of whom 30,000 are certainly Italians, that in Trieste and its territory the Slav population is one-quarter at the utmost, while three-quarters are Italian. And indeed, since the immigration of the Slovenian population into the towns has always been favoured by the Austrian Government as a weapon in its fight against the Italians, we may consider this element as greater now than it would be in different political conditions. In any case, the Slav element is mainly disposed in the country or in the suburbs; the city proper, in its upper and middle classes, even in its populace, is overwhelmingly Italian.

In Istria the census of 1910 gives 168,000 Serbo-Croatians, 55,000 Slovenes, 147,000 Italians;\* but in Istria it is important to distinguish the eastern zone, on the other side of the Vena Mountains and Monte Maggiore (district of Volosca), whose 50,000 inhabitants are overwhelmingly Slav, from Western Istria, where Italians and Slavs are everywhere mingled in such a fashion as to make it simply impossible to divide the territory of the one from that of the other, the only difference being that the Italians tend to concentrate in the cities, while the Slovenes and Serbo-Croatians form the bulk of the rural populations.

The district of Volosca (47,700 Slavs, 955 Italians) has been always considered by Italian writers (e.g. Combi, Benussi) as a 'monstrous appendage' connected with Istria proper by the Austrian Government in order to augment the preponderance of Slavs over Italians in the province. Take this appendage away from Istria, and the Slav preponderance in Eastern Istria would be reduced to not more than 27,000 persons on a total of 327,000 inhabitants. Even this minimal majority is partly determined by the fact that the Austrian Government has always admitted by preference Croatsians to work in the Arsenal at Pola, excluding the Italian element as much as possible, without, however, succeeding in preventing an Italian majority in Pola. Furthermore, one must note that the most important Istrian towns—Pola (37,000), Rovigno (11,000), Capodistria (9000), Pirano (8000), Muggia

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\* Census of 1900: 143,000 Serbo-Croatians, 44,000 Slovenes, 136,000 Italians.

(5000), Isola (7000), Parenzo (4000) and Dignano (6000)—are, generally speaking, overwhelmingly Italian. Pisino and Gimino are the only cities of more than 4000 inhabitants which have a Slav majority. In general the Slavs are scattered over a rocky and miserable territory in small centres which rarely exceed 1000 inhabitants.

To sum up—the population of the Julian Veneto, when the district of Volosca is subtracted from Istria, is divided between Italians and Slavs in equal proportions even on the basis of things created by the Austrian régime, and calculated on the Austrian statistics.

		Italians.	Slavs.
Gorizia and Gradisca	..	90,000	154,000
Trieste and district	..	149,000	59,000
Western Istria	.. ..	147,000	175,000
		<hr/> 386,000	<hr/> 388,000

The problem thus deals with a region which is ethnically an equally mixed one, about which it is futile to discuss whether it be Italian or Slav, as do the Italian and Slav Nationalists, since every fair-minded person must see that it is an Italo-Slav region, in which neither of the races that live together there can claim the right of imposing its own exclusive nationality.

This being so, it seems probable that, should it be possible to create a new Serbo-Sloveno-Croatian State, the apportionment of the Julian Veneto to Italy would be the solution which would create the fewest difficulties in daily administration, and would most quickly induce the Italians and Slavs to shake down together in the contested regions, while it would have the further result of more solidly assuring good relations between Italy and the Slav State.

We do not pretend that the Italians in the Julian Veneto are the 'superior race,' as the Italian Nationalists childishly imagine, nor can we fail to recognise that the Italian Government, in its administration of the region, will have great difficulty in restraining the tendency towards reprisals and *vendette* against the Slavs, because a half-century of ferocious fighting in those regions has perverted too many spirits and destroyed in them every sentiment of equity and liberty; and we cannot even

guarantee that the Italian Government, under the pressure of local hatreds, will not commit errors, perhaps great ones. But, on the other hand, it is not credible that the political agitators for Slav Nationalism have not been at least as much perverted and envenomed by the methods of the Austrian Government as the Italian Nationalist politicians, nor that *their* mania for persecution and violence might not make itself felt in the government of the new Slav State; still less that this Government, as against the Italian Government, could possibly be the only infallibly just Government recorded in human history.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that the Italians in the Julian Veneto constitute the most cultivated and refined social element, that they predominate in almost all the larger cities, are established at the head of such a great centre of political life as Trieste, and have a larger historical tradition of civilisation and government. They present, in brief, the characteristics requisite to assure to the region conditions of well-being, of order, and of a civilisation superior to that which could be hoped for from a rural Slav multitude, constrained by the sterility of the soil they dwell on to a life of exhausting exertion and of comparative rudeness. Trieste, administered by Italy, especially in the first years of the new *régime*, would certainly not be a bed of roses for an Italian Government desirous—as indeed it must be, even in its own interests—of maintaining legal equality and peaceful relations between the Italian majority and the Slovenian minority; but what a real Inferno the town would become if it were part of the new Slav State, with the Italian majority assailed on every side by Slovenian Nationalism!

Naturally, the Slavs who would be included in the new Italian frontiers must obtain guarantees that their own cultural liberty will be respected, and that they will enjoy perfect equality before the law with the Italian majority; and there is nothing to hinder this guarantee receiving the solemn sanction of an international pact. The problem of the treatment of national minorities is not one that belongs exclusively to the Julian Veneto; it presents itself in Alsace-Lorraine, in Bohemia, in Poland, in all lands inhabited by mixed races. It must be decided by the Peace Congress, with guarantees of an international

character. These guarantees Italy must not only give but maintain.

The military side of the problem cannot be passed over. In no part of the district of Gorizia is it possible to establish a military frontier which can protect the Veneto against attacks from the east, unless it be the heights almost as far as the forest of Ternova. The plain to the west of Gorizia, inhabited by Italians, has no possible line of defence. On the other hand, the State which is master of the heights between the Isonzo and Laibach can utilise various lines of defence against an assault from below.

Eastern Istria dominates, from the naval base of Pola, the whole of the upper Adriatic; and the maritime inferiority of Italy is aggravated by the political circumstance that, while the Italian forces are paralysed, as regards any offensive movement against the cities of the Istrian coast, by the fact that they are inhabited by Italians, the Austrian offensive from Pola against the Italian coast is not restrained by any preoccupation due to racial solidarity.

The incorporation in Italy of Istria, as far as the Vena Mountains and Monte Maggiore, represents no great peril for Slovenia and Croatia. In fact, on the other side of the suggested Italian frontier, the mountainous land continues for a long distance, with many excellent lines of defence. By sea, in the Gulf of Quarnero, if Italy should gain, along with Istria, the double island, Lussino-Cherso (territory ethnically mixed, with a slight Croatian predominance), and the Slav State should take the other islands, a condition of perfect equilibrium would be created; the Slav powers could not make use of the Gulf of Quarnero to threaten the Italian coast, nor would the Italian forces care about venturing into the gulf to menace the Slav coast. In short, even from the military point of view, every consideration of equity suggests that, if this ethnically mixed region were given to Italy, one cause of Italy's unfair weakness on land and sea would be eliminated, so that, in a feeling of reciprocal security, friendly relations between Italy and the Jugo-Slav State might arise such as have been rendered impossible between Italy and Austria by mutual suspicions and anxiety.



The Slovenian Nationalists lay claim to Trieste, because Trieste is the only possible port for the Slovenian back-country. But by this rule Switzerland ought to have Piedmont and Genoa, Germany would have been in her rights in conquering Belgium and Antwerp, and the Magyars could lay claim to Croatia and Fiume. The inhabitants of every back-country have a right to demand of the countries and ports which serve it, not political dominion, but free transit for imports and exports without payment of customs. And it would be in Italy's interest, installed politically at Trieste, to concede unconditionally to the inland territory this freedom of transit, of which, in fact, the port of Trieste would have need if it wished to prosper. Nor could Italy reasonably refuse to conclude with the Slav State conventions for the port of Trieste analogous to those which assure to Switzerland the free use of the Ligurian ports and the Italian railways. Indeed, international guarantees might also be given to these conventions in the Peace Treaty. For the Slavs to demand of the port of Trieste more than this would show such an evident desire to get the upper hand that all parties in Italy would unite against it.

The Slav Nationalists refuse this solution of the problem of the Julian Veneto because they aspire to suppress Italy on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, and to make the new Slav State the heir of the hated Adriatic claims of Austria as against Italy. They are under a fatal illusion if they think that the group of little more than a million Slovenes, who live between the Germans of Austria and the coast of the Adriatic, could by themselves suffocate the Italians in the Adriatic and at the same time defend themselves against the Germans. Fortunately, however, the problem of Gorizia, of Trieste and of Istria will not be decided by the Slav Nationalists, nor even by the Italian Nationalists, who are no better. It will be decided by the responsible men of the Italian and Serbian Governments; and it is to be hoped that these Governments will not fail to respond to the control and pressure of all the reasonable and loyal men of the Allied nations who are in league against Germany.

Whoever bases his views, without partisan preconceptions and without national arrogance, on good sense and equity, cannot, unless we are quite mistaken, fail to



recognise that, not only in the interest of the local population, not only in the interest of Italy, but in the interest of the future peace of Europe, the least unsatisfactory solution which can be suggested for the problem of the Julian Veneto is the following: (a) the incorporation of the Julian Veneto in Italy, with that land frontier which, while giving Italy the least extension possible in Slav territory towards the coast, will afford her a satisfactory line of military defence; (b) international guarantees of cultural liberty and equality before the law for the Slav population included in the new Italian frontier; (c) the right to commercial transit, free from customs duties, through the port of Trieste for all the inhabitants of the back-country.

*The Problem of Fiume.*

Fiume, without counting the 6000 Magyars, who almost all have been artificially brought to live there, and the 3000 citizens of other nationalities, who have no importance in the present enquiry, is inhabited by 24,000 Italians and 15,000 Slavs. It is divided from the industrial suburb, Sussak, which contains 11,000 Serbo-Croatians and 1500 Italians, by a river and a bridge. But, while Sussak forms part of Croatia, Fiume enjoys, or rather should enjoy, an autonomous constitution which separates it from the kingdom of Croatia and associates it from the juridical point of view, as a unit diverse from Croatia, with the kingdom of Hungary, among the so-called 'Crown-lands of St Stephen.'

So long as the Magyars respected this constitution, that is to say down to the last years of the 19th century, Fiume lived at peace. In 1902, although the first signs of Magyar greed had begun to reveal themselves, Pasquale Villari found it still 'sufficiently satisfied with its present status. No one in Fiume, nor, in fact, anywhere in Dalmatia, is talking of Irredentism; there does not even exist there a Committee of the National League for the defence of the Italian language, which for the moment does not appear to be in any way threatened.'\* But the Magyars began to lay claim to making Fiume Magyar, as they claimed to do with Croatia; and their brutal political

\* Villari, 'Discussioni critiche,' Bologna: Zanichelli, 1905.

programme of oppression has given rise to tenacious resistance, to violent fighting, in which the Italian or 'autonomous' faction has desperately and honourably defended the citizen franchises against a Government without honour or probity. The fights between the Italians of Fiume and the Government of Budapest became complicated with those between the Italians and the Croats, the latter (in concurrence with the Magyars) insisting on their right to dominate in Fiume and drive out the Italians. When the defence of the old citizen autonomy, not only against the Magyars but also against the Croats, revealed itself as fraught with difficulties, there began to appear the first signs of Italian Irredentism, initiated by young men educated in Italy.

This urban nucleus, isolated from its own suburb and from all the territory behind it, the commercial centre of a gulf whose shores are inhabited by Serbo-Croats, opening directly towards a sea on whose eastern coast dwell some 3,500,000 Serbo-Croats, is undeniably a centre two-thirds of whose inhabitants are Italian; and these Italians are without doubt the richest and most cultivated portion of the community, and form the political and administrative *personnel* of the place. But to unite to Italy the 24,000 Italians of Fiume, the 1500 Italians of Sussak, and that other thousand or so of Italians who are scattered through the district of Volosca, would mean also incorporating the 50,000 Slavs of Eastern Istria, the 15,000 Slavs of Fiume and the 11,000 Slavs of Sussak, besides an uncertain number of thousand Slavs to the north and east of Fiume.

The problem of the just defence of the Italians of Fiume can be solved by a less wholesale method than simple annexation. It is not necessary to throw overboard in a moment such a long and uninterrupted historical tradition as that which has made of Fiume one of those 'autonomous cities,' whose number is perhaps destined to increase in those places which geography indicates as the *rendezvous* of races. If the ancient autonomous constitution were reestablished, adapted to the new times, and defended against the encroachments of Croatian Nationalism, and Italy became the guarantor of the Constitution of Fiume, this solution would conciliate all the ethnical and national claims. As guarantor of Fiume's

autonomy, Italy would have the right to intervene to protect her compatriots, if ever its autonomy were infringed by the Croatians.

Italy has in its territory a Republic of San Marino; Croatia, for her part, would have in Fiume *her* Republic of San Marino; that would be all. The autonomous constitution of the Municipality of Fiume, guaranteed by Italy, would form a part of all that system of international guarantees, with which Italy would assure cultural liberty and legal equality to the Slav minority included in the new Italian frontiers, while the Slav State would do the same by the Italian minority. The necessity of treating Fiume in an exceptional manner is determined by the fact that Fiume is a large centre of active and easily excited townsmen, which cannot in any way be compared with the small agglomerations, chiefly rural, in the Julian Veneto. If even in these rural centres it will be prudent for Italy to give the largest possible measure of tolerance to the existing traditional institutions, the necessity is even more evident in a city like Fiume, on which Croatian Nationalism would be always tempted to encroach if an international pact did not restrain it.

The campaign for the political annexation by Italy of Fiume and of eastern Istria is carried on not only by the group of *Irredentisti* at Fiume, but also by the Italians at Trieste in the interest of the commerce of their town. Trieste and Fiume are at almost equal distances respectively from Vienna and from Budapest. Hitherto, between Trieste and Fiume, that is to say between the Austrian Government which rules in Trieste, and the Hungarian Government in Fiume, there has been arranged a series of port and railway agreements by which Fiume has served chiefly Hungary and Croatia, and Trieste the Austrian countries proper, not, however, without depriving Fiume of a part of the Hungarian trade, thanks to the better position of the port of Trieste in relation to the countries behind, and thanks also to the advantages possessed by the Trieste-Budapest railway over the line from Fiume to Budapest.

The people of Trieste fear that these agreements will be cancelled, to the damage of Trieste, by the new Serbo-Croatian State if it should get possession of Fiume.

And in fact the Jugo-Slavs, if they became the political rulers not only of the port of Fiume but of all the territory immediately behind the port of Trieste, could easily create a system of railway tariffs which would concentrate in the port of Fiume not the commerce of Hungary and Croatia alone, but also that of Slovenia and Austria-Bohemia, thus ruining the port of Trieste. As the only remedy to this injustice and peril, it is proposed to put both Trieste and Fiume under the same Italian political *régime*, which should use its power over the tariff to draw to each port the commerce of its respective back-country.

But it is evident that Italian occupation of the port of Fiume would not solve the problem at all. The Jugo-Slav State, politically excluded from Fiume, would seek a port further south; and, being always in possession of the railways which unite their respective interior territories to Trieste and to Fiume as well as to the new port further south, they would have the means, by an artificial system of railway charges, to weaken the Italian ports in favour of their own Slav port. Nor would Italy, even if she took over all the ports of the Adriatic, be able to regulate according to her own desires the commerce of each port with its back-country; on the contrary, every attempt which Italy made to monopolise or to control in her own way the commerce of the eastern Adriatic would naturally push the new Slav State to seek its own greater economic independence in the direction of Salonica, or even in that of the northern ports, relying on the friendship of Germany to strengthen them against Italy.

There is, however, a solution which would conciliate the legitimate interests of both Trieste and Fiume—namely: a railway and customs agreement annexed to the Peace Treaty, according to which the railway lines which connect Trieste and Fiume with their respective back-countries would be put under a joint control, and the railways and customs tariffs arranged on the basis of excluding any artificial rivalry between the two towns, distributing the lands behind them between these two centres of traffic according to the natural zone of influence of each.

Another point to be arranged at the Peace Conference

is that of the transit and of the tariffs between the Italo-Slovenian territory and an independent Bohemia, across the German zone which will still interpose itself between Slovenia and Bohemia. A politically independent Bohemia enjoying free transit towards Trieste would not be constrained to make use, for all its needs, of the route of the Elbe and the ports of the north; it would contribute to the prosperity of the port of Trieste and of Adriatic commerce, and would be the natural ally of the Jugo-Slavs and of the Italians. It would be necessary, however, to put the railway communications between Slovenia and Bohemia, which cross the Archduchy of Austria, under a mixed Jugo-Slav, Italian, German and Bohemian administration. And it would remain to be seen whether it might not be convenient to institute, in the port of Trieste, zones especially reserved for Slovenia, for Austria and for Bohemia, analogous to those which Serbia obtained at Salonica in the Treaty of London.

*The Problem of Dalmatia.*

The strip of coast which stretches for about five hundred kilometres from Zara to the Bocche di Cattaro, along with the chain of islands which faces it in the middle Adriatic, contains, according to the census of 1910, 610,000 Serbo-Croatians and 18,000 Italians.\* But the Italians are certainly more numerous than this. Graziadio Ascoli, a man of the highest scientific authority and of unquestioned probity, calculated in 1895 that the Italians of Dalmatia amounted to 40,000, besides the 20,000 'bilingual seamen' of fluctuating nationality. Pasquale Villari also, in 1902, calculated their number at 'a little less than 40,000.' The results of the elections, by universal suffrage, in 1911 point the same way. These, in fact, give us the following numbers:

Population .. ..	628,000
Inscribed Electors .. ..	144,000
Total of Votes cast .. ..	81,000
Serbo-Croatian Votes .. ..	75,000
Italian Votes .. ..	6,000

Supposing that the population is distributed between Italians and Serbo-Croatians in proportion to the voters,

\* In the census of 1900, 565,000 Serbo-Croatians and 15,000 Italians.

the conclusion is that the Italians form 8 per cent. of the population, that is to say, about 45,000 out of 628,000. But one must remember that it is more than likely that a smaller proportion of Italians than of Slavs abstained from voting, partly because a minority has a greater desire to affirm itself than a majority; partly because, being more educated, the Italians must have felt more clearly the value of a national affirmation; and also because, living in the towns, they had greater facilities for casting their votes than the rural Slav multitude scattered in myriads of little centres with scanty means of communication. Thus we see that the town of Zara, with 13,000 inhabitants, has 2700 voters, of whom 2100 are Italians; on the other hand, the electoral district of Imoski, with 14,367 inscribed voters, gives only 1749 Slav votes and 89 Italian, while in the elections of 1907, 4200 Slav votes were cast. That the Italians were more active than the Slavs in the Dalmatian elections becomes clear from the elections of 1909 for the Diet, in which there voted (according to the '*Österreichisches Statistisches Handbuch*') 60·7 per cent. of the electors inscribed in the Curia of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and 41·1 per cent. in the Urban Communes, in both of which Italian elements are contending; while only 20·7 per cent. voted in the rural Communes, which are compactly Slav. On the basis of these considerations it would appear that the Italians must be somewhat less than 55,000, more likely 40,000 or thereabouts.

Even supposing the Italians to number so much as 60,000, it is evident that they do not constitute in Dalmatia more than a weak minority scattered in little groups in the midst of an ocean of Slavs. And even this numerical inferiority is aggravated by the circumstance that about one-third of them are concentrated in the town of Zara, where they form the great majority. This circumstance, assuring their prevalence in this one exceptional point, further diminishes the Italian minority disseminated in the other centres and accentuates its smallness.

It is true that the Italians concentrated in the coast towns of Dalmatia belong to the upper and middle classes, and are more refined than the Slav populace. But, except in Zara, they nowhere constitute the majority of even the ruling classes. Ascoli in 1895 calculated that



the Italians constituted a quarter of the ruling classes; and the fact that the Italians in Dalmatia pay thirty per cent. of the ground taxes confirms this calculation, as there are several Italians among the larger proprietors, thus probably making several divisions of small Slav ownings correspond in fact to one Italian tax unit. The Slav population in Dalmatia has its own ruling class, which is three times more numerous than the Italian ruling class; it has its own schools, its own newspapers, its own political and economic organisations; it administered, before the war, the provincial Diet and all the communes of the region, except that of Zara; its high culture, in comparison with the Slav populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina—and it is a superiority due to Italian influence—has strongly accentuated its national sentiment. And, even admitting that the Austrian Government may have in the past helped to arouse this sentiment and to exasperate it against the Italians, there cannot exist to-day in Italy a single reasonable person, acquainted with the real state of things, who can believe that Italy would be able to denationalise this region and bring back the good old times when it was regarded as a colony of the Venetian Republic.

The only fair and equitable solution of the Dalmatian problem is that Italy should recognise the right of the enormous Slav majority in this region to join itself to the Southern-Slav nation. In admitting this, Italy would do no more and no less than remain faithful to the traditions of her own national *Risorgimento*.

In 1865 Niccolo Tommaseo wrote:

'We do not believe that Dalmatia can now be attached to Italy, because our age is entirely different from that of the Venetian Republic, because Italy has in herself too many difficulties and perils to seek further ones across the water, and because, while it has always been difficult to rule men speaking another language, for Italy now it would be impossible when their aim is to institute we do not say material equality but civil equity.'\*

On the eve of the war of 1866, the official Milanese organ, 'La Perseveranza,' declared:

'Italy desires her natural frontiers, desires the provinces

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\* 'Il Serio nel faceto,' p. 285.



which were torn from her, desires everything from the Brenner to the Quarnero; but her aspirations do not go beyond. It may turn out that the exigences of war will require a more or less long military occupation of some points on the Adriatic coast; these are necessities of a temporary and inevitable character. Once the war finished, everyone will return to his own house.\*

In 1866 Giuseppe Mazzini wrote:

'Istria is ours—as necessary to Italy as the ports of Dalmatia are to the southern Slavs.'†

'The eastern frontiers of Italy were settled since the time when Dante wrote,

". . . to Pola in the Quarnero  
Which closes Italy and bathes its limits."

'Istria is ours. But from Fiume along the eastern arm of the Adriatic up to the river Boiano on the borders of Albania, there stretches a zone in which, among the remains of our colonies, the Slav element predominates. This zone of the Adriatic coast, not stopping at Cattaro, embraces Dalmatia and the Montenegrin region. . . . Conquering for the Slavs of Montenegro the port they have need of, the Bocche di Cattaro, and for the Slavs of Dalmatia the principal towns of the eastern coast . . . making herself an agent in the rising of the Illyrian Slavs . . . Italy would acquire, before all other nations, a right to expect kindly feelings and economic advantages from the entire Slav race.'‡

With all this, we do not say that in the solution of the Dalmatian question Italy has no rights to safeguard. She must, in fact, before everything else require the new Slav State to assure to the Italian minority its cultural liberty and its legal equality, with international guarantees analogous to those which would be granted by Italy to the Slav population in the Julian Veneto. Supilo, questioned by an Italian Deputy, Signor Bevione, as to whether the Slavs would consent to cede Northern Dalmatia to Italy, replied that the Jugo-Slav nation could not accept treaties opposed to its national honour.

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\* 'I Diritti dell' Italia: Trieste e l'Istria,' etc., pp. 423-431. Rome: Bocca, 1915.

† Quoted by Saffi, 'Ricordi e Scritti,' xiv, p. 235.

‡ 'Scritti editi ed inediti,' xvi, 143, 152.

And he was right. But the Italian nation, too, would be dishonoured if it abandoned without defence the Italians of Dalmatia to the tender mercies of the Serbo-Croatian majority, especially after the exasperation between Italian Nationalists and Slav Nationalists created in peoples' spirits by the brutal and ill-intentioned polemics of the last three years. The existence of international treaties to safeguard the Italian minority will give power to the central Jugo-Slav Government to resist the attempts which the Dalmatian Slav Nationalists will certainly make to induce it to annul in local life all the rights of Italians. Among the guarantees of the Italian minority it would be opportune to give the municipality of Zara an autonomous constitution analogous to that guaranteed by Italy to Fiume. The considerations that favour a special treatment for Fiume point towards a similar treatment for Zara.

Besides all this, there is also a problem of military equilibrium to be resolved in Dalmatia. Still more than in the upper Adriatic, there exists between the eastern and the western coasts of the middle Adriatic, an enormous disproportion of military advantage, as against Italy. The Italian coast, from the mouths of the Po to the Gargano, is everywhere open to bombardment from the sea, deprived of good anchorage, sown with populous towns,\* with a railway line between Termoli and Rimini running along the coast, which cannot be laid further inland because of the Appennines. On the other hand, the shores of the Dalmatian mainland are not only marked by few and small urban centres,† but are

\* Cervia, 10,000 inhabitants; Cesenatico, 9000; Bellaria, 4000; Rimini, 45,000; Riccione, 4000; Cattolica, 4000; Pesaro, 27,000; Fano, 27,000; Sinigaglia, 23,000; Falconara, 7000; Ancona, 63,000; Porto Recanati, 4500; Porto Civitanuova, 5000; Porto S. Giorgio, 5000; Cupra Marittima, 3000; Grottamare, 4000; S. Benedetto del Tronto, 10,000; Giulianova, 3000; Castellamare Adriatico, 12,000; Pescara, 8000; Francavilla al Mare, 6000; Ortona, 16,000; Vasto, 15,000; Termoli, 5000; Lesina, 3000; Rodi Garganico, 5000; Peschici, 3000; Vieste, 7000. In this enumeration there do not appear either the smaller centres of less than 3000 inhabitants, or those populous towns, such as Ravenna, for instance, which are not actually on the sea, although they are at a very short distance from it.

† The only centres which have more than 10,000 inhabitants are Zara, Sebenico (at the end of an easily defensible channel), and Spalato; then come Ragusa (8000), Traù and Cattaro (at the end of another easily defensible channel) with little over 3000 inhabitants; Capocesto has 2800; while

protected everywhere by a double, in some places a triple barrier of islands, on whose coasts only a few scanty communities are to be found, from whose heights the sea can be explored in all directions, in whose channels military and merchant navigation can have free scope. 'Dalmatia,' said the Croatian Deputy, Smolaka, at the Reichsrath of Vienna, on Dec. 3, 1910, 'Dalmatia, with its 500 kilometres of coast-line, and its hundred ports, dominates the Adriatic.'\*

To sum up, the Italian coast of the middle Adriatic is, in respect to Dalmatia, in a much worse position than that of the East Coast of England in respect to the Kiel Canal. Dalmatia, in fact, is much nearer to Italy; and the Power in possession there has at least as many chances of surprising the opposite Italian coast by bombardments and of intercepting her mercantile and military communications between the north and south as Germany would have if she possessed all the coast from Calais to Heligoland.

As opposed to Austria, a state of 50,000,000 inhabitants, mistress of both Dalmatia and Istria, Italy found herself in a dangerous position, and was obliged to exhaust herself in maintaining naval armaments superior to those of Austria in order to correct as much as possible her natural inferiority. The *status quo* in the Balkans, to which Italy always clung desperately, until the war came in to upset all the ancient arrangements, had this simple purpose—to hinder Austria from seizing Montenegro and Albania, and becoming mistress of the Bocche of Cattaro and of Vallona, and thus assuring herself of the absolute dominion in the lower Adriatic, where the Apulian coast becomes even more populous† and even less capable of defence than the coast of the middle Adriatic.

In the new territorial arrangement which this war

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Razance, San Cassiano, Zara Vecchia, Zlosela, Stretta, Vodice, Ragoznica, Castelnuovo, Castelvechio, Almissa, Macarska, Podgora, and Risano count from 1000 to 2050 inhabitants.

\* Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 406-416.

† Manfredonia, 13,500 inhabitants; Trinitapoli, 12,000; Margherita di Savola, 7000; Barletta, 44,000; Trani, 31,000; Bisceglie, 31,000; Molfetta, 43,000; Giovinazzo, 11,000; Bari, 103,000; Mola di Bari, 15,000; Polignano a Mare, 8500; Brindisi, 28,000; Otranto, 3000.

will create, Italy should obtain on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, north and south, the naval bases of Pola and Vallona. Her position would then be markedly better. But the problem of the security of her coast in the middle Adriatic and of her railway and maritime communications between the northern and the southern basins of this sea, will not be changed to her advantage if every readjustment to correct her inferiority is denied her. It might indeed be said that the new Jugo-Slav State, with its 11-12,000,000 inhabitants, would of course be a much weaker state than Austria, and would consequently be less of a menace to Italy. But the future lies on the knees of the gods; no one can be sure that the course of international politics may not eventually lead the Jugo-Slavs to ally themselves with Germany against Italy, or to take part in a general Balkan Confederation which would create a Great Power in the Adriatic and the *Ægean*, or in some other way to join an international combination which should augment their military potentiality on the sea. If England in 1890 had been able to foresee the present war, she would certainly not have ceded the island of Heligoland to Germany; nor to-day would it be prudent for her to cede Malta to Italy, in spite of the fact that for thirty years Italy has been her ally in the Mediterranean. It is not unreasonable and illegitimate, then, if Italy, as a reward for her great sacrifices in this war, should ask not only the freeing of the Italians in the Trentino and the Julian Veneto from the Austrian yoke, but also her greatest possible security in the Adriatic.

The Italian Nationalists, in order to solve this problem, lay claim to the occupation by Italy of all the islands and the whole strip of the Dalmatian coast from Zara to Bocche di Cattaro. The less indiscreet would renounce only the coast between the mouths of the river Narenta and the Bocche di Cattaro. These claims are not only iniquitous from the point of view of national rights, but unjustifiable even from the military point of view.

The occupation of the whole of Dalmatia by Italy, while it would give a radical solution to the naval problem by making the Adriatic into an Italian lake, would nevertheless create a further formidable problem for Italy—that of defending a frontier of 500 kilometres on the

other side of the water. In case of war, Italy would have to immobilise many hundreds of thousands of soldiers whom she would urgently need for the defence of the Julian Veneto; and, in order to supply this army, immobilised in Dalmatia, she would have to use an enormous supplementary fleet in the Adriatic which she would only too sorely require for other more vital needs. Suppose, however, the Jugo-Slavs possessed the coast from Narenta to Antivari, then, it is true, the frontier which Italy would have to defend would be shorter, and would require few forces; but she would have to protect against the menace of the positions of Gravosa and of the Bocche di Cattaro not alone the Italian coast but the communications with her army in Dalmatia as well—that is to say, the Italian navy in the Adriatic would have to employ a much greater force than would be needful merely to protect the east coast of Italy.

That Italy must seek guarantees of security on the east coast of the middle Adriatic is the truth. But the middle Adriatic has three coast lines—an external line, made by the outer islands; an internal line, made by the coast of the mainland; and a middle line made by the islands between the outer islands and the mainland. If Italy should get one or more of the outer islands as bases necessary for the security of her eastern coast and for the movement of her navy from the lower to the upper Adriatic, she ought to ask for nothing more.

The Jugo-Slav State would not be in any way menaced by this occupation, for the Italian naval bases would serve merely to prevent the Slav navy from coming out of the archipelago to disturb the middle Adriatic, exactly as the possession of Pola and Lussino-Cherso would guarantee the position of Italy in the upper Adriatic; while the line of the internal islands, which would belong to the Slav State along with the coast of the mainland, would form an insurmountable obstacle to Italy if she claimed to pass from defence to attack. Only an admiral who had lost the use of his reason would dare to risk his navy in that labyrinth of channels.

Without doubt the islands that would thus fall to Italy's share—and just which they would be is a technical problem subordinate to the acceptance of the political principle—would be chiefly or almost wholly inhabited

by Slavs. But these do not number more than twenty or at most thirty thousand; and Italy could guarantee to them the most complete administrative autonomy and commercial liberty, reserving for herself only the high sovereignty and the indispensable right of fortification and military control. Nor is the principle of national right, in the modern conscience, so absolute that it can never, in small things, yield to other criteria of equity and opportunity. No man of good sense would take Gibraltar from England, because its vital importance to secure the communication of England with Egypt and India is so evident; nevertheless from the strict standpoint of nationality Gibraltar should be Spanish. What is required to decide the matter in these cases is that the military necessities should be obvious, and not such as to lead to the enslaving or the serious mutilation of whole nations, like the claims of the Germans in Belgium, Poland, France, Rumania and Serbia. Italy ceded to France in 1859 not only Savoy, which was a region incontestably French, but also the county of Nice, which at that time was quite as incontestably Italian and the fatherland of Garibaldi; and to-day there cannot be found more than a few *exaltés* Italian Nationalists who dream of wanting to take back Nice and its county. This renunciation, which we made in the past and which no one of us to-day even discusses, inclines us to believe that some slight exception to the principle of nationality in our own favour might to-day be tolerated by the Slavs.

*Territorial Compromise and National Guarantees.*

The necessity of solving the problem of the Adriatic by means of a compromise was recognised by the governments of Italy, Russia, France and England, in the Convention of London of April 1915. According to what was then settled, if the rumours that have been circulated are exact, the Slavs would have Fiume, the coast of Croatia, the middle and southern coast of Dalmatia from Spalato south, and the islands of Brazza, Curzola and Lesina. Italy would get all the other islands, the Julian Veneto, and an *enclave* on the Dalmatian mainland which should include the districts of Zara and Sebenico as far as Traù. Serbia took no part in this



Convention; and at the moment of writing (Sept. 17, 1917) there has been no official or semi-official statement that she has accepted these conditions either in her own name or in the name of the other Southern Slavs, whose moral representative she claims to be.

This compromise has, before everything else, the fundamental merit of being a *compromise*, that is to say of being based on the conception that both Italian and Slav interests can be conciliated by a solution intermediate between the claims of each. Furthermore, given the wild exaggeration of Slav Nationalism—twin-brother to Italian Nationalism!—it has the merit of placing Serbia face-to-face with an agreement of the four Great European Powers of the anti-German coalition instead of with Italy alone. It will be anything but an evil that the Serbian Government should have to reconcile its claims with the necessity of not putting itself in opposition to all the greater Allied Governments. The Convention of London, however, like all human creations, is by no means so perfect that it cannot be improved; and it is to be hoped it will be improved when the time comes for Italy's treating directly with Serbia.

From the preceding pages, it should be clear which articles in the Convention of London require amendment. From the Italian point of view it has the defect of abandoning, for inclusion in Slav territory, without any guarantee of cultural liberty or legal equality, the Italian nucleus at Fiume and the Italians who are scattered in central and southern Dalmatia; further, it fails to protect the port of Trieste against the competition of the railway lines that serve Fiume, if they should avail themselves of an artificial system of tariffs. From the Slav point of view, on the other hand, the Convention of London is unsatisfactory in this respect, that, while it equitably assigns to the Serbo-Sloveno-Croatian State the ports of Fiume and Spalato, which are indispensable for the economic life of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, it takes away the districts of Zara and Sebenico, districts indisputably Slav (except the actual town of Zara), and cuts off also several islands which nevertheless would furnish Italy with no important advantages.

On these points Italy could very well make friendly concessions, asking in return for compensation on the



points on which the compromise of 1915 is defective as towards herself. And since, on the basis of this compromise, Italy's renunciations would be rather more than her gains, it would not be out of place for her, in order to equalise the division, to ask from Serbia the neutralisation of all the coast of the mainland from Fiume to Antivari, and of the adjacent islands. The naval bases which Italy would own in the upper and middle Adriatic would remain disarmed so long as the pact of neutralisation was loyally observed by the Slav States; but these bases would guarantee the Italian coasts against the day when the relations between Italy and the Jugo-Slav State might become strained and the pact of neutralisation cease to be respected.

The methods for securing cultural liberty and legal equality to the Slav communities incorporated in Italy and the Italian populations remaining in the Slav State would have to be worked out in detail. Without pretending to exhaust the theme or to excogitate perfect proposals, I may perhaps venture to indicate the points deserving attention and the practical arrangements necessary for solving the problem.

The Italians who may remain scattered in Dalmatia, outside of the two autonomous towns (Fiume and Zara) should be guaranteed the use of the Italian language in the Law Courts of the region, in the administration of the mixed communes (to be particularised), and in the Diet. This would have the effect of forcing the Dalmatian magistrates of grades superior to that of Justice of the Peace, as well as all the functionaries of the mixed communes, and those of the provincial Diet, to speak Italian as well as Serbo-Croatian. In consequence, in the middle Serbo-Croatian schools of Dalmatia, the teaching of Italian as a complementary language would become obligatory; and, *vice versa*, the middle Italian schools of Dalmatia would have to teach Serbo-Croatian as an obligatory complementary tongue.

The schools of all grades would have to be administered in Dalmatia by two educational district-councils, one Italian and one Serbo-Croatian, which would sit together only when they had to deliberate upon matters of common interest. The two educational councils would be elected by the heads of families belonging to one or

the other of the ethnic groups according to their declaration of option at the time when the electoral school lists were framed. The schools would be maintained by means of a special school tax, leaving each contributing group to pay for the administration of its own establishments. The school grants which the Diet might accord would be distributed between the two administrations in proportion to the population served by each.

As it is not possible to pretend that Dalmatia ought to have a special College for the small number of Italian students, Dalmatian graduates of the middle Italian schools should have permission to pursue their University studies in Italy; and the Italian degrees granted to Dalmatian students should hold good for the exercise of the learned professions in Dalmatia.

All elections should take place on the system of proportional representation and universal suffrage. The same system should be followed by the electing bodies in nominating the special Commissions (electoral commissions, board of assessments, etc.). Italy would naturally concede analogous guarantees to the Slav population of the Julian Veneto.

An Italo-Slav Bank should assist those Italians and Slavs to emigrate and to sell their real estate, who may not be satisfied with the guarantees of the Adriatic Statute for the protection of national minorities. The Italian and Slav Governments might also appoint a permanent Arbitration Commission, whose function it would be to decide all cases of conflict which might arise in the interpretation and application of the Italo-Slav Statute regulating the administrative life of the mixed Adriatic territories both in Dalmatia and in the Julian Veneto. The Arbitration Commission might itself be presided over by an Arbitrator appointed by the Hague Tribunal.

These suggestions are, of course, based upon the assumption of the good faith of both Governments in arranging the whole of this juridical system, and on their firm intention of imposing upon all local elements a scrupulous adherence to the pacts. For the first years it will indeed be no easy task either for the Italian Government or the Government of the new Slav State. What glory, however, for the statesmen of the two nations if they succeed in creating and realising a new

type of legal guarantee which might serve, for the peace of the world, as the inspiration of all ethnically mixed countries in solving the difficult problem of national minorities!

English and French publicists could greatly help in creating and consolidating good relations between Italians and Slavs if they would treat the Adriatic problem with tact and a sentiment of equity. Unfortunately certain writers, both in England and in France, have not yet understood the situation, and are more or less violent partisans and upholders of the extremest claims of the Slav Nationalists. The propaganda of these somewhat indiscreet friends of Slavism has produced disastrous effects in Italy. Not only does it make more difficult the work of those who, resisting the claims of the Italian Nationalists, affirm the necessity of an Italo-Slav accord and compromise, but it plays only too well the game of the pro-German elements, which are always active in Italy, working to keep alive rancour and suspicion between Italians and Slavs in order to further Germany's political schemes, and only too delighted to present French and English public opinion as favourable to the excesses of Slav Nationalism and thus hostile to Italy. We do not ask foreign publicists to espouse the cause of Italian Nationalism against the Slavs, as in fact some have done in the intention of pleasing the Italians. England and France ought to be the common friends of both Italy and Serbia and mediate between them; public opinion in these two countries should not second the excesses of either Nationalist party, but should reinforce, both in Italy and among the Slavs, only the conciliatory and modern currents of opinion.

The foregoing study presents to the English public ideas which the writer, with his friends and associates, upheld in Italy down to the winter of 1914-1915, while Italy still maintained its neutrality; and which they and he have continued during the course of the present war to uphold and spread in their country, meeting, it is true, many obstacles, but attaining also useful results. The article was written some months ago, when no one foresaw the tragic military reverse of October-November,

and it is now published without any changes, as if no new facts had supervened in the military field, either to Italy's advantage or the opposite.

The dolorous crisis which threw the military organisation of Italy into sudden confusion has destroyed neither our faith in ultimate victory, nor our sense of the duty incumbent on us to continue the fight; nor has it modified in any way the essential elements of the Italo-Slav problem in the Adriatic. If we would secure a just national settlement between the Italians and the Southern Slavs, there is but one possible solution of the Adriatic problem. What was true before the Austro-Germans overran the Venetian plain is equally true now.

Naturally all our arguments fall to the ground if the final victory is Germany's, and the Allies are beaten. But in that case so many other things would vanish into thin air—all, in short, that the world contains of what is just and what is good!—that, in the general disaster, no one would especially mourn the disappearance of the ideas of those who have always, in days of good and days of evil fortune, upheld the necessity of justice in the relations between Italy and the Slavs of the Adriatic.

GAETANO SALVEMINI.

## Art. 12.—TWO DISTINGUISHED GLADSTONIANS.

1. *Selections from the Correspondence of the first Lord Acton*. Edited with an Introduction by John Neville Figgis and Richard Vere Laurence. Vol. I. Longmans, 1917.
2. *Recollections*. By John, Viscount Morley, O. M. Macmillan, 1917.

A HAPPY coincidence in publication has thrown into juxtaposition Lord Morley's 'Recollections' and a fresh volume of Lord Acton's 'Correspondence,' which keeps appearing, as one cannot but regret, under various auspices and with indifferent regard for the convenience of the reader or the credit of the writer. The two men, whose memorials are thus simultaneously submitted to the notice of the public, offer such interesting points of comparison and of contrast, both in opinion and career, that a soul like Plutarch's must have snatched greedily at so delicious an opportunity for moralising and story-telling within the category of similarity and opposition. Eyes much less acute than his would, indeed, discover at a glance enough common ground between the two to make it worth while to trace their distinctive features. Both men, with personalities too independent and knowledge too extensive for discipleship, moved constantly in Gladstone's company, found in him the statesman of their hopes, and entertained for him a regard involving a large measure of veneration—in Acton's case a far larger measure than history will justify or than friendship can explain. Their appreciation of him sprang in the first instance from a common belief in individualism, in the freedom of the individual from interference, such as we can hardly know again, at least in any passionate or philosophic sense. And both men, being students of history, gave, as was natural, much time and thought to a study of the growth and development of personal liberty, Acton seeking to grasp the movement in its long range and earliest origins, Lord Morley illustrating its character from that particular and unhappy phase of its fortunes which occurred in France before the Revolution. Then, again, the study of history has been for both preeminently a school of casuistry or, if we prefer,

a hall of judgment, where characters and causes are brought to trial, and acquitted or condemned with un-sleeping industry. For each of them the ethical has dominated all other considerations.

These are some points of resemblance. The differences are more striking and instructive. Lord Morley's career looks singularly finished. The tale has been well told, the time well used, the talents carefully laid out. As journalist, as man of letters, as statesman, he has met with rare success and recognition; and this in an age of increasing specialisation. In Acton's life, on the other hand, there is all the appearance of failure. The goal seems everywhere just missed. At the outset, as he never forgot, religious disabilities shut him out of the English Universities. In the House of Commons he felt as if he agreed with no one nor anyone with him. He was thought of as Ambassador at Paris, but was just disqualified for want of a diplomatic training and perhaps of another invaluable diplomatic accessory. His great book—a History of Liberty—for which he collected such countless notes, was never written, and faded, even before his own eyes, into a 'Madonna of the Future.' His Cambridge Professorship enabled him to plan but not to edit the 'Cambridge Modern History.' And that work, invaluable and indispensable as it is, just missed the perfection of collaborative composition that he dreamed of, and did not quite satisfy the student or quite charm the amateur. Acton, in truth, seems like the Grammarian in Browning's poem, defiant of time, circumstance, occasion, with which things no prudent man may trifle. For him, but not for Lord Morley, 'man has for ever.'

Here we touch the very root of the contrast. Acton is at heart a mystic, possessed of two worlds, in both of which he has his being.

'He loved retirement and avoided company,' says the strange fragment of self-portraiture which he left among his papers, 'but you might sometimes meet him coming from scenes of sorrow, silent and appalled, as if he had seen a ghost, or in the darkest corners of churches, his dim eyes radiant with light from another world.'

But in Lord Morley's philosophy, as he himself tells us,



repeating once again some old assertions, such dreaming has no place. For him the flaming ramparts of the world stand firm, dazzling the eye and blocking the path of man, strive he never so wisely.

Fundamentally, then, the two men were, as we say, poles asunder. And yet, since the climate of the polar regions is similar, the Catholic and the Agnostic understand one another better than either can understand all the inhabitants of the zones that lie between. Is it a mere chance that Lord Morley has administered, and administered with rare ability, the two offices in the British Cabinet which alone call for a lively religious imagination? At any rate the essay on Joseph de Maistre is there to prove that Ultramontaniam had few secrets for the biographer of the Encyclopædists. And Acton on his part was never tired of pointing out how in George Eliot there existed one who, though only the inhabitant by birth and education of circles where the thought of God was rather contemned than rejected, had, with a genius comparable to that of Sophocles, Dante and Cervantes, preached such virtue as only the noblest Christian writers could surpass. Both men had early achieved that long, first step in intellectual happiness—the sympathetic and dispassionate consideration of opinions one does not share and may even spend one's life in combating.

They were born within four years of each other—Acton in 1834, Lord Morley in 1838—became acquainted over the affairs of Ireland, found common interests in history and politics, and formed a high regard for one another's characters and a high estimate of one another's talents. Acton's praise is, however, the more critical.

'He [John Morley] has the obstinacy of a very honest mind.'

And again:

'As there are for him no rights of God, there are no rights of man—the consequence on earth of obligation in Heaven. Therefore he never tries to adjust his view to many conditions and times and circumstances, but approaches each with a mind uncommitted to devotion and untrammelled by analogies. . . . The consequence of this propensity is that he draws his

conclusions from much too narrow an induction; and that his very wide culture—wide at least for a man to whom all the problems, the ideas, the literature of religion are indifferent and unknown—does not go to the making of his policy. These are large drawbacks, leaving, nevertheless, a mind of singular elasticity, veracity and power, capable of all but the highest things. He seems to me to judge men dispassionately.'

Lord Morley has himself criticised the criticism. He tells us that he is surprised at the imputation of indifference about 'the ideas and literature of religion,' and complains that acquiescence in the second-best in politics is due to no indifference to principles but to the hard teachings of common sense, to which such statesmen as Walpole, Chatham, Peel, were constantly alive. His surprise might, perhaps, diminish if he were to view afresh Acton's list of the hundred best books, where the theological element is so easily master; just as his complaint is doubtless modified by the reflexion that Acton moved always in the high altitudes of political theory and knew little or nothing of the rough-and-tumble life of the practical politician.

His own tribute to Acton is in some respects the most striking in his 'Recollections':

'Friendship is a relation that has many types. On none did I presume to set a more special value than on my intercourse with this observant, powerful, reflective, marvellously full mind. He saw both past history as a whole and modern politics as a whole. He was a profound master of all the lights and shades of ecclesiastical system; a passionately interested master of the bonds between moral truth and the action of political system; an eager explorer of the ideas that help to govern the rise and fall of States; and a scrupulous student of the march of fact, circumstance and personality in which such ideas worked themselves through. He was comprehensive as an encyclopædia, but profound and rich, not tabulated and dry. He was a man who even on one's busiest day could seldom come amiss, so deep and unexpected was he in thought, so impressive without empty pomp of words, so copious, exact and ready in his knowledge. . . .'

The connexion between the two men was not wholly severed by death. The whim or wisdom of one of his admirers placed in Lord Morley's hands the disposal of

Acton's famous library of some sixty thousand volumes bearing on the history of Liberty. He decided not to keep it himself but to give it to Cambridge University, where it rests, a dumb instrument, expecting evermore to be woken to life by the magic touch of a master who returns not again.

In one respect Acton greatly puzzled his acquaintance. As Lord Morley puts it, 'The union of devoted faith in liberty with devoted adherence to the Church of Authority was a standing riddle.' The correspondence which has now appeared throws a good deal of fresh light on this enigma. In a letter of great interest, addressed to Lady Blennerhassett in 1879, Acton discovers the story of his mind.

'It is the story,' he writes, 'of a man who started in life believing himself a sincere Catholic and a sincere Liberal; who therefore renounced everything in Catholicism which was not compatible with Liberty and everything in Politics which was not compatible with Catholicity.'

Believing, then, in civil and religious liberty, he had to reconcile his principles with the opinion that since the twelfth century the violation of religious liberty had been 'associated,' though 'not exactly identified,' with the Papacy.

'The Papacy,' he continues in a most characteristic passage, 'contrived murder and massacre on the largest and also on the most cruel and inhuman scale. . . . Was it better to renounce the Papacy out of horror for its acts, or to condone the acts out of reverence for the Papacy? The Papal party preferred the latter alternative. It appeared to me that such men are infamous in the last degree. I did not accuse them of error, as I might impute it to Grotius or Channing, but of crime. I thought that a person who imitated them for political or other motives (was) worthy of death. But those whose motive was religious seemed to me worse than the others, because that which is in others the last resource of conversion, is with them the source of guilt. The spring of repentance is broken, the conscience is not only weakened but warped. Their prayers and sacrifices appeared to me the most awful sacrilege. The idea of putting on the same level an Ultramontane priest and a priest of licentious life was to me not only monstrous but unintelligible.

'I understood the movement for the glorification of the Papacy as a scheme for the promotion of sin. . . . I heralded the Council \* by pointing out that the Popes had, after long endeavours, nearly succeeded in getting all the Calvinists murdered. It meant: give them any authority or credit that may be their due, but let it be always subject to that limit and condition. Let everything be conceded to them that is compatible with their avowed character and traditions; but see that you do nothing that could shelter them from the scorn and execration of mankind. It is well that an enthusiast for monarchy be forced to bear in mind the story of Nero and Ivan, of Louis XIV and Napoleon; that an enthusiast for democracy be reminded of St Just and Mazzini. It is more essential that an enthusiast of the papacy be made to contemplate its crimes, because its influence is nearer the Conscience, and the spiritual danger of perverted morals is greater than the evil of perverted politics. It is an agency constantly active, pervading life, penetrating the soul by many channels, in almost every sermon and in almost every prayer-book. It is the fiend skulking behind the Crucifix. . . .

'That is my entire capital. It is no reminiscence of Gallicanism. I do not prefer the Sorbonne to the Congregations or the Councils to the Popes. It is no reminiscence of Liberal Catholicism. Rosmini and Lacordaire, Hefele and Falloux, seem to me no better than De Maistre, Veuillot and Perrone. It is nothing but the mere adjustment of religious history to the ethics of Whiggism.'

Such, then, was Acton's own reading of the riddle that puzzled others. His position was altogether singular. His master in historical study opposed the 1870 definition of Papal Infallibility on the ground of doctrine; the Pope was claiming powers, Döllinger urged, for which there was no warranty in the history of the Church. But his own opposition was based upon a subtler point of morals. The decree, if it were carried, would, he contended, seem in some sense a reaffirmation of much that he deplored in the history of religious persecution. Thus, while Döllinger left the Church, Acton found it easy to give Manning the explicit assurance that 'he had no private gloss or favourite interpretation for the Vatican Decrees'; that 'the Acts of the Council alone constituted the law which he recognised.'

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\* The Vatican Council of 1870.

He certainly took a strange way, both before and after the Decrees were carried, to signify his assent. None of his co-religionists would find it easy to explain, much less to defend, the appeals for secular interference to save the Council from itself, which he addressed to Mr Gladstone. He pleaded that pressure to stop the passage of the Decrees should be brought to bear on the Vatican, not alone by the Catholic Governments of France and Bavaria, but by the Protestant Governments of England and Prussia. Then, when the issue was decided, he took occasion to contribute to the 'Times' more than one letter calculated to throw into strong relief some of the ugliest episodes in the annals of the Papacy. In striking at the 'fiend skulking behind the Crucifix,' he seemed to some, like Newman, to be in danger of wounding the hands that sustained the Cross. The foes of the Papacy will certainly find in his writings material of war. But his candour is double-edged; and it is possible to discover in it a nicely balanced vindication of his creed:

'I know,' he wrote, 'that there are some whose feelings of reverence and love are, unhappily, wounded by what I have said. I entreat them . . . to ask themselves seriously the question whether the laws of the Inquisition are, or are not, a scandal and a sorrow to their souls. It would be well if men had never fallen into the error of suppressing truth and encouraging error for the better security of religion. Our Church stands, and our faith should stand, not on the virtues of men, but on the surer ground of an institution and a guidance that are divine. . . . I should dishonour and betray the Church if I entertained a suspicion that the evidences of religion could be weakened, or the authority of councils sapped, by a knowledge of the facts with which I have been dealing, or of others which are not less grievous or less certain because they remain untold.'

This is hardly the place to follow the controversy farther. 'The way out of the scrape,' Acton wrote in 1875, 'will yet be found in insisting upon the authority of tradition as the only lawful rule of interpretation.' *O felices angustiae!* When the mists cleared away, it was found they had carried with them all the extravagant doctrine with which Louis Veuillot and others had striven

to invest the person of the Pope. The tradition of the Church of Rome had been freed from its excrescences.

So much, then, for the ecclesiastical polemics in which Acton was so heavily engaged. A later letter (in French) to Lady Blennerhassett shows that it was precisely as a scientific historian and not as a theologian that he had entered the lists. Defending himself against the charge of excessive severity in his historical judgments, he lays down as the test of political virtue a regard for the sanctity of human life :

*'L'Histoire ne peut pas se servir des systèmes de morale attachés aux religions, car ils ne sont applicables que dans les limites de ces religions. Et une morale indépendante manque à la science. Il faut donc que l'Histoire se compose son propre système. D'abord, il juge par le Code Criminel. Mais là il y a peu de principes universels. . . . Il n'y a d'absolument essentiel que la vie. Donc c'est la vie humaine qui est l'arche sainte. Personne ne peut être plus décidément caractérisé et condamné que celui qui verse le sang. . . . Plus on réussit à étendre cette épreuve, plus l'histoire s'élève au-dessus de l'opinion et entre dans la science.'*

Interesting and suggestive as this is, it is the less part of the letter. We to whose war-aims President Wilson has imparted a rare purity of intention do not need to be shown the profundity of American idealism. But it says much for Acton's insight, or, perhaps rather, for the value of the study of history, that he who elsewhere pointed out the Prussian peril should also have laid his finger upon the real home of international idealism :

*'Ce qui . . . creuse un gouffre entre les old and new Whigs, c'est le développement, presque la découverte de la conscience. Cette notion . . . est venue lorsque le Christianisme s'est trouvé réduit à sa plus simple expression, sans église, sans sacrement, sans clergé, sans rituel, et qu'il est arrivé au point de se confondre avec la morale universelle. Dans cette forme-là le Christianisme a fondé un état, et créé une constitution, où il n'y avait guère autre chose de sauvegardé que l'individualisme. . . . Ce qui rend la vie politique si digne, si intraitable, c'est l'élément qui nous vient d'Amérique. . . . Le système du droit naturel, des principes abstraits, du droit absolu, du droit comme forme du devoir, de la politique entendue comme science et non comme expédient—ce système*



est entré comme un fer tranchant dans le monde par les jurisconsultes de Boston et les théoriciens de Virginie.'

Amid 'the forests of Pennsylvania,' then, is to be sought the tree of the knowledge of political good and evil, of liberty, of international conscience, call it what you will, which in 'the forests of Germany' has withered away. Here, if anywhere, is to be found the faith which shall move political mountains and produce such a change in the nature and relations of men as to enable them to convert swords into ploughshares and spears into pruning-hooks, in the sure knowledge that they shall not make war any more. Did Acton believe that this could be? He is too cautious to commit himself. 'If it seem to you (he writes to Lady Blennerhassett) that I have faith in the future and in progress, that my theodicy is Whig in character, that I share the revolutionary philosophy, I must remind you that I have been tracing objectively a sequence of ideas.'

'Voyez seulement le côté religieux de la chose—on a marché de l'unité vers la diversité, du Catholicisme au Protestantisme, de la Bible aux sectes, au doute, au rationalisme, au déisme, au panthéisme, et enfin à la suprématie de la science. Qui trouve tout cela progrès croit, ou que le Catholicisme est une antiquité, ou que l'avenir sera tout autre que le passé.'

Though we have not yet quite parted company with Acton we are already upon ground where we may meet Lord Morley. Liberalism rests on two postulates—that the world is growing better, and that evil sooner or later, but still, here and now, meets with its deserts. Destroy the belief in progress and in visible retribution, and the springs of Liberalism will assuredly run dry. So we find Lord Morley in 1897 assuring an Oxford audience, which doubtless received the opinion less critically than it would have done twenty years later, that 'the world in spite of a thousand mischances and at tortoise pace has steadily moved away from Machiavelli and his Romans.' Acton's judgment on the great cynic let in no such ray of hope:

'Religion, progressive enlightenment, the perpetual vigilance of public opinion have not reduced Machiavelli's empire or disproved the justice of his conception of mankind. . . . He is

not a vanishing type but a constant and contemporary influence.'

So with the other postulate of Liberalism. Speaking of George Eliot in a letter to that same fortunate recipient of all his best thoughts—Lady Blennerhassett—he observes that

'the idea which she used so much because it goes down so well with British Christians, the certainty of earthly retribution, is one which no historical-minded person can accept. She herself was aware that virtue is not much happier than crime; and she never filled up this tremendous gap.'

Lord Morley's teaching runs in the same groove with George Eliot's; and something ethical—some force that makes for righteousness—is throughout tacitly assumed to exist in the nature of things. Other fires, hotter than the pale sun of Mill, which, as he somewhere tells us, had replaced the setting star of Newman in the academic sky of his Oxford life, have warmed his style and fed the flame of those noble moralities which are the 'life-blood of greater things than style can ever be.' He is, at bottom, as was cleverly said, an 'inverted theologian.'

Of the Oxford of Mill the 'Recollections' contain a vivid sketch. Slight though it is, it might yet bear comparison with the picture of the Oxford of the 'forties left by Dean Church. Wilberforce then occupied, if he did not fill, the place which earlier had been Newman's, which later was to be Liddon's, and later still Gore's; and to his sermons the young undergraduate, having, as he tells us, 'an irresistible weakness' for 'the taking gift of unction,' resorted. Overton and T. H. Green were other influences driving roughly in the same direction; Mark Pattison looked the other way. Greater pains have been taken with the portrait of Cotter Morison, an original and striking figure than which Oxford had had few, if any, more engaging since the days of Hurrell Froude. Morison wrote St Bernard's Life as well as Gibbon's, but his intellect ran on Gibbon's lines and not St Bernard's. 'He longed . . . for the historian to arise who, as he used to say, would depict with sweeping brush the Decline and Fall of Theological as did Gibbon of Imperial Rome.' Doubtless he was unacquainted with the dictum of Sir William Harcourt, recorded in due course in the

'Recollections,' that there are two things which can neither be ended nor mended—the House of Lords and the Pope of Rome.

From Oxford the young man plunged into the great world of letters. How great its rulers were Lord Morley does well to remind a generation which takes an easy pride in the merely clever. Darwin and Spencer, Mill and Huxley, Carlyle and Ruskin, George Eliot and Matthew Arnold, Victor Hugo and Mazzini were such company as a man might find, and as he himself did find. A deeper friendship, which gives occasion for one of the great chapters of the book, sprang up with George Meredith. Here is part of the portrait of the great pagan :

'I once commended to him Goethe's well-known and ever noble psalm of life, "Das Göttliche." He wrote me that he had read it once more with a feeling of new strength, which is like conception in the brain: "This is the very spirit of Goethe, I have many times come in contact with it and been ennobled. Fault of mine if not more. This high discernment, this noblest of unconsidered utterance, this is the Hymn for men; this is to be really prophet-like." He worked and slept up in his little chalet on Box Hill. "Anything grander," he said, "than the days and nights at my porch you will not find away from the Alps, for the dark line of my hill runs up to the stars, the valley below is a soundless gulf. There I pace like a shipman before turning in. In the day with a S.W. blowing, I have a brilliant universe rolling up to me; after midnight I sat and thought of Goethe and of the sage in him and the youth." This is Meredith as he lived and at his best.'

In close juxtaposition though strange contrast with this breezy figure is that of the 'saint of rationalism.' Saints sometimes have hidden tempers, and Mill was apparently in this class :

'Fitzjames Stephen . . . said he was cold as ice, a walking book. On the contrary he was a man of extreme sensibility and vital heat in things worth waxing hot about. In truth he sometimes let sensibility carry him too far. One notable afternoon in European history, I saw him in an instant blaze into uncontrollable anger. It was July 14, 1870. He was sitting in his garden, and I brought him the news that France had declared war on Prussia. He violently struck his chair

and broke out in a passionate exclamation, "What a pity the bombs of Orsini missed their mark and left the crime-stained usurper alive!"

It is an incident which may well be commended to the notice of such reckless persons as are tempted to take upon them an apostleship of vengeance!

Thus, then, the book runs on with its sketches of life and character, drawn without seeming effort and framed in philosophic musings. Gradually, as the delightful table-talk proceeds, political portraits replace those of men of letters. Chamberlain and Parnell are full-length figures here. The first-named is the subject of a singularly striking piece of portraiture. All Lord Morley's estimates are generous; this is the most generous of all. For here is a study in two conflicting temperaments and two rival policies. In the light of all that has happened since Chamberlain's death, the chapter will be found to repay a close attention.

Admiral Maxse, who made the two men acquainted, declared they were meant for one another; and, since personal friendship survived the hard test of political antagonism, his discrimination cannot be said to have been wholly at fault. But, if their qualities were complementary, their principles were at war. Chamberlain embodied the whole doctrine of power—was swift, daring, resolute and, in spite of Lord Morley's description of him as '*verus, integer, apertus*,' was not so scrupulous as all that. His affinities were the caucus, imperialism, protection and the Union; and it is interesting to find that in the late seventies his leanings in these directions were already visible to his friend. Lord Morley, on the other hand, had the truer sense of the currents of world-opinion which were bearing England out of her isolation, splendid or not as we please, into that vast sea of troubles, where the water has been turned to deepest crimson by a young man's fancies and an old man's fears. Subconsciously, perhaps, both British statesmen knew that they were approaching one of the great climacterics in world-history. Chamberlain would have fought Germany, if fight it was to be and not alliance, on the German model, not of course of atrocity, but of system and method. Lord Morley's instinct was the more

sure. The England he had in mind was one in closer sympathy with American ideals—cosmopolitan, democratic and federal. In such an orientation of policy Ireland was the vital point. 'I felt,' he tells us, 'that Chamberlain was slow to realise the scale, the proportions, the prodigious magnitude and complexity of the Irish problem, not only in Ireland but wherever Irishmen were gathered and could make trouble for us.' So, in the end, the two men parted, as other Englishmen parted afterwards at a time when broad and steady thought might have saved a continent from a catastrophe.

Parnell was, of course, the great personal factor in the schism. 'The pen of Tacitus, or Sallust, or de Retz would,' Lord Morley tells us, 'be required to do full justice to a character so remarkable.' And he quotes Mr Gladstone as affirming that Parnell was 'a political genius—a genius—a genius of most uncommon order.' Here are one or two glimpses:

'For myself, in our protracted dealings for some four or five years, I found him uniformly considerate, unaffectedly courteous, not ungenial, compliant rather than otherwise. In ordinary conversation he was pleasant without much play of mind; temperament made him the least discursive of the human race. . . . He was one of the men with whom it was impossible to be familiar. In affairs he proved himself an excellent ally; he was perfectly ready to make allowance for difficult circumstances; he never slurred them over, nor tried to pretend that rough ground was smooth, nor marched like the foolish kind of optimist spoiling his sight by blinkers. . . . His sympathy with the misery of the Irish peasantry was real and it was constant, though he was too hard-headed and too disdainful to make a political trade of this sympathy or to say much about it. A general liking for his species he neither had nor professed. Of merely personal ambition, whether in its noble or its vulgar sense, he had, I think, little share or none. . . . I have been at his side before and after more than one triumphal occasion, and discovered no sign of quickened pulse. His politics were a vehement battle, not a game, no affair of a career.'

Beside one other portrait we may fitly stand a moment in silence before we leave the gallery:

'May 19 (1911).—Yesterday I sat next to the German Emperor at luncheon at Haldane's (Lord Kitchener on the other

side of him), and it may interest you to know that H.M. opened our talk with vivacious thanks for the kindness that his son had received in India. He was loud in particular recognition of the quality of the officer who attended him. I don't think I ever met a man so full of the zest of life, and so eager to show it and share it with other people. . . . He talked to me about some recent book of Bishop Boyd Carpenter, which he liked so much that he had it translated into German, and in the evening often read pieces aloud to his ladies while they sat stitching and knitting. I said something of Harnack and of his negative effects. "Not at all so negative," he answered, "since I got him to Berlin." How much of his undoubted attractiveness is due to the fact of his being the most important man in Europe, who can tell?'

And now, as on a wishing-carpet, we are borne away to fields and pastures new—to a delightful holiday-time in Norfolk, with neither shooting nor sailing nor golf for diversion, but with the Classics—Greek, Latin, French, Italian, English—lying open about the tables, and Mr Gladstone working hard by at Lowestoft. Then a fresh wave of the magician's wand, and Paris appears with Jusserand, Taine, Renan, Pailleron, Vogüé at command. After that the Durdans, and a summer night which surprises us suddenly in a land where it would seem to be always afternoon; then Carlton Gardens with a Cabinet in process of construction; then Newcastle on the day of the declaration of the poll; then the Lodge at Phoenix Park with Mr Asquith for a guest. Here we may pause a moment to catch a snatch of conversation:

'Oct. 23, 1893. . . . A great discussion whether evolution as a doctrine would make men more merciful or less. I said more, A. said less. . . . In the relations of states it looks as if Asquith were right. Compare 16th century with 19th. Luther held by Revelation, Grace, Justification by Faith. The fervid apostle of evolution believes in Justification by Success, and the dispensation of the God of Battles.'

Only for a moment must we pause. The magician still has much to show us of the remote parts of Ireland and of remoter India. He might have had the Indian Secretariate in 1892, but the Irish plough was exacting, and it was not until 1906 that he set his face towards the East. There followed a correspondence with Lord



Minto of singular charm and grace of diction. As the mood takes him, he sets down the thoughts that are passing through his mind, details the hopes and fears of the political arena, searches the dangers of his road, philosophises over the lassitudes of great place, comments upon the chance and curious incidents of the passing day. Did ever viceroy have so human, so pleasing an assurance of sympathy in the place where he must most desire to find it? Between them the two men guided India from the close of one epoch to the dawn of another—from tutelage towards self-determination. Not a little, perhaps, in their common success was due to the singular genius for friendship disclosed by the Indian Secretary.

When India was done with, two historic episodes still remained for the old political warrior before the inexorable hour arrived when the bow must be fastened to the wall and the sword left to rust in the scabbard. About the Curragh incident, indeed, he tells us nothing, though that obscure affair will some day need all the light that can be thrown from different quarters if it is to occupy its true place in history. About the constitutional crisis which attended the passage of the Parliament Act he is more communicative. It fell to him, as acting Leader of the House of Lords, to make the announcement of the King's pledge; and the description of the part he played on that dramatic occasion is not unworthy of a historian. The features of the Bill, indeed, made his championship of it a matter of singular propriety; for they combined the substance of a constitutional change with the preservation of an ancient institution. The Radical in him welcomed the passage of power from the peers; the historian in him rejoiced—or, so we may guess—at the safety of all the forms and fashions of the historic House, of which he had himself, by the irony of circumstance, become a notable ornament.

Thus, then, the story is told out in the fading light of a very wintry world. And if the sun seems going down in a heaven thick with clouds, it is not that the career has not been brilliant, the performance successful beyond the common, but that Rationalism and all the creeds or half-creeds that take their root there have failed to read just so much of the riddle of the universe as, once

human nature is unbound, can make this earth of ours appear in the cold light of reason other than some city of dreadful night. We watch the old student of Lucretius stoically collecting some threads from the gorgeous palls that men have spread over death, and weaving them afresh into 'an Easter digression' most strangely named. But it is all to no purpose. The confession has already slipped out :

'I have often myself said, though I am commonly a man of good though pretty serious spirits, that "low spirits" are what we call the mood in which we see things as they are. I know that d'Alembert has somewhere said something of the same sort. Lo! here is Byron :

"The glance  
Of melancholy is a fearful gift;  
What is it but the telescope of truth  
Which strips the distance of its fantasies  
And brings life near in utter nakedness,  
Making the cold reality too real?"'

And then :

οὐ μὲν γάρ τί ποῦ ἐστὶν οἰζυρώτερον ἀνδρὸς  
πάντων, ὅσσα τε γαῖαν ἔπι πνέει τε καὶ ἔρπει.\*

And again :

ἡδέα μὲν γάρ σου τὰ φύσει καλὰ, γαῖα, θάλασσα,  
ἄστρο, σεληναίης κύκλα καὶ ἡελίου·  
τᾶλλα δὲ πάντα φόβοι τε καὶ ἄλγεα· κῆν τι πάθῃ τις  
ἰσθλόν, ἀμοιβαίην ἐκδέχεται Νέμεσιν.†

Before such solemn melancholy in a world become too grim for philosophies, too grey for tears, we can only pass and sigh. Acton, as his editors remind us, had, out of the volume of his vast knowledge of human life and thought, introduced into his inaugural address at Cambridge a digression more nearly reminiscent of

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\* No more piteous breed than man, 'midst all the things that breathe and creep on the earth.

† Sweet before all else are things fair to thee by nature, earth, sea, stars, orbs of moon and sun; all else is but fears and griefs; and even if there should come some good gift to one, Nemesis follows to balance.

Easter. 'The action of Christ,' he told his hearers, 'Who has risen on the world which He redeemed, fails not but increases.'

It remains to say a word as to the craftsmanship of the two books. Lord Acton's style, like so much else in his life and work, was, as we say, just *manqué*; character was there but not finish. Only once, perhaps, did he write a really perfect thing—the fragment of self-portraiture, to which reference has been made. The correspondence, now published, follows, however, the general rule, and derives its merit from its content and not its form. The editorial work is of course competent and painstaking, but also rather stiff and unimaginative. To arrange letters under subject-headings—ecclesiastical, general and so forth—is to miss the vital point that letters are human documents and, like the personalities of which they are the expression, follow a chronological and not a logical rule. One piece of carelessness is hardly excusable in a theologian of Dr Figgis's eminence. 'Infallible' is not a synonym for 'impeccable'; and to say that 'Acton had no more faith in the infallibility of Councils than in that of Popes' is either to accuse him of gross hypocrisy or else to convict oneself of dangerous carelessness.

Of Lord Morley's execution it is almost impertinent to speak. His style, a little mellowed by time, still holds the field for ease and charm and strength against all living competition. It is largely reminiscent of the Oriel school which, seeking, as he tells us he sought himself, just 'correctness,' achieved a miracle of dignity and grace. If in the age which is being born we are likely to see no more of this kind of writing, we should be the more grateful for a leave-taking so splendid, so worthy of a great tradition, a great epoch, and a great master in letters.

ALGERNON CECIL.

## Art. 13.—MODERN DIPLOMACY.

1. *A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe.* By D. J. Hill. Three vols. Longmans, 1905-1914.
2. *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice.* By Sir Ernest Satow, G.C.M.G. Two vols. Longmans, 1917.
3. *Termination of War and Treaties of Peace.* By Coleman Phillipson, LL.D. Fisher Unwin, 1917.
4. *Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace and their Teaching.* By Sir Walter G. F. Phillimore. Murray, 1917.
5. *Three Peace Congresses of the Nineteenth Century.* By C. D. Hazen, W. R. Thayer, R. H. Lord; and *Claimants to Constantinople.* By A. C. Coolidge. Harvard Univ. Press; Milford, 1917.

THE days in which we live are, in more than one sense, critical. It is a testing time for nations, for individuals, for established institutions, and not least for preconceived ideas. Great traditions, great achievements, even great and acknowledged services will avail little to mitigate the severity of the judgment, except in so far as these things afford a presumption of high efficiency in the present, and of definite promise for the future.

In this general scrutiny the methods and machinery of Diplomacy cannot hope to escape. There is a general disposition to affirm, and in some quarters to believe, that 'Diplomacy,' as hitherto practised and understood, is largely responsible for the great tragedy which for three years or more has filled the world-stage. Whether that grave charge can or cannot be substantiated is a question which need not for the moment be discussed. Other critics, more reflective and better trained, push the responsibility one stage further back. They attribute the present catastrophe less to the conduct of international affairs than to the fact that affairs should be international. The ultimate genesis of the world conflict of to-day is sought, and by some enquirers is found, in the relatively recent development of the existing European polity—a polity based upon the recognition of the rights of a large number of nation-states, entirely independent and nominally coequal. The two attributions, as will be seen presently, are not really so wide apart. Both may be regarded as slightly academic.

There is, however, another point of more immediate and practical significance. It is safe to assume that the present war and the peace by which it is concluded will mark an exceedingly important epoch in the history of diplomacy. The young democracies, and the more advanced parties in the older democracies, obviously will not be content to leave the ordering of international relations to the high-priests of the diplomatic mysteries. They are determined to control foreign no less than domestic policy. Whether such control is likely to conduce to the maintenance of peace, is a question on which there may legitimately be a difference of opinion. One thing, however, is certain: the leaders of the New Democracy are not likely to be deterred from the attempt by any diffidence as to their competence for the task they essay. It is not denied that they may in the future make mistakes, but in their opinion those mistakes are likely to be fewer, more venial and less disastrous in their consequences, than the blunders perpetrated in the past by trained diplomatists, by crowned heads, and by uncrowned capitalists. Whatever may be thought of these confident anticipations, and of the implied criticism of the existing system, there can be little doubt that an attempt will, in the near future, be made to 'democratise' foreign policy, to devise new machinery for the control of the Chancelleries, and to transfer to elected assemblies, or to committees selected from and immediately responsible to them, functions which have hitherto been deemed to belong to the executive rather than to the legislative side of government. If, however, the attempt is not to issue in disaster, swift and irretrievable, there is one condition precedent, the importance of which will not by any reasonable person be denied: those who essay the task of controlling foreign policy must equip themselves by patient and assiduous study both of the science of Politics and of the art of Diplomacy. It may, indeed, be objected that it is superfluous to acquire the rules of the game, since the new diplomatists do not mean to play the same game or to play it according to the old rules. But they cannot avoid the pitfalls unless they know their location, nor amend rules which they have not mastered. The new school of diplomacy should, therefore, be not less grateful than the old for the initiation of a series of

contributions to International Law and Diplomacy, under the editorial control of Prof. Oppenheim of Cambridge. The first instalment of the new enterprise consists of 'A Guide to Diplomatic Practice,' from the pen of Sir Ernest Satow, himself a diplomatist of high distinction and wide experience.

The literature of the subject, in English, has hitherto been singularly, though characteristically, meagre. France, for reasons easily intelligible, is, on the contrary, exceptionally affluent. There is, for example, nothing in English at all comparable to the series of diplomatic despatches which the French Government has published in a series of admirably edited volumes—'Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France.' The student of English mediæval history is indeed fortunate in the possession of the great collection of Chronicles issued under the ægis of the Master of the Rolls. From Roger of Hoveden and Walter of Coventry, for example, you may learn all that anyone can reasonably want to know of the foreign policy of the early Plantagenets. The historian of the 16th century is provided with the 'Calendar of State Papers' to assist his researches into the diplomacy of Henry VII, of Wolsey, or of Queen Elizabeth. No such facilities exist for the study of the 17th century, or the 18th or 19th centuries. The historian of these periods must seek his materials in manuscript either at the Record Office or the Foreign Office, but without a special permit he can obtain access to the Foreign Office Papers only down to 1837, and with a permit only down to 1860, a date, as Prof. Firth has lately argued, quite arbitrarily selected.\* For the actual texts of 19th-century treaties recourse may be had to the collection of Sir Edward Hertslet, and for the period actually covered (1814–1891) it would be impossible to better that collection. For the rest, there are the stray volumes of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, the annual volumes of British and Foreign State Papers, and the Parliamentary Papers. But the latter lack consecutiveness, and are very carefully edited. At every turn the serious students of English diplomacy are discouraged and baffled, while the people who look up to

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\* Presidential address to the Royal Historical Society.



them are not fed. It is small wonder, therefore, that the governing masses in this country should be less well equipped for the intelligent discussion of questions of foreign policy than most of their continental neighbours, or that, in the circumstances, they should hitherto have betrayed little curiosity as to oversea affairs.

There are, however, indications that this indifference is coming to an end. The outbreak of a great war has stimulated interest in the history and methods of diplomacy as nothing else could have done, with the result that the shelves in our libraries devoted to European History and Diplomacy are rapidly filling up. Among works on this subject recently published there are several, besides Sir E. Satow's book, which seem to demand particular attention—Mr D. J. Hill's 'History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe,' Mr Coleman Phillipson's 'Termination of War and Treaties of Peace,' and a little volume of essays by competent American historians.

On behalf of Sir E. Satow's work the claim is made by its editor that 'it is unique with regard to the method of treatment of the subject, as well as the selection of the topics discussed;' and, so far as English literature is concerned, the claim cannot be contested. Its intention and scope are precisely indicated by the title 'A Guide to Diplomatic Practice.' The first volume may be regarded primarily as a text-book for practical diplomats. It deals in detail with the machinery of diplomacy; the constitution and functions of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; the language of diplomatic intercourse and forms of documents; credentials; the selection, position, immunities and classification of diplomatic agents; the reception and termination of a mission, and so forth. The treatment is, however, far less forbidding than such a bare enumeration would suggest. Apart from special chapters devoted to such topics as precedence among states, titles and precedence among sovereigns, maritime honours, and 'counsels to diplomats,' the more technical topics are treated with a wealth of historical illustration which renders them hardly less attractive to the historical student than to the budding diplomatist.

This is even more strikingly the case in the second  
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volume, which deals with congresses and conferences, treaties and other international compacts, 'good offices' and mediation. Here, too, the method is analytical rather than historical, but the subject-matter is presented in a form which will make the book an exceedingly valuable, if not an indispensable, adjunct to the study of European history during the last three centuries. For erudition, conspicuous and profound, has not converted Sir E. Satow into a Dry-as-dust; and he combines weight of learning with a skill in exposition which will gain for his words an audience far beyond the circles of professed diplomatists.

Mr Coleman Phillipson's work, as its title suggests, is more limited in scope and more strictly legal in form. Part of the ground covered by it is common to him and to Sir E. Satow, but the treatment is widely different. Mr Phillipson will appeal more definitely to the international lawyer, less conspicuously to the historical student. The latter will, indeed, welcome the collection of the texts of the principal treaties of the 19th century; and these texts occupy a considerable proportion of the book. The rest deals with two main topics: (a) the termination of war, either by reciprocal intermission of hostilities, or by conquest and subjugation; and (b) with Treaties of Peace—armistice conventions, the interposition of third parties, the constitution and procedure of peace conferences, preliminaries of peace, peace negotiations, and the treaty of peace. Through all the mazes of these topics Mr Phillipson will be found to be a preeminently trustworthy guide.

Mr Hill, like Sir E. Satow, has won distinction both as a scholar and as a diplomatist, but his work is planned on lines quite distinct from those followed by either of the other authors mentioned. As is clearly implied in the title, his book is historical rather than juridical. A history of diplomacy, as the author justly insists, properly includes 'not only an account of the progress of international intercourse, but an exposition of the motives by which it has been inspired and the results which it has accomplished.' More even than that—it must include also 'a consideration of the genesis of the entire international system and of its progress through the progressive stages of its development.'

What is the scientific *terminus a quo* of such an enquiry? 'It is customary,' writes Mr Hill, 'to regard the Congress and Peace of Westphalia as the starting-point of European diplomacy, but this is principally due to the fact that so little has been known of earlier diplomatic activity.' That may be so. But the customary practice has something, as will be argued presently, to recommend it. Moreover, it is worthy of notice that Mr Hill sets out to write a history of diplomacy in the international development of Europe. It is, therefore, pertinent to enquire where the international development begins? Can it begin before the development of the nation-state? By implication Mr Hill answers this question with an emphatic affirmative. The first of his three substantial volumes starts with an analysis of the condition of Europe under the Roman Empire; it carries us on to the revival of the Empire in the West, to the dismemberment of the Carolingian Empire and to the Holy Roman Empire of mediæval times. Mr Hill then traces the conflict of the Empire and the Papacy, and so brings us to the development of Italian diplomacy. The real genesis of modern diplomacy he finds (i, 359) in the city-state system of mediæval Italy.

'A little world by itself, whose component parts were numerous, feeble and hostile, Italy soon created an organism to take the place which the Empire had left vacant. To know the intentions of one's neighbour, to defeat his hostile designs, to form alliances with his enemies, to steal away his friends and prevent his union with others, became matters of the highest public interest . . . The system long in use by Venice was now applied by every Italian State. . . . but Venice continued to be the school and touchstone of ambassadors.'

From the development of Italian Diplomacy, Mr Hill passes to the rise of national monarchies, and thence to the formation of modern states. With the expulsion of the English from France, the absorption of the feudal duchies, the overthrow of Charles the Bold of Burgundy, and the unification of France under Louis XI and Charles VIII, we reach by general consent the dawn of the modern era. May not this be regarded as the true *terminus a quo* for a history of European

diplomacy, for the study of international relations? Mr Hill repudiates the suggestion with scorn (II, vi, vii):

'The essence of diplomacy does not lie in the character of its organs or its forms of procedure. Intrinsically it is an appeal to ideas and principles rather than to force, and may assume a great variety of specific embodiments. . . . What is to be said of the Italian cities winning their local liberties from the greatest emperors of the Middle Ages by means of their leagues and alliances? And what of the Republic of Venice, in particular, situated between powers of overwhelming magnitude, yet not only maintaining from the beginning its virtual independence but acquiring by its compacts a vast colonial dominion from the spoils of the Eastern Empire? If these were not feats of diplomacy, in what age shall we expect to find them? . . . The importance of that period both for the international development of Europe and for the part played in it by diplomacy cannot be overestimated. In it were elaborated and set in motion ideas and influences that have never ceased to affect the destinies of Europe.'

All this is, in one sense, true to the verge of truism. But it is true only if we are prepared to give to the terms 'diplomacy' and 'international' a somewhat elastic and non-technical connotation. The question as to the proper and precise connotation of those terms is one which must presently engage attention. Well before the end of the second volume, which closes with the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), we are launched upon the period when those terms may, beyond dispute, be appropriately employed. But to that period we shall revert.

To his third volume, published in 1914, Mr Hill gives a sub-title: 'The Diplomacy of the Age of Absolutism.' He prefaces the volume by a statement (III, v) which seems strangely self-contradictory, though somewhat characteristic of the author.

'Men,' he writes, 'had sought refuge from anarchy by establishing the supremacy of the State and concentrating power in the hands of a few. We behold entire nations moving *en masse* in directions not determined by their needs or their individual desires, nor yet in view of their well-being, but by the command of one man who—for reasons of his own, for which he had to give no account—acted as he saw fit.' . . . 'Yet it is impossible to explain this period in terms of

individual action . . . it was the thought and feeling of the time that made monarchy absolute.'

Precisely. Power was committed to a ruler, virtually dictatorial, in order, on the one hand, to rescue the adolescent nation-state from feudal anarchy, and on the other to achieve territorial readjustments which, if not 'determined by national needs,' or conceived in the national interests, were distinctly so regarded by the mass of the nation. M. Albert Sorel cannot be described as an adulator of absolutism, but what says he of that traditional foreign policy of which the absolute monarchs of France were conspicuous exponents?

'La politique française avait été dessinée par la géographie: l'instinct national la suggéra avant que la raison d'état la conseillât. Elle se fonde sur un fait: l'empire de Charlemagne. Le point de départ de ce grand procès qui occupe toute l'histoire de France c'est l'insoluble litige de la succession de l'Empereur . . . À mesure que le temps s'éloigne l'image du grand Empereur s'élève et prend des proportions colossales. De Philippe-Auguste à Napoleon elle plane sur l'histoire de France.'

This is the truly philosophical view of a great historical tradition; but M. Sorel does little more than re-echo the language of Richelieu himself:

'Le but de mon ministère a été de rendre à la Gaule les frontières que lui a destinées la Nature, de rendre aux Gaulois un roi gaulois, de confondre la Gaule avec la France, et partout où fut l'ancienne Gaule d'y rétablir la nouvelle.'

It is perfectly true that the time came when Louis XIV, in the vain pursuit of dynastic ambitions, transgressed the limits suggested by geography, and departed from the policy hallowed by tradition; but it is mere prejudice to ignore the fact that, up to a point, the policy of the absolute monarchy was not one whit less national than that pursued by the statesmen of the First or the Third Republic. The doctrine of 'Les Limites naturelles,' the idea that the national frontiers of France were marked by the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, has profoundly and continuously influenced the diplomacy of France, whether the agents of that diplomacy received their instructions from a Bourbon, from a Buonaparte, or from a servant of the Republic. A parliamentary minister is

not necessarily a more faithful interpreter of the national will than an 'absolute' monarch, as an historian like Mr Hill ought to have perceived. Alsace and Lorraine were acquired for France at the zenith of the Bourbon monarchy. Did the First or the Second Republic ever show the least disposition to restore those provinces? The United Provinces, under the Dutch Republic, pursued their colonial ambitions with at least as much eagerness as Spain under Charles V or Philip II. Dynastic motives do not account for national policy consistently pursued under varying political conditions. But we need not go abroad to find illustrations of so obvious a truth. No country in Europe has been less influenced, in its foreign policy, by the individual desires of an absolute monarch than Great Britain; yet no country has pursued certain ends with greater persistence or more undeviating consistency.

Mr Hill's argument would seem, therefore, to be somewhat vitiated by a prejudice, not to be expected in a philosophical historian, against the 'enlightened despots' of the 17th and 18th centuries. Yet the point must not be pressed against him too far; nor does the defect, if such it be, seriously detract from the value of a work which is conceived on original lines and is executed, in the main, with conspicuous skill. His erudition is undeniable, his style lucid and attractive, while the general treatment of an important theme is full without being prolix, and scholarly without being dull. The method and plan which he has chosen to adopt raise, however, a large question of historical principle which demands further discussion. Before proceeding to that discussion, we may glance briefly at the contents of the remaining books in the list prefixed to this article.

Sir Walter Phillimore's book, very recently published, deserves a much more detailed examination than is possible within the assigned limits of this article. It aims at two objects: on the one hand to provide an historical analysis of the principal Treaties of Peace concluded in Europe during the last three centuries; and, on the other, to offer certain suggestions as to the best means of preventing war in future, and for humanising and regulating the conduct of wars when they do occur. Both objects are very successfully achieved.



Sir Walter Phillimore begins by laying down with great lucidity the main conditions which must be fulfilled by any Peace which shall be at once just, and lasting and effective. He also points out the reasons which have militated against the permanence of Peace Treaties in the recent past. The short life of many Treaties has been due partly to the deliberate evasion or postponement of points of controversy, as, for instance, the terms of the cession of Alsace to France in 1648; sometimes to lack of precise geographical or topographical knowledge on the part of draftsmen, as in regard to the Anglo-French boundaries in North America in 1748; or again to the careless employment of vague terms and conditional phrases. Having thus cleared the ground, Sir Walter proceeds, by a careful and detailed review, to deduce the principal lessons to be learnt from the Treaties concluded by the several European Powers from the Treaties of Westphalia down to the Treaty of Berlin. He adds a useful chapter on extra-European Treaties, laying especial stress upon certain features of the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905); another upon Treaties concerning the Laws of War; and a third upon the conditions under which and the times at which Treaties can be properly and lawfully denounced. It is, however, to the concluding chapter, containing detailed suggestions as to the terms of the Peace Treaty which shall conclude the present war that his readers will turn with the most eager curiosity. It is impossible to examine in detail the fifteen points elaborated by our author; it must suffice to say that the treatment is eminently reasonable and judicious, and that the opinions expressed and the suggestions made deserve and will doubtless receive very careful study and attention.

The last book on our list differs widely, alike in method and scope, from the rest. It consists of four papers read by eminent American historians at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association held at Cincinnati during the closing days of 1916. The first three essays deal with the great Peace Congresses of the 19th century. In a fourth Mr Coolidge deals with the 'Claimants to Constantinople,' and discusses that well-nigh insoluble problem with lucidity and good sense. The other essays form a valuable historical pendant to

the juridical works already noticed, and for that reason I take this opportunity of calling the attention of English scholars to their timely publication. Mr Hazen's note—it hardly reaches the compass of an essay—on the Congress of Vienna is suggestive and illuminating; Mr Thayer's account of the Congress of Paris is not less suggestive, somewhat more substantial, and decidedly more controversial. In dealing with the Congress of Berlin Mr Lord reveals strongly pro-Russian sympathies. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877, he declares, 'might fairly be called the most just and necessary war undertaken in Europe in the 19th century'; and he quotes with approval the dictum of an English writer, that 'the Treaty of San Stephano was the wisest measure ever prepared for the pacification of the Balkan Peninsula.' It is not, however, easy to understand what exactly he means by the expression of his regret that 'analogous arrangements for the western half of the peninsula were not concluded by the Powers.' But we must not be beguiled into detailed criticism of an essay full of interesting though disputable propositions.

The main purpose which inspires these pages is a different one. It is to consider how far the recent publication of such works as those which have been briefly noticed in the preceding paragraphs may be held to betoken an awakened interest, on the part of the English public, in the machinery and methods of diplomacy, and in the problems with the solution of which diplomacy is concerned. The interest, if awakened, is unquestionably recent and tardy. Yet one point should not be ignored. Diplomacy, as now understood, is itself a relatively new development; international relations are, in an historic sense, a thing of yesterday. The word 'diplomacy' is said to have been first employed, in its modern signification, by Edmund Burke towards the end of the 18th century. The system itself—'a uniform system based upon generally recognised rules and directed by a diplomatic hierarchy having a fixed international status'—was finally established, according to Prof. Alison Phillips, 'only at the Congresses of Vienna (1815) and Aix-la-Chapelle (1818).'\* Even if we accept the wider definition

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\* 'Encyclopædia Britannica' (11th edition), Art. 'Diplomacy.'

or description preferred and adopted by Mr Hill, and take 'diplomacy' to be synonymous with international relations, it is difficult to assign its genesis to a period earlier than the close of the 15th century. Before that time we look in vain for the nation-states between whom mutual relations were possible. Not until then did Europe really begin to emancipate itself from the grip of the legacy bequeathed to it by the world-Empire of Rome. The Roman Empire had long since passed away, but for a thousand years after its passing Europe continued to be dominated by the institutions which arose out of its ashes. The Empire of the Cæsars bequeathed to the world three legacies: the idea of a World-State, the idea of a Catholic Church, and a system of land-tenure which ultimately developed into one of the most powerful principles of government and society which has ever impressed itself upon mankind—the relation of lordship and vassaldom, a political, social, and personal nexus based upon the tenure and cultivation of land. The Holy Catholic Church, the Holy Roman Empire, the feudal system—these are the institutions, the ideas and principles which dominated European society from the overthrow of the Cæsarean Empire down to the new birth of learning and the Protestant Reformation.

The system reared upon these foundations never extended in its integrity beyond the continent of Europe. England, in this as in other respects, always occupied an exceptional position. Even a Saxon king claimed to be '*alterius orbis imperator*'; many archbishops of Canterbury were in effect '*alterius orbis Papæ*'; while feudalism, though fully developed in the hands of the Norman lawyers into a coherent system of land tenure, was firmly repudiated, alike by the Norman and the Angevin kings, as a method of government. England, therefore, stood from the first outside the unified and unifying influence which, throughout the Middle Ages, moulded the life and decided the destinies of her continental neighbours. To this, among other reasons, must be attributed the precocious sense of nationality and national unity which, in the view of foreign commentators upon English institutions, was the most characteristic and differentiating feature of mediæval England. The people of this country attained nationhood

at least three centuries before the people of any other country in Western Europe. One of the nation-states of modern Europe may, therefore, be described as far back as the early years of the 13th century. But, as it takes two people to make a quarrel, so it seems to demand at least two nations to render possible an 'international' system. So long as the Empire and the Papacy retained any real political effectiveness, the modern states-system could be nothing more than embryonic.

By the end of the 15th century, however, the nationality principle was making rapid progress in two of the great states of Western Europe. The expulsion of the English from France, after a contest which, originating in a quarrel primarily commercial though ostensibly dynastic, had more and more definitely assumed a national character; the expulsion of the Moors from Spain after a secular crusade in which gradually the Spanish nation had been born—these events, substantially simultaneous, announced to Europe the passing of the unified system of the Middle Ages, and the advent of a new era, distinguished by the emergence of a number of nation-states, and by the recognition of their complete independence. The new era dawned at the end of the 15th or the beginning of the 16th century; the process was not completed until nearly the end of the 19th. Not until the decade 1870-1880 was continental Europe exhaustively parcelled out among independent states, based for the most part upon the recognition of the nationality principle. France, Spain, and the United Provinces were the product of the 16th century; Austria, as distinguished from the Holy Roman Empire, of the 17th; Russia and Prussia emerged clearly in the early years of the 18th century. But Belgium as a nation-state dates only from 1830; Greece from the same time; Germany and Italy were not finally unified until 1870; while the Balkan States, Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro, were gradually emancipated from the dominion of the Ottoman Empire between 1859 and 1878.

The object of this catalogic, though far from exhaustive, summary is to suggest that Europe, regarded as a congeries of independent nation-states, is the resultant of an evolutionary process of relatively recent date. Incidentally, it is worthy of remark that the process has incurred

the odium of critics who approach the subject from widely different standpoints. Dr Barry and Mr Lowes Dickinson come curiously close together alike in their condemnation of the existing polity and in their analysis of its genesis. In his fascinating little book 'The World's Debate,' Dr Barry writes (p. 17): 'The thing which at Münster and Osnabrück stereotyped itself in the world's history was a world's catastrophe—the break-up of Christendom.' 'In the great and tragic history of Europe there is,' writes Mr Dickinson in 'The European Anarchy' (p. 9), 'a turning-point that marks the defeat of the ideal of a world-order and the definite acceptance of international anarchy. That turning-point is the emergence of the sovereign state at the end of the 15th century.' There is, of course, a sense in which the propositions advanced by Dr Barry and Mr Dickinson are indisputably true. It is equally true that in this new order of things modern diplomacy had its genesis. The Middle Ages were well accustomed to the coming and going of special envoys on special missions, but a permanent embassy in a foreign state was a thing unknown until after the middle of the 15th century; and only very gradually was the diplomatic system, as we know it, defined and elaborated. England, as might have been expected, was exceptionally slow in adopting the new machinery.

Hardly had the old landmarks disappeared and the new states-system emerged, when men set themselves to devise a new machinery for the regulation of international intercourse. Hobbes, in 'The Leviathan,' conceives of society, in a *præ-contractual* condition, as chaotic; every man's hand was against every man's, and consequently the life of man was 'nasty, brutish, and short.' To Hugo Grotius the European polity presented an appearance equally chaotic. Oppressed by the recent memory of the civil wars in France and Germany and the bloody contest between his own country and Spain, and confronted by the desolation and misery wrought by the Thirty Years' War, Grotius might well think that the break-up of the mediæval unities had dissolved Europe in perpetual anarchy. He sought a remedy in the promulgation of a system of International Law. For him, as for Hobbes, a contract was the condition

precedent to stability and peace. Henry IV, or perhaps his great minister Sully, sought a remedy in the establishment of a federal Europe; William Penn suggested the setting-up of an international tribunal of arbitration (1693); while, at the close of the wars of Louis XIV, a French divine, the Abbé de St Pierre, published an elaborate '*Projet de traité pour rendre la paix perpétuelle entre les souverains chrétiens*' (1713).<sup>\*</sup> Kant published his famous essay on '*Perpetual Peace*' in 1795; and nine years later the crowned mystic, the Tsar Alexander I, sent his friend Nikolai Nikolaievich Novosiltsov on a special mission to England to lay before Pitt the Tsar's scheme for the reconstitution of the European polity on the lines of a great Christian republic. The ideas then adumbrated afterwards took practical shape in the Holy Alliance of 1815.

This brief reference to a remarkable succession of 'peace projects' will sufficiently indicate the dissatisfaction with which the existing polity was regarded alike by thinkers and by practical politicians. But diplomacy was not, as is too frequently assumed, the cause of the prevailing 'anarchy'; it was the consequence of it. Nay more, it was an attempt to mitigate the inconveniences which resulted from the dissolution of the mediæval unities. Yet from the first it was regarded with suspicion. 'An ambassador,' according to the jocose definition of Sir Henry Wotton, 'is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country.' If for 'good' we might read 'destruction,' the definition would command wide and serious acceptance among a large number of latter-day pacifists.

Diplomacy, and particularly 'secret diplomacy,' has come in for hard knocks of late. It would be impossible within the prescribed limits of this article to attempt any vindication of its methods, or to estimate the results of its activities, even were the materials available. For reasons already indicated, the materials are not available, nor, unless the legal custodians of our State Papers can be induced to offer more generous opportunities to responsible students of recent history, are they likely to

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<sup>\*</sup> An English translation of the first two volumes of this interesting work was published in 1714.



be. In the absence of materials the prosecution and the defence are alike at a disadvantage. Something may be learnt from memoirs, biographical or autobiographical, such as those of Sir Robert Morier, Sir Horace Rumbold, Lord Redesdale, and Lord Lyons; but much of the evidence derived from such sources is necessarily *ex parte*, and accusation and apology must, therefore, be based largely upon conjecture. If, however, it is permissible, in the absence of any possibility of definite proof, to hazard a conjecture, it would be in the direction that 'diplomacy' has done infinitely more to preserve peace and to retard war than many of its more vociferous critics would be disposed to allow. Lord Cromer once confessed that what he most feared, during his reign in Egypt,

'was not deliberate action taken by the diplomacy of any nation, but rather the occurrence of some chance incident which would excite a whirlwind of national passion, and which, being possibly manipulated by some skilful journalist who would focus on one point all the latent hysteria in France or England, would create a situation incapable of being controlled by diplomacy.'\*

Lord Cromer may not have been in a position of complete detachment as a critic, but few men were better qualified to form a judgment, and none was more honest in expressing a judgment when formed. Diplomacy was, in his view, the handmaid of peace; war the confession of failure. It is true that recent revelations have lent colour to the views popularised by Mr Norman Angell as to the mischievous machinations of 'war-lords and diplomats'; but the depravity of individuals does not involve the condemnation of a system. 'Diplomacy' may be blameless, though the diplomatist be guilty. In any case, if the argument attempted in the foregoing pages be sound, diplomacy is the necessary concomitant of that states-system which has characterised and dominated the European polity for the last four hundred years. Is that system destined to pass and to give place to a new order? and, if so, on what lines is the reconstruction of Europe likely to take place? Are we to look to a revival of the œcumenical order of the Middle Ages,

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\* 'Political and Literary Essays' (Second Series), p. 290.

to the realisation of Dante's dream of a world-state under a world-emperor? Such was unquestionably the vision which floated before the eyes of some of the most gifted sons of Germany when the German people, with their Kaiser at their head, plunged the world into the cataclysm of war. 'The world,' said Prof. Karl Lamprecht in August 1914, 'will be healed by being Germanised.' The omens to-day do not seem favourable to this solution of the problem.

Must we, then, look for a solution to some modification of the schemes which, ever since the modern states-system emerged, have from time to time been devised to afford some softening of the asperities, some escape from the recurrent catastrophes which quickly revealed themselves as inherent in the new order? Shall we, like Dr C. W. Eliot, the venerable and venerated ex-President of Harvard, look to the realisation of the scheme which, in one form or another, commended itself to the political idealism of Henri IV, to the piety and benevolence of the Abbé de St Pierre, to the calm and detached reason of Immanuel Kant? Is security and stability to be found in the establishment of a League of Nations, equipped with a complete apparatus of super-national federalism? These are large questions; they are naturally suggested by a review, however summary, of the history of European diplomacy, and they are likely to force themselves with ever-increasing insistence upon a world which for some years has been face to face with all the hitherto unimaginable horrors of modern warfare. It is impossible, however, even to attempt an answer in the concluding sentences of this article. It must, for the present, suffice to have indicated the genesis of the problem by which Europe and the world are to-day confronted.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

## Art. 14.—SINN FEIN. ✓

I.—*Sinn Fein and Germany.* ✓

THIS article deals only with the period before the war, during which the Sinn Fein movement originated and became allied with Germany, and its home and foreign policy was formulated. The Irish rebellion of Easter week 1916, and the recent revelation by the United States Government of the plots in America, have given the public some insight into the dangerous connexion between Sinn Fein and Germany. The meaning and ultimate aim of the insurrectionary leaders in Ireland, when they refer in their speeches and resolutions to the 'Peace Congress' and the 'Freedom of the Seas,' may perhaps be gathered from the following pages.

During the first six months of 1904, a series of articles on the 'Resurrection of Hungary' appeared in the 'United Irishman.'\* The writer was Arthur Griffith, the creator of the policy of Sinn Fein ('Ourselves Alone'). His object, as he stated in the preface to his book,† was

'to point out to his compatriots that the alternative of armed resistance to the foreign Government of Ireland is not acquiescence in usurpation, tyranny and fraud. . . . A century ago in Hungary a poet startled his countrymen by shouting in their ears, "Turn your eyes from Vienna or you perish." The voice of Josef Karman disturbed the nation, but the nation did not apprehend. Vienna remained its political centre until fifty years later. The convincing tongue of Louis Kossuth cried up and down the land: "Only on the soil of a nation can a nation's salvation be worked out."

'Through a generation of strife and sorrow, the people of Hungary held by Kossuth's dictum and triumphed gloriously. The despised, oppressed and forgotten province of Austria is to-day the free, prosperous and renowned Kingdom of Hungary. . . . Hungary is a nation. She has become so because she turned her back on Vienna. Sixty years ago Hungary realised that the political centre of the nation must be within the nation. When Ireland realises this obvious truth and turns her back on London, the parallel may be

\* A weekly paper first published in Dublin in 1899. It claimed to be the 'pioneer organ of Irish-Ireland.'

† 'The Resurrection of Hungary.' Dublin: Duffy, 1904.

completed. It failed only when two generations back Hungary took the road of principle, and Ireland the path of compromise and expediency.'

The 'Resurrection of Hungary' had an enormous circulation, and the preface to the second edition claimed that 'no book published in Ireland within living memory had been so widely read.' This was the genesis of Sinn Fein. In the forefront of the pamphlet were the words of Sydney Smith: 'It is impossible to think of the affairs of Ireland without being forcibly struck with the parallel of Hungary'; and in a hundred pages was compressed a vivid sketch of the history of the Hungarian constitutional struggle against Austria from 1849 to 1867, when, after Sadowa, the emancipation of Hungary was achieved and the Emperor Francis Joseph was crowned King at Pesth.

'Hungary won her independence under Déak (Griffith urged) by refusing to send members to the Imperial Parliament at Vienna or to admit any right in that Parliament to legislate for her. She demanded absolute territorial and political integrity, and declined to regard the Emperor of Austria as King of Hungary or to regard Austria as other than her enemy until these things were granted.'

It was no consideration of justice, he wrote, that moved Beust to settle the Hungarian question.

'The sole consideration that moved him was that, if the Hungarian question was not settled to the liking of the Hungarians, the Hungarians would settle it themselves by disrupting the Empire. . . . Twenty years later, Beust frankly stated the position. Austria had been beaten after a short but most disastrous war; Prussia had forbidden her any more interference in German affairs; the country was almost in a state of latent revolution; and an outbreak in Hungary, promoted by foreign agents and foreign gold with Klapka doing Bismarck's bidding, was in the highest degree probable, and would, had it occurred, have led to the almost overwhelming disaster. Knowing this he felt bound to accede to the views of the Déak party.'

It seemed clear to Griffith that, as the ancient Hungarian constitution was revived, so could Irish independence again be won, as acknowledged in the English Renunciation Act of 1782, which enacted that

'the right claimed by the people of Ireland to be bound only by laws enacted by His Majesty and the Parliament of that Kingdom in all cases whatever shall be and is hereby declared to be established and ascertained for ever, and shall at no time, hereafter, be questioned or questionable.'

'One strong able honest man (said Griffith) in Ireland in 1867, after the failure of the Fenian insurrection, apprehending the significance of the coronation of Francis Joseph at Pesth, could have rallied and led the country to victory. Ireland did not produce him. Ireland produced Isaac Butt, the apostle of compromise, who, by himself and his successors, has led the country to the brink of destruction. . . . The Act of Union was never valid. . . . The members of the Irish Parliament had no legal powers to terminate the existence of that Parliament.'

To support this contention Griffith proclaimed that the leaders of the Irish Bar, Saurin, Plunkett, Ponsonby, Ball, Bushe, Curran, Burrowes, Moore, Fitzgerald and a hundred others, pointed out the lesson at the time. The fact that England had ignored this constitutional right, and that Ireland had forgotten it, did not affect it in the least. Ireland, in regard to the settlement of 1783, is precisely in the position of Hungary in regard to the Constitution of 1848. Austria illegally suspended that Constitution and declared it abolished. Déak stood for eighteen years insisting that it was not abolished, since it could not be abolished save with the consent of the whole people of Hungary. He refused all compromise and ignored the laws passed for Hungary in defiance of her Constitution. It was inevitable that such an attitude must baffle Austria or any other nation towards which it was assumed, and leave her no alternative to unconditional surrender except government by the sword.

Protesting against the policy of the Irish Parliamentary party, Griffith quoted the adverse criticism which Beust, who arranged the *Ausgleich* with Hungary, passed on Gladstone's Home Rule Bill of 1886. Beust had pointed out that the Hungarian Parliament had been rendered coordinate with the Austrian Parliament, and that Hungary was thus rendered absolute mistress of her own affairs, while her status in international law was that of a sovereign state. Gladstone's Bill, on the other hand, proposed to erect a legislature in Dublin,

subordinate to the Parliament of London, excluded from having any voice in questions of war and peace, foreign affairs, the army and navy, international treaties, customs, currency, and other prerogatives of a nation.

'It was an opera-bouffe Parliament (wrote Griffith); and, in return for the farcical thing Ireland was to resign for ever her status as a separate nationality and become a province of the Empire.'

Beust, in pursuing the analogy between the Irish and Hungarian questions, admitted that Austria never would have conceded Hungary's demand had Hungary not made it impossible for her to refuse it by the policy she adopted and persisted in for eighteen years. England would similarly never concede Ireland's demands unless Ireland made it impossible not to concede them.

Griffith's policy was to be a policy of passive resistance. The attendance of Irish Members at Westminster should cease, as this proceeding recognised the competency of the British Parliament to make laws to bind Ireland. A General Council should be formed in Ireland from the Irish representatives; Ireland should set up a consular agency of her own, as Hungary did, to secure a profitable market for Irish goods abroad; 'the British Civil Courts' in Ireland should find their 'supersession by the institution of Voluntary Arbitration Courts' such as the Young Irelanders projected and the Hungarians established; the Irish abroad, especially in America, would form a valuable auxiliary both by rendering aid to Irish industrial enterprises and by obstructing and thwarting the designs of British foreign policy, as the Hungarian exiles did from 1849 to 1867.

'It would of course be a principal duty to keep Irishmen out of the ranks of the British armed forces. In Hungary the County Councils saw so effectively to this, that the Austrian army was rendered ineffective, and went to pieces in seven days before the Prussians.'

In conclusion, he wrote :

'We have merely roughly indicated how the policy which made Hungary what it is to-day may be applied to Ireland. There is no doubt of the readiness of the people to follow. The people of Ireland are not less patriotic and not less intelligent than the people of Hungary. Three-fourths of



their misfortunes are traceable to their pusillanimous, incompetent and sometimes corrupt leaders. An Irish Déak would have found in Ireland a support as loyal and as strong as Déak found in Hungary. But an Irish Déak never appeared, and shallow rhetoricians imposed themselves on the people in his stead.'

Dealing with the question of the Crown, he said :

'We hold that the subsistence of the connexion between this country and Great Britain in any form is not for our country's good, but we recognise the existence of a large mass of our countrymen who believe, as Déak believed in the case of Austria and Hungary, that, provided the countries retain each their independence and exist coequal in power, the rule of a common Sovereign is admissible. With men of such views Nationalists are cordially prepared to cooperate, as the followers of Kossuth's cooperated with Déak. It involves no abandonment of principle on the part of those who desire to see Ireland a sovereign independent state. But an alliance or cooperation with men who are willing to accept a statutory and emasculated legislature as a "settlement of the Irish Question" would be an abandonment of the principles of Irish Nationalism, and can never be entertained by any Irish Nationalist.'

This domestic policy of Sinn Fein was publicly formulated in the following terms at its first convention held at the Rotunda, Dublin, on Nov. 28, 1905 :

'National self-development on the lines successfully adopted by the Hungarians in their struggle with Austria by a policy relying on "Sinn Fein" (Ourselves Alone). To give the strongest adhesion to the Gaelic and Industrial Revival Movements and to all movements originating from within Ireland instinct with national tradition and not looking outside Ireland for the accomplishment of their aims ; and to carry this policy into effect by utilising to the utmost the powers of all representative bodies, and by the recognition of an Assembly, meeting in Dublin, and composed of delegates from such bodies and other popularly elected representatives, as the sole authority entitled to national obedience.'\*

At the inaugural meeting the chairman, Edward Martyn, stated that

'the most important of all matters was the anti-enlisting

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\* See note (1) on p. 268.

crusade. By the work of the National Council the recruiting statistics in Ireland had considerably decreased. The Irish Nationalist who entered the English army or navy deserved to be flogged.\*

Griffith prophesied that, if Ireland adopted such a policy, her time would come as it came after eighteen years to Hungary; that Ireland would yet have her 'last word' like 'Hungary's last word' when, in 1867, upon the Emperor issuing a decree making military service compulsory on the Hungarians, the crisis came and defiance rang through the land, and at length Francis Joseph, in fear of insurrection, issued under Beust's advice, the royal rescript suspending the conscription law and all other obnoxious laws until the Hungarian Parliament declared itself willing to adopt them.

The apostle of Sinn Fein at first gained few adherents among the politicians. Some mocked, few said 'we will hear thee again on this matter.' But proselytes began to come in, and gradually the Parliamentary party, then in the zenith of its power and holding Nationalist Ireland in the grip of a penetrating and tyrannical organisation, was undermined. Sinn Fein appealed to the younger generation; and the belligerent Nationalists began to fall away from the Parliamentary party, as more and more, during the long Liberal reign, it gave up its independent opposition and became a wing of the English Radicals, acting and jobbing in close alliance with them and in effect managing Ireland, as Mr Redmond stated, under Mr Birrell's régime, 'by means of the real Chief Secretary, Mr Devlin.' At home, in the Colonies, and in America, the anti-British associations approved and rapidly assimilated the Sinn Fein policy, which gave a practical means of evincing their traditional hostility to England. The Irish Republican Brotherhood, the old Fenians, the Gaelic League, the Gaelic Athletic Association, in short, all the insurrectionary groups found in its policy a common attraction. It appealed to the implacable Irish spirit, and satisfied the secular national aspirations for complete and sovereign independence;

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\* See Report of the Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland, 1916. Cd. 8311, p. 113.

and, as the inability of the Parliamentary party to secure anything but a maimed and crippled constitution on the basis of the Home Rule Bills became more and more demonstrated, dissatisfaction spread, and the revolt against the M.E.P.s (Members of the English Parliament) and their methods of compromise increased. Sinn Fein appealed, too, to the 'Intellectuals,' 'the long-haired men'; and nearly all the literature of the later Irish Nationalist school of writers was inspired by Sinn Fein. Home Rule was sterile, Sinn Fein was fertile. It had its poets, its prose writers and dramatists. It captivated boys and girls with its tales and legends; and the young men and women were educated in the National and Intermediate schools by teachers often so saturated with Sinn Fein ideas that the insurrection of 1916 has been rightly termed the 'Schoolmasters' Rebellion.'

The political, economic, and revolutionary doctrines embodied in 'the Resurrection of Hungary' were reiterated and inculcated by Griffith and a group of clever writers in the seditious press. The seed was germinating rapidly from the time of the Boer War onwards. The anti-enlisting campaign was triumphant and unchecked. The Gaelic Language Movement gained official recognition, and Irish was made a compulsory subject for appointments by many local bodies. Soldiers and the Constabulary were insulted. Sinn Fein boy-scouts were organised, and the propaganda became increasingly daring and effective. Insurrection was brewing. Such was the state of the country, restless, apprehensive, party-pestered, with the British Ministry under Mr Birrell abandoning almost the pretence of control, when Germany, intriguing against England, found Ireland ready for her machinations.

From 1910 down to the rebellion of Easter Week, the seditious newspapers in Ireland increased to a remarkable degree. Pamphlets and leaflets, printed and type-written, were distributed by hand and post in all directions.\* It was evident that these papers must have been financed

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\* E.g. in July 1913 a violent anti-enlistment leaflet, 'War—England, Germany, and Ireland,' was scattered about, stating, 'The mighty British Empire is on the verge of destruction,' 'The hand of the Lord hath touched her,' 'The English live in daily terror of Germany. War between Germany and England is at hand.'

by some wealthy agency, for their circulation and advertisements could not have kept any of them in existence for a quarter of a year. Several of them were well printed on excellent paper, and all of them were circulating the same doctrines and competing in virulence against England. There can be no doubt that they were financed by Germany through German-American sources. 'Sinn Fein,' edited by Arthur Griffith, was to a great extent the official organ; Casement, writing anonymously, was one of its contributors. It was intensely pro-German. On Aug. 8, 1914, its leading article on the outbreak of the war said:

'Ireland is not at war with Germany. She has no quarrel with any Continental power. England is at war with Germany. . . . Germany is nothing to us in herself, but she is not an enemy. Our blood and our miseries are not on her head. But who can forbear admiration of the Germanic people whom England has ringed about with enemies, standing alone and undaunted against a world in arms?'

'Irish Freedom' was also a most active engine of German intrigue. It first appeared in November 1910, under the management of John McDermott, one of the signatories to the Proclamation of the Irish Republic in April 1916, a manifesto which of itself proves the prior Sinn Fein alliance with Germany, stating as it did that,

'having patiently perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, Ireland now seizes that moment; and, supported by her exiled children in America, and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying first on her own strength, she strikes in full confidence of victory.'

So far back as October and November 1911 'Irish Freedom' was working for Germany; and in one of a series of articles headed 'When Germany Fights England,' it wrote:

'If then Ireland lends her aid to Germany, and Germany wins in a war with England, Ireland will become an independent nation.'

Casement was one of the contributors to 'Irish Freedom'; and in December 1914 it contained an

announcement of his reception at the Foreign Office in Berlin :

'We have now an official statement by the German Government that Germany would never invade Ireland with a view to its conquest or the overthrow of any national institution. Should fortune ever bring the German troops to Ireland's shores, these troops would land not as an army of invaders to pillage and destroy, but as forces of a nation inspired by good-will towards Ireland and her people, for whom Germany desires national prosperity and freedom. . . . In fact Germany has no quarrel with Ireland, and Ireland has no quarrel with Germany. The only enemy of Irish freedom is now, as ever, England.' \*

Almost every number of the Sinn Fein publications, 'The Irish Volunteer,' 'Honesty,' 'The Spark,' 'The Irish Worker' (Larkin's paper, edited by Connolly, the rebel leader), 'The Gael,' 'Ireland,' 'Fianna Fail,' 'Scissors and Paste,' and 'Nationality' (the successor of 'Sinn Fein'), was openly or covertly pro-German. The loyal Irish, North and South, saw what was coming and warned the British Government; but these warnings, as well as those from official sources, were, as told in the evidence taken at the Hardinge Commission, disregarded. †

The domestic policy of Sinn Fein was, as we have seen, formulated in 1904. In 1911 its foreign policy was formulated. Griffith gave it a domestic policy; Casement gave it a foreign policy. In June 1911 he was knighted, and in the same year he was engaged in his traitorous dealings with Germany. He promulgated this policy by means of pamphlets privately circulated and by articles in the 'New Ireland Review' and writings in the seditious press. He was in touch with Germany and worked in collaboration with Kuno Meyer, who had long lived in Ireland, had founded the school of Irish Learning in Dublin in 1903, and held a professorship in University

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\* A proclamation printed in Berlin in almost identical terms with this statement was circulated and posted up in Co. Wexford and other places in Ireland in Feb. 1915; and large quantities of the proclamation were found at Enniscorthy in the house of Delacy, who escaped to America, and has been recently sentenced to two years' imprisonment for plotting the escape of Germans at San Francisco. See, further, note (2) on p. 208.

† 1916, Cd. 8311.

College, Liverpool. Casement's policy was to recommend Ireland to Germany as holding the key to unlock 'the Freedom of the Seas'; and to recommend Germany to Ireland by the vision of an Ireland created a sovereign state, guaranteed in independence by the victorious Central Powers at the Peace Congress that would assemble when England should be vanquished in the great war which he knew from his German associates was fast approaching.

The Sinn Fein foreign policy was published and disseminated and discussed in Ireland and known to Irish loyalists long before Ulster began to arm in resistance to Home Rule. The Sinn Fein Irish Volunteer Movement was not, as is so often asserted, designed as an answer to the Ulster Volunteer Movement; it was intended for a different purpose. Many of the rebels who organised it were in touch with Germany in Europe and America. The Irish Volunteers were raised by the Sinn Fein leaders as a military force to back the foreign policy of Sinn Fein, so that there should be a disciplined body of Irishmen ready to strike at England in the event of a German invasion, and, aided by German officers, men and munitions, to fight for the independence of Ireland. The Sinn Fein Volunteers were not hostile to the Ulster Volunteer Movement, and publicly proclaimed the fact; they rather welcomed it, counting on the hope that the Radical Government would force Home Rule on Ulster, that Ulster would resist in arms, that England would be plunged in civil war, that Germany would seize the opportunity, that a divided England, 'beaten to her knees,' would meet her Sadowa, and that Ireland, at last united, north and south, in detestation of British Government, would demand and compel her independence as Hungary had done.

Casement's review articles were collectively printed in America, and published in cheap pamphlet form (price five cents) before and immediately after the outbreak of the war, under the title of 'Ireland, Germany, and the Freedom of the Seas. A possible outcome of the war of 1914. To Free the Seas, free Ireland.'\*

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\* They were also published in 1914 under the title 'The Crime against Europe—A possible Outcome of the War of 1914' (Philadelphia, the Celtic



In a preface dated Aug. 15, 1914, he said :

'It was the intention of the writer of the articles, begun in 1911, and written in odd moments in 1911 and between the end of 1912 and November 1913, to show how the vital needs of European peace, of European freedom of the seas, and of Irish national life and prosperity were indissolubly linked with Germany in the struggle so clearly impending between that country and Great Britain. The war has come sooner than was expected. The rest of the writer's task must be essayed not with the author's pen, but with the rifle of the Irish Volunteer. As a contribution to the cause of Irish freedom this presentment of the cause for Germany, friend of Ireland and foe of England, is now published.' . . . 'A German triumph will bring equality of opportunity to all who traverse the seas; and, in order to safeguard that new-won freedom, Ireland, the keeper of the seas for Great Britain, must become the keeper of the seas for Europe. Such is the object of the German effort; such the possibility and hope to Ireland and the sea nations of a German triumph. A German victory must bring, as one of the surest guarantees of future peace and sea-liberty for all, an Ireland restored to Europe and erected into a Sovereign European State under international guarantees.' . . . 'In this war Ireland has only one enemy. Let every Irish heart, let every Irish hand, let every Irish purse be with Germany. Let Irishmen in America get ready. The day a German sea victory tolls the death-knell of British tyranny at sea, it tolls the death-knell of British rule in Ireland. . . . Let Irishmen in America stand ready armed, keen, and alert. The German guns that sound the sinking of the British Dreadnoughts will be the call of Ireland to her scattered sons.'

The official policy of Sinn Fein calls upon the Irish to have nothing to do with Westminster, but to return members to form a Convention at home, and to represent Ireland at the Peace Conference after the war, and there demand that she shall be recognised as one of the small nationalities and her independence guaranteed by the Great Powers. Certain pressmen and members of parliament used to tell the British people that the Sinn Feiners were interesting idealists or harmless cranks. In reality

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Press). Immense quantities of these pamphlets were circulated in Ireland through the post, being fraudulently enclosed in covers bearing the names of business firms in high repute in Dublin, Belfast, and elsewhere.

Sinn Fein is the most dangerous revolutionary movement since the time of the Tudors. As the Irish insurrectionaries had under Elizabeth a European foreign policy in connexion with England's great enemy, Spain, so now, after three hundred years, they have a foreign policy in connexion with her far greater enemy, Germany. Now, as then, the aim of that policy is to strike down the sea power of England and thus destroy her.

Casement's original articles supplied texts for the numerous seditious Irish newspapers, financed by German and Irish-American money. Two of the most remarkable of them—'Ireland and the Next War' (July 1913), and 'The Elsewhere Empire' (December 1913)—were published in the 'Irish Review,' the organ of the Irish 'Intellectuals,' and reproduced in 'Irish Freedom,' which was controlled by the most dangerous of the rebel leaders, MacDermott and James Connolly.\* They thus gained a wide publicity, not only among the 'long-haired men,' but among the rank and file of the seditious.

The following is a passage from one entitled 'The Keeper of the Seas,' circulated in August 1911:

'Without Ireland there would be to-day no British Empire. The vital importance of Ireland to England is understood but never proclaimed by every British statesman. To subdue that western and ocean-closing island and to exploit its resources, its people, and, above all, its position, to the sole advantage of the eastern island, has been the aim of every English Government from the days of Henry VIII onwards; and the vital importance of Ireland to Europe is not, and has not been, understood by any European statesman. To them it has not been a European island, a vital and necessary element of European development, but an appanage of England, an island beyond an island.' . . .

'Montesquieu alone of French writers grasped the importance of Ireland in the international affairs of his time; and he blames the vacillation of Louis XIV, who failed to put forth his strength to establish James upon the throne of Ireland, and thus by an act of perpetual separation to "*affaiblir le voisin*." Napoleon, too late, in St Helena, realised his error: "Had I gone to Ireland instead of Egypt, the Empire of England was at an end." With these two utterances of the French writer and of the French ruler, we

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\* See 'Irish Freedom,' August 1913 and March 1914.

begin and end the reference of Ireland to European affairs which Continental statecraft has up to this emitted, and so far has failed to apply.' . . .

'Perhaps the one latter-day European who perceived the true relation of Ireland to Great Britain was Niebuhr. "Should England," he said, "not change her conduct, Ireland may still, for a long period, belong to her, but not always; and the loss of that country is the death-day, not only of her greatness, but of her very existence."'

Having denounced the 'British usufruct of the overseas world now maintained to exclude Germany at all costs from the arena,' Casement suggests the German Irish Allied policy, and the present Sinn Fein programme of Ireland at the Peace Congress:

'Detach Ireland from the map of the British Empire and restore it to the map of Europe, and that day England resumes her native proportions and Europe assumes its rightful stature in the Empire of the World. Ireland can only be restored to the current of European life, from which she has for so long been purposely withheld, by the act of Europe. What Napoleon perceived too late may yet be the purpose and achievement of a Congress of nations.' . . .

'Ireland's strategic importance is a factor of supreme weight to Europe, and is to-day used in the scale against Europe. . . . The *arbitrium mundi*, claimed and most certainly exercised by England, is maintained by the British Fleet; and, until that power is effectively challenged and held in check, it is idle to talk of European influence outside of certain narrow Continental limits. The power of the British Fleet can never be permanently restrained until Ireland is restored to Europe. Germany then of necessity becomes the champion of European interests as opposed to the world-dominion of England.'

The Sinn Fein policy of Ireland at the Peace Congress does not contemplate simply an attempt to force the doors of a Peace Congress where England and her Allies are conquerors; it has another more sinister aspect. It looks to Ireland's appearance at a Peace Congress, after a victory by the German Powers, where she will claim to be created an independent state under European guarantee. This is a tangible policy, and was and is the aim of the Sinn Fein insurrectionists; and the Clare, Kilkenny, Roscommon and Longford elections, the latter

of which the 'Manchester Guardian' described as 'equivalent to a serious defeat of the British Army in the field,' have returned representatives to take part in such a Congress.

'We must eject the Irish slaves of England from every constituency and replace them by men who will stand in the eyes of Europe for an independent Irish nation. The way of Ireland to the Peace Conference is through the constituencies. The ballot boxes must accredit the representatives of the Irish nation to that Congress which is pledged to regard the right of small nations to live in liberty and peace. The opportunity has come to Ireland to render the permanent settlement of Europe impossible without a permanent settlement of Ireland, and to the constituencies in Ireland now we say: The issue upon which you must vote is whether Ireland accepts England's rule and whatever England may decree, or whether Ireland rejects that rule and claims from the Peace Conference the right that the Allies declare they stand for, the right that the United States declares it stands for, the right of Belgium, the right of Poland, the right of a nation to govern itself' ('Nationality,' May 19, 1917).

In the remarkable article 'Ireland, Germany and the Next War,' published in July 1913, Casement, under the pen-name of Shan Van Vocht, clearly formulated the Sinn Fein foreign policy. The Review was sent by him to General Von Bernhardi, with a request to translate and circulate it in Germany. Bernhardi summarised and published it in the 'Berliner Post.'

'To-day, indeed (wrote Bernhardi, discussing the article), Germany's policy seems to be steering full sail towards an agreement with England; but, as this goal could not be reached without the abandonment of our whole future as a world-power, it is valuable for the "Realpolitiker" to examine exhaustively both the strength and the weaknesses of England.

'It is not without interest to know that, if it ever comes to a war with England, Germany will have allies in the enemy's camp itself, who in the given circumstances are resolved to bargain, and at any rate will cause a grave anxiety for England, and perhaps tie fast a portion of the English troops. . . . This prospect gains in significance when the circumstance is borne in mind that the Irish-Americans also reckon on an Anglo-German War, and, when it breaks

out, will certainly do the utmost in their power to damage England.'

Bernhardi received a semi-official rebuke in the 'Kölnische Zeitung,' because these things might better have been discussed in Military Council, and such outspokenness might raise difficulties for German policy; but the proposals were soon to bear fruit.\*

Casement took as his text an article by Sir A. Conan Doyle in the 'Fortnightly Review' of February 1913—'Great Britain and the Next War,' in which the writer appealed 'to his Irish fellow-countrymen of all political persuasions to recognise Ireland's interests as one with those of Great Britain in the event of a British defeat'; declaring that 'the British fleet is their one shield. If it be broken, Ireland will go down; for no sword can transfix England without the point reaching Ireland behind her.'

'I propose (wrote Casement) to show briefly that Ireland, far from sharing the calamities that must necessarily fall on Great Britain from defeat by a German Power, might conceivably thereby emerge into a position of much prosperity. The British view of the fate of Ireland in the event of a British defeat may be stated as twofold—only two contingencies are admitted. Either Ireland would remain after the war as she is to-day, tied to Great Britain, or she might be (this is not very seriously entertained) annexed by the victor. No other solution, I think, has ever been suggested.'

As to the first alternative, he admitted that the view was correct that, 'if, on the conclusion of a great war, Ireland were still to remain as she is to-day, an integral portion of a defeated United Kingdom, it is plain she would suffer and might be made to suffer possibly more even than fell to the share of Great Britain.' As to the second—the 'bogey man' idea that Germany would 'take' Ireland—he asserts that,

'To create a prosperous and flourishing Ireland, recognising that her own interests lay with those of her new administration, would assuredly be the first and chief aim of German

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\* 'Times,' Sept. 19, 1913. 'Irish Freedom,' Oct. 1913. See the preliminary chapter in Well's and Marlowe's 'The Rebellion in Ireland' (Maunsell, 1917).

statesmanship. . . . To rule from Hamburg and Berlin a remote island and a discontented people, with a highly discontented and separated Britain intervening, by methods of exploitation and centralisation, would be a task beyond the capacity of German statecraft.'

German effort, then, would plainly be directed to creating an Ireland satisfied with the change and fully determined to maintain it.

'Were annexation by the victor indeed to follow a British defeat, Ireland might very conceivably find the changed circumstances greatly to her advantage. . . . But there is a third alternative (he wrote) I have never seen discussed or hinted at, and yet it is at least as likely as the first alternative, and far more probable than the second, for I do not think the annexation of Ireland by an European power is internationally possible, however decisive might be the overthrow of England. Such an overthrow would be of enormous import to Europe and to the whole world. . . . It would be with the victor to see that the conditions of peace he imposed were such as, while ensuring to him the objects for which he had fought, would be the conditions least likely to provoke external intervention or a combination of alarmed world interests. . . .

'Germany would have to attain her end—the permanent disabling of the maritime supremacy of Great Britain—by another and less provocative measure than annexation. It is here and in just these circumstances that the third alternative, which no Englishman, I venture to think, has ever dreamed of, would be born on the field of battle and baptised a German godchild with European Diplomacy as sponsor. Germany for her own Imperial ends and in pursuit of a great world-policy might successfully accomplish what Louis XIV and Napoleon only contemplated. An Ireland already severed by a sea held by German warships and temporarily occupied by a German Army might well and irrevocably be severed from Great Britain, and with common assent erected into a neutralised independent European state under international guarantees. An independent Ireland would of itself be no threat or hurt to any European interest. On the contrary, to make Ireland an Atlantic Holland, a maritime Belgium,\* would be an act of restoration to Europe of this most

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\* This was before 'The Scrap of Paper' was torn up.



naturally favoured of European Islands that a Peace Congress should in the end be glad to ratify at the instance of a victorious Germany. . . .

'It is evident that, if Great Britain were defeated, Germany would carry the Irish question to an European solution in harmony with her maritime interests, and could count on the support of the great bulk of European opinion to support the settlement those interests imposed. And if, politically and commercially, an independent and neutral Irish state commended itself to Europe, on moral and intellectual grounds the claim could be put still higher. Nothing advanced on behalf of England could meet the case for a free Ireland as stated by Germany. Germany would attain her ends as the champion of national liberty, and could destroy England's naval supremacy for all time by an act of irreproachable morality. . . . A more and more pent-in Central Europe may discover there is a Near-Western question, and that Ireland, a free Ireland, restored to Europe, is the key to unlock the western ocean and open the seaways of the world.'

To further the Sinn Fein foreign policy, Casement went to Germany and entered into traitorous dealings there. The Irish rebels fought to carry it into effect. It has permeated and fired revolutionary Ireland, while Germany has intrigued and plotted there, and is still plotting to assist it. Through it, Mathew J. Cummings of Boston, the President of the A.O.H. (American Alliance), linked together the German and Irish Associations in America, and was given the assurance that Germany would recognise the Irish rebels as belligerents and take charge of the Irish claim at the Peace Conference.\* This is the policy adopted on April 19, 1917, by the Sinn Fein Conference in the Mansion House, Dublin, held under the Republican Flag, and attended by over 150 of the younger priests and 900 other delegates. It was reiterated at the Convention held to frame the Sinn Fein constitution, on Oct. 25, 1917. Backing this policy, Germany, in the Note to America on Jan. 31, 1917, declares that,

'to the principles and wishes which she professes belongs in the first place the right of all nations to self-government

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\* See 'New York World,' March 7, 1915.

and equal rights, and in acknowledging this principle she would sincerely rejoice if peoples like those of Ireland and India, who do not enjoy the blessings of independence, now obtained their freedom.\*

Meanwhile, through this policy, thousands of British troops are 'tied fast' from the front to control Ireland, where, alone among all the belligerent people of Europe, conscription is not enforced and a quarter of a million stalwart Irishmen are left unenrolled for military service. Major Hills told the Prime Minister, 'It will not be pleasant for England to have to go to a Peace Conference with Ireland standing in the corner as a naughty child. It will want some explaining to the world, and I am not sure that the world will not listen to Ireland as much as to ourselves.'† The official organ replied:

'English statesmen will succeed in settling the Irish question when they restore to Ireland the same sovereign rights they profess to be fighting for in the case of Belgium, Serbia, and Roumania. To claim these rights Ireland is going to the Peace Conference, whereat Major Hills confesses her voice will be listened to equally with England's; and, while the English Government and Ireland's misrepresentatives conspire to try and prevent her going there, let our countrymen in each constituency prepare, when opportunity comes, to elect an Irishman to go, not to the London Parliament where they break treaties, but to the Peace Conference where all Europe will make treaties.'‡

VIGILANT.

## II.—*Sinn Fein and Labour.*

Whether a special degree of patriotism will render a community specially zealous about the efficiency of its internal institutions and its own social and economic well-being, or not, depends largely on the general history, temperament and education of that community. A people whose love for their native land is constantly being called upon for dynamic acts of resistance or rebellion, in order to 'free' the land from a more or

\* 'Irish Opinion,' Feb. 24, 1917. † Parl. Deb. (March 22, 1917), 2090.

‡ 'Nationality,' March 31, 1917.

less hated domination, may have neither the ability nor the energy to attack those inherent evils which they share in common with friends and foes alike. Conversely (and other things being equal), there may be much material progress and a vast activity in the arts of peace in a kingdom which needs the flame of war itself to kindle the dormant patriotic zeal of its inhabitants. In a country like England, enjoying centuries of independence, and a comparative immunity from foreign aggression, the note of national self-consciousness (which is the static form of patriotism) will not be heard so frequently as in a country like Ireland, where pride of ancestry is deeply scarred with a sense of subjection to an alien race. Patriotism, more than any other of the instinctive virtues, thrives on persecution—and especially on the memory of persecution. The growth of other feelings in the body politic—some good, some not so good—is often checked in consequence. This must be borne in mind by any who seek to make a critical examination of that extremely dark horse in the industrial stable, the Irish Labour Movement.

It has been said that all civil risings, like all wars, are economic in origin. On this hypothesis the Irish insurrection of 1916 may be attributed to the age-long animosity set in motion by the spoliation of English conquerors and their camp-followers, or to the more immediate exasperation caused by the implacability of modern (and mostly native) capitalism—according to whether the historian prefers to take a longer or a shorter view. Enough, however, can be deduced from the prevailing circumstances to prove that, like all previous exhibitions of its kind in Ireland, this was both a Patriot's and a Poor Man's Revolt—though the sentimental side of it was undoubtedly more apparent than the practical side. 'Easter Week came from Dublin's slums,' says a recent writer\* on the subject. The Dublin slums were certainly well represented at this carnival, but as the hot-bed of a disaffected Nationalism rather than as the seed-ground for enlightened economic ideals. The grievances of the labouring classes may have been implied in the Republican programme; but from the

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\* Austin Harrison in 'The English Review' (Sept. 1917).

first the 'intellectuals' of the Separatist movement overshadowed the Socialist and Syndicalist leaders, one figure alone among whom (and of him more anon) stands out with any prominence.

This, of course, was only to be expected. Among the vast majority who populate the South, West and Eastern Midlands of Ireland national consciousness has always been much more in evidence, and more deliberately fostered, than either civic, social, or even class consciousness. Socialism, and theories of proletarian cooperation, are more prevalent among the working men of Ulster; but there they have hitherto been held in check by the anxiety and uncertainty about Home Rule. In the other districts they have, to a considerable extent, been subordinated to the fulfilment of Home Rule. Among the agrarian element (forming still, by far, the larger part of the labouring population) they have made hardly any headway at all; while even with the shop and factory hands of the big cities south of the Boyne the green flag (now the green, yellow and white) has invariably provoked more enthusiasm than the red. And this in a country where the agricultural workers—the cabin-boys of the national ship, as they might be called—had stood up to the landlords with a ferocity unequalled in this class outside France; where the Larkinite strikes of a few years back were bitterer and bloodier than any similar uprisings in England; and where, as James Connolly points out in his posthumous work\* on the struggles of the Irish poor, 'the capitalist system is the most foreign thing' that has ever been introduced. This seeming paradox gives rise to the following interesting questions: How strong is the current of Labour 'unrest' beneath the surface of Sinn Fein politics? To what degree have the doctrines and aspirations of 'class-consciousness' caught on among Irish workers? Would the granting of self-government, with its inevitable consequence of dulling the edge of merely national egoism, have the effect of emphasising still further the 'class-cleavage' which the strikes and the Rebellion all too fatally revealed?

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\* 'Labour in Ireland; Labour in Irish History; the Re-conquest of Ireland.' By James Connolly. Maunsell, 1917.

In endeavouring to get at the 'true inwardness' of the industrial situation in Ireland at this moment, and to 'place' the spirit of Larkinism in its relation to the more traditionally *intransigent* movement, it will be necessary to give a brief *résumé* of the conflicting atmospheres in which the Capital and Labour drama is being played in that country. The problem here is, of course, complicated by the presence of two or three factors—extrinsic, admittedly, to the essence of it, but generally governing its issues up till now—which are absent from the controversy in England. For one thing, the farm, more than the factory, decides the existing prosperity of the people of Ireland; for another, two-thirds of both the town and rural workers, as we have said, are consumed with a now flaming, now smouldering, opposition to the hand that rules them; and for a third, the nominally religious susceptibilities of the North and South have for centuries prevented anything in the nature of a permanent Labour fusion.

As regards the first factor, it is pretty safe to assert that Socialism (on a collectivist basis, at any rate) is scarcely likely to win the suffrages of a peasantry who have seen their condition improve from serfdom to proprietorship. Adapting Connolly, we might say that they would be almost sure to regard it as 'the most foreign thing' ever proposed to them. Originally, the land of Ireland was split up into communes under the chiefs of the clans; and so it remained until taken and parcelled out by a succession of invaders. Several attempts were made in the early part of the 19th century (one of which is described in the 'Quarterly Review' for November, 1819) to revive the communal system in a small way, both for farming and general industry. It is not unnatural that our Socialist author should refer to these experiments approvingly, seeing that many of them were the direct outcome of Robert Owen's propaganda mission in Dublin on behalf of the new creed. Other writers (notably P. D. Kenny, in his 'Economics for Irishmen'), without condemning the earlier communism of the Irish, have anything but admiration for such survivals of its effects as may still be detected in the shiftlessness and lack of initiative of large numbers of the agricultural population. Perhaps

it is too severe to sum up the agrarian situation in Ireland at any time as a combination of 'communism, cupidity, scoundrelism of all kinds' (the 'Encyclopædia Britannica's' description of it during the forty years before the Union); but there is no doubt that some of the worst features of communism—mixed, of course, with the demoralisation caused by English misrule—have bitten deep into the character of the Irish peasant. This is far, however, from saying that the gospel of Socialism—even of Larkinism—with its denunciation of private property in the means of production, has any attractions for him. The great stumblingblock for Socialists has always been the 'man on the land'; and where, as in Ireland, individual ownership—if only of a 'farm' six yards by three in area, the size of some of the 'holdings' in Connaught—is more and more aspired to, the economic doctrines which may appeal to the mechanic have little or no weight. The recent revolt, then, so far as it affected the farming sections of the community, was a revolt against the 'hated Sassenach' rather than against the inequalities of landed proprietorship.

The racial and religious factors in the industrial imbroglio of the towns are intertwined. Mr Bernard Shaw has said that 'England in Ireland is the Pope's policeman.' But it is equally true that the Pope in Ireland has often been England's policeman—with Good King William of Immortal Memory coming in as a somewhat less effective guardian of the *status quo*. At various periods in the last two centuries of Irish history the ferment of international events has tended to subdue the so-called religious quarrel between the two factions; and it has seemed as though the labouring men of both North and South were about to make a common stand against the evils of their economic condition. The most notable instance of such a fraternisation occurred, as Connolly shows in his book, during, and immediately after, the French Revolution. In the midst of the Republican ardour disseminated in Ireland by that event, the Society of United Irishmen, led by Wolfe Tone, came into being and, building on the principles laid down in the 'Contrat Social,' welded together both Catholics and Protestants in a fierce determination to overthrow the oppression of the aristocratic and



manufacturing interests. The following passages from 'Labour in Irish History' are worth quoting, not only for their description of the state of feeling then, but also for the bearing they have on the situation now :

'The Protestant workman and tenant was learning that the Pope of Rome was a very unreal and shadowy danger, compared with the social power of his employer or landlord; and the Catholic tenant was awakening to a perception of the fact that under the new social order the Catholic landlord represented the Mass less than the rent roll. The times were propitious for a union of the two democracies of Ireland. They had travelled from widely different points through the valleys of disillusion and disappointment, to meet at last by the unifying waters of a common suffering . . .

'The Protestant workers saw in it [the French upheaval] a revolution of a great Catholic nation, and hence wavered in the belief so insidiously instilled into them that Catholics were willing slaves of despotism; and the Catholics saw in it a great manifestation of popular power—a revolution of the people against the aristocracy, and therefore ceased to believe that aristocratic leadership was necessary for their salvation.'

The 'union of the two democracies' culminated for a moment in the Rebellion of '98, though the Protestants of the North soon withdrew, and the movement became purely sectarian. Two years later the Act of Union damped down the industrial fires for a time; and once more the anti-English nature of Irish insurrectionism became accentuated, even the Emmet conspiracy of 1802 being more Separatist than Socialist in character.

From this time onwards the battle of employers and employed (and unemployed) was to be fought out against a varying background of civil and religious disability, famine, feud, and the ever-recurrent agitation for Repeal. This atmosphere, as was said at the beginning, has undoubtedly militated in some degree against such a steady growth of Trade Unionism among the workers of Ireland as we find among the workers of England. Economic servitude and political helotry combined have clouded the issue. Pitiably as their condition has been, and is, the poor of Dublin have shown a remarkable disposition on occasions to rally round the 'Patriot' in preference to the Social Revolutionist, even when the former has been either hostile or indifferent

to their claims. For all that, the principle of working-class cohesion for industrial objects has been eagerly grasped, if not persistently carried out; and, even so far back as 1824, we read that the artisans of Dublin were perfectly organised, and that many of the employers were already beginning to complain of 'the tyranny of the Trade Unions.' The 'two democracies,' in response to the appeal of Chartism, drew together again during the five or six years that preceded the famine of 1847-9. Irish Chartist associations sprang up all over the country; and probably at no time before or since has there been such a zealous desire among the workers of Ireland to ally themselves, not only with their fellows of a different faith, but also with the revolutionists in England and on the Continent. Internationalism was very much in the air in the early forties; and the Irish industrial population, instructed by such men as Feargus O'Connor, John Mitchell and James Fintan Lalor, gave a ready acceptance to the programme of joint revolutionary action on the part of the democracies.

For the rest of the century the social outbreaks which attained to any magnitude were almost wholly confined to the agrarian districts, and need not be touched on here. The misery, degradation and filthy poverty of the Dublin poor resulted now and then in spasmodic and easily-suppressed strikes. But the spirit of patient, far-seeing organisation on Trade Union lines, which characterises the English and Scottish Labour movement, was conspicuously missing. 'Patriotism,' whether of the 'clean-cut' or 'constitutional' brand, had come to its own again, ruled every debate, and coloured every dispute. The generally advancing prosperity of Belfast served to intensify the estrangement between the Unionist and the Nationalist workers, which the latters' uncompromising adherence to their Home Rule notions had now made once more such a dominating factor in the situation. Irish capitalism, whether Papist or Protestant, was only too plainly drawing away from the fundamental 'Cause,' and leaving the rags and bones of the religious controversy to the groundlings while it got on with more important concerns.

Meanwhile, the housing, feeding and industrial conditions of the poorer workers in the capital city cried to

Heaven for redress. One need not sport the ultra-revolutionary colours in order to condemn the callous and inhuman way in which the slum-dwellers have been crushed by the iron heel of commercial competition and greed. Maxim Gorky's 'Creatures that once were men'—and women—could be applied aptly enough to large numbers of the ugly, dirty, stunted, twisted objects whom one meets shuffling along, or sitting forlornly in the doorways of the evil-smelling, pestiferous courts which make Dublin one of the minor plague-spots of the world. Why are the people thus? Many things have conspired to keep them so. The migration of the aristocracy, the lack of industries on a large scale, the tenement system, the iniquitous rack-renting of rooms, drink, a supine Corporation, scandalously low wages, their own natural ingrained laziness—all these nauseous elements contribute to the squalor of the poor of Dublin. But, though personal habits, superstitions and outworn sentiments have much to do with their condition, the economic cause is at the root of it all. An irrational distribution of labour, a mal-distribution of wealth—that is the main reason of poverty anywhere. In Dublin it stares at one. Two significant events—the Larkinite rising and the Sinn Fein rebellion—in the last four years have removed neither the cause nor the effect; but in supplementing each other to a certain degree they succeeded in throwing a strong light, the one on the evils of unrestricted capitalism in Ireland, and the other on the unabated desire of the 'irreconcilables' to snatch (if possible) a victory for patriotism and socialism at the same time.

Not that, as we have said, the Sinn Fein Rebellion of 1916 had any necessary connexion with, or was a direct corollary of, the Larkinite rising of three years before. That rising was anti-capitalist, both in its origin and objects; and only took on an anti-Governmental tinge after its needlessly violent suppression. The most impartial student of the facts will admit that the strikers had one of the strongest cases in the world. Even the 'Irish Times' was forced to agree that Larkinism was a 'revolt against intolerable conditions of life'; and even William Martin Murphy, perhaps the most prominent of the Dublin employers at whom the strikes

were aimed, told his *confrères* that the seeds of Larkinism were to be found in 'sweating wages and bad conditions.' If they had any doubt about the effect of their inexorability they must have been enlightened by the letter addressed to them by 'Æ' (George Russell), who told them that

'the men whose manhood you have broken will loathe you, and will be always brooding to strike a fresh blow. The children will be taught to curse you. The infant being moulded in the womb will have breathed into its starved body the vitality of hate. It is not they—it is you who are blind Samsons pulling down the pillars of the social order.'

The most casual observer of what has happened since can see that the hot gospel of Labour revolt which Jim Larkin preached from the steps of Liberty Hall has had, and is having, a marked effect on the minds of the workers in regard to their economic condition. All the same, the Rebellion was not made out of the strike. No doubt, as one of the signatories to the Republican Proclamation, and as the head of his own Citizen Army, Connolly himself (who was an Internationalist first, and only a Nationalist at all because his country happened to be bound to the throne of another) exerted a powerful influence on the economic-revolutionary group. But the Patriots, both among the leaders and the led, far outnumbered the Socialists; and the Constitution of the new State that was to be set up, though it made mention of its 'gallant Allies' on the Continent (Germany and Austria!), and referred in specious terms to the 'independence' that was about to be achieved, professed no particular democratic faith, and foreshadowed nothing in the way of industrial reform.

The truth is that, with the exception of Connolly and one or two others, the instigators of the rising were not primarily inspired by these ideals, but acted in the traditional manner and with the traditional aims of the very narrowest Nationalism. As usual, it was the dreamers and devotees of poor old 'Dark Rosaleen' who captivated the popular imagination. Of constructive statesmanship—in the event of the Rebellion being successful—there was scarcely a sign. It has been asked what the stalwarts of the insurrection would have done

if England, in her intense preoccupation with something else, had allowed them to remain in possession of Dublin, and bidden them to go ahead, form a Government and run the country. Unfortunately we can get no reply now from the majority of the stalwarts to that very pertinent question. But the publicly expressed policy of many of the leaders who remain, as to the course of action of a Sinn Fein Administration in Ireland, seems to point to the fact that 'Dark Rosaleen' would have been more rampant than before, with the Labour revolution for which Connolly worked waiting, as ever, forlornly in the shade. This rebellion, for all its Socialist leaven, had not risen to the idea of democratic Internationalism. It sought no working-class alliances—not even with the Trade Unionists of England, the friends of Irish freedom. It had made no plans for curbing the undue influence of either priest or publican; while, as for the claims of the 'oppressed proletariat' (except in so far as it was oppressed by England), there is nothing, beyond a few high-sounding phrases, to prove that it had, like the lady in 'Martin Chuzzlewit,' 'so much as a pin-cushion ready.'

And yet it would be a mistake to think that this ill-starred Nationalist rising has ended in a democratic reaction. The number of Sinn Feiners has enormously increased since the execution of the rebel chiefs, and Mr Asquith's visit; but, so, too, has the number of those who realise the impossibility of defeating England by force of arms, and who are now turning their attention to the problem of working out their economic salvation in concert with the more scientific forms of Labour organisation which are coming to the front in other countries. The Chartist advocate, Feargus O'Connor, made a great impression on the working-men of his day when he told them that the condition of the masses in politically free England was hardly better than their own, and that, unless they could achieve their industrial liberty, the completest separation from the ancient enemy might leave them worse off than they were before. There are indications that this lesson is being re-learned. The acuter minds in the ranks of Labour in Ireland are coming to see that all the old social inequalities could coexist with the strictest Republicanism. There is certainly nothing to show that a Sinn Fein Capitalism would be any less ruthless than

the Unionist and Imperialist brand, or that the Dublin Corporation, for example, would suddenly become a pure and disinterested body just because what is largely its own political persuasion had seized the reins of central Government. The very healthy suspicion is abroad that Sinn Feinism is no more immune than Nationalism, Unionism or any other political aspiration from the operations of commercial adventurers, who are far from desiring the establishment of an Industrial Commonwealth.

That this suspicion has been gaining ground among the Socialist rank and file would seem to be apparent from a declaration on the point made by Dr Dillon, one of the members of the Executive body, at the Sinn Fein Convention, held last October in Dublin. 'If it is imagined,' said Dr Dillon, 'that the Republic will be of a character which will exclude all possibility of social reform, and that the people who are engaged in starting the Republic all belong to the capitalist classes, this idea is not true. If this idea is allowed to spread it will seriously interfere with our movement.' And yet, as if to emphasise the fact that the leaders of the movement, if not hostile to Labour, are the veriest amateurs at industrial strategy, the only definite resolution brought forward at this Convention in regard to what should be the future Labour politics of Sinn Fein was that moved by the Countess Markievicz, calling on Irish trade unions 'to sever all connexion with British trade unionism'—the 'clean-cut' with a vengeance! It is not surprising that this quixotic suggestion has been laughed out of court by the main body of Irish trade unionists, who belong directly, or whose societies are affiliated, to the most powerful organisations in England, and who are not so completely mad as to suppose that they can afford to insist on a policy of 'splendid isolation' at the very moment that their brethren across the water are drawing closer and closer together. The practical minds, too, among the intellectuals, who are more deeply stirred by such a book as 'Labour in Irish History' than by a whole cartload of moonstruck, 'patriotic' poetry, see that the Connolly spirit is going to do more for the workers of Ireland than the spectacular heroics of the Pearses and Plunketts.

On the other hand, it has been said that Sinn Feinism



can never hope to accomplish its ends because there are no wealthy men on its side. It is, perhaps, a truer reading of the situation which maintains that its failure under present conditions is certain because it divides the Irish workers of the North and the South on the question of the supreme Government, while offering nothing in the way of a hopeful Labour policy which could bring them together. Wolfe Tone, though he, too, fell a victim to the 'invasion' idea, found the magic symbol more surely when he sought to unite the divergent sections of his poorer fellow-countrymen on a basis of social and economic rights, rather than on that of an exclusive political independence. 'And,' he wrote in the manifesto of the United Irishmen, 'if the men of property will not help us they must fall; we will free ourselves by the aid of that large and respectable class of the community—the men of no property.'

At that time Belfast, and not Dublin, was the centre of revolutionary agitation in Ireland. It is not impossible that it may be so again. Though free from the foetid poverty that disfigures the capital city, Belfast, as Connolly graphically pictures it, has its own industrial horrors, which in many ways are more staggering than elsewhere. The workers of the northern capital are not so destitute or so hopeless as those who haunt the 'alleys of their ancestors' in Dublin. Municipal affairs in Belfast, too, are far better managed. But just because, perhaps, Belfast has no romantic glamour, and no ideals outside its own prosperity, the evil side of Capitalism is seen and realised in the raw. It is small wonder that the 'men of no property' in this Protestant stronghold should have been attracted to the Larkinite Socialism which so appealed to their Catholic brethren. More to the point, however, is the fact that even the skilled artificers on the Lagan are being steadily won over to the propaganda of advanced Trade Unionism, which abolishes craft distinctions and makes the industry the unit of organisation. The time may be drawing near in Ireland when the old political cries of 'die-hard' Unionism and 'die-often' Nationalism will both have lost their spell, so far as many large industrial groups are concerned; when the Dublin workers will see that Sinn Fein butters no parsnips, and the hefty 'boys' of

Queen's Island begin to get a glimmering notion of the fact that even in a separate Ulster they might run short of provisions.

But, whatever developments of Labour organisation may be witnessed in Ireland, the feeling is growing that the ancient barriers of race and religion, that have divided the workers for so long, are artificial and unreal beside the barriers that divide Labour from Capitalism. Given a form of Self-Government which the three provinces would agree to, and the fourth not reject, the strength of the former barriers might soon have to stand the test of a 'class-war' which would lack nothing in thoroughness because it was being fought by Irishmen in Ireland. Just as Labour in England is quite obviously groping towards a new alignment of its forces, so the Irish workers, laying their tribal animosities aside, may essay a grand amalgamation for economic purposes. Certainly if they seize and hold on to the 'class-conscious' idea with the same tenacity that they have seized and held on to the bone of Home Rule, their contribution to the industrial struggle should make a brilliant page of history.

BERTRAM CLAYTON.

#### NOTES TO PP. 243, 247 ABOVE.

(1) This policy is embodied in 'The Constitution' adopted by Sinn Fein as proposed by the Executive and set out in the agenda for the Convention held in the Mansion House, Dublin, Oct. 25, 1917. Arthur Griffith presided at this Convention, which elected De Valera as President and Griffith as Vice-President of the Sinn Fein organisation (Daily Papers, Oct. 26, 1917).

(2) This official statement appeared in the 'Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,' Nov. 20, 1914. The statement was sent out by the German Foreign Office by wireless to Sayville, Long Island, and circulated widely in America. It was republished in a violently anti-British volume, 'The King, the Kaiser, and Irish Freedom,' by James K. M'Guire (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1915), addressed 'to the millions of men and women of German blood in America,' and advocating the Sinn Fein policy.

## Art. 15.—THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

*The Western Front.*

DURING the first three days of October the Germans persisted, but without success, in their efforts to drive our troops from the positions won, on Sept. 26, between the Menin road and the crest of the ridge north of Polygon Wood. On Oct. 4 our offensive was resumed on a front of about eight miles, from a point south of the Menin road to the Ypres-Staden railway, anticipating by a few minutes a hostile attack between Polygon Wood and Zonnebeke by five divisions, which were thrown back in disorder, and suffered heavy loss. The operations were hindered by unfavourable weather, rain falling heavily throughout the day, and low clouds, driven before a westerly gale, making flying almost impossible. In spite of these adverse conditions all the appointed objectives were gained before midday, and six counter-attacks were repulsed during the afternoon. The progress made on this occasion, and in the principal stages of the subsequent fighting, is indicated on the accompanying map. In this brief outline it is only possible to notice the most prominent features of a series of engagements which, in the methods of attack and defence, the nature of the German positions, and the desperate nature of the fighting, did not differ from the earlier phases of the great battle.

With regard to the general design of the operations, we may accept the view of military writers in the German press that the intention was to capture the commanding position known as the Passchendaele ridge, and to squeeze the enemy out of the low-lying area between it and the Yser Canal, as the first step in an advance against the submarine bases on the coast. It will be observed from the map that the ridge in question trends in a north-westerly direction beyond Westroosebeke, enclosing on the north and east the forest of Houthulst, and terminating in the rearward defences of Dixmude. The ground south of the forest, over which our troops had to advance in order to cover the left flank of the attacks on the ridge, is intersected by several streams, which, swollen by the excessive rainfall, spread

over the valleys, and formed successive barriers of lakes and marshes. It was in this region, strongly defended by redoubts and 'pill-boxes,' that the severest fighting took place; for not only was movement slow and toilsome, but the prompt adaptation of captured positions for defence against counter-attack was impracticable in the prevailing quagmire. It was the resistance encountered on the western slopes, rather than on the ridge itself, that hindered the advance in the direction of Westroosebeke.

Houthulst Forest forms the principal defence of the low-lying area between the ridge and the canal. Covered in front by marshes, defended by concreted works and nests of machine-guns, and supported by the cross-fire of artillery placed on the higher ground between Terrest and Westroosebeke, it has proved a formidable position to attack. In a combined operation on Oct 22, French and British troops carried the southern defences on a front of nearly a mile and a half, and established themselves well within the boundary. On Oct. 26 and 28 General Anthoine's troops, in conjunction with Belgian detachments, which made their way across the inundations, made a remarkable flank movement between the forest and the canal, capturing an extensive system of entrenchments, and occupying the whole of the Merckem peninsula. This success, followed by raids and artillery activity in the Dixmude sector, caused the Germans some uneasiness; and it is evident from the Berlin communiqués that they were anticipating an attack in that quarter, when attention was diverted to Italy by the progress of the Austro-German invasion.

The anxiety with which the Germans regarded the approach of the Allied forces to their defensive centre in Houthulst Forest manifested itself in a succession of fierce counter-attacks, which were directed chiefly against the sector embracing the Staden railway, and the junction of the French and British lines near the south-west corner of the forest. The Germans would naturally consider the latter a weak point; but the close cooperation which existed between the Allied troops made all their efforts abortive. The Passchendaele sector was an equally tender spot; but here also the enemy's attempts to recover lost ground had no other result than to impose

a severe strain on the endurance of our troops, and to retard their progress. After the fall of Passchendaele village (Nov. 6) the Germans abstained from further counter-attacks in the Flanders zone of operations, contenting themselves with subjecting our positions, especially those in the Passchendaele sector, to continuous bombardment.

On Nov. 20 the scene of action shifted to the Cambrai front, where troops of the 3rd Army took the offensive between the Scheldt and the Canal du Nord, in conjunction with subsidiary attacks, of the nature of diversions, east of Epéhy, and between Bullecourt and Fontaine lez Croisilles. The concentration of the striking force was effected with remarkable secrecy; and, although the activity of their patrols and raiding parties indicates that the Germans were apprehensive of an attack some days before its delivery, it is evident from the sequel that they had no suspicion of the novel form it would take. According to the correspondent of the 'Hamburger Fremdenblatt,' airmen, during the previous week, had reported a continuous southward movement of troops, but had been unable to determine their destination, dull, foggy weather having interfered with observation. As to the time of the attack the Germans were in complete ignorance; for General Byng dispensed with the usual preparatory bombardment, and the general quietude of the night before the battle probably led them to expect an uneventful day.

The positions attacked, which formed part of the Hindenburg system, comprised three lines of exceptional strength. The main trench of the advanced line was deep and narrow, with numerous strong points and snipers' posts. The second, or main line, situated from 500 to 1000 yards in rear, consisted of a trench some ten feet deep, with a width designed to stop tanks, and provided with numerous trench-mortar emplacements and dug-outs. The third, or support line, was placed a similar distance in rear of the main line, and was of similar construction; and a deep tunnel, running parallel to and behind it, provided at once free communication and secure cover for reserves. In front of each line were broad belts of entanglement, formed of steel wire half an inch thick, with barbs an inch long; and between the

lines, and for a couple of miles in rear of the system, there were a network of communication trenches, countless strong points, and a profusion of wire.

The main infantry attack was preceded by a line of tanks, for whose employment the ground, undamaged by bombardment, and dried by a spell of fine weather, was exceptionally favourable. Surmounting every obstacle, they flattened out the wire entanglements, and prepared the way for the infantry without creating the general havoc which, when artillery is used for that purpose, impedes the subsequent movement of guns and transport. In the first stage of the attack Lateau Wood, La Vacquerie, Welsh Ridge, Ribecourt, and Havrincourt were carried, and a footing was gained in Flesquières. In the second stage Masnières, Marcoing, Neuf Wood, Graincourt, and Anneux were occupied; and, on the west of the Canal du Nord, where tanks were not employed, progress was made as far as the Bapaume road by bombing along the trenches. Thus, on the first day, the triple line of defence was surmounted on nearly the whole of the front attacked.

The weather, which had favoured the preliminary arrangements, broke on the morning of the battle, and rain fell almost continuously for three days. German reinforcements having begun to arrive by the morning of Nov. 21, the subsequent advance encountered gradually increasing opposition. Progress was made towards Crévecœur and north-east of Masnières; Noyelles and Cantaing were captured; and a footing was gained in Mœuvres. In the evening Fontaine was entered, but was lost to a counter-attack. After an interval of two days, spent in consolidating the captured positions, the offensive was resumed on the front from Fontaine to Mœuvres; and for three days the battle raged about the dominating height crowned by Bourlon Wood, where positions changed hands again and again. Desultory fighting continued until Nov. 29, at the end of which our line included the outskirts of Banteux, Lateau Wood, Masnières, the outskirts of Fontaine, Bourlon Wood, and the southern parts of Bourlon, Mœuvres, and Tadpole Copse. The Hindenburg line had been broken through and left some miles behind, but strongly-fortified villages and localities, and the energetic action of fresh German



forces, which had appeared in large numbers, barred further progress.\*

The disadvantages of the position were obvious. It formed a salient some eight miles in breadth, and five in depth, the greater part of which was exposed to the cross-fire of the hostile artillery. The enemy had full freedom of movement, and ample space outside the periphery for the employment of large forces, while our troops suffered corresponding disadvantages. It was clearly desirable to gain greater freedom by expansion to the west; and attempts appear to have been made to advance in the direction of Inchy with that object, but it may be surmised that sufficient forces were not available. It was an important factor in the situation as it existed on the morning of Nov. 30, that these attempts, and the heavy fighting which had taken place in the region of Fontaine and Bourlon, had resulted in the bulk of our troops being concentrated in the north-west portion of the salient, the south-eastern flank of which was, in consequence, but weakly held.

In the meantime the Germans had assembled large forces opposite both flanks of the salient, with the object of recovering the lost ground by an encircling counter-offensive. The nature of the country favoured concealment, a series of long parallel spurs extending from south to north throughout the region from the east of the Scheldt Canal to the Agache. On the east flank troops could be brought under cover within striking distance of our positions; while, on the west, the valley of the Agache afforded concealment for large forces. The first notice of impending attack was a heavy bombardment with gas shells, directed chiefly on Bourlon Wood, and the deluging of the back areas with shrapnel and high-explosive projectiles. Simultaneously, about 8 a.m. on Nov. 30, an attack was launched against our positions from Vendhuile to the neighbourhood of Crèveceur; and our troops being taken by surprise, and being unprotected by wire, the Germans made rapid progress in the sector embracing the junction of the new line with the old, capturing Villers-Guslain, Gonnellieu, and Lateau Wood, and penetrating to Gouzeaucourt and

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\* 12,000 prisoners and 130 guns were taken in these operations.

La Vacquerie. At this stage they were checked by our reserves; and by the evening of Dec. 1 all the ground had been recovered as far as, and including, Quentin Ridge, Gonnellieu, and La Vacquerie. Attacks elsewhere had been repulsed; but Masnières was evacuated, being exposed to enfilade fire from Lateau Wood.

Two hours after the launching of the attack outlined above the enemy advanced in great force between Fontaine and Mœuvres, and succeeded momentarily in penetrating a portion of the front between the latter village and Bourslon Wood, and reaching the Bapaume road near the sugar refinery. They were thrown back by our counter-attack; and, by the evening of Nov. 30, the position had been reestablished with the exception of a few first-line trenches, which remained in the enemy's hands. The front from Masnières to Fontaine was also subjected to attacks which left the situation unchanged. The battle was continued on Dec. 3 and 5, the Germans making their principal efforts on the front from Gonnellieu to Marcoing, but with trifling results. On the night of Dec. 4-5 our front was withdrawn to a new line, embracing Gonnellieu and Welsh Ridge, and excluding Marcoing, Graincourt, and Mœuvres, which has since been maintained.\*

In the subsidiary attack near Bullecourt, already referred to, important sections of the Hindenburg line were carried; and, a few days later, a strong point east of the village was captured by a night attack. Having failed in several attempts to retrieve the position, the Germans directed their attention to points in our front between Quéant and Bullecourt, launching three attacks on Dec. 12, after a heavy bombardment. Two of these were repulsed, but the third effected a lodgment in a small salient south of Riencourt, where the trenches had been obliterated by artillery fire. The remainder of the month passed in comparative quietude, except for local attacks, on the 30th and 31st, against our positions on Welsh Ridge, which gained a footing in two small salients, the greater part of which was promptly recovered by counter-attacks.

The dramatic success of the first day's fighting before

\* The Germans claimed 9000 prisoners, 148 guns, and 716 machine-guns.

Cambrai gave rise to some ill-timed jubilation; and the disappointment was all the keener when the later course of the battle failed to realise the exaggerated hopes which had been entertained at the outset. The reverse of Nov. 30 has been the subject of criticism and speculation as premature as the earlier rejoicings. The incident is at present under investigation by the proper authorities, in whose hands the matter may safely be left. Surprise in war does not necessarily imply culpable negligence, for the limitations of human endurance preclude large bodies of troops being kept incessantly on the alert. Security depends on the enemy's designs being detected by patrols and aerial reconnaissance, and on the vigilance of the troops in the front trenches, whose function is to delay the development of an attack sufficiently to enable the reserves to come into action. Front lines on which months of labour have been spent have rarely withstood attack in force; while, in the present case, the troops had to meet the attack of six or seven German divisions in hastily prepared positions, unprotected by wire entanglements. They were far less favourably situated than were the enemy on Nov. 20. Other causes which contributed to the reverse have been referred to above, of which the chief was probably the concentration of the bulk of the forces in the Fontaine-Mœuvres sector. Had our attack in that quarter been successful, the Germans would hardly have been able to attempt their counter-offensive. The truth seems to be that our enterprise was undertaken with insufficient force, which may, perhaps, be attributed to the drafting of troops to Italy. On the other hand, the attack at Cambrai stopped a projected transfer of German troops to Italy, which, had it been effected, might have enhanced the gravity of the situation on that front.

On the French front the principal event to be recorded was an attack in force by our Allies, on Oct. 23, between Filain and Vauxaillon (north-east of Soissons), which, in the course of three days' fighting, carried their line forward to the Ailette, the left bank of which they occupied on a front of about six miles. The Germans, thinking it inexpedient to await the attack which was likely to develop on the flank of their remaining positions on the Chemin des Dames ridge, withdrew

across the river on the night of Nov. 1-2. Our Allies thus gained possession of the southern slopes of the valley of the Ailette on a front of twenty miles west of Chevreux (inclusive). In these operations they captured 12,000 prisoners, 200 guns, 222 trench-mortars, and 720 machine-guns. Local fighting has also occurred on several occasions in the Verdun sector, and at other points on the front. It is only necessary to mention attacks made by the French, doubtless in aid of the Cambrai offensive, south of Jouvincourt on Nov. 21, and in the sector of the Bois des Caures (Verdun) on Nov. 25. In the former our Allies carried a section of the enemy's first line; in the latter they captured the first and second lines on a front of over two miles, taking, in all, 1300 prisoners.

*Italy.*

The disintegration of the Russian army had enabled the Austrians to withdraw a number of divisions and a considerable force of artillery from the eastern front to reinforce their armies operating against Italy; and when, about the middle of September, the Italian offensive had reached the stage described in the 'Quarterly Review' for October, it had become known at Italian headquarters that a counter-stroke on a formidable scale was in contemplation. The progress already made had brought General Capello's army into positions unfavourable for defence, while the enemy's increasing resistance showed that a continuance of the advance would inevitably be slow and laborious. The enemy, in short, had become strong enough to hold the Italian armies in check from the Bainsizza Plateau to the sea, while striking a blow in some other quarter with the fresh forces which continued to arrive. Prudence counselled the suspension of the offensive and a redistribution of the troops to provide against the danger which was believed to be impending.

The conditions which existed on the western front were a material factor in the situation. The heavy rainfall of August, and the subsequent intermittent bursts of bad weather, had combined with the continuous action of the great masses of artillery on either side to reduce the country in the Flemish zone of operations to a state

of impassability in which even a prolonged spell of fine weather in the declining months of the year could effect little improvement. Hampered by these unfavourable conditions, the Allied offensive had not achieved the success anticipated; and, so long as they continued to exist, the Germans saw no reason to fear a sudden collapse of their defences in that quarter. As for the remainder of the front, there was no point so vital to their system of defence as to make it hazardous to risk a local reverse; while any operation towards the south on a large scale would necessitate the transfer of a great part of our forces from Flanders—an operation which would take time and could be countered by a corresponding regrouping of the enemy's forces, in which he would have the advantage of better lateral communications.

In these circumstances the Germans saw an opportunity for lending their Austrian allies a helping hand. A composite army was formed under the command of von Below, comprising six German and four Austrian divisions, which was concentrated in the region of the Upper Isonzo. On its left Boroëvic, with twelve divisions, prolonged the line to Gorizia. Wurm's army, on the Carso, had been increased to eleven divisions. On Below's right Krobatin, with four divisions and a stiffening of German troops, occupied the Carnic front. Schenckenstuel, with nine divisions, was in the Trentino. Thus, at the beginning of the offensive, the hostile armies comprised forty-six divisions, of which six were German.

The Italian General Staff was not ignorant of the enemy's preparations; and dispositions were made to meet the impending attack, the main objective of which could hardly be in doubt. The 3rd Army opposed Wurm on the Carso. The 2nd Army held the front against Boroëvic and Below, with the 4th on its left, occupying the line of the Alps, and linking up with the 1st Army in the region of the Brenta. General Cadorna was confident of the ability of his armies to maintain their positions against the threatened attack; and the Allied General Staffs, with whom he was in close communication, saw no reason to question his opinion.

The enemy's plan was to direct the main attack against the front from Plezzo to the neighbourhood of

Tolmino. A glance at the map will show that the positions of the 2nd Italian Army, from Gorizia to Plezzo, lay roughly along the arc of a circle centring at Udine, an important junction of roads and railways. A rapid advance from the Tolmino—Caporetto front in the direction of Udine would therefore compel the right wing of that army to retreat in haste in order to avoid being cut off. Moreover, the continuance of the advance beyond Udine would threaten the retreat of the 3rd Army. Besides these strategical advantages, the enemy had the tactical advantage of being in possession of the right bank of the Isonzo at Plezzo, and of holding a bridgehead in the bend below Tolmino, which the Italians had omitted to reduce. A success at either of these points would endanger the retreat of the Italians from the intermediate positions across the obstacle of the Isonzo, under combined pressure in front and from the flank. Further, a westward movement from Zaga and Plezzo would oblige the 4th Army to relinquish its positions in the Carnic Alps, opening the Pontebba and Plöcken passes to hostile columns which could operate against the left flank of the Italian armies in the plain.

When the offensive opened on the morning of Oct. 24, rain was falling, and the valleys were shrouded in mist. The principal attack was made by Below on the Plezzo-Tolmino front, Boroëvic attacking the positions on the Bainsizza Plateau and the slopes of San Gabriele. The Italian lines on the Carso were heavily bombarded, but the 3rd Army held its ground against the hostile infantry. Below's troops, breaking through about Plezzo and Tolmino, obliged the Italians to give way on the intermediate front, and in the northern part of the Bainsizza Plateau. By the evening of Oct. 26 they had been forced back across the frontier. The Germans had captured Monte Matajur, and were making their way down the spurs of the Julian Alps, and westwards towards the Upper Tagliamento. Berlin claimed 60,000 prisoners and 500 guns.

Various causes have been assigned to account for the Italian *débâcle*, which is the harder to explain when it is remembered how well the 2nd Army acquitted itself in the August offensive. All accounts are agreed that the thick weather favoured surprise; and the hostile guns



were silent until the moment of the attack, when the Italian positions were swept by a storm of gas-shells, against which, it has been said, the Italians were insufficiently protected. But surprise does not fully account for the magnitude of the disaster. Experience has shown, as in Flanders and at Cambrai, that, although the first lines of defence may be rushed, the attack is usually checked on encountering fresh troops when its energy is on the wane. It has been surmised that the disposition of the Italian reserves was faulty. Another suggestion is that the German propaganda, which has been active in Italy, as elsewhere, had undermined the discipline and patriotism of the troops;\* but this supposition leaves it to be explained—unless local causes, peculiar to the 2nd Army, were to blame—why the other armies were unaffected. The only fact about which there seems to be no doubt is that the failure of the 2nd Army was unforeseen by the General Staff, who should have been informed by those in immediate touch with the troops had there been any apparent sign of disloyalty or indiscipline. Until full details become known it would be fruitless to probe behind the broad official statement that the disaster was due to the feeble resistance of certain detachments of the army, which rendered the valiant efforts of other troops ineffectual.

Von Below, having occupied Cividale on Oct. 27 and Udine on Oct. 29, advanced on Codroipo, throwing out strong detachments towards Latisana with the object of intercepting the retreat of the 3rd Army, which had daringly clung to its positions on the Carso till Oct. 26. Covered by flank guards, the army made good its retreat across the Tagliamento at Latisana on Oct. 31, having destroyed the bridges along the route. Its losses were comparatively light; and a great part of the artillery, including the British batteries, was saved. Misfortune continued, however, to pursue the 2nd Army, the remnants of which suffered heavy losses owing to the capture of Codroipo by the enemy. Endeavouring to reach the passage at Latisana, a force numbering (according to Berlin) 60,000 men was intercepted by

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\* Some of the leaflets dropped from aeroplanes among the troops were published in the 'Corriere della Sera' ('Times,' Nov. 1).

Wurm and compelled to surrender, swelling the list of captures to 200,000 prisoners and 1800 guns. In the meantime the right wing of the 4th Army had effected its retreat from the positions between the Pontebba and Plöcken passes, with the loss of 17,000 prisoners, who, with 80 guns, were rounded up in the mountains east of Tolmezzo, and surrendered after a stubborn defence.

Having passed to the right bank of the Tagliamento, the Italians enjoyed a few days' respite for reorganisation, while the enemy, delayed by broken bridges, damaged roads, and rivers swollen by the heavy rain which had fallen continuously since the operations began, were occupied in closing up the rear of their columns, and bringing up the artillery. It was evident from the first that the defence of the Tagliamento could not be prolonged, the collapse of the 2nd Army having laid open the passages of the upper reaches, which would also be turned by the enemy's advance down the Fella valley. To cause the Italians further disquietude, Austrian troops, on Nov. 3, made the first of a series of demonstrations in the zone of the Val Giudicaria, west of Lake Garda, on the route from Trent to the plain of Lombardy. The Tagliamento was ultimately turned by the capture of the crossings from Gemona to Pisano, the Italians retreating behind the Livenza on Nov. 6. About the same time the left wing of the 4th Army withdrew between the Plöcken Pass and the region of Agordo, falling back towards Belluno, on the Upper Piave.

The halt on the Livenza was of brief duration. Continuing the tactics which had proved so successful, the enemy pressed forward in the fringe of the mountains, occupied Magniano, and, on Nov. 7, captured Sacile after a stubborn fight, which was prolonged for the greater part of two days owing to the difficulty of bringing up artillery. The Italians, continuing their retreat, crossed the Piave on Nov. 9, and blew up the bridges. On the same day the Austrian demonstration in the Val Giudicaria was repeated.\*

The line of the Piave was subject to the weakness which had made the other rivers untenable. Like the Tagliamento and the Livenza, it was liable to be turned

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\* At this stage the enemy claimed 250,000 prisoners and 2300 guns.

by hostile columns advancing from the mountain passes on the north, in conjunction with a frontal attack in the upper reaches. But in other respects the Italians were better situated than on the previous occasions. The river offered a more formidable obstacle; and the enemy was no longer favoured by easy approaches in its rear from north to south. The mountain barrier between the Piave and the Adige, through which the Brenta affords the only easy route, presented difficulties to the movement of artillery and transport which would increase as the Italians fell back, destroying the communications; while the situation of the Italians in this respect would improve as they approached the plains. More important was the advantage gained by the concentration of the 4th Army, previously dispersed along the Alpine frontier, and its junction, on the left, with the 1st Army, which, having neither marched nor fought, was comparatively fresh. Moreover, the shortening of the front made it possible to withdraw the shattered fragments of the 2nd Army. Lastly, French and British forces, which had been despatched on the receipt of intelligence of the Italian disaster, were expected to come into line about the end of November. General Diaz, who had succeeded to the chief command, decided, therefore, to hold the Piave, which was the last line covering Venice, the evacuation of which was begun.

The enemy naturally determined to devote their efforts to forcing the Piave before the Allied reinforcements should arrive on the scene. A frontal attack on the lower reaches would have necessitated awaiting the arrival of the heavy artillery, delayed by the state of the communications—a consideration which, no doubt, partly influenced them in deciding to follow the out-flanking method which had hitherto met with success. The bulk of the 11th Army, with its artillery complete, was already in contact with the Italians on the Asiago plateau; and the 10th Army, which was nearing Belluno, was at least as well equipped as the Italian 4th Army, which had lost much of its *matériel* in the retreat. Moreover, the flank attack promised more decisive results, as it would threaten the retreat of the 3rd Army from the Piave.

Attempts were made to gain a footing on the right

bank of the river at a few points in the plain, of which the chief was near Zenson, where, on Nov. 12, Austrian troops forced the passage, and established a small bridge-head in the loop of the river, the base of which is closed by a high bank, designed to check inundations, beyond which the enemy failed to advance. About the same time a small force made its way into the marshes opposite Grisolera, between the new and old channels, where some indecisive actions have taken place. Other attempts near San Dona, and in the vicinity of the Oderzo-Treviso railway, were ineffectual.

The main operations began on Nov. 10 with the capture of Asiago by the Austrians; and for more than a fortnight there was continuous fighting between that town and the Brenta, which resulted in the Italians being pressed back from Monte Longara and Monte Lissar to a line of heights defined by Mounts Sisemol, Tondarecar, and Badeneceche, the front striking the Brenta near San Marino. Meanwhile Krobatin, marching down the Upper Piave valley, where he rounded up 14,000 prisoners in the region of Agordo, found the Italians, on Nov. 12, in position on the heights south of the line Feltre-Fonzaso. Our Allies fell back, fighting stubbornly, and repelling several attacks on the river-crossing near Quero, which it was essential to hold until the rest of the army should come into line. On Nov. 18 they reached the line Monfenera-Tomba-Col dell' Orso-Pertica-Col della Berretta-San Marino, forming a united front with the 1st Army. After five days' fierce fighting from Asiago to the Piave the Austrians suspended their attacks, and confined themselves to bombarding the Italian positions, while assembling reinforcements. During these operations the Val Giudicaria was the scene of a third demonstration on Nov. 13.

The positions thus successfully defended were not without disadvantages. The Col dell' Orso formed a pronounced salient in the Piave-Brenta line; but, being connected by a ridge with Monte Grappa, which is only 300 feet higher, and having an extensive range of fire over the surrounding country, it was important to deny it to the enemy. In the Asiago region the line of defence formed a still more pronounced salient, with its apex at Monte Tondarecar; but, as this summit

commanded the adjoining peaks, the rectification of the front would have entailed the abandonment of the entire range of heights.

So soon as the Austrians were ready, they directed their efforts against these two localities. After a fourth demonstration in the Giudicaria zone on Dec. 3, they launched, next day, two concerted attacks in the Asiago region; one from the north-west against Monte Sisemol and the heights immediately adjoining it, the other embracing Monte Badencette and the eastern slopes of Monte Tondarecar. The former failed; but in the latter quarter the enemy broke through, and, advancing in a westerly direction, obliged the Italians to relinquish the entire salient and to withdraw to a new line passing across the Foza spur, and south of Sisemol. The troops left to cover the withdrawal fought gallantly to the last, and many were cut off. Vienna claimed 16,000 prisoners and sixty guns. The scene was then changed to the Piave-Brenta front, where, on Dec. 11 and the following days, Krobatin launched determined attacks in various sectors, his main objective being the Col dell' Orso salient, which, however, withstood all his efforts. On the flanks he was more successful. The Italians were pressed back to the southern slopes of Monfenera and Monte Tomba; and a determined attempt to force a way down the Brenta valley resulted, by Dec. 14, in the capture of the Pertica, Berretta, and Caprile heights, and the occupation of San Marino. This obliged our Allies to make a corresponding retirement on the right bank to a line from the mouth of the Gadena to the Sasso Rosso summit. On Dec. 18 the Italians lost Monte Asolone, but recaptured it two days later. Baffled in their attempts to break through between the Brenta and the Piave, the Austrians turned again to the Asiago plateau, where, on Dec. 23, they attacked south of the Frenzela valley, and gained the summits of Val Bella and Col dell' Rosso. The Italians recaptured these heights two days later, but, being unable to hold them under the concentrated fire of the hostile artillery, they had again to retire to more sheltered positions on the southern slopes.

In the meantime the Allied forces under Sir Herbert Plumer and General Fayolle had taken up their assigned

positions on Dec. 5, the British in the Montello sector, with the French, on their left, covering the junction of the river and mountain fronts. The close of the year was marked by two successful operations. On Dec. 30 General Fayolle stormed the enemy's positions between Monte Tomba and the Piave, taking 1400 prisoners and seven guns; and the Italians, on the night of the 31st, captured the bridge-head at Zenson, and drove the Austrians across the river.

It is possible that the success achieved by the enemy surpassed his expectations. Strategical plans are governed by the result of battles, and no set plan can go beyond the first encounter with the enemy. The most that strategy can do at the outset is to set the armies in motion in the direction which will enable them to derive the greatest advantage from a success in the first encounter. After the tactical decision strategy again steps in, and arranges that the next engagement shall take place under similarly favourable conditions. It has been seen that the enemy's first move was well conceived. An initial success might have been expected to give them possession of the Upper Isonzo, and, probably, of the river-line as far as Gorizia. The hold of the Italians on the Carso positions would have been shaken, and the situation would have lent itself to further development. There would have been a prospect of recovering the territory lost by the Austrians, which, in itself, would have been an important achievement. It would probably have sufficed to divert the attention of the Allies from France. But, whether the enemy aimed at more ambitious projects, or not, it is clear that their original dispositions were well adapted to take advantage of the *débâcle* of the 2nd Italian Army, and to lead up to advantageous situations at each stage of the advance.

The strategical aspect of the Venetian frontier was discussed in the 'Quarterly Review' for July 1915, and it is unnecessary to revert to the subject in detail. It was shown how disadvantageous the situation of the Italians would be if they should elect to take the offensive on the Isonzo front, with the Austrians occupying the Trentino in rear, and the line of the Carnic Alps on their flank. It was surmised that they would set themselves first to gain possession of the Trentino; but



ambition, or political considerations, led them to aim at Trieste. The disadvantages of the situation might have become apparent at an earlier stage had not the enemy been too much occupied on other fronts. The collapse of Russia has enabled the enemy to dispose of larger forces; but, whether owing to disinclination to commit themselves too deeply, or to the inadequacy of the railway communications, which, at this season, are liable to interruption by snow, they have not made the most of their apparent advantages. An extension of the Piave-Asiago front of operations to Lake Garda would offer obvious possibilities; but there is only one line of railway south of Franzenfeste (the junction of lines from Innsbruck and Tarvis), which is probably being worked to the limit of its capacity in supplying the forces already employed.

*Palestine.*

After the indecisive operations in the neighbourhood of Gaza on March 26, our troops withdrew behind the Wadi Gaza, while the Turks established themselves in a strongly entrenched line from the sea to Beersheba. Our left was subsequently thrown forward across the wadi in the coast sector, where, with the aid of the warships, some six miles of the enemy's advanced positions were captured. Except for some minor actions the hot weather passed without incident. In June Sir Edmund Allenby was transferred from the command of the 3rd Army in France to succeed Sir Archibald Murray as Commander-in-Chief. The Turks brought up considerable reinforcements, and our army was increased with a view to the resumption of the offensive.

It was General Allenby's design to fall upon the flanks of the Turkish positions in succession, with the object, presumably, of causing a dispersion of the enemy's reserves. His first objective was the entrenched position about Beersheba. After a night march on Oct. 30-31, the infantry attacked the defences from the west and south-west; while the mounted troops, making a wide turning movement through the desert, advanced from the east. The town was occupied in the evening, after a stubborn fight. On the night of Nov. 1-2, the western and south-western defences of Gaza, which had in the

meantime been subjected to a heavy bombardment, in which monitors took part, were attacked and carried. Five days later the southern defences were captured, and the town was enveloped on the east. The right wing, meanwhile, continued its advance north and north-west of Beersheba. The Turks, defeated on both flanks, began a general retreat to the Wadi Hesi, a portion of their left wing, which appears to have become isolated, taking the direction of Hebron.

The position on the Wadi Hesi was turned by the capture of Herbieh; and the retreating Turks were pursued rapidly in the Wadi Sukereir, behind which they endeavoured to take up a line covering Beit Jibrin and Hebron. They were driven back after a stiff fight on Nov. 12, and forced to retire behind the Wadi Surar. Having captured strongly-entrenched positions at Mes-miyeh, Katrah, and Mughar, our troops, on Nov. 13, occupied a front through Et Tineh, Katrah, and Jebnah, to the sea. The following day saw them in possession of the railway from the junction with the Jerusalem line as far as Naanah. Ramleh and Lydda were occupied on Nov. 15; and two days later Jaffa was entered without opposition, the Turks retiring to the Auja.

At this stage the northward movement was suspended, and operations were begun for the capture of Jerusalem. Mounted troops occupied Beitur el Tahta, and infantry advanced in the Judean highlands west of Jerusalem. The line was gradually drawn more closely round the city on the south-west, west, and north-west; and the eastward advance was continued from Beitur el Tahta towards the road to Shechem, which was strongly held by the enemy. By Nov. 26 our troops occupied a line extending northwards from Bitir at a distance of from four to six miles from the city. The Turks were in force on the heights in front; and the attack was deferred in order to await the development of a movement from the south. During the interval attacks were repulsed at numerous points of our front between Jerusalem and the mouth of the Auja.

Details are as yet wanting of the course of events on our right flank during the foregoing operations. After the capture of Beersheba it was of the first importance to operate against the enemy's main forces in the region

between the railway and the coast; and the pursuit of the detachment which retreated towards Hebron, involving, as it would have done, a divergent advance, does not appear to have been pressed. It is probable that the detachment in question, or the greater part of it, was attracted to the principal area of operations; for the occupation of Hebron, on Dec. 6, and the advance to Bethlehem on the following day, appear to have been effected without difficulty. On Dec. 8 a general attack was delivered against the positions encircling Jerusalem from south to north-west. Our troops established themselves across the Shechem road, and a force advancing north-eastwards from Bethlehem cut the road to Jericho. Jerusalem, being thus isolated, was surrendered by the Turks on Dec. 9.

On Dec. 27 the Turks, with German assistance, made a determined effort to recapture Jerusalem by an attack in force against our positions on, and west of, the road to Shechem, with the object, apparently, of breaking through to the railway, and thus isolating the right wing of the army. After a prolonged struggle in front of our main line of defence, the attacking force, said to number two army-corps, was thrown back in confusion by a timely counter-stroke against its right flank. A general advance was then begun on a wide front, which, by the end of the month, brought our troops to a line embracing Ras Arkhub es Suffa, Burkah, the road junction at Bireh, and Janiah. In the meantime the passage of the Auja had been forced in the sector adjoining the coast, and Et Tineh, Rantieh, Mutebbis, Sheikh el Ballutah, and El Jelil had been occupied. Over 11,000 prisoners, 99 guns, and large quantities of ammunition and other material, were captured in the course of the operations.

#### *Mesopotamia.*

After the capture of Ramadiyah (Sept. 29), which deprived the Turks of their advanced base of operations on the Euphrates, the operations in Mesopotamia were directed to making the situation north of Baghdad similarly secure. The Turkish force on the Tigris was defeated on Nov. 5 at Tekrit, where large depôts were destroyed. Meanwhile the region of Deltawa had been

cleared of the enemy, who retreated across the Diala at Kizil Robat to a position in the hills east of the river. Their forces in the Jebel Hamrin, west of the river, were subsequently attacked, on Dec. 3, in conjunction with a Russian column which operated on the east bank, and were forced to retreat beyond Kara Tepeh, twenty-five miles north of Deli Abbas on the Kifri road. The army has had to lament the loss of the talented Commander who let it so often to victory. Sir Stanley Maude succumbed to cholera on Nov. 18.

*The Russian Front.*

On the eastern front there has been no operation of importance except the occupation by the Germans of the islands which enclose the Gulf of Riga on the north-west; an enterprise which, as it encountered but feeble resistance from the disorganised Russian forces, possesses little interest from the military point of view. A powerful squadron, comprising ten battleships, ten cruisers, fifty destroyers, and eight or ten submarines, convoyed the fleet of transports, and covered the disembarkation of the land force, which consisted of two divisions. The Russian Baltic Fleet made no attempt to interfere; and, the shore batteries having been silenced, the landing was quickly effected on Oct. 12, at Tagga Bay, on the north-west shore of Oesel Island. By the evening of the 17th Oesel had been completely occupied; the remains of the two Russian divisions which formed the garrison had been driven across the mole to Moon Island, where they surrendered on the following day; and the German fleet had defeated and dispersed the inferior force opposed to it. Dagö and Schildau were occupied a few days later; and a force was landed on the mainland near Verder, but was subsequently withdrawn. The Germans claimed 20,000 prisoners, 100 guns, and a large quantity of material.

With the seizure of power by the Maximalists, early in September, any hope that the Russian Army might again become an appreciable factor in the military situation disappeared. As the result of a conference at Brest Litovsk, an armistice was agreed upon between German and Russian Representatives, which was to run from Dec. 17 till Jan. 14, and to continue indefinitely, subject

to 'seven days' notice by either side. A similar agreement, applying to the Rumanian front, was concluded at Focsani. Among the terms was a stipulation that there should be no further withdrawal of German troops from the eastern to the western fronts, except in the case of movements already begun. Even if the Germans should respect such an undertaking, it is likely to be ineffective; for large numbers had already been withdrawn, and such further transfers as might have been deemed advisable were probably in course of execution. It is hard to imagine that an agreement will be reached regarding terms of peace, or that Germany is sincere in negotiating with a party whose tenure of power is so insecure as that of the Maximalists. In the meantime the Germans will have to keep an army on the eastern front, both for observation, and to back diplomacy with a display of force.

*General.*

Looking back on the events of the past year, it must be acknowledged that the high expectations entertained at the outset have fallen far short of fulfilment. The Allies' programme contemplated a combined offensive on all fronts, which, had it been carried out, might have brought the war to the last stage, if not to a conclusion. The man-power of the Central Alliance had been sifted to the dregs, while the Allies, as a whole, had large mobilised reserves, besides further undeveloped resources. Fortune, and German resource and intrigue, conspired to mar the prospect. The failure of Russia was the first and greatest catastrophe. It upset the Allies' general plan of campaign, and made of the eastern front a reservoir from which Germany and Austria could draw reinforcements for other theatres of war. The 'Hindenburg retreat' spoiled the project for a combined offensive on the western front, caused the French and British armies to drift apart, and led us ultimately to seek an objective in the plain of Flanders, which, through excessive rainfall, soon became a swamp. Thus the enemy gained their opportunity for striking a blow at Italy, which had the effect of causing a further dissemination of the French and British forces, a substantial part of which was already dispersed in secondary theatres of war.

The slow progress of the war, culminating in the Italian disaster, gave rise to a general feeling of dissatisfaction, which was not allayed by Mr Lloyd George's impulsive speech at Paris. The blame was attributed to a faulty military policy, and to want of close accord between the Allies in the preparation of their plans. To remedy this an Inter-Allied War Council was established, the precise functions of which have not been clearly defined. The desire was to attain to something approaching the unity of command which the enemy have enjoyed since the German General Staff assumed the supreme control of all the armies of the Central Alliance. It does not need much consideration to realise that an equivalent unity of command is unattainable among the Allies, whose plans must be founded on agreement, and not on the predominance of one Power. It appears to be the chief function of the Council to facilitate such agreement, with the aid of expert opinion, which, if it is to be of value, should be arrived at in consultation with the General Staffs of all the Allied Powers, and based on information furnished by them.

Thus, while it may be hoped that the Council will be of service in promoting accord, and in obviating the inconvenience which has been caused by the heads of the General Staffs having been withdrawn from their regular duties to attend periodical conferences, it is advisable not to expect too much. There is no reason to suppose that the Council, had it existed, would have felt less confident about the situation on the Italian front than the Commander-in-Chief on the spot, than whom it could have been no better informed, or that, in opposition to his opinion, it would have recommended the despatch of a force to Italy. Had such a request been made, it would have been met by the Allied Governments without the intervention of a Council comprising the heads of those Governments, advised by representatives of the Allied General Staffs. It is still more obvious that no Council could have anticipated the Russian Revolution or provided against its disastrous effects.

Some of the criticisms which appeared in the press attacked the root of the Allied policy. The writers, with the faith that removes mountains, contended that the offensive on the western front was a mistake, and that a



better plan would have been to concentrate in Venetia for the invasion of Austria. To such critics it appeared easier to move and supply armies in the Alps than in the plains of France, and to capture rock-fortresses than earthworks. They thought nothing of the difficulties of the situation on the Julian front, already referred to; difficulties which would increase as the armies advanced on their march to Laibach or Vienna—places suggested as appropriate objectives. The protection of the lines of communication through hostile territory would soon absorb a large portion of the fighting force; and, even if unlimited forces were assumed to be available, a state of equilibrium would shortly result from the inability of the scanty communications to forward the necessary supplies. Other critics, carrying the principle of the 'single front' to the limit of absurdity, advocated the rapid transfer of troops from France to Italy, and even to Salonika, for offensive purposes, forgetting that such movements take time, and that, the enemy's means of transit being both shorter and more numerous, the move would be anticipated on each occasion. Needless to say, these are fundamental conditions, which would remain obdurate even if the Allies could attain the complete unity of command enjoyed by the enemy. It follows from these considerations that henceforth, until the enemy's power declines, the Allies must adopt a defensive attitude in Italy, and seek a decision on the western front, where their lines of communication, besides being in home territory, are shorter, and where, in other respects, they can meet the enemy on more favourable terms.

The *moral* of the German troops on the western front is said to be good—better, in fact, than it was a year ago. It has been impossible, in the swamps of Flanders, to subject them to such punishment as they sustained last year in the battles on the Somme. Their successes in Italy, and the collapse of Russia, have done much to efface the memories of Vimy and Messines. The drafting of the best men from Russia, together with the relegation of the inferior elements to that front, has helped to maintain both their *moral* and general standard of physique. Reports of disaffection in the Bavarian divisions must be regarded with suspicion in view of the way in which these troops have acquitted themselves at

Passchendaele and Cambrai. Indeed, the Bavarians have been much in evidence wherever serious fighting had to be done. German airmen have shown, if anything, increased boldness, and have, on several occasions, adopted our tactics of flying low to attack troops on the ground. On the whole, it is necessary to face the fact that the Germans are far from being beaten, and to prepare for a strenuous time in the new year. Unhappily the Government have been too slow in taking steps to develop our remaining resources in man-power; and there is no time to lose if we are not again to let slip the best months of the campaigning season, and to feel the want of the powerful striking force, with ample reserves, which will be needed to take an effective part with the American armies and our valiant French Allies in sustained and decisive operations.

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